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SHELL, NIGERIA AND THE OGONI. A STUDY IN UNSUSTAINABLE ...

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<strong>SHELL</strong>, <strong>NIGERIA</strong> <strong>AND</strong> <strong>THE</strong> <strong>OGONI</strong> I<br />

here may prove useful to it for there is no<br />

doubt in my mind that the ecological war<br />

the Company has waged in the Delta will<br />

be called to question sooner rather than<br />

later. . . (Saro-Wiwa, 1995b).<br />

The trial, which was conducted by a military<br />

appointed tribunal and included a<br />

serving military officer, was universally<br />

condemned as a sham (Birnbaum, 1995; ICJ,<br />

1996).<br />

Next to the Nigerian dictatorship, Shell was<br />

the main target for international campaigners<br />

so Shell found itself under intense pressure to<br />

intervene. Shell claims it did call for the government<br />

to respect the right to a fair trial and<br />

humane treatment for persons in detention<br />

and, once the conviction was confirmed, the<br />

Chairman of the Group wrote to the Nigeria<br />

military dictator asking for clemency (SPDC,<br />

1998i). Nevertheless, on 10 November 1995,<br />

Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight MOSOP leaders<br />

(now known as the Ogoni Nine) were hanged<br />

by the Nigerian authorities.<br />

After the executions there was worldwide<br />

condemnation of Shell (Wheeler, 1995; O’Sullivan,<br />

1995; Hammer, 1996). Headlines appeared<br />

that painted Shell as callous and a<br />

supporter of dictators. In the months after the<br />

executions of the Ogoni Nine, Shell found its<br />

role in Nigeria the focus of much analysis in<br />

the media. The role of transnational corporations<br />

in countries with dictatorships was debated<br />

in many and diverse publications and<br />

fora. Some in the media suggested that the<br />

furore had gone too far (McElvoy, 1996). In<br />

response to the criticisms, Shell launched a<br />

communications campaign including a series<br />

of full-page advertisements in major newspapers<br />

such as the New York Times. However, far<br />

more typical was commentary that drew the<br />

obvious conclusion that ethical responsibilities<br />

could not be ignored. UK-based Marketing<br />

Week in their cover story on ‘Shell’s sticky<br />

problem’ noted:<br />

. . . the Shell case has wider implications<br />

for other multinationals who could also<br />

face worldwide pressure to accept ethical<br />

and social responsibility for their actions<br />

around the world (O’Sullivan, 1995).<br />

In the year following the executions, Shell<br />

was forced to defend itself again and again –<br />

from the criticisms of members of conservation<br />

groups, academics and learned societies<br />

who wished to sever links with the company<br />

through to local governments considering<br />

boycotts of Shell products.<br />

The Shell Annual General Meetings in May<br />

1996 and 1997 also saw significant and simultaneous<br />

actions in The Netherlands and the<br />

United Kingdom. During the 1997 AGM a<br />

shareholder resolution was tabled requesting<br />

the company to be more transparent in its<br />

social and environmental responsibilities. In a<br />

significant result the resolution was supported<br />

by over 10% of shareholders who<br />

voted even though the directors recommended<br />

voting against the resolution. There<br />

were also actions outside the AGM including<br />

the handing out of an alternative ‘annual report’<br />

entitled Human Rights and Environmental<br />

Operations Information on the Royal Dutch/Shell<br />

Group of Companies (Project Underground,<br />

1997).<br />

RECENT CHANGES<br />

The sudden and unexpected death of General<br />

Abacha, Nigeria’s military ruler, in 1998<br />

brought significant change to Nigeria. The<br />

country returned to civilian rule; the political<br />

climate in the country has freed up significantly,<br />

and a great number of political prisoners,<br />

including the remaining Ogoni activists<br />

arrested with Ken Saro-Wiwa but not yet tried<br />

(known as the Ogoni 20), were released. The<br />

militarization of Ogoni ended and MOSOP<br />

leaders in exile began returning home.<br />

In order to address the outstanding issues<br />

of development, the government initiated the<br />

Niger Delta Development Commission Bill<br />

(NDDC Bill). While full of good intentions,<br />

MOSOP felt the current Bill was ‘vulnerable<br />

to the same political manipulation that has<br />

characterised earlier bodies’ and ‘has exposed<br />

the continuing [...] lack of understanding of<br />

fundamental issues by policy-makers in Abuja<br />

[the Nigerian state capital]’ (MOSOP International<br />

Secretariat, 1999b).<br />

Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. Sust. Dev. 9, 74–86 (2001)<br />

81

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