ENGINE - Royal Australian Navy

More documents

Recommendations

Info

through a pair of toilet rolls and you'll gain a good understanding of how much they restrict the visual environment. The diagonal deck markings found on the LPA are specifically intended to combat this issue by providing the pilot with both longitudinal and lateral positioning information via the one cue. Without these, the pilot is frequently required to alter viewing direction from the front to side windows to maintain plan position. The TopOwl system employs two image-intensifying tubes mounted on the outside of the pilot's helmet. The image is then projected onto the visor such that the pilot can see both the intensified image and look through the visor to the real world. Because the distance between the tubes is greater than the distance between the pilot's eyes an optical illusion known as hyperstereopsis occurs, which may be worthy of further research for those interested. NIGHT VISION GOGGLES TOPOWL FIGURE 6: NIGHT VISION IMAGING SYSTEMS In the context of a single ship/ helicopter evolution, meteorological factors of significance include sea conditions and the ambient wind environment. Factors such as air temperature and pressure also affect the performance of the helicopter but they will typically rema in constant throughout the evolution. As an aircraft behaves in a particular manner in the air, a ship behaves in a particular manner given a set of sea conditions. As well as the effect this behaviour has on sliding; toppling limits, the way the ship, or in particular the flight deck, moves can create difficulties for the pilot. Where this occurs the ship motion limits are reduced accordingly. The airflow environment has a significant effect on the handling characteristics of the helicopter. A pilot will need to counter the effects of a constant airflow with a set of control inputs, and the amplitude of those inputs will increase with increasing amplitude of the airflow. This static effect is no different to that experienced in the land-based environment. Of more significance in the ship borne environment is turbulence and other effects created by the ship superstructure. These effects are more prominent at higher ambient wind speeds from the sector around ±30° of Communication (internal and external) Servicing and maintenance facilities Fuelling system Aerial delivery equipment Flight deck nets TABLE 2: AVIATION SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND FACI LInES ship's head and are the result of a complex combination of strong vortices from sharp prominences, chaotic airflow from diverse structures, and , in some cases, significant downdraft off the hangar face (or forward bulkhead) that 'sucks' the aircraft towards the deck. Maintenance of a particu lar condition with in limits largely relies on the accuracy of sh ip fitted wind speed and direction, and sh ip motion indication systems. And the va lidity of a particular envelope rel ies on the configuration of the ship remaining the same, at least from a ship motion and airflow perspective. To achieve th is, ship sensor systems need to be serviceable and calibrated, appropriate authorities need to review any upper deck modifications , and significant changes to ship stability characteristics will probably requ ire redefinition of the envelopes. Support Equipment and Facilities The equipment and facilities discussed so far are specifically associated with structural limitations and safe operating limits that are applied during a ship/helicopter evolution. There are also a number of other systems and facilities, detailed in Table 2 that are either critical to safe operation, critica l to maintaining an aviation capability, or critical to dealing with emergencies. Fire protection system Crash rescue equ ipment Flight deck control position equipment Earthing points and poles Personal protective equipment Airworthiness Management of Aviation Support Systems Ship/helicopter operations cross the realms of multiple technical and operational regu latory environments. The RAAF Director General Techn ical Airworthiness regulates maintenance of the technical integrity of all ADF aviation materiel, an equivalent position to that of HNE for maritime materiel. Operationally, Chief of Air Force is responsible for the airworthiness of all aviation systems in the ADF inventory and operational airworthiness management functions are delegated to Commander Austra lian Fleet as the RAN Operational Airworthiness
Authority. This creates a somewhat comp licated ai rworthiness management environment at the unit level that we are only beginning to come to terms with. Airworthiness management complications arise primarily because ship fitted systems are managed according to the Navy Technical Regulatory System, the implementation of which differs from the Technical Airworth iness Regulatory System. As you'd expect, the foundation principals of both systems are the same and they both meet CDF's overarching requirements for the management of technical integrity of ADF materiel. However, there are airworthiness oversight functions not covered by the Navy Technical Regulatory System and, to some extent, aviation positions established in both Fleet and DGTA, along with a regular cross-Force aviation discussion meeting, close these gaps. In fact, the Authority to Operate (AUTH OP) process that you may be fam iliar with specifically meets the intent of the relevant airworthiness regulation by considering both technical and operational aviation capabilities of a particular platform. For all ADF regulatory systems, the level of regu latory oversight applied to a particular system is typically based on the risk posed by that system should it fai l. Recent changes to airworthiness regulations see a categorisation system, shown in Table 3, being applied to management of aviation support systems, including all ship fitted aviation systems. Although categories for ship fitted systems are still in the process of being formally set, Table 3 provides a good indication of where some key systems are likely to sit This categorisation system acknowledges the airworthiness implications of individual systems and will provide capability managers, program offices, and embarked technica l personnel with a better context in which to manage equipment and conduct risk analyses. Although this can change from ship to ship, Table 3 also details the Category Description Potentially applicable systems A The output or function Fuelling systems (ME) directly affects the immediate RAST (ME) performance of the aircraft. Failure could reasonably be expected to result in death or serious injury to personnel, or significant damage to property, with limited aircrew ability to effect recovery action. B The output or function is Deck structural charactenstics (ME) relied upon by aircrew for the Superstructure configuration (ME, safe operation of the aircraft. WEE) Failure could possibly result in injury to personnel or damage to property if aircrew are unaware of the problem and fail to execute normal recovery procedures. Deck markings and lighting (E, ME) Ship motion indication system (WEE) Wind speed and direction system (WEE) Deck status light (ME) Wave-off light (where fitted) (ME) Horizon Reference System (ME) Glide slope indicator (WEE) Securing points and mooring aids (ME, S) C The output or function is used Communications (WEE) by aircrew for advisory or non-safety purposes only. The failure would not be expected to result in injury to personnel or damage to property. KEY: ME - Marine Engineering Department, WEE - Weapons Electrical Engineering Department, S - Supply Department, E - Executive Department TABLE 3: AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEM AIRWORTHINESS CATEGORIES (AAP 700 1.048), POTENnALLY APPLICABLE SHIP BORNE SYSTEMS, AND TYPI CAL DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY department typically responsible for managing each listed system. So, if your department appears against one of these systems, particularly if deSignated category A or B, then you inherit some substantial airworthiness responsibilities. And along with fire protection and crash rescue systems, this equipment is crucial to the safety of personnel, preservation of the ship, and maintenance of the aviation capability. Ponder this ... Don't be a causal factor! For further information contact: LCDR Steve Arney Reet Aviation Facilities Engineer Engineering Division, FHQ Email: steven.amej@defence.gov.au References AAP 7001.048. ADF Airwothiness Manual (AMi ed.). ABR 5419. (2007). Ship Helicopter Operations Manual (Revision 2 ed., Vol. 1). Prouty, R. C. (2003). Helicopter Control Systems: A History. Journal of Guidance, Control , and Dynamics , 26 (1). RAN Doctrne 1. (2000). Australian Maritime Doctrne. RAN Doctrine 2. (2005). Navy
Page 1: ENGINE ISSUE 16 OCTOBER 2009 NAVY
Page 4 and 5: BY CDRE JOHN BRYSON INTRODUCTION BY
Page 6 and 7: BY LEUT CALDERAZZO FROM THE EDITOR'
Page 8 and 9: BY CMDR GREG SWINDEN REAR ADMIRAL P
Page 10 and 11: BY CMDR GLENN GREEN WHAT, ME AN ENG
Page 12 and 13: BY CMDR KATH RICHARDS AND CMDR DAVE
Page 14 and 15: 6 Future Environmental Policy Trend
Page 16 and 17: work is funda mentally about how be
Page 18: BY SBlT JOHNSON HOW DO WE KNOW THAT
Page 22 and 23: asins) and is 3200ft long'. The dee
Page 24 and 25: covered in earlier In modules but i
Page 26 and 27: Step 4 - Attend study groups Implem
Page 28: WHEN SHOULD A RADHAZ SURVEY BE COND
Page 31 and 32: the standards expected of them. Acc
Page 36: CPO "HERBY"TANNOCK DISCUSSES DAMAGE
Page 40 and 41: of this internal cooling has not ye
Page 43 and 44: How does the Register work? • Red
Page 46 and 47: BY MR JOHN COLQUHOUN THE SHIP/HELIC
Page 49: RSO GSO RGURE 4: SHIP HElICOPTER WI
Page 54 and 55: invokes a number of short courses i
Page 56 and 57: BY DAN CU RTlS, M PLG SECRETARY MAR
Page 59: OF301E MSC 1 CAUTIAOV PNl V/UHF OF
Page 63 and 64: poor Austra lians and Kiwis trapped
Page 65 and 66: BY LSMT CAMERON WILLIAMS MTUDDAIOP
Page 67 and 68: Course Name Advanced Project Manage
Page 70: Organisational Resilience .........

ENGINE - Royal Australian Navy

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?