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SOME QUESTIONS ON HUNGARIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS 33
urban areas. Mikoyan wanted to talk about the economy. He worried about the
growing foreign trade deficit and claimed that the production of soap, textiles, and
shoes was below the 1952 level. According to Mikoyan, Hungary's goals for the
development of heavy industry were still set too high. An 86% increase, envisioned
in the production of iron in a country that possessed no iron ore or coke,
seemed unrealistic. 167 Mikolyan's views were seconded by Malenkov, who also
deplored the renewed attempts to accelerate industrialization. l68 Khrushchev then
proceeded to pronounce a criticism of Nagy and Rákosi that fell equally on the
shoulders of both men. The latter was guilty of sticking to his old policies and not
recognizing his mistakes. These errors were harmful to party unity. Then CPSU's
first secretary also made a significant remark, which strengthened Nagy's hand.
Khrushchev claimed that it was incorrect, as Rákosi had attempted, to explain
away the earlier Soviet criticisms by arguing that they constituted a "Beria provocation".
"He [Rákosi] thinks," said Khrushchev, "that after we shot Beria, we also
shot [Beria's] criticisms. This is not so". Rákosi was responsible for the sentencing
of many innocent people. 169 He then scolded Prime Minister Imre Nagy for
dwelling too much on the mistakes of the past and not talking enough about the
"results" ofthat same past. 170 This and the statement that "the mistakes will have
to be corrected in such a way as not to destroy comrade Rákosi's authority" were
clear signals that Khrushchev was no longer firmly supporting the policy of 1953.
At the same time he was not ready to return to traditional Stalinism either. In a
particularly noteworthy comment Khrushchev touched on the collectivization issue
by stating that he did not favor its acceleration, but did not wish to see it held
back either. Khrushchev referred to his own experience in the Ukraine as a positive
example. There the collectivization had been pursued as part of a "very tense
class struggle, but was still concluded three years earlier than in neighboring
Byelorussia". 171 Moscow's critiques crystallized around the themes of party unity
and economic policy; and it was not hard to see that Khrushchev and the Hungarian
"old guard" did not see eye-to-eye on the latter issue. Yet, the two problems
were closely interrelated, because economy was the stumbling bloc that divided
the Hungarian leadership the most. Of course the economy was important for its
own sake as well. The Soviets reinstalled Ernő Gerő, who had been relieved of his
economic responsibilities in 1953, and asked him once again to devote fully his
energies to economic issues.
This reinstatement allowed Gerő to launch an offensive designed to revive his
old economic policies. He and Rákosi tried to convince Yuri Andropov, the Soviet
ambassador to Hungary, that the new government was responsible for the economic
problems because of its non-repressive peasant policies and devotion to
raising the standard of living. The rise of incomes championed by the new government
simply exceeded the levels that the country's economy could support.
Gerő recommended that the problems could best be alleviated by reducing the