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4.2.a: Socio-economic Features of Respondents 55 4.2.b: Evolution of the Co-operative 56 4.3: Ensuring Sustainability 63 4.4: Conflict and Its Resolution 66 4.5: Changing Dimensions of Sustainability in the Long Run 69 4.6: A Note on the Charcharia Fishermen’s Co-operative 70 4.6.a: Origin of the Co-operative 70 4.6.b: Characteristics of the Harvesting Process 71 4.6.c: Impact of Resource Regime 71 4.6.d: Influence of Contextual Factors 71 Chapter 5: A Community Owned water Body in Hazamdihi 73-84 5.1: Background of the Resource Community 73 5.2: Evolution of the resource management system 74 5.3: Property Rights and their Changes 76 5.4: Political economy of the Management System 79 5.5: Resource and Villagers 84 Chapter 6: Comparing Our Cases 85-104 6.1: Looking Back 85 6.2: A Common Methodological Framework 85 6.2.a: Technical and Physical Attributes of the Resource 86 6.2.b: Decision Making Arrangements 88 6.2.c: Patterns of Intersection within the Community 92 6.2.d: Outcome of the Resource Regime 94 6.3: Testing Our Hypotheses 98 6.3.a: Central Hypothesis 99 6.3.b: Testing Our Sub-hypotheses 100 6.4: Collective Action and It’s Constraints 103 Chapter 7: Theories, Evidences and Policies 105-128 7.1: CPR Use as a Collective Action 105 7.2: CPR Games and Co-operation 110 7.3: Beyond Prisoner’s Dilemma 113 7.3.a: Bankura (Hazamdihi): Another Dimension 121 7.4: Looking For a Policy 122 Appendix A: Statistical Tables A-H Appendix B: Results of Contingent Valuation Exercise I-J Reference K-P b
LIST OF TABLES 1.1: Classification of Private, Public and Common Property Resources 2 1.2: Share of Gross Income from CPRs to Gross Income of Poor Households 5 1.3: Decline in CPRs in Selected Villages in Karnataka 7 1.4: Types of Resource Regimes 11 1.5: Description of Survey Sites 21 2.1: Accrual of Costs/Benefits to Resource Users and Community 27 2.2: Tragedy of the Commons in a Game Theoretic Framework 28 2.3: Design Principles for successful Collective Action 36 3.1: Land Holdings in Belemath 44 3.2: Grass Root Indicators of Resource Related Development 46 3.3: Role of Panchayat in Generating Environmental Consciousness 47 3.4: Dependence of Income from CPRs 48 3.5: Itemwise Dependence on CPRs in Belemath 48 3.6: Incidence of Defection in Belemath 51 3.7: Pattern of Land Holdings 55 3.8: Grass Root Indicators of Development 56 3.9: Incidence of Defection of Villagers 57 3.10: Dependence of Income from CPRs 59 3.11: Item-wise Dependence on CPRs in Matha 59 4.1: District of Origin 63 4.2: Reasons for Coming to Bon Hooghly 64 4.3: Allocation of Duties and Associated Salaries 68 4.4: Benefits from Co-operative 70 4.5: Direct and Indirect Benefits to Members 71 4.6: Relative Importance of Income from Co-operative 72 4.7: Results of OLS Regression of Fish Sales on Fish Seed 76 4.8: Relative Importance of Fishing and Boating in Generating Revenue 81 5.1: Caste Profile of Population 85 5.2: Distribution of Population according to Income 86 5.3:Population Engaged in Different Occupations 86 5.4: Resource Use and Associated Property Rights 89 5.5: Land Holding Distribution 93 5.6: Relation between Caste and Land Holding 94 5.7: Pond Use according to Caste 96 5.8: Pond Use by Different Income Groups 96 5.9: Information Received according to Caste 97 c
Page 1 and 2: EERC Theme: CPRs and Forests EERC W
Page 3 and 4: CPR INSTITUTIONS IN WEST BENGAL An
Page 5: TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables c-
Page 9 and 10: List of Project Personnel Principal
Page 11 and 12: Hypothesis Our project focussed on
Page 13 and 14: The other three sites studied are s
Page 15 and 16: 10. The community that did not norm
Page 17 and 18: also helped us with our Accounts. O
Page 19 and 20: exploit the resource. Such resource
Page 21 and 22: [7] CPRs help to maintain the ecolo
Page 23 and 24: households. The poor households obt
Page 25 and 26: Now, Ciriacy-Wantrup (1971) & Bisho
Page 27 and 28: CPR with Tightened Access Figure 1.
Page 29 and 30: 4. Decisions are based on simple ru
Page 31 and 32: According to World Resource Institu
Page 33 and 34: Secondly, during our preliminary at
Page 35 and 36: villagers. These conditions would a
Page 37 and 38: Finally, we shall sum up the policy
Page 39 and 40: interest in a society that believes
Page 41 and 42: unknown time period, can lead to co
Page 43 and 44: ules? Why do resource users monitor
Page 45 and 46: 6) Conflict resolution mechanisms e
Page 47 and 48: Table 2.3: Design Principles for Su
Page 49 and 50: of CPR theory is in a stasis. This
Page 51 and 52: In the succeeding chapters we will,
Page 53 and 54: Over time, resource users are facin
Page 55 and 56: Table 3.1: Land Holdings in Belemat
Page 57 and 58:
Table 3.2: Grass-Root Indicators of
Page 59 and 60:
Table 3.4: Dependence of Income fro
Page 61 and 62:
4. The payment of wages and distrib
Page 63 and 64:
that it was rich households who wer
Page 65 and 66:
the education level is low, it is m
Page 67 and 68:
Unlike the responses in Belemath, t
Page 69 and 70:
Table 3.11: Item Wise Dependence on
Page 71 and 72:
CHAPTER 4: FISHERMEN’S CO-OPERATI
Page 73 and 74:
These households mainly migrated to
Page 75 and 76:
not been terminated out of sentimen
Page 77 and 78:
Table 4.3: Allocation of Duties and
Page 79 and 80:
Table 4.5: Direct and Indirect Bene
Page 81 and 82:
exploitation, they stopped fishing
Page 83 and 84:
R-Squared 0.93328 R-Bar-Squared 0.9
Page 85 and 86:
growth of fish. On the other hand,
Page 87 and 88:
the environmental impact of this wi
Page 89 and 90:
found that the party retained tight
Page 91 and 92:
Table 5.2: Distribution of Populati
Page 93 and 94:
Section 5.3: Property Rights and th
Page 95 and 96:
costs of production, exclusion and
Page 97 and 98:
There are two interesting features
Page 99 and 100:
In the case of some of the benefits
Page 101 and 102:
Section 5.5: Resource and Villagers
Page 103 and 104:
1. Physical attributes of the resou
Page 105 and 106:
the locality. In addition and impor
Page 107 and 108:
Turning to the co-operatives we fin
Page 109 and 110:
In Hazamdihi there is a total lack
Page 111 and 112:
Interdependence is possibly most st
Page 113 and 114:
A related issue is that of equity.
Page 115 and 116:
The success of the regime in ensuri
Page 117 and 118:
collective action institutionalized
Page 119 and 120:
esource. Water body, regular financ
Page 121 and 122:
5. Communities not inheriting any p
Page 123 and 124:
1 > b2-c2, 0 > b1-c1 , and b2-c2 >
Page 125 and 126:
Following Dixit and Skeath (1999) a
Page 127 and 128:
group manifest themselves as PD. Ho
Page 129 and 130:
1- (b2-c2) ≥ δ (b2-c2)/(1-δ), t
Page 131 and 132:
the following manner: if the realiz
Page 133 and 134:
Let us assume that b / (n) > 0 and
Page 135 and 136:
Player I Strategies C D Strategies
Page 137 and 138:
mechanisms and multiplex relationsh
Page 139 and 140:
degrading it’s sustainability). W
Page 141 and 142:
Increasing market and market opport
Page 143 and 144:
ITEMS CONSUMPTION ENERGY INTERMEDIA
Page 145 and 146:
Main Occupation 60000 60001- 70000
Page 147 and 148:
Income class Table A.2.6: Illegal F
Page 149 and 150:
Year Fish Seed Fish Sales 1990-1 24
Page 151 and 152:
Note: Here the variables are INT =
Page 153 and 154:
11. Axelrod, R. & W.D. Hamilton (19
Page 155 and 156:
35. Haefale, E.T. (1974) The Govern
Page 157:
of Wight (UK), Connemara (Ireland)
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