Full Report - WFP Remote Access Secure Services

Full Report of the Evaluation of the Kosovo EMOP 6040
The fact that there was scarcely any suffering from a lack of food has been clearly confirmed by
the interviews undertaken with former target groups of the EMOP 6049 during the evaluation
exercise. Almost all former beneficiaries interviewed remember the food aid received as good,
sufficient and adequate.
The evaluation was also concerned with a number of complex issues, with the aim of drawing
lessons from them. It is obvious that each operation of this intensity, magnitude and publicity has
its own components to learn from. In fact, some workshops on lessons learnt have already been
undertaken and recommendations made.
However, the evaluation shows that responses on what lessons can be learned from EMOP 6040
are not uniform. On the one side, quite some enthusiasm about the way WFP handled the
operation has been expressed. On the other side, arguments have been put forward describing
the operation as WFP’s normal mandate, arguing that WFP often handles emergency cases
much bigger than the Kosovo operation. The mission has tried to summarize some of the different
views and to assess how representative the operation was for the formulation of general
recommendations.
5 ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Between April and June 1999, WFP had to build up three large-scale emergency operations in
Albania, FYRoM and Kosovo essentially. The operations involved over 160 international staff, and
some 500 newly recruited local staff. The special feature of the situation was not so much the
magnitude of the caseload of about one million refugees, IDPs, and other groups affected by the
conflict, but much more the timeframe and circumstances of the events. Within less then 100
days, the organisation had to set up a large emergency machinery, dismantle it, and set up
another one in Kosovo. Furthermore, the emergency programme was undertaken in a highly
political context and under intensive coverage of the media.
During these three months, a number of particular issues came up which were unusual in the
WFP’s emergency experience. Some findings extracted from reviewing the data, and the
interviews made, may help to further assess these issues and to reach some conclusions and
recommendations.
It should be mentioned that different WFP headquarters units and the Regional Office have
already made some efforts to analyse those elements and to present lessons learnt from the
operation. The report will refer to some of those sources.
5.1 Contingency Planning and Exit Strategies
Contingency planning had been started in the region in 1995 with plans updated by WFP
annually. The question is, ‘How did it work in the Kosovo context?’ At two junctures in the
operation - the commencement of the NATO bombing campaign in March 1999 and the signing of
the military agreement and the sudden return of the refugees in June - July of that year, WFP was
confronted with new demands and programme priorities.
5.1.1 Assumptions and Contingency Planning
The evaluation of preparedness and contingency planning of WFP’s Kosovo Operation is difficult
to answer, as there are no standards. Staying with our base model of the three different phases of
the operation, there have been two crucial points in the whole programme. First, the provision of
sufficient and adequate food to hundreds of thousands of refugees entering Albania and FYRoM
at the beginning of phase two. Second, the provision of sufficient food stocks during the dramatic,
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