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water bodies were being managed with varying degrees of success, in none of these
cases was the resource threatened.
Our central hypothesis had been divided into several components. We analyse the
validity of each of these sub-hypotheses below.
1. We have seen that the emergence of CPR institutions is not always linked to
degradation issues. Our first sub-hypothesis is therefore invalid. This will affect the
other sub-hypotheses that were linked sequentially to each other.
2. Outcomes need not always be joint. Further, interdependence may be manifested
across generations – especially in the case of forests. However, some amount of
reciprocity is needed to foster co-operation.
3. We found an absence of normative or institutional constraints to free riding
attempts in all our case studies.
4. Low economic costs of co-operation was significant in explaining success in Bon
Hooghly, Charcharia and Hazamdihi. In the case of Belemath, the reduction in
income due to co-operation was low. In the case of Matha, the high costs of co-
operation appeared to significantly inhibit co-operation.
5. Heterogeneity remains a contested factor in explaining collective action. This is
line with the conclusions of recent works on this area.
6. The surplus from the resource has determined the choice of the regime in each
case – though it has not affected its efficiency.
7. The physical feature of the resource is an important factor explaining the range of
possible forms of regimes is set by the nature of the resource.
8. Feedbacks either in the form of visible restoration or stable income flows is an
important factor contributing to the success of the regimes in Belemath, Bon
Hooghly, Charcharia and Hazamdihi.
9. Despite the success of these regimes, we found that transgressions of the rules
were also present. Such violations were due to temporary fall in income. A seasonal
pattern of defection was observed in both Belemath and Matha.
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