1 Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Linguistic Instrumentalism My paper ...

come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the sign really
consists in” (op. cit.). If our practice is not socially satisfactory, those empowered to
enforce the laws may pursue and punish infractions. The institutional social practice
called courts will decide the correct interpretation. Those who cannot acquire the habits
of some customary practice will find themselves more or less ostracized from the
society or repeatedly punished by it. 17
So far, we still have only a partial connection between Wittgenstein and Dewey
regarding customs and practice. I believe a Deweyan understanding of habits helps us
better understand what Wittgenstein is up to in his discussion of customs. For Dewey,
“habits are arts,” that is they “involve skill of sensory and motor organs, cunning or
craft, and objective materials” (15). Habits are embodied know how:
But after all, this practical work done by habit and instinct in securing prompt
and exact adjustment to the environment is not knowledge, except by cou rtesy.
Or, if we choose to call it knowledge—and no one has the right to issue an ukase
to the contrary—then other things also called knowledge, knowledge of and about
things, knowledge that things are thus and so, knowledge that involves reflection
and conscious appreciation, remains of a different sort . . . . For it is a
commonplace that the more suavely efficient a habit the more unconsciously it
operates. (MW 14: 124-125)
What we have here is the distinction between “knowing that” and “knowing how.”
Habits are the means of knowing how, which is why Dewey declares: “Concrete habits
do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving and
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