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Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...

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On <strong>the</strong> contrary, it is <strong>the</strong> parliamentary system that is highly<br />

exposed to <strong>the</strong> temptation <strong>of</strong> compartmentalisation. Interesting<br />

examples <strong>of</strong> this are precisely <strong>the</strong> farmyard manure<br />

action plan or <strong>the</strong> prohibition <strong>of</strong> tobacco advertising in Belgium.<br />

Economic interest groups can, via <strong>the</strong>ir contacts with<br />

a small group <strong>of</strong> ‘specialised’ members <strong>of</strong> parliament, exercise<br />

unprecedented pressure on <strong>the</strong> decision-making. Directdemocratic<br />

decision-making would make it much more difficult<br />

for such interest groups to play a winning h<strong>and</strong>.<br />

The quorum in <strong>the</strong> parliament<br />

Sometimes <strong>the</strong> participation quorum for referendums is defended<br />

by making a comparison with <strong>the</strong> quorum that applies<br />

in many parliaments. Votes in <strong>the</strong> parliament are <strong>of</strong>ten<br />

only valid provided at least 50% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> parliament<br />

cast <strong>the</strong>ir vote. In <strong>the</strong> analogy, a popular vote could only<br />

be valid provided at least 50% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people cast <strong>the</strong>ir votes.<br />

The analogy is false, however. We have seen that <strong>the</strong> parliament<br />

is logically equivalent to those who vote in a referendum, not<br />

with <strong>the</strong> total number <strong>of</strong> people entitled to vote. A member <strong>of</strong><br />

parliament has a current contract with <strong>the</strong> citizens: he or she<br />

has entered into this contract for a specific period to undertake<br />

<strong>the</strong> social decision-making ins<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> citizens <strong>the</strong>mselves do<br />

not want to decide. The Member <strong>of</strong> Parliament (MP) must <strong>the</strong>oretically<br />

always be present at <strong>the</strong> votes in <strong>the</strong> parliament, <strong>the</strong>refore.<br />

If he or she intentionally stays away, this is a breach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

contract with <strong>the</strong> voters. The 50% quorum in <strong>the</strong> parliament is a<br />

weak reflection <strong>of</strong> this obligation. It is not a happy arrangement,<br />

because it works in favour <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> polarisation between majority<br />

<strong>and</strong> minority in <strong>the</strong> parliament. In its turn, this polarisation is<br />

irreconcilable with <strong>the</strong> contract that exists between members <strong>of</strong><br />

parliament from <strong>the</strong> minority, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir voters. If <strong>the</strong>se members<br />

<strong>of</strong> parliament are part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> minority, <strong>the</strong>y can justifiably<br />

claim that <strong>the</strong>ir presence in <strong>the</strong> parliament is pointless: <strong>the</strong>y<br />

can never affect <strong>the</strong> decisions. These members <strong>of</strong> parliament<br />

are, <strong>the</strong>refore, unable to honour <strong>the</strong>ir contracts with <strong>the</strong> voters,<br />

which is not <strong>the</strong>ir own fault, but a result <strong>of</strong> blocking by <strong>the</strong>ir colleagues<br />

from <strong>the</strong> majority. It would be better to replace <strong>the</strong> 50%<br />

quorum in <strong>the</strong> parliament by a rule in which <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> a<br />

member <strong>of</strong> parliament would be sanctioned by dismissal <strong>and</strong><br />

replacement by an unelected c<strong>and</strong>idate from a different party.<br />

The referendum’s area <strong>of</strong> authority<br />

It must be possible to hold a referendum on all <strong>the</strong> issues for<br />

which a representative decision is also possible. It is in conflict<br />

with <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> initiative to deny <strong>the</strong> citizens <strong>the</strong> right<br />

to direct decision-making on certain issues. However, direct<br />

decision-making must be subject to <strong>the</strong> restrictions that also<br />

apply to representative decision-making. Three points are especially<br />

important in this context:<br />

• The decision-making must occur at <strong>the</strong> proper level. For<br />

example, one cannot reform <strong>the</strong> social security system at<br />

provincial level, or abolish <strong>the</strong> generation <strong>of</strong> nuclear power<br />

at municipal level.<br />

• The proposals to be voted on must be in accordance with <strong>the</strong><br />

basic rights <strong>and</strong> freedoms as established in <strong>the</strong> constitution<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> international treaties concerning human rights.<br />

• However, <strong>the</strong> people must have <strong>the</strong> right to change <strong>the</strong> constitution<br />

by referendum <strong>and</strong> must also be given direct-democratic<br />

control over entering into treaties. Treaties must always<br />

be subject to a time limit <strong>and</strong> be terminable. In any<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r case, <strong>the</strong> people’s sovereignty would be restricted in<br />

an unacceptable manner.<br />

1<br />

The political elite has a strong tendency, prompted by distrust,<br />

to exclude direct-democratic decision-making for certain<br />

subjects. One finds this attitude not only among political<br />

leaders, but also among academics <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essors. An example<br />

is <strong>the</strong> ‘Recommendation issued by <strong>the</strong> scientific committee<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> commission for political renewal’ (2000) for <strong>the</strong><br />

committee <strong>of</strong> Belgian members <strong>of</strong> parliament who are concerned<br />

with political renewal. In this we can read: “Tax matters<br />

are excluded from a popular vote in most countries; <strong>the</strong><br />

reason is based on <strong>the</strong> justified fear that in <strong>the</strong> referendum<br />

or <strong>the</strong> popular consensus <strong>the</strong> people will almost always opt<br />

for a lowering <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> expenses <strong>the</strong>y bear, whereas at <strong>the</strong> same<br />

time <strong>the</strong>y dem<strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong> government provide <strong>the</strong> same or<br />

even better services”. Following on from this, <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essors<br />

advocate <strong>the</strong> exclusion <strong>of</strong> issues that exclusively or mainly<br />

concern tax or budgetary topics. Their argument is not only<br />

anti-democratic; it is also false to <strong>the</strong> extent that <strong>the</strong>y do not<br />

mention <strong>the</strong> clearly contradictory example <strong>of</strong> Switzerl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

Here <strong>the</strong>re are no restrictions on referendums on tax issues,<br />

without this adversely affecting <strong>the</strong> national budget (see also<br />

chapters 5 <strong>and</strong> 6).<br />

Right <strong>of</strong> petition<br />

Smaller groups <strong>of</strong> citizens (e.g. 0.1% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> electorate, <strong>about</strong><br />

45,000 signatures in Great Britain) must be able to put something<br />

onto <strong>the</strong> parliamentary agenda (right <strong>of</strong> petition), even<br />

if insufficient signatures were collected to obtain a referendum.<br />

This is a direct result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parliament<br />

itself: it is <strong>the</strong> institution where decisions are made <strong>about</strong><br />

socially relevant issues on which <strong>the</strong> citizens <strong>the</strong>mselves do<br />

not want to decide. The fact that several thous<strong>and</strong> citizens<br />

submit a petition already makes <strong>the</strong> subject into a socially<br />

relevant issue.<br />

The right <strong>of</strong> petition <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> citizens’ initiative referendum<br />

are linked in a multi-stage direct-democratic procedure. A<br />

citizens’ initiative starts as a petition group. If, for example,<br />

43,800 signatures are collected, <strong>the</strong> citizens’ proposal enters<br />

parliament as a petition. If <strong>the</strong> parliament adopts <strong>the</strong><br />

proposal, <strong>the</strong> initiative ends. In <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r case, <strong>the</strong> citizens’<br />

initiative can force a referendum if it has a higher number<br />

<strong>of</strong> signatures (e.g. 2% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> electorate, around 900,000 in<br />

Great Britain). The voters must <strong>the</strong>n also be informed <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

parliament’s recommendations or considerations, which will<br />

certainly form a significant part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> social debate. The parliament<br />

can also be granted <strong>the</strong> right to submit an alternative<br />

proposal in addition to <strong>the</strong> people’s proposal. Then, in <strong>the</strong><br />

referendum, <strong>the</strong> voters have <strong>the</strong> choice between three alternatives:<br />

<strong>the</strong> status quo, <strong>the</strong> people’s proposal, or <strong>the</strong> parliamentary<br />

alternative (this type <strong>of</strong> system exists in Switzerl<strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> Bavaria). This kind <strong>of</strong> measure can ensure that <strong>the</strong>re is a<br />

closer bond between <strong>the</strong> parliament <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> people (see also<br />

chapter 6, point e).

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