Did St. Thomas Aquinas Justify the Transition from 'Is' to 'Ought'

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1. Aquinas’s General Approach to Cognition
This is why St. Thomas read so carefully, frequently, and reverently the writings of his
great predecessors, and urged others to do so as well. For him it was a sign of laziness
to neglect this reading, and a sign of arrogance to hold one’s predecessors in contempt. 9
From Aristotle, Aquinas also learned that the immediate motive to study the
thought of others is the hope of finding knowledge about the truth of things (not the
truth that somebody thought in this or that way) or of finding at least some useful hints
to discover the truth about things that really exist. 10 To arrive at certainty, a kind of
radical openness that one might find in a court hearing is required. Otherwise, an
important aspect or point of view may be missed, notwithstanding the fact that the same
can cause some confusion and even add more doubts. In the end, however, this
openness is worthwhile because it can reveal more of the truth we want to discover. 11
Therefore, such a reverential study is not guided by a mere fancy, but by a sincere
desire for solid explanations, sound reasoning, and, finally, for the truth:
Since in choosing or rejecting opinions a person should not be influenced either by
a liking or dislike for the one introducing the opinion, but rather by the certainty of
truth, he therefore says that we must love both parties, namely, those whose opinion
we follow, and those whose opinion we reject. For both have diligently sought the
truth and have aided us in this matter. Yet we must “be persuaded by the more
certain,” i.e., we must follow the opinion of those who have attained the truth with
greater certitude. 12
The reverence shown to our predecessors does not mean an uncritical acceptance
of their positions, but the whole idea of apprenticeship, so present in Aristotle and
emphasized by Aquinas as an acknowledgment of dependence on others, 13 as also
9 “Docilitas, sicut et alia quae ad prudentiam pertinent, secundum aptitudinem quidem est a natura: sed
ad eius consummationem plurimum valet humanum studium, dum scilicet homo sollicite, frequenter et
reverenter applicat animum suum documentis maiorum, non negligens ea propter ignaviam, nec
contemnens propter superbiam.” (STh, II-II, 49, 3 ad 2).
10 “Studium philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserint, sed qualiter se habeat
veritas rerum” (In De caelo, I, 22, n. 8).
11 “Sicut autem in iudiciis nullus potest iudicare nisi audiat rationes utriusque partis, ita necesse est eum,
qui debet audire philosophiam, melius se habere in iudicando si audierit omnes rationes quasi
adversariorum dubitantium” (In Meta., III, 1, n. 342).
12 “Quia in eligendis opinionibus vel repudiandis, non debet duci homo amore vel odio introducentis
opinionem, sed magis ex certitudine veritatis, ideo [Aristoteles] dicit quod oportet amare utrosque,
scilicet eos quorum opinionem sequimur, et eos quorum opinionem repudiamus. Utrique enim
studuerunt ad inquirendam veritatem, et nos in hoc adiuverunt. Sed tamen oportet nos ‘persuaderi
a certioribus’, idest sequi opinionem eorum, qui certius ad veritatem pervenerunt” (In Meta., XII, 9, n.
2566).
13 According to MacIntyre, this, among other things, distinguishes sharply Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas’s
approach from the Enlightenment model of “plain person” anthropology and morality, which regarded
a human being as knowing by himself and at once what the world is and what he is supposed to do, as
stripped of any tradition, independent from any influence of others, and establishing his own world for