Policies to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation ...

REDD and the Future Carbon Market
Uncertainties regarding the magnitude of LUCF emissions and concerns over sovereignty 4 and
methodological issues, such as leakage, additionality, and permanence, were at the source of the
original reluctance to consider REDD activities as a means to generate carbon credits (Gullison et
al. 2007). Some of these concerns have been assuaged. Further, consensus is growing that the
global community is not going to solve the climate change problem without addressing emissions
from forests, and confidence in monitoring methodologies for LUCF emissions is increasing. For
many developing countries endowed with large tropical forests, the carbon market offers significant
funding to support forest protection and sustainable development programs; thus, they are
willing to consider engaging in the climate dialogue and taking on emissions reduction commitments,
at least in the forestry sector.
Arguments for Incorporating REDD into the Carbon Market
Generally, arguments in favor of incorporating REDD into the carbon market are based on the
amount of funding available and the potential to engage developing countries in climate change
mitigation. Additional arguments include the following:
∫ LUCF emissions account for 20 percent of annual CO2 emissions, which can be addressed, at least
in part, through the carbon market.
∫ REDD is a cost-effective means to achieve emissions goals.
∫ Forestry projects can align with ecological and sustainable development goals.
∫ Credits generated from REDD create a means for developing countries to participate in carbon markets.
∫ Historically, official development assistance and nonmarket-based financing projects targeting
tropical deforestation have suffered from limited funds and interest. 5
Arguments against Incorporating REDD into the Carbon Market
Generally, the counterarguments fall into two categories: principled arguments against inclusion
of REDD activities into mainstream market mechanisms, and practical concerns over the design
and consequences of REDD credits. In summary, the principled arguments are as follows:
∫ REDD would distract attention from the problem of fossil-based energy production.
∫ It would reduce pressure on Annex I countries to increase their targets and implement in-country
carbon mitigation programs.
∫ It may have adverse effects on sustainable development goals and local communities.
∫ It would provide incentives only for countries with high rates of deforestation and fails both to
reward countries that have already reduced deforestation and to create incentives for countries
that have never had high rates of deforestation (such as Democratic Republic of Congo).
The issues surrounding the design of REDD mechanisms at both the international and the national
level are explored in detail in Chapter 3.
Background 2