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Section 1.1: Definition of CPRs CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION Man interacts with natural resources and natural environments through a variety of property rights. By property rights we, like many others, mean not a relation between individuals and the object owned (in this case the environmental natural resource), but between the individual(s) and a legally/socially endorsed stream of benefits arising from the resource. One can therefore have ‘property’ in things supposedly ‘owned’ by someone else. By ‘rights’ we imply the capability of the claimants to the property to secure acknowledgement to honour the claim by ‘others’ who do not have such claims. Such claims and duties may be codified through either written law or unwritten custom. Property rights are embedded and evolve in specific social, political and ecological and economic contexts. We can, therefore, think about a spectrum of property right regimes for natural resources. Common property regime is one such regime within this spectrum. Common Property Resources (CPRs) are those "resources which are collectively used by a group of people” (Pasha, 1992). Alternately they can be defined as “those (non-exclusive resources) in which a group of people have coequal use rights. Membership in the group of co-owners is typically conferred by membership in some other group, generally a group whose central purpose is not the use or administration of the resource (per se), such as a village, a tribe, etc. “ (Jodha, 1990). Even if the legal ownership of the resource rests with some other agency (waste lands may belong to the Revenue Department of the State), the resource community exploits the resource as if they are the de facto owners. From these definitions two characteristics of CPRs stand out: consumption of the resources are rival, the principle of exclusion cannot be applied. By rival consumption we mean that exploitation of the resource by one individual reduces the stock of resource, thereby affecting consumption by others. In other words, exploitation of CPRs generates externalities in the shape of reduced consumption - either in the present, or (which is more common) in the future. Now a local community - a group of people, a village, a few neighbouring villages, etc, may 1
exploit the resource. Such resources are referred to as local commons, as opposed to global commons, which are exploited by nations. Inapplicability of the principle of exclusion refers to the fact that a resource user cannot be prevented from utilizing the resource even if he does not pay for it. The reason for this is that that each resource user is a co-owner, having equal rights of usage. Using these two characteristics, we can classify all goods into four categories as follows (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989). Table 1.1: Classification of Private, Public and Common Property Resources Characteristic Exclusion Feasible Exclusion Not Feasible Rival Consumption 1 2 Non Rival Consumption 3 4 Resources in category 1 refer to privately owned resources, while those in categories 3 and 4 are public goods (with 4 referring to `pure’ public goods), and those in category 2 are CPRs. Such resources are of various types : community pastures, community forests, waste lands, common dumping and threshing grounds, village ponds, rivers, aquifers, etc. Section 1.2: Importance of CPRs in Rural Economy CPRs have historically played an important role in the rural economy : “In the past the peasants who had small pieces of land, who couldn’t eke out enough from it for their survival, use to eat fruits from their nearby forests and used to collect leaves, flowers and dried tree branches, and by selling these to others supplemented their income. They also used to maintain a couple of cows, goats and were living happily in their villages depending on the village common grazing land.” (Jyotibha Phule, Shetkaryacha Asad, qtd. in Kothari, Singh & Suri, 1996). 2
Page 1 and 2: EERC Theme: CPRs and Forests EERC W
Page 3 and 4: CPR INSTITUTIONS IN WEST BENGAL An
Page 5 and 6: TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables c-
Page 7 and 8: LIST OF TABLES 1.1: Classification
Page 9 and 10: List of Project Personnel Principal
Page 11 and 12: Hypothesis Our project focussed on
Page 13 and 14: The other three sites studied are s
Page 15 and 16: 10. The community that did not norm
Page 17: also helped us with our Accounts. O
Page 21 and 22: [7] CPRs help to maintain the ecolo
Page 23 and 24: households. The poor households obt
Page 25 and 26: Now, Ciriacy-Wantrup (1971) & Bisho
Page 27 and 28: CPR with Tightened Access Figure 1.
Page 29 and 30: 4. Decisions are based on simple ru
Page 31 and 32: According to World Resource Institu
Page 33 and 34: Secondly, during our preliminary at
Page 35 and 36: villagers. These conditions would a
Page 37 and 38: Finally, we shall sum up the policy
Page 39 and 40: interest in a society that believes
Page 41 and 42: unknown time period, can lead to co
Page 43 and 44: ules? Why do resource users monitor
Page 45 and 46: 6) Conflict resolution mechanisms e
Page 47 and 48: Table 2.3: Design Principles for Su
Page 49 and 50: of CPR theory is in a stasis. This
Page 51 and 52: In the succeeding chapters we will,
Page 53 and 54: Over time, resource users are facin
Page 55 and 56: Table 3.1: Land Holdings in Belemat
Page 57 and 58: Table 3.2: Grass-Root Indicators of
Page 59 and 60: Table 3.4: Dependence of Income fro
Page 61 and 62: 4. The payment of wages and distrib
Page 63 and 64: that it was rich households who wer
Page 65 and 66: the education level is low, it is m
Page 67 and 68: Unlike the responses in Belemath, t
Page 69 and 70:
Table 3.11: Item Wise Dependence on
Page 71 and 72:
CHAPTER 4: FISHERMEN’S CO-OPERATI
Page 73 and 74:
These households mainly migrated to
Page 75 and 76:
not been terminated out of sentimen
Page 77 and 78:
Table 4.3: Allocation of Duties and
Page 79 and 80:
Table 4.5: Direct and Indirect Bene
Page 81 and 82:
exploitation, they stopped fishing
Page 83 and 84:
R-Squared 0.93328 R-Bar-Squared 0.9
Page 85 and 86:
growth of fish. On the other hand,
Page 87 and 88:
the environmental impact of this wi
Page 89 and 90:
found that the party retained tight
Page 91 and 92:
Table 5.2: Distribution of Populati
Page 93 and 94:
Section 5.3: Property Rights and th
Page 95 and 96:
costs of production, exclusion and
Page 97 and 98:
There are two interesting features
Page 99 and 100:
In the case of some of the benefits
Page 101 and 102:
Section 5.5: Resource and Villagers
Page 103 and 104:
1. Physical attributes of the resou
Page 105 and 106:
the locality. In addition and impor
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Turning to the co-operatives we fin
Page 109 and 110:
In Hazamdihi there is a total lack
Page 111 and 112:
Interdependence is possibly most st
Page 113 and 114:
A related issue is that of equity.
Page 115 and 116:
The success of the regime in ensuri
Page 117 and 118:
collective action institutionalized
Page 119 and 120:
esource. Water body, regular financ
Page 121 and 122:
5. Communities not inheriting any p
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1 > b2-c2, 0 > b1-c1 , and b2-c2 >
Page 125 and 126:
Following Dixit and Skeath (1999) a
Page 127 and 128:
group manifest themselves as PD. Ho
Page 129 and 130:
1- (b2-c2) ≥ δ (b2-c2)/(1-δ), t
Page 131 and 132:
the following manner: if the realiz
Page 133 and 134:
Let us assume that b / (n) > 0 and
Page 135 and 136:
Player I Strategies C D Strategies
Page 137 and 138:
mechanisms and multiplex relationsh
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degrading it’s sustainability). W
Page 141 and 142:
Increasing market and market opport
Page 143 and 144:
ITEMS CONSUMPTION ENERGY INTERMEDIA
Page 145 and 146:
Main Occupation 60000 60001- 70000
Page 147 and 148:
Income class Table A.2.6: Illegal F
Page 149 and 150:
Year Fish Seed Fish Sales 1990-1 24
Page 151 and 152:
Note: Here the variables are INT =
Page 153 and 154:
11. Axelrod, R. & W.D. Hamilton (19
Page 155 and 156:
35. Haefale, E.T. (1974) The Govern
Page 157:
of Wight (UK), Connemara (Ireland)
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