hungarian studies - EPA - Országos Széchényi Könyvtár

32 LÁSZLÓ BORHI
Nagy was his party's chief agricultural expert, which was not exactly a position of
power in Rákosi's industrially minded Hungary; and until his promotion in Moscow
Nagy was far removed from the highest echelons of the Hungarian communist
leadership.
Nagy's political, social and economic reform program had been more ambitious
than Malenkov's because unlike his Soviet counterpart, Nagy had come to
realize that the party itself was in crisis. 163 The Hungarian reformer's most drastic
measures were directed at reorienting economic priorities. Nagy did not, however,
desire to undo the institutional system of the centralized command economy,
or to reestablish a market economy in any significant way. The "economic regulators"
were restored in agriculture. In order to raise consumption, the 1954 plan
reduced the amount allocated for investment by 17%, while at the same time boosted
the share of agriculture in investments from 13% to almost 25%. Industrial investments
in general were reduced from 46.3% to 352%, and the proportion of investments
devoted to heavy industry within the category of industrial investment
went down from 41% to 30%. 164 Peasants were allowed to leave agricultural cooperatives;
and agricultural taxes were reduced, or tax breaks were granted, not
only to cooperatives but to individual peasants as well. The amount of compulsory
delivery was also reduced. Unfortunately, however, the country's economic
indicators did not improve; and in some respects they actually got worse. For
example, more maize was produced but significantly less wheat. Agriculture's
share in the gross national product did not change. 165 In fact, the nation's GNP
stagnated. Furthermore, in 1954 Hungary's indebtedness to the West increased
significantly. The foreign debt expanded because the country was unable to sell in
foreign markets the planned amount of goods in order to offset the growing import
of agricultural products and raw materials necessary for its industry. The
economic difficulties made it much easier for Rákosi's "old guard" to conspire
against Nagy in Moscow and to attack his policies at home. Rákosi did not hide
his aversion to any reform of hard-line Stalinism and spoke out for the continuation
of heavy industrialization not long after that policy had been disavowed in the
Kremlin. The conflict within the Hungarian leadership was becoming so tense
that less than a year after the June 1953 consultation a new one was to be held in
Moscow. This new consultation may have been initiated by Rákosi. The screenplay
was the same as before: the masters of the Kremlin listened to report on the
Hungarian situation, which was delivered by the head of the HWP. The Soviet
leaders then passed judgment and gave voice to their policy guidelines. The meeting
took place on May 5,1954 and, among others, included Malenkov, Khrushchev,
Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Suslov from the Soviet Union
and Rákosi, Nagy, Gerő, and Farkas from the Hungarian side. 166 Khrushchev and
Voroshilov were interested in the question of unity within the Political Committee;
Kaganovich inquired about the class struggle in the countryside and in the