1 Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Linguistic Instrumentalism My paper ...

eference. Immanent meanings provide a richer understanding and appreciation of an
otherwise cold proposition. They are the unity not just of the thought that went into
arriving at the conclusion or reference, but also of the feeling and action. It is largely a
matter of distinguishing linguistic reference from an embodied, habitualized, and felt
consummatory qualitative experience of the self in practical dynamic unity with the
world, which the reference provides as an aid to coordinating our activity. 3
While an ardent anti-dualist, Dewey is always willing to support subtle
distinctions as long as we do not hypostatize them. Here is a particularly relevant
example where he distinguishes among three aspects of experience:
It is not possible to divide in a vital experience the practical, emotional, and
intellectual from one another and to set the properties of one over against the
characteristics of the others. The emotional phase binds parts together into a
single whole; “intellectual” simply names the fact that the experience has
meaning; “practical” indicates that the organism is interacting with events and
objects which surround it. (LW 10: 61)
Instrumental, referential, or what Dewey calls “significant” meanings emphasize the
intellectual component of vital experience, while immanent meaning includes the other
two phases in proper dynamic equilibrium. Immanent meanings involve an
understanding, appreciation, perhaps even an enjoyment that depends on the prior
achievement of objective intellectual reference. Because they are not cognitive, the
affective and practical features are, in themselves, inarticulate. At best, words may only
gesture toward them, yet they matter immensely in the wise conduct of life.
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