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7. Another determinant of the institutional form of the CPR regime is the physical characteristics of the resource in question; 8. The feed backs to resource conserving behaviour are positive; 9. Situational factors, like a temporary fall in income may lead to defection; 10. Such defection will be tolerated up to certain limits without punishment. However, the contingent fulfilment of the threat will have to be credible. Methodology Employed For our purpose we decided to use an empirical approach. We examined four CPR institutions in detail, and another CPR regime cursorily. Database Since our study relates to the historical development of institutions, we relied on primary data. This data was collected based on field surveys undertaken in five areas. Survey Sites We have undertaken surveys in the following areas: Belemath in the district of Burdwan (forest resource), Matha in the district of Purulia (forest resource), Hazamdihi in the district of Bankura (water body), and two fishermen’s co-operative in Bon Hooghly and Charcharia in Calcutta (water body). We selected the site partly to enable us to make comparisons across resources, and between management systems for the same resource. In the case of forests we studied a co-produced management regime – Forest Protection Committees. Both the survey sites were basically similar to each other with regard to their socio- economic background. Both were poor villages, with low level of literacy. The main occupation was agriculture. Dependence on forests was high in both cases. The only difference was that the population in Matha was tribal, while that in Belemath was mixed. These two studies formed an interesting contrast as – despite their similarities – the performance of the regimes was different in these villages: in Matha, it was a failure, while in Belemath it was a success. III
The other three sites studied are similar with regard to the resource. However, while the regimes in Charcharia and Bon Hooghly are formal Fishermen’s Co-operative, that in Hazamdihi is a multi-use water body managed informally by the village. The cases of the formal co-operative are also important in view of their location – both are situated in an urban belt, within the Calcutta Metropolitan Area. Hazamdihi, in contrast, is in the poor under-developed district of Babnkura. Methodology of Field Survey Our survey methods consisted of interviewing community members using a structured questionnaire. In view of the historical nature of the information required we also employed non-conventional techniques like group discussions Sample Size We have not relied on sampling but attempted to interview all members (census enumeration). However, in all cases, some members were not available during our survey. In such cases we simply interviewed the available population. The group discussion was undertaken with about 8-10 members at a time in each of the villages in the three villages. In the case of the co-operative, participants of the group discussion were chosen randomly with replacement. To factor out the view of a particular individual being repeated we identified participant repeatedly joining such discussions. Theoretical Framework The data so collected was integrated using the Oakerson framework. The conclusions from our empirical study were then contrasted with the results of game theoretic models. Findings Our central hypothesis is not validated by our survey. The emergence of CPR regimes does not seem to be related to the onset of resource degradation problem. In Matha, degradation did not evoke any response from the community. Although the IV
Page 1 and 2: EERC Theme: CPRs and Forests EERC W
Page 3 and 4: CPR INSTITUTIONS IN WEST BENGAL An
Page 5 and 6: TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables c-
Page 7 and 8: LIST OF TABLES 1.1: Classification
Page 9 and 10: List of Project Personnel Principal
Page 11: Hypothesis Our project focussed on
Page 15 and 16: 10. The community that did not norm
Page 17 and 18: also helped us with our Accounts. O
Page 19 and 20: exploit the resource. Such resource
Page 21 and 22: [7] CPRs help to maintain the ecolo
Page 23 and 24: households. The poor households obt
Page 25 and 26: Now, Ciriacy-Wantrup (1971) & Bisho
Page 27 and 28: CPR with Tightened Access Figure 1.
Page 29 and 30: 4. Decisions are based on simple ru
Page 31 and 32: According to World Resource Institu
Page 33 and 34: Secondly, during our preliminary at
Page 35 and 36: villagers. These conditions would a
Page 37 and 38: Finally, we shall sum up the policy
Page 39 and 40: interest in a society that believes
Page 41 and 42: unknown time period, can lead to co
Page 43 and 44: ules? Why do resource users monitor
Page 45 and 46: 6) Conflict resolution mechanisms e
Page 47 and 48: Table 2.3: Design Principles for Su
Page 49 and 50: of CPR theory is in a stasis. This
Page 51 and 52: In the succeeding chapters we will,
Page 53 and 54: Over time, resource users are facin
Page 55 and 56: Table 3.1: Land Holdings in Belemat
Page 57 and 58: Table 3.2: Grass-Root Indicators of
Page 59 and 60: Table 3.4: Dependence of Income fro
Page 61 and 62: 4. The payment of wages and distrib
Page 63 and 64:
that it was rich households who wer
Page 65 and 66:
the education level is low, it is m
Page 67 and 68:
Unlike the responses in Belemath, t
Page 69 and 70:
Table 3.11: Item Wise Dependence on
Page 71 and 72:
CHAPTER 4: FISHERMEN’S CO-OPERATI
Page 73 and 74:
These households mainly migrated to
Page 75 and 76:
not been terminated out of sentimen
Page 77 and 78:
Table 4.3: Allocation of Duties and
Page 79 and 80:
Table 4.5: Direct and Indirect Bene
Page 81 and 82:
exploitation, they stopped fishing
Page 83 and 84:
R-Squared 0.93328 R-Bar-Squared 0.9
Page 85 and 86:
growth of fish. On the other hand,
Page 87 and 88:
the environmental impact of this wi
Page 89 and 90:
found that the party retained tight
Page 91 and 92:
Table 5.2: Distribution of Populati
Page 93 and 94:
Section 5.3: Property Rights and th
Page 95 and 96:
costs of production, exclusion and
Page 97 and 98:
There are two interesting features
Page 99 and 100:
In the case of some of the benefits
Page 101 and 102:
Section 5.5: Resource and Villagers
Page 103 and 104:
1. Physical attributes of the resou
Page 105 and 106:
the locality. In addition and impor
Page 107 and 108:
Turning to the co-operatives we fin
Page 109 and 110:
In Hazamdihi there is a total lack
Page 111 and 112:
Interdependence is possibly most st
Page 113 and 114:
A related issue is that of equity.
Page 115 and 116:
The success of the regime in ensuri
Page 117 and 118:
collective action institutionalized
Page 119 and 120:
esource. Water body, regular financ
Page 121 and 122:
5. Communities not inheriting any p
Page 123 and 124:
1 > b2-c2, 0 > b1-c1 , and b2-c2 >
Page 125 and 126:
Following Dixit and Skeath (1999) a
Page 127 and 128:
group manifest themselves as PD. Ho
Page 129 and 130:
1- (b2-c2) ≥ δ (b2-c2)/(1-δ), t
Page 131 and 132:
the following manner: if the realiz
Page 133 and 134:
Let us assume that b / (n) > 0 and
Page 135 and 136:
Player I Strategies C D Strategies
Page 137 and 138:
mechanisms and multiplex relationsh
Page 139 and 140:
degrading it’s sustainability). W
Page 141 and 142:
Increasing market and market opport
Page 143 and 144:
ITEMS CONSUMPTION ENERGY INTERMEDIA
Page 145 and 146:
Main Occupation 60000 60001- 70000
Page 147 and 148:
Income class Table A.2.6: Illegal F
Page 149 and 150:
Year Fish Seed Fish Sales 1990-1 24
Page 151 and 152:
Note: Here the variables are INT =
Page 153 and 154:
11. Axelrod, R. & W.D. Hamilton (19
Page 155 and 156:
35. Haefale, E.T. (1974) The Govern
Page 157:
of Wight (UK), Connemara (Ireland)
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