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stimulate such demand should be one of the aims of a European Security Research programme, according to the Group of Personalities. Security research is clearly a technology push area. There has been no analysis of the real needs of public and private organizations in the security and defence areas. This is even more pressing in the case of nanotechnology based security technologies, where both the technical characteristics and the potential applications are still largely undefined. The Group of Personalities also pointed out that the distinction between military and civil technologies is becoming less important, and the same technologies can be applied for both purposes without adaptation (Group of Personalities, 2003). They do not seem to consider the possibility that such dual use technologies can also be applied by criminals and terrorists, or regimes which do not respect human rights (as is the case in many countries in the world today). Currently, there is no European regulation of classified information used or originating from European funded research (see section 5.2.1 above). This implies that either the security research programme does not lead to results which are particularly useful for the security sector, or there is an acute risk that the published results end up in the wrong hands, thereby undermining the security of European citizens even more. On a more fundamental level, the disappearance of the boundary between military and civilian technologies also infringes on academic freedom. Especially in the case of life sciences, the scientific community is put increasingly under political pressure to limit openness and take responsibility not only for its own research and the safety and security of its results, but also to take measures to restrict access to materials and knowledge by others who may use it for hostile purposes (IAP, 2005). The further integration of civil and security research may lead to expansion of such precautions and restrictions of academic freedom, to the detriment of scientific discovery and technological progress for the benefit of society in areas like nanomedicine, nanoelectronics, energy and environmental technologies. Similarly, the existing export restrictions for strategic goods may be expanded to cover more and more civilian technologies with a potential dual use. This could jeopardise international trade and world peace and stability. According to a recent publication of the Rathenau Institute in the Netherlands (Vedder et al, 2007), in the new millennium, governments in Europe as well as North America have been establishing regulatory and technological systems aimed at improving security in their territories man-made disruption to population, infrastructure, environment and food and water supply. This trend was already set in motion before the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, but has been intensified since that. As a result, the privacy of citizens has been eroded further without proper discussion of how privacy and security should be balanced. The motivation behind the necessity of these measures is mostly lacking. There is a need for political and public debate, taking into account: • the cumulative effect of intelligence and security measures; • advancing digitisation of data files; • efficacy of security measures; • greater transparency of national and European procedures for adopting new security measures. The closed circles where the debate takes place must be opened up to the general public (Vedder et al, 2007). The Rathenau report is playing a role in the political and public debate in the Netherlands. Some commentators find it too pessimistic regarding the impacts of security policies and technologies. Also, a large majority of the Dutch public is more concerned about security than about privacy (Comité 4 en 5 mei, 2007). A similar trend in public opinion can be observed in other European countries, as discussed below (section 5.4). 51
5.3.2 Impacts of RFID and related technologies The EC’s work on better implementation of the Data protection directive 95/46/EC also includes technological aspects. In 2003 and 2004 the Commission worked on a Communication on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET). At present, “RFID devices raise fundamental issues on the scope of the data protection rules and the concept of personal data. The combination of sound and image data with automatic recognition imposes particular care when applying the principles of the directive.” However, the Commission believes the rules are still valid. The Directive is technologically neutral, and sufficiently general to accommodate new technologies, although particular guidelines may have to be adapted (European Commission, 2007). The European Parliament is also discussing the implications of RFID chips and how to regulate them. The Scientific and Technological Options Assessment unit (STOA) of the European Parliament is engaged in a project on RFID and Identity Management. The final report was announced for April 2007 but had not been published yet in June. (van ‘t Hof, forthcoming) Philips’ chief privacy officer Jeroen Terstegge criticised the focus on “personal data protection” by the EU in the discussion on RFID chips. He believes that the focus of legal protection should be “digital footprints”, and whether or not these footprints can strictly be classified as personal data. The point is not that the use of RFIDs chips and data storage will infringe on personal data protection (Seminar RFID & Opsporing (Tracing), ECP.NL, Rathenau Institute, RFID platform Nederland, Den Haag, 4 April 2007). 27 Box 1: Case study on Dutch transport RFID chip card Dutch public transport companies will introduce RFID chip card technology to pay for tickets in 2009. Two types of tickets are available, anonymous and personalised. The railway company NS is pushing for the personalised card, by only offering a price reduction on personalised cards and sending current subscription holders the personalised card. The Committee on Secure Personal Data (CBP) and the passenger association ROVER have complained that NS is violating privacy and personal data protection legislation. A public debate in Parliament and the media started in April 2007, stimulated by the Rathenau Institute. The Public Prosecutor Harm Brouwer would also like to be able to use the data collected with RFID and other chip technologies. He sees opportunities for identifying criminals and collecting evidence, including their travel by public transport and car (after introducing road pricing). He discussed these opportunities during a seminar organised by the Rathenau Institute, RFID Platform Nederland and ECP.nl on 4 April 2007. 28 Proponents for the use of private databases for police and national security purposes, like Mr Brouwer (see box 1), do not appear to make a rational assessment of the main current bottlenecks in crime fighting, and identify the optimal use of the public budget for the police and justice department. Instead they seem to be attempting an increase in the public budget by imposing legal requirements for storing data on private companies, without paying for it. This leads to an increase in taxes “in kind” on these companies, which may lead to higher prices for consumers. The quality of the debate would improve if all the costs, expected benefits and risks of each technical and non-technical security option were made available. In the Nanoforum workshop on Nanotechnology and Security several new ethical aspects of nanotechnology were discussed, relating to the implications of invisible distributed wireless sensor networks (possibly mobile). For example, how can informed consent of the observed persons be guaranteed? Can the devices be turned off after use or by 27 http://www.rathenau.nl/showpageproject.asp?steID=1&ID=2029 28 http://www.rathenau.nl/showpage.asp?steID=1&item=2132 52
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Tenth Nanoforum Report: Nanotechnol
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Nanoforum reports The Nanoforum con
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About Nanoforum This European Union
Page 7 and 8: 1 Introduction ....................
Page 9 and 10: 1 Introduction Security is becoming
Page 11 and 12: The most common image detection met
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Page 21 and 22: Quantum dots Quantum dots, with the
Page 23 and 24: Cantilevers Advances in photo- and
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Page 31 and 32: nanoparticles onto the respective s
Page 33 and 34: gas separation. If required, therma
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Page 43 and 44: 4 Identification 4.1 Introduction T
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Page 49 and 50: a b Figure 4.9 a) Damaged mobile re
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Page 67 and 68: de Vigilancia MadrI+D, Madrid, 2007
Page 69 and 70: and indeed whether it succeeded or
Page 71: DINAMICS: “Diagnostic Nanotech an
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