ENGINE - Royal Australian Navy

the standards expected of them.
Accordingly, the employer was
held to be vicariously liable for
the conduct of all members,
because their acts and decisions
were committed 'in the course of
their duties', and thus they were
legally indemnified (that is, their
legal costs were borne), by the
Commonwealth.
It is beyond the remit of this article
to discuss the detailed findings
and recommendations of recent
ADF BOl's into aviation accidents.
They do serve a critical purpose
in reminding us all of the areas
where future inquiries will be
specifically directing their beam of
inquiry because we have now been
formally warned in the ADF aviation
world to 'lift our game' in these
areas. My strong advice to you in
light of these BOI Reports and the
steps taken by Navy to address
these shortcomings, is that there
is now a compelling case against a
claim by a technician or engineer
that they were unaware of the legal
obligations and liabilities attached
to their positions in the event of
a future serious military aviation
incident.
The SHARK 02 BOI also provided
strong direction to maintenance
supervisors on the minimum levels
of responsibility and accountability
acceptable for supervisors on
the maintenance floor. 'Their
accountability will be judged on
the adequacy and completeness
of the framework that a supervisor
provides to his subordinates'. For
example, it is strongly suggested by
the BOI Report - and Navy agreed
to and has since implemented
this recommendation - that when
delegating to a subordinate, the
supervisor must ensure that:
a. the subordinate is competent
to exercise such authority
b. the subordinate understands
their responsibilities in
accepting the delegation;
c. the subordinate has adequate
resources available for the
task; and , finally
d. the subordinate has an
adequate framework for
reporting and meeting
accountability.
Similar guidance flowed from
the SHARK 02 BOI Report in
relation to the accountability of
subordinates on the workshop
floor. If a subordinate deviates
from the specific framework
provided to them in the course
of the maintenance task (for
example , using an incorrect
tool that causes damage to a
component that later fails in flight),
they may be held accountable
for their deviation from correct
maintenance procedures. The
BOI Report further recommends,
however, that the supervisor may
also be held accountable for the
defective management framework
they provided to the subordinate.
For instance, did the supervisor
adequately:
a. define the task and agree to a
course of approved action?
b. identify the subordinate's work
limits and/ or discretions
allowed?
c. provide guidance as to when
subordinates should refer
to the supervisor for further
advice or direction?
d. allow for deviations from
proposed limitations when
essential, but imposing
a requirement to inform
the supervisor at the first
opportunity?
e. design an implement an
effective process for monitoring
unauthorised or undesirable
deviations? and finally,
f. a widely promulgated set of
Standing Orders or Instructions
for the efficient management of
the organisation?
It will be becoming increasingly
obvious to all that the systemic
maintenance management
deficiencies identified in both
BOI Reports have prompted
this significant tightening of the
'accountability and responsibility'
nut for maintainers and their
supervisors in Naval Aviation. The
conclusions of the BOI President
into the causes of the more recent
tragic crash in HMAS KANIMBLA
are particularly apposite to my
earlier observation. He states in
the Executive Summary of that BOI
report the following:
'The systemic approach to air
safety investigation, which has
driven the adoption of safety
management systems in aviation,
has shown that the same
underlying organisational factors,
such as inadequate training,
equipment deficiencies, ineffective
risk management policies and
procedures, absence of effective
integrated safety management
systems, and so on, can all
combine with a set of specific
circumstances and events on the
day, to contribute to a multiplicity
of possible accident scenarios.
Each of these scenarios might
appear to be quite different on
the surface, but all emanate from
the same underlying contributory
systemic factors. In the present
accident, a number of systemic
deficiencies in the Army Aviation
System have been identified,
and the tragic accident to Black
Hawk 221 was but one of many
potential accident scenarios which
could have resulted from the same
underlying systemic factors'.
The parallels in the findings,
causes and recommendations in
respect of these two recent fatal
crashes over a period of just three
years are eerily similar. Noting this
however, I emphatically believe
that we are learning from past
incidents, and statistics show that
military aviation has never been
safer. I cannot help but be struck
by the common concerns raised in
both inquiry reports - particularly
in relation to exposed maintenance
deficiencies - of the Navy SHARK
02 and Army Blackhawk tragedies
of 2005 and 2006.
On a more personal level, a
common concern of all 'affected
persons' in BOI proceedings is
their level of personal liability in
the event that an adverse finding is
made against them in that forum.
Or in the words of one maintainer
to me during the SHARK 02
proceedings, 'Can they take my