Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin

Similarly caught unawares is the Islamic Movement in Nigeria, the second of the three
major Islamic trends that formed the background for understanding recent changes in the
application of Islamic law in Nigeria. Although maintaining principled distance from the
reform initiatives of the politicians, the Islamic Movement differs from IZALA in other
important respects, most notably in its Shi’ite doctrinal orientation that contrasts sharply
with the Wahhabism of the IZALA. The Islamic Movement in Nigeria originated from
the activism of Muslim students who were initially attracted to the radicalism of the Iranian
Revolution of 1979, but eventually came to espouse more and more Shi’ite doctrines,
symbols and practices. Right from its inception, the Islamic Movement was much more
politically oriented, given its explicit opposition to the secular character of the Nigerian
state and its equally vocal demand for establishing an Islamic state in the country. Its explicit
political orientation and even more importantly its militant and confrontational approach
toward achieving its political goals have landed the Islamic Movement in more
troublesome encounters with the Nigerian state, especially the security agencies, resulting
in many arrests and detentions of its leadership and the deaths of many followers in confrontation
with law enforcement and security agencies. During the decades of the 1980s
and 1990s, the Islamic Movement experienced three significant changes: 1) from the initial
attraction to the political radicalism of the Iranian revolution to a religious conversion to
Shi’ism, especially to Shi’ite political doctrines regarding the Imam as the only legitimate
political leader of Muslims; 2) the establishment of extensive network of local cells,
mosques and schools; and 3) the routinization of the initial radicalism around the charismatic
figure of Shaykh Ibrahim al-Zakzaki, the living martyr who has engaged the Nigerian
state in many confrontations, conferring on him a certain aura of righteousness, courage,
piety, etc. Ironically, when the Shari’a politics began in 1999, al-Zakzaki did not support
it; instead, he argued that ordinary politicians could not lead the struggle for the establishment
of an Islamic state in Nigeria and that the Shari’a could not be implemented
without first establishing an Islamic society and state, for that would amount to putting the
horse before the cart. Yet, more than two decades of the Islamic Movement’s political activism
contribute significantly to the increased public receptivity to the recent political initiative
of expanding the scope of Islamic law.
Finally, the vast majority of Nigerian Muslims have traditionally been affiliated with the
Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya Sufi orders, particularly since the nineteenth century. Over the
ages, these Sufi orders have evolved a modus operandi with political authorities that facilitated
their acceptance of the changing roles of Islam in public affairs. During British colo-
320 Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin jahrbuch 2006/2007