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Did St. Thomas Aquinas Justify the Transition from 'Is' to 'Ought'

Did St. Thomas Aquinas Justify the Transition from 'Is' to 'Ought'

Did St. Thomas Aquinas Justify the Transition from 'Is' to 'Ought'

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29<br />

0. A Short His<strong>to</strong>ry of <strong>the</strong> Problem<br />

a deficient one. If this is so, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re is a possibility that, in studying <strong>Aquinas</strong>’s<br />

thought, we may learn something.<br />

I hope it will be evident <strong>from</strong> this dissertation that <strong>the</strong> “Is/Ought Thesis” and<br />

“Naturalistic Fallacy,” as meta-ethical claims, are incompatible with <strong>St</strong>. <strong>Thomas</strong>’s<br />

thought because of different epistemological, semantical, logical and metaphysical<br />

presuppositions. It is also advisable <strong>to</strong> take in<strong>to</strong> account that some renowned authors<br />

have recently attempted <strong>to</strong> show that <strong>the</strong>se two philosophical devices are doubtful<br />

achievements. 45 We should be all <strong>the</strong> more cautioned not <strong>to</strong> defend important moral<br />

truths with faulty premises and not <strong>to</strong> interpret <strong>Aquinas</strong> by use of such dis<strong>to</strong>rting lenses.<br />

45 See for example G. E. M. Anscombe, “On Brute Facts,” originally published in 1958, reprinted in<br />

Ethics, Religion and Politics, 22-25; idem, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 26-42; Philippa Foot, atural<br />

Goodness (Oxford University Press, 2001) as well as her many essays reprinted in collections Virtues<br />

and Vices and O<strong>the</strong>r Essays in Moral Philosophy and Moral Dilemmas and O<strong>the</strong>r Topics in Moral<br />

Philosophy (both published in Oxford University Press, 2002); John R. Searle, “How <strong>to</strong> Derive<br />

‘Ought’ From ‘Is’,” The Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 43-58 (reprinted in Speech Acts: An Essay in<br />

<strong>the</strong> Philosophy of Language, [Cambridge University Press, 1970], as Section 6.1: “The Naturalistic<br />

Fallacy Fallacy”); Julius Kovesi, Moral otions, first published in 1967 and re-edited by R. E. Ewin<br />

and Alan Tapper in Moral otions (with Three Papers on Pla<strong>to</strong>) (Christchurch, New Zealand:<br />

Cybereditions, 2004); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A study in moral <strong>the</strong>ory (London: Duckworth<br />

1981), especially 6-83; Jean-Louis Gardies, L'erreur de Hume (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,<br />

1987); Candace Vogler, Reasonably Vicious (Harvard University Press, 2002); Hilary Putnam, The<br />

Collapse of <strong>the</strong> Fact/Value Dicho<strong>to</strong>my and o<strong>the</strong>r essays (Harvard University Press, 2002).

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