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NAVY 

ENGINEERING 

ISSUE 5 SEPTEMBER 2003 

BULLETIN

EDITORIAL BOARD 

Chairman 

Captain P. J. Law, RAN 

Members 

Engineering Advisory Council (EAC) 

Editor 

WOMT Mark Richardson 

Published by 

Defence Publishing Service 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this Bulletin are the personal views of 

the authors, and unless otherwise stated, do not in any way 

reflect Royal Australian Navy Policy 

Deadline 

Issue 6 March 04 Contributions by 01 Feb 04 

Contributions should be sent to 

The Editor 

Navy Engineering Bulletin 

CP4–7–131 

Campbell Park ACT 2600 

Telephone: (02) 6266 4212 

Fax: (02) 6266 2388 

E-mail: navyengineeringbulletin@defence.gov.au 

Distribution 

To be added to the distribution list contact the Editor. 

ISSN 0642295654 

Foreword – Deputy Chief of Navy 2 

Introduction – Chief Naval Engineer 3 

From the Editor’s Desk 4 

From the Desk of the AT Category Sponsor 5 

DNOP News 13 

An Engineering Approach to Maintaining Capability 14 

Technical Mentoring in the RAN 17 

From the Desk of DTA-LOG(ENG) – Advanced Technical Training for 

ET & MT 19 

Professional Development – it’s not just a piece of paper 21 

Navy Warrant Officer gains Worldwide Engineering Recognition 22 

Report on Merchant Ship Secondment to MV Iron Chieftain 23 

A Risk – Is It Really? 28 

MOTU-ME: Who Are We and Where Do We Live? 29 

OPERATION SUTTON – Apprehension of Alleged Illegal Russian 

Fishing Vessel VOLGA 34 

NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN SEPTEMBER 2003 

CONTENTS 

Applying Reliability Centred Maintenance to Mechanical, Electrical, 

Electronic and Structural Systems 37 

Navy Engineering Re-union 2003 43 

The New C3 – Cost, Capability and Commonality 45 

MOBI - A Look at the Past: WORKSHOPS 49 

To MTE, or not to MTE 53 

ERUS 

Optimising Engineering Watchkeeping Duties in FFGs – 

55 

A Systems Approach 57 

Retention Bonus or Reward System? 

Aircraft Battle Damage Repair and Contingency Maintenance in the 

62 

Aviation World 

Naval Technical Regulatory System (TRS) – Development and 

63 

Implementation Project – An Update 67 

Engineering of Maritime Capability, a Project SEA 1442 Perspective 70 

Engineering or Management 74 

APESMA Management Education Course Schedule 75 

1

2 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN SEPTEMBER 2003 

REAR ADMIRAL R.C. MOFFITT 

RAN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVY 

Foreword 

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to welcome readers to the 

fifth edition of the Navy Engineering Bulletin. 

In a year that has evolved as 

another one of the most 

operationally demanding for the 

Navy in recent times, nowhere 

have these demands been more 

keenly felt than in the Engineering 

disciplines. The criticality of 

Engineering as a key element of 

capability has been clearly 

demonstrated as the RAN rose to 

the challenges presented by 

Operations Slipper, Bastille and 

Falconer, while concurrently 

fulfilling vital roles in home and 

regional waters. It is significant 

that, while being pushed to 

extremes of performance, our 

ships and aircraft participating in 

these escalated operations were 

able to meet all operational 

requirements unimpeded by 

major defects or extended downtime 

due to breakdown. This is 

testament to the tenacity and 

professionalism of the 

Engineering personnel 

maintaining and supporting them, 

who were often called upon to 

provide innovative solutions under 

difficult circumstances; ensuring 

their units remained at the 

optimum level of availability, 

ready to overcome the challenges 

and threats presented by modern 

warfare. 

In addition to the demands 

invoked by Navy’s current high 

operational profile, Navy 

Engineering is also undergoing an 

important period of change and 

review. The Navy Technical 

Regulatory System, currently in 

initial stages of implementation, 

will improve our certification 

processes, formalise and 

strengthen our risk management 

systems and ensure not only that 

our ships, submarines and 

aircraft are materially fit for 

service; but also that our people 

are properly trained, competent 

and authorised to operate and 

maintain them. Interfacing with, 

and complementing the NTRS, 

are a number of personnel 

initiatives aimed at accrediting 

our people more effectively. One 

of these is the Navy’s agreement 

with the Institution of Engineers, 

Australia, which provides a 

structured, internationally 

recognised professional 

development and accreditation 

program for our Engineering 

Officers and Sailors. Another is 

the introduction of new, 

competency based Marine 

Technical Operator qualifications, 

aligning Engineering operating 

practices and qualifications with 

the need to provide ‘competent, 

authorised individuals, whose 

work is certified as correct’; a 

fundamental principle of the 

NTRS. 

The demands on our engineering 

people, therefore, have been very 

high and will remain so for the 

foreseeable future. The Navy 

maintains an intense operational 

commitment across many varied 

theatres concurrent with an 

expansive program of continuous 

review and improvement. It is this 

program of improvement which 

has been the genesis of many of 

the initiatives to be introduced to 

Navy Engineering in the near 

future, initiatives aimed both at 

making Navy Engineering more 

effective and improving the 

retention rates of our Engineers 

and Technicians. I congratulate 

the Navy Engineering community 

for the dedication and 

commitment displayed by all it’s 

members in meeting past 

challenges, and urge you all to 

maintain this positive attitude 

when faced with the challenges to 

come. In particular, I encourage 

all in the Navy Engineering 

community to embrace the 

forthcoming changes and work 

together to realise the full 

benefits that are their intent. 

I hope you enjoy this edition of 

the Navy Engineering Bulletin. As 

a key element of capability, it is 

important that the Engineering 

Branch has a forum to 

disseminate information, 

exchange ideas and promote 

discussion on engineering related 

topics. The Navy Engineering 

Bulletin fulfils this role admirably, 

therefore I commend it to you 

and encourage all in the Navy 

Engineering community to 

support and contribute to this 

excellent publication. 

R.C. MOFFITT 

Rear Admiral, RAN 

Deputy Chief of Navy

CNE Introduction 

I think this bumper issue of the Engineering Bulletin shows clearly the 

many and varied ways Engineers Make it Happen. From operating and 

maintaining our ships through to the design and systems engineering of 

the future Maritime Communications and Information Management 

Architecture, engineers underpin our Maritime capability. 

Over the last year or so, our 

operational tempo has been 

extremely high and much of our 

engineering effort, both at sea 

and ashore, has been focussed 

on meeting the mission. The pace 

of operations, while still high, is 

now reducing and we need to 

make maximum use of this 

opportunity to reconstitute our 

people and systems. Most of you 

should be aware that the Chief Of 

Navy has implemented a formal 

reconstitution plan that focuses 

on reconstituting our systems, 

skills and most importantly the 

personnel impacts that a high 

operational tempo has incurred. 

Reconstituting these three areas 

is of critical importance to Navy 

and Navy engineering. 

• We must take the opportunity to 

ensure our systems are returned 

to appropriate levels. In particular 

make sure maintenance is up to 

date. 

• Large sections of our technical 

workforce have shortfalls in 

important competencies and we 

must get the levels of outstanding 

PPRs reduced. 

• Many technical sailors have not 

had the opportunity to take leave. 

We also need to ensure our 

management systems are 

reconstituted. CSO(E) will be 

checking that units in Maritime 

Command do have the correct 

management focus and in 

support areas ashore the focus 

will be on rolling out the Technical 

Regulatory System to ensure risks 

to Technical Integrity are being 

managed. 

Reconstitution will allow 

Engineers to continue to Make it 

happen 


COMMODORE TIM BARTER, 

CHIEF NAVAL ENGINEER 

3


WOMT MARK (RICHO) 

RICHARDSON 

From the Editor’s Desk 

Welcome to this, the fifth edition of the Navy Engineering Bulletin and my 

second as editor. And they said it wouldn’t last! 

I think there’s something for 

everyone in this edition. The 

contribution rate this time has 

been nothing short of 

outstanding, exceeding that of all 

previous bulletins and 

representing a wide variety of 

sources from both within Navy 

and from outside agencies that 

support Navy Engineering. Dr. 

Alun Roberts continues the 

Reliability Centred Maintenance 

theme with an article discussing 

the application of RCM to Hull 

Structures, Mechanical Systems 

and Electronics. The aviation 

world is well represented with an 

article on Aviation Battle Damage 

Repair (a subject which has 

rapidly achieved prominence 

given the type of operations our 

aircraft have recently become 

involved in) and a comprehensive 

article from the AT Category 

Sponsors detailing significant 

issues affecting the AT Category. 

We continue our humorous / 

historical theme with another 

excerpt from ‘MOBI’, ex WOETPSM 

Sandy Freeleagus’ book of 

anecdotes about apprentice 

training in the 60’s at HMAS 

NIRIMBA. 

Our feature article this edition (in 

the colour section) presents a 

vivid account of the apprehension 

of a Foreign Fishing Vessel in the 

Southern Ocean by HMAS 

CANBERRA. What’s that got to do 

with Navy Engineering you might 

ask: well when you consider a 

large proportion of the boarding 

party which apprehended the 

‘Volga’ were from HMAS 

CANBERRA’s Engineering Branch, 

this article graphically portrays 

the varied and unusual nature of 

the tasks you can find yourself 

involved in as an Engineering 

Branch Officer or Sailor. It 

highlights that what we do is 

unique and unlike any other 

branch of Engineering, anywhere. 

I think you’ll find it a riveting 

read. 

You’ll also find more information 

on many of the changes and 

challenges facing Navy 

Engineering discussed in the last 

edition. ERUS provides further 

information on the direction the 

changes to MT watchkeeping 

roles and practices is taking; this 

is complimented by an overview 

provided by RELeGEN of their 

study into the practical 

application of these changes in 

FFGs. CMDR Horsnell provides an 

update on the Navy Technical 

Regulatory System and how it 

relates to the delegation of 

Engineering Authority; POMTE Jim 

Rankine of HMAS CERBERUS 

Engineering Faculty looks at the 

reasons behind the difficulties 

in attracting and retaining 

Marine Technical (Electrical) 

sailors; and CPOMT Glenn Pope 

(HMAS STUART) provides a 

tongue-in-cheek view on retention 

initiatives that might just be worth 

looking at. 

The downside of the exemplary 

contribution rate we have 

experienced in compiling this 

edition of the bulletin is that, 

unfortunately, we were unable to 

fit all the articles we received. As 

you will no doubt understand, we 

are constrained by printing costs 

which limit the size of the 

publication we can produce. To 

those who contributed for this 

edition but didn’t get a guernsey 

this time, I offer my sincere 

apologies; please don’t let this 

dampen your enthusiasm for the 

NEB and be assured that you are 

definite starters for the March 04 

edition. 

Enjoy this edition of the 

Engineering bulletin and keep up 

the high level of support – it’s 

what we need to keep producing 

an interesting, informative 

Bulletin. 

Till next time, 

Cheers Richo

On the work front, we have had 

a number of significant 

achievements with the successful 

completion of the ANZAC MT 

Operator Trial and the 

introduction of the new MT 

Operator Qualifications. We have 

developed and distributed for 

review the ET Critical Category 

Recovery Plan, we have spent 

significant effort updating our 

Engineering Policy documents, 

and we have developed and 

updated the majority of the 

Category Management Plans. My 

goal is to increase the availability 

of up to date information by 

making all the relevant policy 

documentation, manuals and 

other articles and matters of 

interest available on the DNPR 

(E&L) website. I also intend 

instituting a quarterly e-mail 

newsletter to Officers and Senior 

Sailors so that important policy 

and employment condition 

changes are available as early 

and as widely as possible. 

We are continuing to develop the 

ME and WE Officers Retention 

Allowance Case and also the MT 

and ET Pay Case. We are also 

working closely with the 

Engineering Faculty at HMAS 

CERBERUS to reinvigorate the 

Initial Technical Training syllabus 

to better meet the requirements 

of the fleet and to improve 

retention. 

I will now address some other 

initiatives, but firstly I should say 

that it is not all hard work. Like all 

good Engineering teams we also 

make the time to enjoy ourselves 

wherever possible. To that end, we 

have actively participated, for the 

third year in a row in the, ANZAC 

day service at Holbrook, NSW 

(ably supported by our Supply 

colleagues) and represented the 

Engineering and Supply Corps 

with vigour and (some) skill at 

volleyball and cricket in the 

environs of Campbell Park. 

With respect to the future, we are 

continuing to work with the Chief 


From the Desk of 

The Director, Navy 

Professional Requirements 

(Engineering and Logistics) 

When I took over the desk at DNPR (E&L) from CAPT Craig Kerr in mid 

December last year, he said that I would be in for a busy time. He was 

right! The Engineering PQ and Category Sponsor teams have been very 

busy tackling some long standing issues within the Branch and also 

attempting to spend some time planning for the Engineering future. 

Naval Engineer and other 

members of the Engineering 

Advisory Council to develop 

options for the continuous 

development and employment of 

the Branch. This is a complex 

task and is closely related to the 

other reviews currently being 

undertaken within Navy to 

optimise the employment and 

recognition of all Navy personnel. 

A thank you to the Campbell Park 

Engineering team for their 

support and efforts over the past 

six months and also my 

congratulations to WOMT Steve 

Hazel for his attainment of 

Chartered Engineering Officer 

status under the RAN Engineers 

Australia Agreement. Finally, to 

enable us to help you we must 

know the issues and your 

concerns, and to that end we will 

continue to travel widely and 

meet, listen and discuss. 

Be safe and professional in 

Engineering. 

CAPTAIN PETER LAW, RAN 

About the author CAPT Peter Law joined 

the RAN in 1977 as a Direct Entry 

Weapons Electrical Engineer Officer. He has 

served in HMA Ships HOBART, YARRA and 

CANBERRA and has also served as the 

Fleet WEEO. He spent the majority of the 

1990's within the Defence Materiel 

Organisation working in several positions 

within the ANZAC Ship and FFG Upgrade 

Projects. In 2001 he was appointed as the 

inaugral FFG Systems Program Office 

Director. CAPT Law lives in Canberra. 

5


Letters to the Editor 

EDITOR NEB 

Hullo, 

My name is Bill Amor and in the 

past I worked as a TO3 at 

MMES 1, and I'd like to comment 

re a statement made at the 

Orange Overalls 2 in particular 

WRT gauge maintenance ie in situ 

maintenance. 

Whilst at MMES I investigated the 

in place/situ/on board 

maintenance of gauges and 

found the following: 

a. it is cost effective after 

an A&A 3 is 

accomplished, 

b. there are equipment's 

available to do this task 

ie on board calibration of 

Bowden tube pressure 

gauges, certain electronic 

gauges and temperature 

gauges, and 

c. the test results are downloadable 

into a computer 

therefore the gauge 

testing is able to be done 

to Quality Standards. 

Decisions to be Made 

When writing a TM 180 re this 

matter I had asked the Techo's 

DataBase, Fleet and other 

agencies re classification of the 

gauges in use. 

Critical Gauges and Non Critical 

gauges: 

I'd believed that not all the 

gauges monitoring a fluid on a 

particular system are critical, ie 

the gauges in the MCR are 

"critical" but a gauge on the 

system elsewhere may not be 

critical if the system is monitored 

only at the MCR but the final 

decision re gauges was to be 

made by, in the current RAN, the 

Systems Program Office or SPO 

as applicable – ie do all gauges 

get calibrated or do the critical 

gauges get calibrated and the 

non critical repaired by 

replacement? 

Costs = number of critical gauges 

= number of hoke valves = 

number of modified lines = the 

Total Costs, equipment costs see 

next. 

Equipment 

There were two suppliers of 

calibration equipment in fact 

FIMA 4 EAST and WEST had the 

equipment in 1999/2000. The 

number of test units would be 

determined by the Ship Class to 

be A&A to take the In Place 

Calibration, whom to do the 

actual work ie to calibrate the 

gauges – would that be FIMA, 

ships staff, sea riders (retired 

MT/ET types Reservists with the 

skills and time and the nouse to 

do this job, which whilst not 

exciting is so critical to machine 

operation") etc? 

Thus the number of calibration 

units is determined by the 

decision made reflecting the 

"whom" ie whom is to do the task 

and how to cover a particular 

dependency in the times set by 

the maintenance requirements 

and the Class Society. 

Comments 

The idea of in place calibration of 

ship-borne gauges in the RAN is 

not new, two FIMA's had the 

required equipment, training is 

available in gauge maintenance 

through the East Petersham TAFE, 

FIME-AE sailors had done the 

courses. 

STATE OF PLAY 

I left in 2000 and I do not know 

the state of play re this matter. 

TECHO's Data Base 

My original comments re this 

matter are in the Techo's 

Discussion Database, under 

Critical Machines or similar and 

Gauges. 

This is my slant on this matter, 

savings in time, reduction in the 

introduction of contaminations 

into systems via un-plugged 

gauge lines, and visible 

compliance to the requirements 

of Class Societies could be 

accomplished by insitu 

calibration of pressure, 

temperature, electrical and other 

gauges utilising modern 

apparatus. 

Regards 

Bill Amor 

1 MMES – Manager Maintenance 

Engineering Services, the functions of 

which have subsequently been subsumed 

by CME – the Centre for Maritime 

Engineering. (Ed.) 

2 Orange Overalls was an article in the 

March 03 edition of the Navy Engineering 

Bulletin recounting LCDR Vaughan 

Thompsett’s experiences while seconded 

to a Merchant Marine Bulk Carrier, the 

‘Pacific Triangle. (Ed) 

3 A&A – Alteration and Addition (Ed.) 

4 FIMA – Fleet Intermediate Maintenance 

Authority (Ed.) 

Letter to the Editor – ABMT 

Conway HMAS KANIMBLA 

Hi Sir 

Read your article on the new 

watchkeeping models. They sound 

like really great ideas and I hope 

that people take the time to try 

and make them work. My 

question is how are these 

models, designed for the new 

technology, going to affect us?

Knowing our limitations as you 

do, and the projected service life 

of this class, what will happen to 

the techo's trained up here as far 

as the new qualifications go and 

their application? 

I hope the new job is treating you 

well 

All the Best 

ABMT Emma Conway 

HMAS KANIMBLA 

20/04/03 

Reply to AB Conway’s Letter 

from MT Category Sponsor 

Dear Emma 

Good to hear from you and 

thanks for reading our article and 

taking the time to provide 

feedback. 

Your query has highlighted one of 

the more interesting challenges 

facing implementation of the 

changes currently facing the MT 

Category. As you well know, the 

LPA class has a significant 

manual operator requirement in 

managing their engineering plant. 

While initiatives to reduce the 

amount of personnel in the 

engineering watch in LPA are 

currently under consideration, as 

you will no doubt realise 

automation of the LPA 

Engineering plant is a daunting 

prospect which would be 

extremely time consuming and 

costly. There are no firm plans at 

this stage to introduce any 

significant level of extra 

automation to the LPA class 

Engineering plant, therefore the 

immediate benefits inherent in 

the new watchkeeping 

qualifications may be difficult to 

completely realise in LPA. We do 

not, however, wish to hold back 

those Ships with automated 

control and monitoring systems 

simply because it's difficult to 

implement these changes to their 

full extent in some of the older, 

less automated Ships. We need 

to get these practices and 

qualifications in place now, 

before the fully automated 

engineering plants expected in 

future Ships arrive. 

From an LPA perspective, 

technicians who have gained their 

qualifications in LPA and 

subsequently move to a more 

automated platform will be 

required to have their 

qualifications endorsed on their 

new Ship. This is current practice 

so nothing new or unexpected 

here, however there are initiatives 

to make this transition 

considerably easier. By this I 

mean the shifting of operator 

training from being mainly 

conducted onboard by Ship's 

Staff, to simulators and formal 

courses in Ship specific trainers 

like the FFG Trainer at GI and the 

ANZAC Console simulator, (soon 

to relocate to Stirling). The 

operator qualification courses for 

these two classes are currently 

being developed, meaning MT 

sailors will soon complete most 

of their operator based training 

ashore before joining the Ship, 

and will only be required to 

consolidate that qualification 

onboard, not learn it from 

scratch. This should serve to 

increase the achievement rate of 

operator quals and provide a 

simpler, more structured process 

for sailors to follow in obtaining 

them. 

I hope the above answers your 

question, please don't hesitate to 

contact me again if you have any 

further queries. 

Cheers Richo. 

Letter To The Editor – POMTE 

Mark Davis 

Sir, 

Just a few thoughts and 

questions I'd like to discuss 

regarding recent (to me) topics. I 

have just received the proposed 

mentoring in the RAN summary 

and been surprised to see that it 


clearly identifies a short fall in 

competency based training. 

Appreciating that this is a well 

known fact and that there is this 

wonderful proposal to aid in 

training personnel, I can't help 

myself from peering into this with 

a logical perspective. I wonder 

how personnel can be released 

from their current workplace to 

attend when we are struggling to 

make ends meet with personnel 

as it is let alone release them for 

advancement courses and 

ASTC' 5s? 

My personal belief is that we are 

training operators rather than 

maintainers and the fact is, we 

are not taking the time to train 

basic generic trade skills. The ITT 6 

trained junior sailors of today do 

18 months at HMAS CERBERUS 

in category training and from 

there on they don't touch any 

tools in a training environment 

again. This was evident when I 

went to do my LSATT 7 and 

POATT 8. I believe the ITT blokes 

are being fast tracked into middle 

management and along the way 

they are missing the basic 

knowledge that enables them to 

advise their subordinates. I have 

raised these concerns via 

feedback forms and a brief 

roadshow that was conducted 

while I was in training at Training 

Centre East for the above courses 

however, the feedback was well 

received but changes are not in 

place. 

I believe we may introduce 

negative results by placing our 

personnel in civilian workplaces 

as there are already enough 

advertisements luring sailors into 

civilian industry. There are a 

number of ex sailors working on 

Cairns based ships as contractors 

and they all encourage juniors to 

pay off as the pay is better (I 

don't understand that part) and 

conditions are great. The fact is 

that our personnel do hold 

valuable knowledge and skills 

and the civilian industry 

supporting our ships need our 

personnel and their experience. 

For that they are prepared to pay 

good money. 

Just some thoughts, I'm hoping 

you may be able to see a way 

around this but the bottom line 

remains when you see it from a 

supply and demand perspective. 

Regards, 

POMT(E) Mark Davis 

I/C High Power 

Planned Maintenance 

Co ordinator 

HS White Crew in HMAS 

LEEUWIN 

By MT Category Sponsor – PO 

Davis’ letter refers to the 

mentoring project established for 

Submarine technical sailors which 

is the subject of an article 

included in this edition. 

There are currently a number of 

initiatives being examined or in 

varying stages of development, 

which may address many of the 

concerns expressed above. 

5 ASTC – Applied Skills and Technology 

Course (Ed) 

6 ITT – Initial Technical Training (Ed) 

7 LSATT – Leading Seaman Advanced 

Technical Training (Ed) 

8 POATT – Petty Officer Advanced Technical 

Training (Ed). 

7


WOATA JOHN SCHONBERGER 

ATA AND ATV CATEGORY 

SPONSOR 

DIRECTORATE OF NAVY 

PROFESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS 

(ENGINEERING AND LOGISTICS) 

From the Desk of the 

AT Category Sponsor 

Firstly let me introduce myself – I am Warrant Officer John Schonberger 

and my job is Category Sponsor for the AT categories. I have been in 

DNPR(E&L) since Nov 2002, having joined after a four-year stint in 

DSCM, and to say that it has been a busy time over the last eight 

months, is an understatement. Our team consists of, CMDR Peter Burley 

– Assistant Director Aviation Engineering who is the Aerospace Engineer 

PQ sponsor, myself as the AT Category Sponsor and POATV Matt Hyam 

as the Assistant AT Category Sponsor. We also have a CPOATV position in 

our section, which will be filled in Nov 2003 by CPOATV Jose Bascunan. 

THE AT CATEGORY SPONSORS: POATV MATT HYAM, CMDR PETER BURLEY AND WOATA JOHN SCHONBERGER 

What do we do? 

For those that don’t know, our 

instructions are contained in 

DI(N) PERS 2-2. Category 

Sponsors are tasked with 

managing the employment of 

people within the applicable 

category to ensure that current 

and future naval capability 

requirements are met. As this is a 

fairly broad responsibility, we are 

required to consult and provide 

input into a large number of 

organisations, both internal and 

external to the Navy program. We 

maintain close ties with the following 

groups, just to name a few: 

• FEG staff; 

• Maritime Headquarters staff; 

• Maritime Development Desk 

Officers; 

• Directorate of Naval Workforce 

Planning (DNWP); 

• Directorate of Workforce Planning 

and Establishments (DWPE); 

• Defence Force Recruiting 

Organisation (DFRO); 

• Naval training Authorities (in 

particular TA-AVN, NPTC-S and 

RAAF Wagga);

• NPT Accreditation Cell; and 

• The Category’s Recognition of 

Prior Learning (RPL) Cell. 

Category Management Plan 

• Category Sponsors are required 

to promulgate an annual 

Category Management Plan 

(CMP). The CMP will be 

incorporated into, and become an 

essential part of the Workforce 

Planning reporting construct. The 

CMP includes information on: 

• the category structure, 

• category deficiencies, with a 

remedial plan; and 

• strategic changes and 

transition plan to reach the 

desired end state. 

The Aerospace Engineer and 

Aviation Technician CMPs were 

completed in May 2003 and 

forwarded to DNWP. Copies of the 

CMPs were distributed to all 

Aerospace Engineers and AT 

Senior Sailors by e-mail in May 

03. Copies of both plans are also 

available on our web site on the 

Defence Intranet at 

http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au 

/navysyscom/engineering/ 

aviation/aviation.htm 

Significant issues for the AT 

Category during last six months. 

Since January 03 we have 

instituted a number of changes to 

Aviation Technician promotion 

and advancement policies, held 

our inaugural Category Advisory 

Group (CAG) meeting, undertaken 

a whole of FEG position review, 

commenced a review on the 

Skills Acquisition and Retention 

(SAR) program within the NAS 

Nowra workshops and 

coordinated the Occupation 

Analysis. Details of the items 

undertaken over this period are 

detailed below. 

• Rewrite of D(N) PERS 40-4 – 

CASA Licensed Aircraft 

Maintenance Engineers (LAME) 

Exam requirements for AT 

sailors 

DI(N) 40-4 has been rewritten 

and provides new information 

pertaining to eligibility for CASA 

CTC exams and details advanced 

standing for LAME for FSMS 

authorised personnel. 

• Category Advisory Group (CAG) 

meeting 

In May we held the inaugural AT 

Category Advisory Group meeting 

in Nowra. The aim of the CAG is to 

coordinate management and 

development of the category, as 

well as providing a forum for the 

exchange of knowledge and 

information between agencies and 

category personnel. The meeting 

was well attended and a number 

of actions from the meeting have 

already been completed. CAG 

meetings will be conducted twice 

per annum with the next meeting 

to be held in Nov 2003 (venue 

TBA). A signal will be released in 

September requesting agenda 

items and nominations for 

attendance. Remember if you 

have any issues that you want 

raised at this important forum, 

please ensure you attend the CAG 

or provide the agenda items to 

your Category Sponsor staff prior 

to the meeting. 

• Whole of Aviation FEG Positions 

review 

This review commenced in Dec 

2002 and is almost complete. It 

involves an examination all AVN 

FEG (approx 700) positions in 

PMKeyS and their corresponding 

Duty Statements to remedy any 

errors or discrepancies and to 

ensure uniformity of training 

requirements within all Squadrons 

and Flights. A number of errors 

have been discovered with 

position Duty Statements in 

PMKeyS and it is essential that 

supervisors and managers review 

their unit duty statements on a 

regular basis. We have had 

excellent support from DDE-N and 

NPTC-S staff, which has assisted 

the directorate in rectifying errors 

in PMKeyS. Whilst on this topic, I 

encourage you to visit the PTAC 

web site at http://npt.sor.defence. 

gov.au/ptac/default.html This site 

details the Aviation Squadron 

Prerequisite Proficiency Matrix. The 

matrix provides Squadron 


managers with an easy to read 

situation of the training proficiency 

requirements for their Squadron 

and also provides PPR shortfall 

data for individual units. We are 

continuing to assist NPTC-S in the 

development of similar matrices 

for all Ships Flights and these 

should be finalised within the next 

few months. 

• ABR 5419 Ships Flight 

Qualification Matrices 

In conjunction with the Whole 

Aviation FEG position review, we 

have also reviewed all Ships’ 

Flight Qualification Matrices in 

ABR 5419 (Ships Helicopter 

Operations Manual). This task is 

still continuing and is almost 

complete with some additional 

proficiencies being included for 

S-70B-2 flights. It should be 

noted that new proficiency 

numbers have been created for 

all AT authorisations. A copy of 

the AT authorisations can be 

found on our web site. The 

revised edition of ABR 5419 

should be on the streets within 

the next few months. 

• AT promotion and Advancement 

policies; 

In April 2003, a number of 

changes to AT promotion and 

training failure policies were 

promulgated by general message. 

Copies of these messages are 

available on our web site and are 

summarised as follows. 

Introduction of Timeframes for 

Aviation Technician 

Maintenance Authorisations. 

Reference: DGNAVSYS 

WAC/W4A/HEC 232036Z APR 03. 

Timeframes for AT sailors to 

complete AT maintenance 

authorisations were introduced 

in April 2003 and promulgated 

by general message. This was to 

ensure the RAN benefits from 

the training provided to AT 

sailors, by ensuring personnel 

become qualified and authorised 

to maintain aviation assets, to a 

level commensurate with their 

rank, within a realistic 

timeframe. The timeframes were 

agreed to by DNPR(E&L), DSCM, 

9


Authorisation Time Remarks 

QM 1 6 weeks From completion of EAC 

QM 2 10 mths From completion of EAC, ie 8.5 months from attaining QM 1 

QM 3 22 mths From completion of EAC, ie 12.5 months from attaining QM 2 

MQI/FSI 3 mths From promotion within or posting into Squadron/Flight as LSAT (Note 1) 

MM 4 mths From promotion within or posting into Squadron/Flight as POAT (Note 1) 

FSMS 6 mths From promotion within or posting into Squadron/Flight CPOAT (Notes 1, 2) 

LSCC 3 mths From promotion within or posting into Squadron/Flight WOAT (Notes 1, 2) 

Note 1 If member has not completed an EAC on the applicable aircraft type prior to 

promotion within, or on joining a Squadron/Flight, timeframe commences from 

completion of EAC. 

Note 2 Maybe extended by a further 4 months to achieve MM authorisation on aircraft 

type, if not already held. 

TABLE 1 – TIMEFRAMES FOR AT MAINTENANCE AUTHORISATIONS. 

TA-AVN, FAEO and Squadron 

Aviation Engineering Officers. 

Details of the new timeframes 

are as follows: 

AT Maintenance Exams and 

AMCC Part 2 Oral Board 

Training Failure Management. 

Reference: DGNAVSYS WCB/W4A 

080327Z APR 03 

Changes to management of 

Aviation Technician MQI, MM and 

AMCC Part 1 exams were 

introduced to ensure failures are 

managed in accordance with the 

Training Progress Management 

(TPM) Policy in ABR 27. Failure of 

the AMCC Part 2 (Oral Board) is 

managed under a separate policy. 

Details of the policy for AT sailors 

are covered on the following page 

and the information will be 

included in the next revision of 

ABR 10. 

Trainee Progress Management 

(TPM) for Aviation Technician 

MQI, MM and AMCC Exams. 

MQI, MM and AMCC Part 1 

qualifications are deemed nondiscretionary 

in that they are tied 

to the respective 

LSAT/POAT/CPOAT- ATT courses, 

which are based on DSCM 

selection by a sailor’s MAT score. 

MQI, MM and AMCC Part 1 exams 

remain under independent 

control of the RAN Aviation 

Accreditation Board (AAB). 

Although these exams have a 

separate proficiency number to 

their respective ATT course, they 

are intrinsically linked to the ATT 

course. The MQI, MM, and AMCC 

Part 1 exams must be passed for 

personnel to be awarded a 

successful pass for the 

corresponding LS, PO and CPO 

ATT course. The AMCC Part 2 is 

also a non-discretionary 

promotion qualification, however 

it is not linked to the CPOATT-AT 

course. Failure of the AMCC Part 

2 Oral Board is managed 

differently to a failure of the 

MQI/MM/AMCC Part 1 exams. To 

ensure TPM is conducted 

efficiently after an initial exam 

failure, affected personnel are to 

undertake remedial training and 

re-examination attempts in 

accordance with the following 

guidelines: See Table 2. 

Other Issues of Interest 

• Skills Acquisition and Retention 

(SAR) Program 

Skills Acquisition and Retention 

(SAR) positions are located in the 

NAS Nowra workshops to enable 

AT sailors to acquire and retain 

deeper maintenance (DM) skills to 

enhance their knowledge of 

aircraft systems and components. 

The SAR program has been in 

place since the early 1990s. 

Whilst it has provided many AT 

sailors with the opportunity to gain 

workshop and DM skills, it is time 

to assess the effectiveness of the 

program, subsequently a review of 

the SAR program is currently being 

undertaken. In conjunction with 

the SAR review, the new Naval 

Aircraft Maintenance (NAM) 

contract is being developed by 

NASPO and a revised S70B2 

servicing regime is also being 

trialed. Both these projects could 

have an impact on the number of 

MRU positions embedded in 

workshops. In addition to the SAR 

positions, the ELATS function in 

the Avionics workshop at Nowra 

will be civilianised in 2004 and 

the 12 ELATS positions will be 

relocated elsewhere within the 

ALBATROSS/ Squadrons. 

DNPR(E&L) are working closely 

with NASPO and FAEO to 

determine the appropriate number 

of workshop and DM positions 

and where the any remaining 

positions will be relocated. 

• Rotary Wing Flying Training 

Review (RWFTR) 

The RWFTR is a project that is 

examining the replacement 

training aircraft and there are two 

options of the RWFTR project 

currently being considered. One 

option will see the RAN leasing a 

training helicopter to replace the 

AS350BA and the maintenance 

of this aircraft would be carried 

out by civilian staff in 723 

Squadron. Essentially this means 

that 723 Squadron maintenance

MQI Exam Re-examination attempts must be conducted within two weeks of a failure. The third and final 

attempt at the MQI exam must be undertaken within four weeks of the initial exam failure after 

LSATT-AT course. 

MM Exam Re-examination attempts must be conducted within one month of a failure. The third and final 

attempt at the MM exam must be undertaken within two months of the initial exam failure 

after POATT-AT course. 

AMCC Part 1 Re-examination attempts must be conducted within one month of a failure. The third and final 

Exam attempt at the AMCC Part 1 exam must be undertaken within two months of the initial exam 

failure after CPOATT-AT course. 

AMCC Part 2 1. Failure of the AMCC Part 2 Oral Board is not managed in accordance with TPM policy in 

Oral Board ABR 27 but as follows: 

a. On successful completion of the CPOATT-AT course and AMCC Part 1 written exam, all POAT 

or P/CPOAT sailors are to attempt the first available AMCC Part 2 (Oral Board) convened by 

the FAEO. All personnel who successfully complete the CPOATT-AT course and AMCC Pt 1 will 

be eligible to attempt the AMCC Pt 2 Oral Board, irrespective of whether they have been 

identified for promotion to CPOAT. 

b. If in the conduct of the AMCC Part 2 Oral Board, the FAEO determines that a satisfactory 

outcome is unlikely due to lack of experience and currency in core skills, a recommendation 

should be made to DSCM that the sailor be posted/loaned to a Squadron for a consolidation 

period, not exceeding six months. The FAEO will provide a report to the sailor’s CO and DSCM, 

advising of the course of action to be taken prior to any further attempt at the AMCC Part 2. 

c. DSCM will review the case, and if approved, the sailor will be formally posted or loaned to a 

squadron for consolidation training. Personnel that have been provisionally promoted to CPOAT 

will retain their provisional status until the first available AMCC Oral Board is convened after 

the consolidation period. Where a sailor has been selected for promotion, provisional 

protection will be awarded until the sailor re-faces the AMCC Part 2 Oral Board. The member’s 

training and employment is to be managed by TA-AVN / Squadron AEOs to optimise aviation 

skills, experience and development. 

d. Where a consolidation period is granted, personnel must re-face the first available AMCC Pt 

2 Oral Board, after the consolidation period, and within 12 months of completion of the 

CPOATT-AT course. Provisionally protected personnel will be reverted if they fail the AMCC Part 

2 Oral Board after the consolidation period. Further attempts at the AMCC Part 2 Oral Board 

will be at the discretion of the FAEO in consultation with TA-AVN. 

e. For personnel so effected, reversion or cancellation of promotion should not be enacted 

until a substantive fail of the AMCC Part 2 Oral Board has been delivered. Sailors who fail the 

AMCC Part 2 and have had their promotion rescinded or are reverted in rank may be 

authorised promotion on the next framed CPOAT promotion list. Any subsequent promotion 

would be dependent on sailors MAT score and workforce structure vacancies and is subject to 

the member resitting and passing the AMCC Part 2 Oral Board prior to promotion. Personnel 

will not be permitted to achieve provisional protection for any previously failed promotion prerequisite 

course. 

TABLE 2 – TRAINEE PROGRESS MANAGEMENT – AT MQI, MM AND AMC EXAMS. 

positions would be used to 

harvest funding to assist with the 

operational costs of the leased 

aircraft. Another option being 

considered is for the RAN to 

replace both the AS350BA and 

the Seaking with a single 

helicopter type that will undertake 

both the training and Maritime 

Support Helicopter (MSH) roles. 

This option would see the Squirrel 

maintenance positions used to 

harvest funds for a new aircraft 

and would use all RAN Seaking 

related positions to man both 

723 and 817 Squadrons. 817 

Squadron would consist of five 

dedicated Flights (8 maintainers 

per flight) and a small number of 

personnel for Command, 

Management and Flight Support 

Cell functions. The remaining 

Seaking related positions would 

make up 723 Squadron’s 

maintenance complement and 

this would provide both 


maintainers and Aircrew with the 

ability to transfer skills from the 

training Squadron to an 

operational Squadron. DNPR 

(E&L) staff have been examining 

manning concepts for both 

options and have provided the 

Project officers with proposed 

Squadron complements. I must 

stress at this stage, that the 

RWFTR is in the early stages of 

development and is subject to a 

rigorous evaluation process and 

11


requires endorsement and 

subsequent approval by a 

number of senior RAN and 

Defence committees. Further 

updates will be provided when 

more detail is known. Watch this 

space and listen for pipes. 

• ADF Aviation Trades 

Occupational Analysis (OA) 

By now all AT sailors (QM1 and 

above) should have completed 

the OA surveys that were 

distributed over the past few 

months. Senior Sailors would 

have also been provided with a 

second survey to gain your 

responses on the Training aspects 

for Aviation technicians. We have 

been working closely with the 

Occupational Analysis staff in 

Canberra to ensure the survey’s 

success. The OA report is due to 

be distributed in Sep 03 and 

from this may come a range of 

issues for consideration. I would 

like to express my gratitude all 

those involved in coordinating the 

OA responses and also thank 

those personnel who took the 

time to complete the surveys. 

Remember, the more information 

we get from people on the hangar 

floor about how they do their job 

and which tasks are important, 

the better off we are in being 

able to develop future training 

and employment for all AT sailors. 

• Professional Development for 

Technical Sailors. 

The RAN has joined forces with 

the Institution of Engineers 

Australia (now trading as 

Engineers Australia) to enhance 

the development of the naval 

engineering team and assist Navy 

in growing competent 

independent practitioners of 

engineering, with chartered status 

being the brand of success and 

worldwide recognition. Joining the 

Professional Development 

Program is easy. The minimum 

requirement to join Engineers 

Australia is an Advanced Diploma 

in Engineering at AQF level 6 or 

equivalent. RAN personnel who 

currently hold or are studying the 

Advanced Diploma (Technical), or 

Bachelor of Engineering or 

Bachelor of Technology are 

eligible to join. More information 

on the Engineers Australia 

program and other Continuing 

Professional Development 

courses and funding can be 

found in the article written by 

LSMT Simpson in this edition of 

the Navy Engineering Bulletin. 

Employment and Supplementary 

information for SPARs 

Recent discussions between the 

Category Sponsor and DSCM 

have revealed that many CPOATs 

who are being considered at the 

Warrant Officer Promotion Board 

(WOPB) are lacking employment 

history details on their SPARs. 

Flight Senior Maintenance Sailor 

(FSMS) authorisation and the 

exercising of the authorisation are 

considered at the WOPB. Whilst 

not a mandatory requirement for 

promotion to WOAT, employment 

as an FSMS can have a 

considerable affect on the 

member’s standing at the WOPB. 

It became apparent during the 

last WOPB that many CPOATs who 

had exercised the FSMS 

authorisation at sea, and during 

shore detachments, had no 

reference of such events in their 

SPAR or service file. This situation 

is occurring more frequently 

particularly with the increasing 

number of aircraft detachments 

being conducted for short periods 

(often on loan from Squadrons) 

during the SPAR reporting period. 

In some cases it has made it 

difficult for the WOPB panel to get 

a true reflection of a member’s 

complete employment history as 

a CPOAT, due to the lack of any 

reference to FSMS employment in 

the member’s SPAR. 

It is vital for Assessors and Senior 

Assessors to ensure that any 

instances of a CPOAT exercising 

the FSMS authorisation (be at 

sea or ashore) be annotated in 

the member’s SPAR. It is equally 

important for all CPOATs who 

have undertaken FSMS duties to 

ensure such events are included 

in the narrative of your SPAR. If 

your SPAR has already been 

completed and you have 

subsequently undertaken FSMS 

duties, a minute from your HOD 

detailing exercising of the FSMS 

authorisation can still be 

forwarded to DSCM for placement 

on your WOPB pack. This will 

ensure that the WOPB panel has 

the necessary employment 

information to gain the full 

understanding of your 

employment. 

Additionally, any documents 

noting praise, or commendations 

and awards of any nature should 

also be copied and forwarded to 

DSCM to be placed on your 

WOPB pack. The WOPB panel 

considers all documentation on 

your pack and it possible that a 

commendation or certificate of 

appreciation may assist your 

overall standing at the WOPB. 

Conclusion 

Hopefully the above information 

has provided you with a better 

understanding of what your 

Category Sponsor’s functions and 

duties are what we have been 

doing and are currently working 

on for you and the AT category. 

We are intending to visit all units 

where AT sailors are employed 

during the next financial year, so 

let us know if you require a visit 

or presentation. Our aim is to 

provide as much information on 

category issues to you, so please 

don’t hesitate to contact us, and 

if you happen to be in Canberra, 

drop in and we will whip you a 

brew. Our contact details are: 

CMDR Burley 

CP4-7-124 (02) 6266 2097 

WOATA Schonberger 

CP4-7-136 (02) 6266 4584 

CPOATV Jose Bascunan 

CP4-7-138 (02) 6266 2483 

(Joins 3 Nov 03) 

POATV Hyam 

CP4-7-137 (02) 6266 2570 

Hope to see you round the traps.

DNOP News BY 

At the time of writing this I have 

had six months in the chair as 

DNOP(E) and my feet have hardly 

touched the ground. It has been 

quite a challenge to come to grips 

with PMKEYS, a myriad of 

personnel policies and our 

different Engineer Officer career 

progressions, let alone the best 

part which is to begin to get to 

know all of you. Anyway, I thought 

I would take this opportunity to let 

you in on some of the hot issues 

facing us in trying to get you all 

the posting of your dreams. 

Currently there is a significant 

shortage of WE and ME Engineers 

at LEUT/LCDR level 

(approximately 20-25%). This 

means one in four or five 

engineering positions across the 

board will be vacant. If you 

consider shore positions only, 

that translates to one in three or 

four being gapped at any given 

time. Should make it easy for us 

to post you to the job you want, 

right? Unfortunately it doesn’t 

quite work like that. Every 

supervisor has a justifiable 

reason why their positions should 

not be gapped, so considerable 

time is spent in negotiations to 

try and spread this hurt equitably. 

We also have to follow a list of 

priorities set by CN to meet the 

strategic requirements of Navy as 

a whole. Even where we do have 

the right number of personnel, as 

is the case with Aerospace 

engineers, we face mismatches in 

the experience levels required. 

The result is that the process of 

sorting out one posting can be 

somewhat protracted. 

This leads me into the very 

emotive topic of promotions. Given 

that we are short of LCDRs in all 

Engineering PQs, you may be 

seduced into thinking that this 

would mean a large promotion list 

and beers all round the 

engineering fraternity come mid 

December. Regrettably there are a 

couple of other things that have to 

LCDR PHIL SCOTT RAN SOE-1 DNOP 

be taken into consideration. The 

first is the total number of LCDRs 

in the RAN. At the start of the year 

we were overborne LCDRs, largely 

as a legacy of the phase batch 

promotion system. The second is 

the shortage of LEUTs. We are 

currently underborne LEUTs and 

we can’t keep promoting them 

until we run out. This is provided 

as general background information 

designed to give a little insight 

into how the promotion targets are 

set and in no way does this mean 

I know what the promotion targets 

are or will be. 

Until recently charge selection for 

Engineers was based on seniority 

and availability. From now on all 

charge appointments will be 

conducted in accordance with the 

process outlined in ABR 6289. 

Charge positions will now be 

appointed by a board comprising 

DNPR(E&L) and CSO(E). Mid Aug 

will see the board appointing all 

charge positions for the period 

Jun 03 to Jun 04. This process is 

applicable for all MFUs, 

Squadrons and Submarines. All 

eligible personnel will have their 

names presented to the board 

with posting history, performance 

reports, location, type, timing 

preferences and volunteer status 

for the board to take into 

consideration. This process 

mirrors the charge selection 

process for Seaman officers and 

has been introduced to meet the 

requirements for technical 

regulation. Personnel in charge 

positions are to be appointed by 

a competent authority, namely 

CNE, who has delegated this to 

CSO(E) and DNPR(E&L). 

Members accumulating excessive 

leave credits have been causing 

considerable grief at all the DNOP 

desks of late. The ability to meet 

individuals posting preferences is 

often dictated by timing. 

Members with over 70 days leave 

will be posted additional to a 

shore establishment for leave 


before taking up their next 

posting. These excessive leave 

credits may prevent you being 

considered for your ‘dream’ 

posting or could result in you 

taking leave when it doesn’t 

necessarily suit. It is strongly 

recommended that members take 

personal responsibility for 

keeping their leave balance within 

normal limits and take all 

possible opportunities to use 

their leave credits. 

Postings worthy of consideration 

for young engineers seeking to 

raise their profile and give 

themselves an edge in the 

posting/promotion stakes include 

Flag Lieutenant positions or 

Divisional Officer at either Creswell 

or Recruit School. These jobs offer 

insight into areas of the 

organisation not normally 

accessed and broaden your 

outlook as a Naval Officer. At 

Creswell and Recruit school you 

are also given the chance to leave 

your mark on all the new entries 

into the RAN and make sure the 

people you have come and work 

for you later in life are the best 

trained personnel possible. As 

these postings take time out from 

your primary training, they will 

normally only be for 12 months. If 

additional incentive is needed, 

volunteers will be given their 

preference of subsequent posting, 

within reason. 

I would also like to take the 

opportunity to clarify a point on 

the not-so-new performance 

reports (Form AC833-11) 

regarding recommendations for 

Command positions. The 

“Command” box in the NOPAS 

should not be marked “not 

applicable” for LCDRs. CO FIMAs 

and Shore Command positions 

are Command positions that are 

available for selection of 

Engineers and, as such, eligibility 

for selection to these will require 

at least a “suitable” 

recommendation. While on the 

13 

subject of selection for COs of 

FIMAs, the response to the last 

round was disappointing. The 

Minor Command and Sea Charge 

Advisory Committee (MCSCAC) 

selection process was delayed 

because of the lack of personnel 

volunteering for these jobs. The 

Command job should be viewed 

with as much importance as 

ACSC. Having had Command of a 

FIMA will meet the eligibility 

criterion of “previous Command 

experience’ for postings to some 

positions in ADFHQ. CNE and 

DNPR(E&L) are also currently 

investigating other positions that 

maybe considered as Command 

positions in the future. 

Recently the DNOP Defence 

Intranet website has been 

updated and a plan for 

continuous improvement and 

updating information is in place. 

The address is 

defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/dpedn 

op. If you are able, make a habit 

of checking it out from time to 

time. Signal and LOP will, 

however, remain the main avenue 

for advertising posting 

opportunities including overseas 

positions, overseas courses, flags 

positions and the like. 

I encourage you to keep in 

contact. Email is generally 

preferable so we can keep a 

record of your personal career 

and location preferences/ 

circumstances, but don’t be 

afraid to call if things change at 

short notice. 

Contact Details: 

Staff Officer Engineering 1 

(LCDR Engineers and LEUT 

Engineers with CQ): 

LCDR Phil Scott on 

02 6265 1007 or 

(Phillip.Scott1@defence.gov.au) 

Staff Officer Engineering 2 

(LEUT/SBLT Engineers without CQ): 

LEUT Chris Miller on 

02 6265 3276 or 

(Christopher.Miller@defence.gov.au)


BY LCDR ANDREW 

GOLDSWORTHY RAN 

An Engineering Approach 

to Maintaining Capability 

INTRODUCTION 

In the first, relaunched edition of the Engineering Bulletin (Jun 01), LCDR 

Mark Warren postulated that the Naval Engineer would become extinct 

due to the benefits derived from advancing technology and cost 

pressures to reduce crew numbers. CDRE Ken Joseph continued this 

theme of smaller crews on warships, but suggested a greater 

prominence for engineers within the Navy in Issue 2 of the Engineering 

Bulletin (Feb 02). I find these two articles interesting in that whilst I 

believe that smaller crews are a future reality, I would like to suggest that 

the balance should be exactly the opposite. Fundamentally, I would like 

to suggest that as technology advances, will we need fewer and fewer 

‘operators’ but similar numbers of maintainers lead by highly competent 

and adaptive engineers. 

OVERVIEW 

Firstly, I would like to address 

some of the main points made in 

LCDR Warren’s article from the 

perspective of having recently 

served on one of the newer 

technology ships currently in the 

fleet, the ANZAC Class Frigate 

HMAS ARUNTA. Then I would like 

to discuss what our warships 

should be capable of, and 

consequently propose the current 

and future value of engineers at 

sea. Finally, I would like to 

propose an alternative manning 

structure for warships to the one 

presented by LCDR Warren. 

MATURITY OF DESIGN 

The first point that LCDR Warren 

makes in his article is that there 

is a reduced benefit from 

engineers at sea due to the 

maturity of design, and compares 

the design maturity of a warship 

to that of a car. I believe this 

comparison does not accurately 

reflect the relative complexities 

between both designs. A warship 

has a very large number of 

systems having various levels of 

integration with each other and 

with different configurations 

possible. The car on the other 

hand, is a relatively simple 

system with far fewer 

permutations and maintenance 

requirements. Also, the car has 

not been subjected to the 

revolutionary design changes that 

have been seen in ships. Whilst, 

the car has undergone significant 

improvements in design, 

particularly in the area of 

passenger safety, the impact has 

been nothing like the impact of 

changing from sail to steam to 

gas turbines/diesels to fully 

electric propulsion that is 

occurring to ships. Additionally, 

the operator requirement for car 

drivers has changed very little 

over the years whilst an operator 

on a warship will experience a 

significant number of changes, 

both in technology and 

procedures, even within the life of 

a ship build program. 

To further complicate different 

design environments, recent 

trends in contracting strategies 

have meant that the experience 

of one generation of ship is not 

incorporated into the next. We 

have moved away from 

maintaining expertise within 

house that can translate 

operating and maintenance 

experience of ships into contract 

requirements for the next build 

program. As a result, we rely 

increasingly on the design 

experience of the ship builder, 

which, in Australia, is extremely 

limited both in scope and 

duration. The consequence of this 

is that there is not the same 

design refinement and 

improvement for warships as 

there is for the humble old car. 

So, given the pace of design 

change and the experience of the 

Australian shipbuilding industry, it 

seems unlikely that we will ever 

reach the maturity of design that 

exists in cars. Furthermore, even if 

the same level of design maturity 

could be achieved, the level of 

complexity of a warship design 

would necessitate routine 

engineering input. 

COMPUTER CONTROL SYSTEMS 

LCDR Warren then goes on to say 

that increasing levels of computer 

control makes operation of the 

platform much easier. Now, 

providing all the software, sensors 

and control hardware are all

working correctly, I would agree. 

There is today very little 

difference in operator involvement 

whether you are on an FFG, an 

ANZAC, a MHC or HS ship. 

Despite different technologies 

used and different operator 

positions, control is based on a 

set speed that computers 

translate into propulsion settings. 

The problem with this is that the 

systems do not always work 

correctly, especially when Sea 

Training Group are embarked. 

My experience of the ANZAC 

propulsion control system 

certainly suggests that an 

increased reliance on software 

does not decrease the 

involvement of machinery 

operators or the engineer in 

managing the machinery. In fact, 

in my opinion, the difference 

technology has made is that 

when something does go wrong it 

is actually more difficult to work 

out why and then determine a 

way of overcoming the problem. 

Software has added an extra level 

of complication to the job of the 

machinery operator because not 

only do they need to understand 

the plant and the various ways in 

which it can be controlled, they 

also need to understand what the 

software is doing. Problems arise 

in three main ways: 

• firstly as an actual mechanical 

failure, 

• secondly due to incorrect inputs 

as a result of sensor failures, and 

• thirdly, software induced either 

through independent actions or 

by presenting information to the 

operator in such a way that they 

take inappropriate action. 

Consequently, advancing 

technology and greater control of 

systems by software appear to 

have increased the demands 

placed on our machinery 

operators and calls more on the 

skills of an engineer. 

BENEFIT OF AN ENGINEER 

LCDR Warren looks at what the 

Navy gets for the cost of training 

a charge qualified engineer and 

then suggests that using this 

expertise in the design role, in 

line with IE Aust definitions of an 

engineer, would be more 

beneficial. As I have shown 

already, the role of an engineer at 

sea is a lot more involved and 

demanding than simply being the 

“wine caterer and TV tuner” 1, even 

on a technologically advanced 

ship. I certainly found the 

management of an engineering 

department on an ANZAC ship 

more complex than what I can 

remember of the job on an old 

River Class DE. I shall look at the 

value an engineer can provide, 

and in respect to IE Aust 

competencies, in more detail 

shortly. However, I do agree with 

LCDR Warren and CDRE Joseph 

that uniformed engineers should 

have a greater involvement in the 

design process of warships. 

Although, the reason a uniformed 

engineer is useful in this role is 

because they have experienced 

the operation and maintenance 

of a warship at sea. Without this 

experience, engineers will 

become less relevant in the Navy 

because the designs that they 

influence will be less attuned to 

the needs of those at sea. 

COMPARISON TO AVIATION 

After having compared a warship 

to a car, LCDR Warren goes on to 

compare the operation of a ship 

to the operation of an aircraft. 

LCDR Warren, in making this 

comparison, suggests that 


because the level of technological 

sophistication is similar, that 

warships could be manned in a 

similar way. The most significant 

reason that this comparison is 

not valid is based on the time 

available to each platform to 

rectify problems when they occur. 

An aircraft has very little time 

available and even less access to 

equipment to be able to identify 

and overcome problems that 

occur during flight. Basically, 

when an aircraft stops flying it 

has either returned to an airfield 

or we never use it again. On the 

other hand, when a ship breaks 

down, there is time and access to 

rectify or at least engineer an 

alternative to get the ship 

operating again. This becomes 

especially relevant in a wartime 

context, where even with the 

destructive power of today’s 

weapons, there may still be an 

opportunity to save the ship after 

it has been hit. 

Rather than comparing a ship to 

a FA18, we could perhaps 

compare a ship to a Seahawk. A 

Seahawk flight attached to a ship 

have operators that fly the 

aircraft, maintainers who conduct 

the maintenance and assist in 

flightdeck operations, and is 

under the operational control of 

the ships CO, whilst the 

engineering support to the aircraft 

is provided in a separate location 

ashore. This is similar to the 

arrangement being suggested by 

LCDR Warren for ships, the 

operators run the ship, fixers 

keep it going, and it is under the 

operational control of MC Aust, 

whilst engineering support is 

provided from ashore. So, what is 

the experience of the Seahawk? 

How many times have we seen a 

helo unavailable to undertake an 

operational tasking because a 

15


problem outside the normal 

scope of planned maintenance 

has to be referred ashore for an 

answer. The exchange of 

information and questions 

between the embarked flight and 

the ashore support can take an 

extended period of time due to 

the nature of communications 

with ships at sea and results in 

the aircraft being unserviceable 

for long periods. Is this what we 

want for our ships? Interestingly, 

in 2001 the aviation world trialed 

sending an engineer to sea with 

the embarked flight in an attempt 

to overcome this problem and 

also to give the engineer first 

hand experience of a flight at sea. 

AUSTRALIAN WARSHIPS 

Before looking at the value of an 

engineer at sea, we must 

understand what we want our 

ship to be able to do and the 

importance of each ship within 

our Fleet. A comprehensive 

answer to the question of the 

roles that can be given to 

warships by government is 

contained in the Australian 

Maritime Doctrine. Chapter 6 lists 

the characteristics of maritime 

power, of which the following are 

relevant to the current discussion: 

resilience, poise and persistence, 

reach, adaptability and flexibility. 

The engineer plays an important 

role in each of these 

characteristics. An engineer 

contributes to the resilience of a 

ship through the management of 

redundancy within systems and 

through the assessment and 

repair of damage. The ability of a 

ship to remain in the area of 

operations without recourse to 

shore services relies heavily on 

the skills of an engineer. Similarly, 

to achieve the normal reach of a 

warship is dependent upon the 

ability of an engineer to sustain 

the operation of the ship for long 

periods and at extended 

distances from home base. 

Adaptability and flexibility will 

also provide many challenges to 

an engineer, especially in unusual 

tasks that may arise at short 

notice. CAPT Paul Field in the 

Feb 02 edition of the Engineering 

Bulletin makes a more detailed 

discussion on the role of 

engineers in support of Maritime 

Doctrine. To ensure that these 

characteristics of maritime power 

remain available in future 

warships, some form of tactical 

level engineering is vital. 

Another aspect of our Navy that 

distinguishes us particularly from 

the USN, is the value of each 

ship within our order of battle. 

Each ship within our Fleet is a 

significant element of our 

capability to defend Australia. The 

RAN is far less able to absorb the 

loss of even one ship than larger 

navies such as the USN or the 

RN. Consequently, the effort we 

put into sustaining a ship within 

an operational area needs to be 

greater than these larger navies. A 

larger navy has greater scope to 

withdraw a damaged ship from 

the area of operation and 

allocate another. For the RAN, it 

is far more important for us to 

engineer a way to keep a 

damaged ship operating to 

achieve its tasking. 

VALUE OF AN ENGINEER 

So, what does an engineer have 

to offer? LCDR Warren points to 

the IEAust to provide an 

understanding of what an 

engineer does, and proposes that 

engineers are primarily involved in 

design through improving systems 

or maintenance. But if we look at 

the competencies for registration 

as a Chartered Professional 

Engineer, we can see that an 

engineer can have a much greater 

role within an organisation. 

Although there is a heavy 

emphasis on design, there are 

also competencies related to the 

management of engineering 

within the business (ie, for 

business we can use the ship), 

management of engineering 

operations, and investigation and 

reporting of problems. A 

professional engineer therefore 

has a much more expansive role 

than merely design, they are the 

manager of a large and skilled 

technical workforce to assess 

reports properly and to assist 

with particularly complex 

problems. 

LCDR Warren suggests that 

advances in technology will result 

in a corresponding reduction in 

the requirement for engineering 

skills in these areas. The 

assertion that advancing 

technology leads to greater 

reliability does not seem to be 

supported by experience. Without 

having analysed any data, I do 

not believe that anyone would 

suggest that ANZAC Class ships 

are any more reliable than the 

FFGs. In fact, my experiences in 

early 2001, would tend to 

indicate that they are less 

reliable. However, even if this is 

the case, new technology has led 

to greater flexibility for both plant 

operating modes and plant 

control. This greater flexibility 

offers command more choices in 

terms of matching the plant to 

the current operational tasking. 

Engineering operations 

competencies then become even 

more important in helping 

Command manage the plant to 

maximise operational 

performance and minimise plant 

stresses. As we look forward to 

revolutionary engineering plants, 

such as the fully electric 

propulsion, the degree of system 

complexity and flexibility is only 

going to increase, resulting in an 

equivalent increase in importance 

of having an engineer to manage 

the plant. 

AN ALTERNATIVE FUTURE 

So, having established why an 

engineer is important on a ship 

and what an engineer has to 

offer, how might our future 

warships be manned. Although I 

have disagreed with the 

suggestion that technology makes 

systems easier to support, I do 

believe that it makes them easier 

to operate. Consequently, we now 

need less operators to control 

and adjust the ships systems and 

machinery, and as technology 

develops we could see an even 

greater reduction in the number 

of operators required to fight the 

ship as a whole. In fact, it may be 

possible next century to operate 

the warfare side of a ship via 

satellite from MHQ. Therefore, I 

believe that technology will allow 

us to reduce the number of 

operators in a crew, but for the 

reasons stated above, will still 

need engineers and maintainers 

onboard. Imagine an operations 

room with only the captain, a 

PWO and a system manager; a 

bridge with only an OOW; and a 

host of maintainers ready to alter 

the ship’s systems to meet the 

changing operational demands 

and limitations imposed by 

damage. We may well only need 

one or two engineers in this 

scheme rather than the five or six 

we have currently, but the 

ultimate ability of a ship to fight 

and win at sea can only be 

achieved with engineers at sea. 

1 LCDR Mark Warrens article from 

Engineering Bulletin Jun 01. 

About the Author LCDR Goldsworthy joined 

the RAN in Jan 1986 at ADFA where he 

completed a Mechanical Engineering 

Degree in Dec 1990. On completion of 

junior officer training at HMAS CRESWELL 

he joined HMAS DERWENT as an AMEO. 

Whilst an AMEO he also spent some time 

on HMAS TORRENS and HMNZS WAIKATO 

before being awarded an MEOCC. In mid 

1993 he took over as one of the Ship 

Managers at FIMA Sydney, primarily looking 

after IMAV work for FFGs. In late 1995 he 

posted onto HMAS CANBERRA to take up 

the role of DMEO. Once awarded a MEOCQ, 

he was posted to Canberra where he 

fulfilled a number of roles working with 

minor projects and the initial development 

of Certification. In Apr 2000 he assumed 

the role of MEO of HMAS ARUNTA before 

returning once again to Canberra where he 

is now working in the Logisitics Section of 

the FFG Upgrade Project."

Technical Mentoring 

in the RAN 

In many instances, sailors have 

been unable to have their 

taskbooks signed until they 

achieve mastery. Competency 

Based Training principally targets 

the training required to perform 

to a standard in the workplace. 

The role of mastery and informal / 

accidental learning in the 

workplace should not become a 

casualty of innovation – this, to 

some extent, is a flaw in CBT. 

There will always be elements of 

any job that require interpretation 

and integration of knowledge and 

skills. These are considered to be 

‘intangible competencies’. The 

current concept and operation of 

minimum manned platforms, 

together with the resultant change 

in maintenance philosophies, has 

resulted in maintainers lacking 

mastery of intangible 

competencies. It is considered 

that the ability to integrate 

competencies, tangible or 

otherwise, requires mastery 

through mentoring. 

Added to the learning/ 

consolidation concerns 

mentioned, community and 

Defence concerns indicate that a 

major contributor to de-skilling 

and low morale within the 

Defence workforce is the impact 

of outsourcing support functions 

for Defence. A predominantly 

large amount of interesting and 

demanding technical work is 

contracted to industry, resulting in 

a dissatisfied, involuntarily semiskilled 

uniformed workforce. 

Mentoring – The Concept 

Mentoring is an initiative aimed 

at providing practical and 

meaningful work experience 

ashore, using commercial 

Defence contractors, whilst 

developing Defence staff skills, 

and consequently enhancing 

Defence capability within the 


Situation 

People are capability. In today’s Navy, job roles are changing at an everincreasing 

rate. The Navy needs to have the right people with the right 

training, skills and experience to operate and maintain the platforms to 

undertake complex military operations using sophisticated equipment. 

Traditionally, technical sailors undertook their trade training - apprentice 

and phase training – at HMAS NIRIMBA, with practical experience gained 

through time and on-the-job training. Formal training programs provided 

the core methodology of preparing a person for the workplace. This is 

consistent with today’s Navy training system, where learning and 

subsequent assessment is required at the workplace. However, 

significant differences exist between assessment of competency and 

achievement of mastery, mastery being considered the highest level of 

competence. Under the current training system, sailors are being 

assessed competent and are unable to achieve mastery through 

circumstances outside their control; circumstances driven by minimum 

manned vessels, contractor support programs, multi-skilling still required 

for submarine technical sailors, and maintenance philosophies that limit 

crews to Organisational Level Maintenance (OLM) only. 

accords of Government policy of 

closer industry relationships to 

develop shared career structures. 

Mentoring allows formal and 

spontaneous learning to occur in 

a semi-controlled manner, by 

skills transfer from trained 

experienced personnel to less 

experienced within a practical 

working environment. It is 

proposed that mentoring, by 

outplacement of personnel within 

a Defence related industry, will 

increase an individual’s 

development, enhance their 

competency standards within 

their chosen profession, increase 

organisational capability, and 

possibly increase retention 

prospects for skilled personnel. 

Gaps in formal training can be 

overcome, where the learner has 

the opportunity to ask questions, 

receive advice, and work without 

the constraints of a formal 

training environment. 

BY CMDR BRONKO OGRIZEK 

FMEO 

17


The opportunity for Defence to 

tap into industry for skills and 

experience would not only 

complement the RAN’s capability 

in developing and sustaining the 

skills on fitted equipment, but 

also give RAN personnel 

meaningful employment ashore. 

Proposal 

It is proposed to outplace 

selected uniformed personnel 

into Defence-related service 

industry/organisations for periods 

of two to six months, to work 

alongside contractors to develop 

a range of skills consolidation. It 

is recommended that personnel 

be identified for outplacement at 

the Leading Seaman and Petty 

Officer level by analysis of 

performance reports with FEG 

recommendation and 

endorsement. DSCM will post 

nominated personnel to the STSC 

at HMAS STIRLING, to be 

coordinated and managed during 

the outplacement. The benefits to 

mentor, mentee and 

organisations (Defence and 

industry) could be profound, 

It is proposed to outplace 

selected uniformed personnel 

into Defence-related service 

industry/organisations for 

periods of two to six months, 

to work alongside contractors 

to develop a range of skills 

consolidation. 

breaking down the existing 

‘contractor client’ paradigm, 

enhancing Navy’s capability and 

hopefully increasing personnel 

and skills retention. 

For the scheme to be successful, 

it needs total support from top 

management within Defence, 

Government and industry. 

Industry would not only have to 

be willing participants, but the 

profile and environment of 

selected companies would have 

to be conducive to mentoring, 

and industrial, legal and OH&S 

issues would have to be identified 

and resolved. Additionally, 

balancing the cost of outsourcing 

a person for up to six months 

against loss of that person clearly 

indicates that the outsourcing 

and retention benefits outweigh 

the cost of salary and benefits for 

that period. The ability to fix or 

overcome a deficiency 

experienced at sea during an 

operational deployment would far 

outweigh the measurable costs of 

the program. 

Discussions with submarine 

support and commercial 

organisations indicate strong 

willingness to participate in and 

enhance this program. It is 

viewed as a ‘win-win’ for the 

companies, strengthening ties 

between themselves and 

Defence. Anecdotal evidence 

suggests that organisations do 

not view this as an internal 

recruiting mechanism, but a 

venture to enhance ties within 

Defence. The process is also seen 

as an initiative to enhance the 

professional development of 

sailors, increase the capability of 

the RAN, and assist in the 

retention of sailors by providing 

meaningful, challenging 

employment ashore. 

About the Author Bronko Ogrizek was born 

and educated in Sydney prior to joining the 

Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in 1984. As a 

junior officer, he undertook training at 

various shore establishments and at sea in 

HMA Ship TORRENS, VAMPIRE, OVENS, 

relieving as the Marine Engineer Officer 

(MEO) in HMAS OVENS in August 1986. 

CMDR OGRIZEK has served as Marine 

Engineer Officer in HMA Ships OVENS 

(twice), OTWAY, HOBART, WALLER, and 

ADELAIDE. He has consequently served in 

positions ashore in Maintenance, Logistics 

and Training, and is currently the Fleet 

Marine Engineer Officer within AUSFLTCSG.

BY CMDR STEVE BASLEY, 

DEPUTY TRAINING AUTHORITY – 

LOGISTICS (ENGINEERING) 

The aim of ATT is to develop our 

competent, experienced tradelevel 

sailors into senior 

technicians able to cope with the 

technical and professional 

requirements of the next rank. I’m 

sure that some of you who have 

undertaken ATT in recent times 

will be a bit cynical about the 

value and importance of ATT and 

I’ll speak about some of the 

problems with ATT a little further 

on. Firstly though, I will talk a bit 

about what is ATT, where it is 

delivered and what it achieves. 

Courses 

There are currently five separate 

courses delivered to ET & MT 

sailors. They are: 

• LSET ATT 

101558, 20014 37 days 

• LSMT ATT 

101557, 200015 59 days 

200020 

• POMT ATT 

20013, 101581 24 days 

200021 

• POET ATT 

101580 14 days 

• CPOATT 

101220 30 days 

Note: The different numbers relate 

to different streams. While the 


From the Desk of 

DTA Log (ENG) – Advanced 

Technical Training for 

ET & MT 

I have decided that for this issue of the Navy Engineering Bulletin I’ll 

write about Advanced Technical Training. While Initial Category Training 

represents the foundation for our technical workforce, ATT, for a number 

of reasons is equally important. 

courses are the same, the award 

of proficiency numbers results in 

different competency sets being 

loaded into PMKeys. 

Locations 

The LS and PO ATT courses are 

currently delivered by Contract 

staff at the Navy Technical 

Training Units East and West. 

These are located at the Email 

Training Centre and at Leeuwin 

Barracks in Fremantle WA. NTTU- 

W relocated to Leeuwin Barracks 

from the CCI Training Centre in 

Kwinana WA. This happened for 

a number of reasons, but the 

main thrust of the move was to 

deliver the training at a wellequipped 

venue and in a 

military environment which 

provides access to the sorts of 

facilities (eg medical, sporting, 

catering) that we enjoy as 

Defence Force members. It is not 

known at his stage how long 

NTTU-W will remain at Leeuwin, 

although I am hopeful that any 

future move will be to a location 

which provides the same level of 

support to both staff and 

trainees. 

The Email Training Centre (NTTU- 

East) is located at Waterloo NSW, 

behind what used to be the 

Naval Stores Centre (Zetland). 

This venue is currently scheduled 

for demolition and plans are 

currently underway to relocate 

19 

the training to HMAS Penguin, 

where TA LOG currently conducts 

a range of other courses. 

Similarly to Leeuwin Barracks, 

HMAS Penguin is favoured due to 

the military environment and the 

non-academic facilities which are 

available in a military 

establishment. It is currently 

anticipated that NTTU-E will 

gradually relocate, with 

completion expected by early 

’04. 

In addition to East and West, TA 

LOG has recently decided to 

conduct a number of LS and PO 

ATT courses in Cairns and Darwin. 

It has become obvious from the 

feedback provided by members 

from these locations (particularly 

those with dependants) that 

travelling interstate for training 

represents a considerable 

inconvenience to families. Most 

ATT candidates from Northern 

Australia are posted from busy 

operational units and time ashore 

is obviously precious. The first ATT 

courses in NA will commence Feb 

’04 and will be administered from 

NTTU-W. We expect those courses 

to be well-subscribed so get your 

nominations in early! 

As most readers will be aware, 

completion of competencies 

associated with ATT leads to the 

award of qualifications registered 

under the Australian 

Qualifications Framework. These


qualifications are Certificate IV 

(Higher Engineering Trade) for 

Leading Seaman and Diploma in 

Engineering for Petty Officer. 

Rather than being based only on 

the formal underpinning 

components of the ATT courses, 

these qualifications represent the 

cumulative training received and 

competencies awarded (including 

ITT). 

CPOATT 

The Chiefs’ ATT is conducted at 

Engineering Faculty HMAS 

Cerberus. As any graduate of the 

course will testify, this is a very 

intense programme requiring 

regular late-night group sessions. 

It is for this reason that the 

CPOATT has remained at 

Cerberus. The feedback received 

from most courses is that the 

workload is only achievable while 

course members live in as a 

group. 

The CPOATT course currently 

leads to the qualification of 

Diploma of Frontline 

Management. This qualification is 

now removed from the AQF 

register. The AQF rules allow 

training providers 12 months to 

migrate to the new qualification 

and associated competencies. 

Early next year I expect that 

development will be complete 

and graduates will be awarded 

the Diploma of Business 

(Frontline Management) on 

completion of CPOATT 

competencies. 

Current Issues 

The biggest challenge we face in 

regard to the development of our 

sailors through the ATT courses is 

getting members released for 

training prior to promotion. The 

number of sailors being promoted 

provisionally is increasing, 

primarily due to the current 

operational tempo and shortages 

of trained personnel (particularly 

ETs) across all ranks. 

What this represents is a 

significant number of technical 

sailors employed in jobs for which 

they have not received the correct 

training. That we can sustain this 

situation means that either the 

training doesn’t fit the job too 

well or that some tasks are being 

pushed up the line to those who 

should spend more time 

managing rather than doing. 

Either way, I think that every effort 

needs to be made to identify 

training opportunities so that the 

provisional backlog is reduced. TA 

LOG staff are in the process of 

identifying all individuals who 

carry provisional PPRs and, with 

assistance from training 

coordinators, getting those 

individuals trained. 

Future of Advanced Technical 

Training 

A considerable amount of ITT/ATT 

development work is currently 

taking place under the oversight 

of TA LOG and DNPR(E&L). One 

likely outcome of the 

development is that the POATT 

and LSATT will be combined. The 

effect of this will be to reduce 

duplication and ease the burden 

on units for releasing personnel. 

This can be achieved without any 

reduction in the qualifications 

that are issued and without any 

reduction in the level of job 

performance our sailors achieve. 

The delivery methods of ATT also 

need some attention. The 

requirement to remove sailors for 

training during busy periods may 

be unsustainable. In the case of 

some of the smaller platforms, 

rigid crewing cycles may make 

access to the longer courses 

almost impossible. 

The answer has to be flexible 

delivery of ATT and I expect this 

to commence very shortly for 

some modules. While there may 

always be a need for formal fulltime 

courses, I envisage that ATT 

in the future will be as flexible as 

it needs to be. For example, it 

may suit one unit to train sailors 

in three two-week blocks 

separated by four-week 

operational periods. Another ship 

may prefer to release a member 

for one day per week for three 

months during a major upgrade 

period. Modules will be selfpaced 

and learning will be 

facilitated by mentors rather than 

by class instructors. Experiences 

with these sorts of options in the 

past have not been good but they 

can be made to work. Their 

success depends on careful 

management by both the training 

provider and the unit training 

coordinator. I expect it may take 

some getting used to but in the 

end it’s about providing access to 

the training when it’s most 

convenient to the ship and to the 

sailor. 

Conclusion 

Advanced Technical Training 

represents a huge commitment 

from sailors who undertake the 

courses, from ships who release 

them and from TA LOG who 

provides the resources. It’s fair to 

say that the courses aren’t quite 

right yet. The competencies and 

qualifications are appropriate, 

however the formal training part 

doesn’t quite hit the mark. I hope 

that in the future trainees 

complete ATT with a realisation 

that the course has made them 

better able to perform their jobs 

and has provided them with a 

valuable professional 

qualification. Good Luck with your 

ATT course! 

Points of Contact 

NTTU – East 

Mr Graeme Levy 

ph: 02 9690 7519 

email: 

Graeme.Levy@defence.gov.au 

NTTU – West 

LCDR Clare Payne 

ph 08 9311 2440 

email: 

Clare.Payne@defence.gov.au


Professional Development – 

It’s not just a piece of paper 

The Royal Australian Navy has joined forces with the Institution of Engineers Australia (now trading 

as Engineers Australia) to enhance the development of the naval engineering team and assist 

navy in growing competent independent practitioners of engineering with chartered status being 

the brand of success and worldwide recognition. 

Joining the Professional 

Development Program is easy. 

The minimum requirement to 

join Engineers Australia is an 

Advanced Diploma in 

Engineering at AQF level 6 or 

equivalent. Naval personnel who 

currently hold or are studying 

the Advanced Diploma, or 

Bachelor of Engineering or 

Bachelor of Technology are 

eligible to join. 

If the applicant is studying for 

their formal undergraduate 

qualification they can be enrolled 

as a student member of 

Engineers Australia. Once the 

individual has achieved their 

qualification, they need only 

forward a certified true copy of 

their certificate of achievement to 

DNPR(E&L) who will forward the 

application to Engineers Australia 

to upgrade the member to 

graduate status. 

The Navy pays all associated 

costs for program participants 

and in return requires the sailors 

involved to progress the 

competencies to charted status 

and participate in a minimum of 

150 weighted hours of Continuing 

Professional Development over 

three years. Continuing 

Professional Development is the 

key to keeping you up to date 

and current in your field of 

expertise. 

Competencies and Chartered 

Status. The competencies are 

designed to be obtainable in the 

day to day running of a technical 

department or workshop and 

there is no problem in tackling 

the elements of each competency 

individually. During or after the 

competency log progression the 

member is required to submit a 

career episode report. The reports 

are submitted in a continuous 

fashion (addressing elements of 

competency as they have been 

achieved), that way it’s not a 

huge drain on personal time and 

can be completed in small parts 

rather than it being a huge report 

to write and submit all at once. 

Completion of your comptency 

logs ensure that you receive your 

educational qualification (your 

piece of paper), attaining 

Chartered Status ensures that 

you are recognised as a 

competent practitioner of 

engineering (be more do more). 

One senior sailor who has just 

completed and submitted his 

entire Engineering Practice Report 

(the compilation of Career 

Episode Reports) and has 

successfully completed a 

Professional Interview to achieved 

Charted Status is WOMT Hazell. 

Congratulations to WO Hazell 

OMIEAust CEngO. WO Hazell’s 

efforts are even more outstanding 

when you consider he has 

completed the assessment 

process with very little assistance 

from that offered to those whilst 

on the professional development 

program. All members who are 

registered on the Navy/Engineers 

Australia PDP have an the added 

advantage of assistance from 

Engineers Australia Accredited 

Assessors via CER writing 

workshops and the continuous 

assessment and feedback 

mechanism provided when 

submitting CERs. The workshops 

are designed to assist 

participants on the program in 

writing their reports in their 

locality. To organise a workshop 

you just need a small group 

maximum fifteen individuals to 

get together and to invite an 

Engineers Australia Accredited 

Assessor to deliver the workshop 

at your unit. 

To maximise your professional 

development it is really important 

that all participants acquire a 

suitable mentor. The matter of 

establishing a mentor may not be 

easy but is essential for guidance 

and assistance in the preparation 

of reports describing career 

experience and claimed 

competencies. A Mentor can be 

considered in the context of the 

total Navy career ie as a Naval 

Officer and a Professional 

Engineer. The importance of 

obtaining professional advice 

from someone who has a wealth 

of engineering experience cannot 

be over emphasised. 

21 

BY LSMT RACHEL SIMPSON 

DNPR (E&L) 

It’s easy to get funding. Courses 

and conferences relevant to the 

Engineers Australia program and 

Continuing Professional 

Development are funded to the 

value of $400/course or 

conference but if you need 

greater funds than advertised 

here and can justify the excess 

the sponsor may approve the 

extra expenditure. Send an email 

or minute detailing the costs and 

the value to justify extra funding if 

required. The nomination forms 

should be filled out as much as 

possible by you (your details and 

conference/course required) then 

faxed to DNPR(E&L). A SA405 is 

filled out and the expenditure is 

approved/not approved. You are 

notified immediately if not 

approved. The nomination form is 

then faxed to the institution with 

the payment from us and you are 

also sent a courtesy copy to 

confirm payment and nomination. 

Allow at least a weeks notice 

before a conference or course to 

allow for potential unavailability 

of the finance gurus. 

Further information and a 

joining pack can be obtained 

from LS Rachel Simpson at 

CP4-7-132, Campbell Park 

Offices, ACT 2600, Fax 02 6266 

2388, 

Phone 02 6266 4071 or e-mail 

rachel.simpson@defence.gov.au


Navy Warrant Officer gains 

worldwide engineering recognition 

Warrant Officer Stephen Hazell, currently based at Garden Island Perth, is the first member of the 

Royal Australian Navy to achieve Chartered Engineering Officer (CengO) status under the RAN 

February 2002 agreement with Engineers Australia – giving external national and international 

recognition to relevant experience and qualifications gained in the navy. 

The RAN has joined forces with 

the Institute of Engineers 

Australia (now trading as 

Engineers Australia) to enhance 

the development of the Naval 

engineering team and assist Navy 

in promoting competent 

independent practitioners of 

engineering. 

WO Hazell has gained this highly 

regarded ranking after 22 years 

experience of Naval training. He 

was assisted in this process by 

the Professional Development 

Program administered by the 

Directorate of Navy Professional 

Requirements (Engineering & 

Logistics) DNPR (E&L) within 

Naval Systems Command. 

Hazell said “By achieving 

Chartered status it’s recognisable 

proof that when measured 

against civilian benchmarking, we 

are at least as good as 

engineering practitioners in the 

outside industry. In turn, that 

boosts self-esteem and pride in 

what we do on a day to day basis 

in our jobs.” 

CDRE Barter, Chief Naval 

Engineer, presented Steve with a 

certificate marking the 

achievement, he remarked “I 

would like to thank WO Hazell for 

setting this example. I think it’s 

tremendous that a WO is the first 

person to achieve formal 

recognition because I hope it will 

embarrass a few engineering 

officers to get off their butts 

including myself.” 

“One of the four core principles of 

the Technical Regulatory System 

is that design, construction and 

maintenance is to be done by 

competent personnel. This 

program bases the measurement 

of competence against the 

IEAUST competency standards, so 

for Navy to do its job, we need 

officers and technicians who have 

been assessed against these 

standards” said the Commodore. 

Steve submitted his entire 

Engineering Practice Report (the 

compilation of Career Episode 

Reports) and successfully 

completed a Professional 

Interview by Engineers Australia 

to achieve the Chartered status. 

As the Senior Marine Technician 

onboard an FFG Steve is required 

to be a Marine engineering 

specialist responsible for the day 

to day maintenance and 

operation of the engineering 

plant. This includes the main 

propulsion Gas turbines, 

electronic control systems, power 

transmission, high power 

distribution systems and auxiliary 

systems in different 

configurations. 

Furthermore, WO Hazell guides 

and supervises technical sailors 

in the identification and 

rectification of complex faults at 

a system or inter system level. 

Steve is a senior Marine Technical 

Electrical sailor who has fulfilled 

a range of functions and roles in 

the Navy while simultaneously 

acquiring various qualifications. 

These include: Trade certificate, 

Electrical Fitter/Mechanic; 

Diploma of Engineering in 

Electrical Systems; Managing 

Health & Safety in the workplace 

OH & S; Diploma of Front Line 

management; Singer TSD 

mainframe course; Helicopter 

Under Water Escape Training and 

Marine Technical Charge 

Certificate. 

For further information please 

contact Annie Casey,Navy 

Personnel & Training, Public 

Affairs Officer (02) 9359 6286 or 

0411 440 583 

WARRANT OFFICER HAZELL BEING PRESENTED WITH HIS CHARTER BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE CANBERRA DIVISION OF ENGINEERS AUSTRALIA, 

MR MIKE EVANS FIEAUST CPENG, WATCHED BY THE CHIEF NAVAL ENGINEER, COMMODORE TIM BARTER, AND THE CEO OF ENGINEERS 

AUSTRALIA, MR JOHN BOSHIER FIEAUST CPENG.

Introduction to Report by 

POMT Melody 

Merchant Ship Secondment 

– MV Iron Chieftain 

A number of years ago as a LEUT engineer working at the Amphibious 

and Afloat Support Systems Program Office, I was given the opportunity 

to spend several weeks on secondment to a BHP operated merchant 

ship. I found it a very worthwhile experience in that it allowed me to 

observe some different ways of operating and maintaining a ship in a 

minimum manned environment. After that attachment I wrote a report 

about my experiences which was forwarded to the then category sponsor 

DEP-N. I also presented a shortened version to the MEAG in 2000. Since 

that time I have also arranged similar secondments for two other ME 

officers. 

Now I find myself as the MEO of 

HMAS TOBRUK, a ship that has 

much in common with the type of 

main and cargo machinery found 

on a MV. As I write this 

introduction, the RAN ME 

community is about to implement 

some revised watch keeping 

qualifications and routines that 

aim to release more manpower 

resources for maintenance by 

better utilising existing C&M 

technology on our ships. As a 

preliminary to this, I could see 

some benefits being gained by 

giving one of my senior sailors 

Sir, 

It gives me great pleasure to 

submit this report on completion 

of 10 days onboard MV Iron 

Chieftain. The 10 days involved 

the ship loading iron ore in 

Whyalla sailing to Sydney for 

bunkering (refueling) down to Port 

Kembla for discharge of the iron 

ore, once discharged, load coal to 

sail back to Whyalla to discharge 

the coal and reload iron ore. 

(and hopefully others later) the 

same opportunity I had to be 

exposed to other ways of doing 

business. 

When I selected POMT Melody for 

the secondment, the purpose was 

to: 

a. provide him with a unique 

opportunity to further develop 

his own professional and 

technical competence in 

Marine Engineering by 

observing and participating in 

some different ways of doing 

business, and 

I worked mainly with the 

engineering crew onboard both 

observing and contributing in 

ships evolutions and onboard 

maintenance. I found the whole 

crew to be very accommodating 

with little to no effort in fitting in 

with them and the ships routine. I 

thoroughly enjoyed the trip and 

recommend it to anyone within 

the technical branch onboard. I 

believe I have come away with a 


b. encourage him to consider 

how we in the HMAS TOBRUK 

might apply certain aspects of 

merchant practice to improve 

our performance and 

efficiency in maintenance and 

operation of plant. 

PO Melody’s report follows which I 

hope you will agree provides 

some tangible evidence of the 

benefits that can be gained by the 

RAN by continuing this program. 

R.A. ARTHUR 

LCDR, RAN 

EO HMAS TOBRUK 

MERCHANT SHIP SECONDMENT REPORT 

– MV IRON CHIEFTAIN 22MAR – 31MAR03 

greater knowledge on engineering 

practices and look forwarded to 

implementing them in the way I 

do business on board TOBRUK. 

The Vessel: 

The Iron Chieftain has a 

displacement of 62,757-tonne, it 

is a self-discharging built carrier, 

with five cargo holds and 

conveyor belt discharge 

machinery. 

23


The hold discharge equipment on 

board is unique to the Iron 

Chieftain. 

The main propulsion unit is a 

Hyundai MAN B&W, five cylinder, 

two stroke, single acting, 

crosshead, direct reversible, 

exhaust turbocharged type marine 

diesel engine, model – 5S60MC. 

Output 11, 530 BHP 

8, 478 KW at 101 rpm. 

Organisation crew structure in 

order of ranking + their 

subordinates: 

Master - First Mate – Second 

mate – Third mate 

Chief Engineer – First Engineer – 

Second Engineer - Third Engineer 

Chief Steward – Chief Cook – 

Catering Assistance 

Chief Integrated Rating – 

Integrated Ratings 

I observed the following aspects 

whilst onboard. 

Operation of main and auxiliary 

plant under UMS regime: 

Operations of the onboard 

machinery using the UMS regime 

basically are set and forget. There 

are a number of alarm panels 

through out the ship that 

indicates which engineer is on 

duty for that day and that an 

alarm has activated. The duty 

engineer then must attend the 

control room to further investigate 

the cause of the alarm with help 

from the machinery monitoring 

display panels. 

A fire alarm panel situated on the 

bridge detects heat and smoke in 

zones around the ship. If an alarm 

is activated in the machinery 

space a pipe is made and an 

investigation of the zone will take 

place. If after 50 sec the alarm has 

not been isolated at the zone the 

CO2 and or dry chemical powder 

drench system will activate. 

Flash up and shut down of main 

and Aux machinery: 

Flash up and shut down routines 

are similar to TOBRUK’S routine. 

The duty Eng officer will 

commence F/U at 4 HNFS and 

follows a set F/U routine IAW 

their flash up orders (4 HRS 

down to underway) The main 

differences is that the ship uses 

HFO (Heavy Fuel Oil) so the FO 

temperature must be maintained 

at approx 117 – 135 degC 

depending on the viscosity of the 

HFO. This is achieved by using 

steam from an onboard 7 bar 

operating pressure boiler. The 

steam is also used as warm thru 

for the main engine and D/A’s. 

Warm thru will commence at the 

4 HNFS mark. 

The other differences include only 

one-person conducts the F/U and 

S/D, usually the duty Eng officer 

that also includes him to be 

down the engine-room during 

standby (SSD) whilst the Chief 

Eng is on the bridge were the 

engine is controlled by. 

During S/D the ship has a shut 

down procedure document that is 

followed, as TOBRUK does not 

with EOOW going off experience 

for each S/D. 

Conduct of “standbys” on a 

minimum manned ship (SSD): 

Standby’s is the terminology used 

which is equivalent to our Special 

Sea Duty man (SSD). This state is 

closed up during maneuvering 

alongside or proceeding from a 

berth or anchorage. 

This procedure consists of the 

Master, Chief Eng and duty IR + a 

cadet (if borne) on the bridge, the 

duty Eng Officer in the engineroom. 

On the deck you have the 

3rd Mate, Chief IR with two IR’s 

FWD and the 2nd Mate with three 

IR’s AFT. All other IR’s and cadets 

spread out between FWD and AFT 

on the deck as spare hands. 

Management of maintenance 

workload with only four 

engineers borne: 

The four engineers borne carry 

out most if not all of the 

maintenance including planned, 

preventive and breakdown 

maintenance, this also involves 

major overhauls and equipment 

refurbishment. 

The 1st Eng mainly looks after 

the main propulsion and it’s 

systems, but also coordinates 

work for the 2nd, 3rd Eng and an 

IR that is assigned to the engineroom 

on a weekly basis to 

conduct minor jobs like cleaning 

and greasing. 

The 2nd Eng is mainly 

responsible for the generators 

and electrical supplies 

And the 3rd Eng is responsible 

for the aux including, purifiers, air 

compressors and boilers. 

The Chief Eng’s job mainly 

concentrates around admin type 

jobs however depending on the 

CE borne they also involve 

themselves with a lot of the day 

to day maintenance and or defect 

repairs as the other three 

engineers are pretty much flat out 

each day with their own area of 

responsibilities. 

Utilisation, engagement and 

control of maintenance 

contractors onboard: 

Contractors are used but not to 

the extent and as often as we in 

the NAVY use them. As mentioned 

above, the engineers carry out 

most of the work onboard. 

However, at times when the 

workload exceeds the already 

heavy schedules of the four 

engineers they then utilize 

preferred contractors both in Port 

Kembla/Sydney and Whyalla. This 

is arranged by the CE in the form 

of a work requisition, which is 

signed for approval by the Master 

and then faxed off to the 

company. E-mail is also used with 

correspondence with some 

contractors. 

In some cases for specialised 

equipment an OEM maybe 

contracted to conduct some 

maintenance. 

Features of the computerised 

planned maintenance system 

used and how maintenance is 

managed: 

A Microplan Database is the 

computerised planned 

maintenance system used. The 

CE will print out all PM’s due on a

monthly basis and the 1st Eng 

will coordinate the PM’s with the 

2nd and 3rd Eng’s. Once the 

engineers have completed a task 

they will return the PM schedule 

to the CE who will then complete 

it on the database adding any 

comments about the tasks and 

any stores used. The CE also has 

the rights within the database to 

make changes to the schedules if 

he believes more information is 

required, stores update if required 

or any other information that may 

help the maintainer the next time 

the job is due. 

The features of this system 

includes: 

a. Call up of all PM’s due 

on a monthly basis 

b. Ordering of spares 

c. Update of running hours 

d. Document change 

requirement, and 

e. AD-HOC tasking (Defect 

log) 

A PM print out sheet consist of 

the following information: 

a. Maintenance task 

b. History Summary 

c. Full Details of Equipment 

d. Instructions 

e. Spares, and 

f. Condition Report 

Influence of the classification 

society on the ships 

maintenance and operation 

As the prime function of the ship 

is to satisfy its customers by 

importing and exporting cargo 

from one place to the other, if any 

down time occurs due to some 

sort of malfunction or breakdown 

of the ship or it’s cargo discharge 

equipment means loss of 

earnings for both the supplier 

and customer, which could run 

into the thousands of dollars in 

earnings lost. The engineer’s 

priority is to maintain the ship 

and it’s equipment to a high 

standard. Their time alongside is 

taken up with carrying out of 

preventive maintenance to the 

main and aux machinery; this is 

also carried out at sea. 

Whilst at sea they then can 

conduct maintenance on the 

cargo discharge equipment so as 

to have it in good working order 

for when they get to the next port. 

Features and operation of the 

quality management systems 

(SOPS) under the: International 

Ship Management code: 

All BHP/TEEKAY shipping must 

follow the strict international rules 

and regulations set by the 

Australian Maritime Shipping 

Authority (AMSA). All crew 

members must make themselves 

aware of these strict guidelines 

and adhered to them at all times. 

The ship has several sets of 

manuals outlying these 

procedures and guidelines that 

are easily accessible by all 

crewmembers. 

The manuals held on board are 

as followed: 

Vessels Operational Management 

Manual (VOMM) 

Common Vessel Procedure 

Manual (VOMM-CVP) 

Occupational Health & Safety 

Training Manual (OH&S) 

Incident Management Plan- Ship 

born Emerg Man (IMP-SEM) 

Iron Chieftain Operational 

Procedure Manual (CHI-OPS) 

Iron Chieftain Work instructions 

(CHI-WI) 

These form part of the hierarchy 

of manuals that make up the 

Quality, Safety & Environment 

Protection Management (QASEP) 

Management System. 

The features of these manuals 

cover topics such as: 

a. Navigation 

b. Cargo Operations 

c. Additional Cargo 

Requirements 

d. Deck operations 

e. Engine Room Operations 

f. Maintenance 

g. Additional Maintenance 

requirements 

h. Oil/Chemical Transfer 

i. Waste Management. 

j. Safety of Personnel 


k. Organisation 

l. Quality, Safety & 

Environment Protection 

Management 

m. Pollution Prevention 

n. Ship Safety 

o. Personnel 

p. Regulations and Laws 

q. Purchasing and Sub 

Contracting 

r. Administration 

s. Documentation 

t. Safety and Quality Audits 

(Shore and Ship) 

u. Acquisition of Ships, and 

v. Emergency/Contingency 

Planning. 

Features of safety system and 

conduct of drills: 

The ship has a Safety committee 

meeting onboard that sits on a 

monthly basis. The ships crew 

performs a Safety Audit Work 

Around each month with defects 

found rectified straight away. Any 

major defects found which cannot 

be rectified straight away are 

noted and are up for discussion 

during the next Safety Committee 

meeting. 

The safety committee team 

comprises of the following: 

Master 

3rd Mate 

3rd Engineer, and 

Integrated Rating 

The scope of the team discuss 

matters such as: 

a. Critique of last safety 

committee meeting 

b. Any Priority matters 

c. Non conforming Incidents 

with a review of 

corrective actions 

d. Reports raised since last 

meeting 

e. Review of overall 

shipboard safety 

f. Review of enhanced 

safety training drills/ 

statutory drills/direction 

of future drills 

g. Review of worksite 

inspections 

h. New health and safety 

matters, and 

i. Action plan 

25


Training for the ships crew is run 

periodically however not as often 

as we are used to in the RAN. 

Below is a list of the drills carried 

out and there periodic: 

DRILL 

Boat Drill Monthly 

Fire Drill Monthly 

Emerg. Steering 

Drill Three monthly 

Life raft Drill Six Monthly 

Enhanced safety 

Drill Monthly – 

Different topic 

each month 

Rocket Drill Six Monthly, 

and 

Damage Control 

Drill Six Monthly 

Management by the engineers 

of their machinery spares and 

how they obtain these and 

consumables: 

The CE controls his own budget 

for the ordering of all spares, 

consumables and contractor 

work. 

Stores are orded via a work 

requisition that is approved by 

the Master 

The Chief IR and Chief Steward 

are responsible for their own 

ordering for the areas. 

Availability of complete 

maintenance history/records 

and other documentation such 

as technical manuals/ 

drawings: 

All maintenance history and 

records are managed within the 

ships computerised PM database 

and are all readily available on 

request from the CE. 

All technical manuals and 

drawings are also readily 

available from the ships office 

and the CE’s office with a master 

copy kept by the CE in his cabin. 

Features of the qualifications 

and statutory training regime for 

the engineers in merchant ships: 

Chief Engineer has an Advanced 

Diploma in Marine Engineering – 

Unlimited 

1st Engineer has an Advanced 

Diploma in Marine Engineering – 

Unlimited 

2nd Engineer has a Diploma in 

Marine Engineering – Unlimited 

3rd Engineer has a Diploma in 

Watch keeping - Unlimited 

Role of deck officer in conduct 

of all cargo operations and 

management of ships stability: 

The 1st Mate is responsible for all 

embarkation and discharging of 

cargo, he is also responsible for 

the trim and stability of the ship 

at all times. 

Before and after loading or 

discharging of cargo the 1st Mate 

will present the Master with a 

load/unload plan including 

measures to ballast the ship as 

cargo is moved around, approx 

load times and amount of cargo 

embarked. 

If a problem arises during loading 

or unloading the 1st Mate is to 

be contacted immediately. 

The 1st Mate uses Mariner 1993 

version B3.40 computerised 

management tool to help manage 

the trim and stability of the ship. 

Bridge operations in a minimum 

manned ships and any special 

features observed: 

At sea the bridge operates during 

the day with one OOW only. 

During the night it consists of one 

OOW and the Duty IR as lookout. 

The OOW’s are in a three-watch 

system four on eight off the same 

as we use in the RAN. The three 

watches are broken up between 

the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Mate. 

PETER J MELODY 

Petty Officer Marine Technician 

HMAS TOBRUK 

2003

SAT 22 Mar Day 1: 

Alongside Whyalla 

Arrived Whyalla and joined ship alongside iron ore wharf. Met 

Master (Captain), Chief Engineer and other engineering crew. 

Received safety induction forms and video with a quick 

rundown of ships routines. 

Met the rest of the crew 19 all up including myself. 

SUN 23 Mar Day 2: 

Alongside Whyalla/At Sea 

Attended morning meeting on the bridge (1stEng, 1stMate 

and Chief IR) for discussion of daily work to be carried out. 

Conducted Induction work around with 1st Eng. 

Observed flash up of ME and Aux’s with duty Eng (3rd Eng). 

At 4 HNFS. 

Observed Standbys (SSD) in Engine room prior to sailing and 

underway. 

MON 24 Mar Day 3: 

At Sea 

Attended morning meeting on bridge. 

Watched Induction video. 

Assisted 2nd Eng with D/A crankcase deflections. 

Observed 3monthly emergency steering drill. 

Observed/interacted with Fire drill involving casualty search 

and evacuation. 

Compiled report. 

TUES 25 Mar Day 4: 

At Sea 


Compile report. 

Assisted Chief Eng to install new speed generator to cargo 

boom motor. 

Familiarised myself with engine room layout and machinery. 

WED 26 Mar Day 5: 

At Sea 


Assisted Chief Eng in identifying and rectifying surging 

problem with main cargo boom motor. 


Assisted 1st Eng in tracing and identifying earth on cargo 

boom slew motor. 

THURS 27 Mar Day 6: 

At Sea/Anchor Sydney Harbor 



POMT P. J. MELODY: DAILY DIARY WHILST ONBOARD 

MV IRON CHIEFTAIN 22 Mar – 31 Mar 03. 

Assisted in conducting monthly safety work around which 

included checking operation of upper deck lighting, 

ventilation flaps and buffers, life rings, lifeboats and 

emergency D/A etc. 

Conducted Standby’s on the bridge for entering Sydney 

Harbor to anchor for Bunkering (re-fueling). 

Observed Bunkering – setup, checks prior, during and post 

bunkering including soundings. 


Conducted Standby’s on bridge for leaving Sydney Harbor. 

FRI 28 Mar Day 7: 

At Anchor Port Kembla 


Industrial action ashore has prevented the ship going 

alongside for discharge. 

Assisted 1st Eng in removal and repair of leaking valve and 

flange to evaporator. 


SAT 29 Mar Day 8: 

At Anchor Port Kembla 


Industrial action continues ashore. 

Assisted Chief Eng in replacing wiring run found to have 

dead short to earth for the cargo boom slew motor. 

Assisted 1st Eng with tightening main engine head bolts to 

stop oil leak. 

Assisted 1st Eng in checking and cleaning of shaft bonding 

point. 

Assisted 3rd Eng in re-assembling of fuel oil purifier. 


SUN 30 Mar Day 9: 

At Anchor Port Kembla/Alongside Port Kembla 


Industrial actions ashore over however still no berth available 

as yet. Aprox 1730 A/S Port Kembla. 

Helped identify stores in engine room. 

1st Eng explained onboard stores system. 

Carried out set of machinery rounds with 1st Eng. 


MON 31 Mar Day 10: 

Alongside Port Kembla 


Completed report 

Paid off from ship. 

27


BY CAPTAIN ANDREW CAWLEY, 

COMMANDING OFFICER, 

HMAS CRESWELL 

About the author: Andrew Cawley joined 

the RAN in 1982, undertaking general 

Junior Officer training as a Sub-Lieutenant 

in HMAS VAMPIRE from October. In August 

1983, he joined HMAS PERTH as a 

Systems Engineer Officer. Promoted to 

Lieutenant in April 1984, he posted to 

HMAS CERBERUS for Weapons Engineer 

specialist training in late 1984. He 

returned to sea in HMAS HOBART in early 

1985 and later HMAS BRISBANE as a 

Systems Engineer Officer. 

Captain Cawley joined the Navy Office 

Directorate of Fleet Engineering Policy at 

the end of 1985 as the Systems Engineer 

for non-USN weapons systems. 

Moving to Perth in early 1989, he joined 

the small team building up commercial 

refitting practices for Navy in Western 

Australia. He joined HMAS STUART as 

Weapons Electrical Engineering Officer 

(WEEO) in October 1989 and was 

promoted Lieutenant Commander in mid 

1990. When STUART decommissioned 

from the RAN in May 1991, he returned to 

Navy Office in Canberra as the Staff Officer 

for Engineer Officer career management in 

the Directorate of Naval Officers’ Postings. 

In June 1993, Captain Cawley returned to 

sea as WEEO of HMAS PERTH, which 

included the milestone of passing 

management of high power generation and 

distribution in Navy to the Marine Engineer 

in August 1994. Selected for promotion in 

December 1994, he left HMAS PERTH to 

undertake a five month project with Naval 

Support Command to establish 

engineering support models and processes 

in preparation for the full 

commercialisation of Australian Defence 

Industries (ADI) and the dockyards. In May 

1995, Captain Cawley then posted as OIC 

of the Navy’s Technical Training Centre at 

HMAS CERBERUS. Seconded to the Joint 

Education and Training Executive in May 

1997, Captain Cawley undertook the 

Defence Efficiency Review related study 

into ADF Technical Training Rationalisation. 

The Report was tendered in February 

1998. 

Before joining Maritime Command in June 

1999, Captain Cawley completed a 

Masters of Engineering Management, 

specialising in Systems Engineering, at the 

University of Technology, Sydney. 

On 01 July 2000, Captain Cawley was 

promoted to his current rank. He was 

posted to HMAS CRESWELL in October 

2000 where he takes up his dual role as 

Commanding Officer, HMAS CRESWELL 

and Training Authority, Initial Training 

Leadership and Management. Captain 

Cawley is married to Anna Glynne and lives 

at HMAS CRESWELL in Jervis Bay. 

A Risk—Is It Really? 

Over the last few years, the culture of carefully considering risk in our 

decision making has taken hold. People are well attuned to querying 

what risks are associated with an evolution and it is commonplace for 

people to do an “HRA”. But, is it really a risk or is it something else? 

The process of an Hazard Risk 

Assessment is well documented 

in the NAVSAFE Manual, ABR 

6303. Risk is calculated 

according to the Australian 

Standard, AS4360. Most people 

can tell you that you calculate 

risk as the product of 

consequence and probability. The 

issue I’d like to raise in this brief 

article is, what do you really know 

about the probability of an event 

occurring? 

Many times I have heard people 

say ‘the probability of that 

occurring is very low’. That sort of 

an answer is either a fact or a 

guess, and too often it is a guess. 

How many people do you think 

say that because they have a ‘gut 

feeling’ it does not happen very 

often, or because they 

themselves have never witnessed 

such an event? How many times 

have you heard people offer such 

a judgement about something 

they actually have no expertise 

in? 

In 1992, Brian Wynne, a UK 

academic working in the field of 

environmental risk, developed 

what he called his Taxonomy 1 of 

Risk. The first level is where we 

know about the behaviour of a 

system 2 and we can model the 

probability of something 

happening. That is to say we can 

determine a mathematical 

probability, 0.0 

know about consequence, then 

we can calculate risk and use this 

to guide our decision making. 

If we possess specification about 

system design (variables) and 

operation, we can claim we know 

something about system 

behaviour, but we cannot simply 

extend that claim to say we know 

about the probability distribution 

of various events occurring. There 

must be specific, objective 

knowledge about event 

probability. If we do not know 

about the probability distribution 

of events, we are not able to 

assign a mathematical value to 

probability and we therefore 

cannot calculate risk. This is 

uncertainty. 

But it does not end there, Wynne 

takes the issue two steps further. 

People can generally accept they 

do not understand something 

about a system that lies before 

them because they do not have 

the expertise to work something 

out. But regardless of whether you 

are an expert or a novice, there is 

always the unknown. What 

decision makers need to 

remember is there may be events 

(probability) or hazards 

(consequences) we simply do not 

know about. The issue for 

decision-makers is to be careful 

of ignorance, be careful of people 

who say they have worked it all 

out and the (∑) risk is known 

and acceptable. 

The next level in Wynne’s 

taxonomy is the unknowable. 

Given time and effort, we may 

discover new information about a 

system and convert the unknown 

into the known. In the context of 

risk management, the ‘known’ will 

become a calculable risk if we 

understand its probability 

distribution (and consequence) or 

it will become uncertainty. 

However, when ‘causal chains and 

networks are open’, there is 

always the unknowable. 

In short, Wynne has usefully 

distinguished a taxonomy: 

• Risk—where you know the 

probability distribution 

• Uncertainty—where you do not 

know the probability distribution 

• Unknown; and 

• Unknowable. 

So, what is the point of this. Next 

time someone says ‘the 

probability of that occurring is 

very low’, test them about what 

they really know about the 

probability distribution. If they are 

just guessing, then tell them it is 

not risk, it is uncertainty! While 

that might be a play on words, 

what is important is you know the 

difference between guesswork 

and science and base you 

decisions accordingly. 

1 Taxonomy:- Classification, especially in 

relation to its general laws and principles, a 

systematic classification. 

2 Meaning in the broadest sense of the 

word system, not simply electro-mechanical 

devices. 

References: 

Wynne, B., 1992. Uncertainty and 

environmental learning: reconceiving 

science and policy in the preventative 

paradigm, Global Environmental Change 

2(2), 111-127. 

Irish, J., 1998. Risk, Uncertainty, Ignorance 

and Indeterminancy, University of 

Technology, Sydney.

MOTU-ME 

(Mobile Operational Technical Unit – Marine 

Engineering) 

Who are we and where do we live? 

As OIC MOTU-ME I am 

responsible for four areas, those 

being Fleet Condition Assessment 

Unit (FCAU), Fleet Diesel 

Inspectors (FDI), Fleet 

Pneumatics Specialists (FPS) and 

FFG PCS Trainer. I am located in 

Building 9, GI, Sydney (near the 

houses on the end of the island) 

with FCAU and two FDIs. FPS live 

in Building 67, GI, Sydney (next 

door to the Credit Union) and the 

FFG PCS Trainer is located in 

Building 79, GI, Sydney (aft of 

FIMA Sydney). We also have two 

new additions to the organization, 

that being two FDIs in West 

Australia located in Building 73 

co-located with FIMA Perth. In all 

there are 21 billets, 17 are filled 

today with the aim of all positions 

filled by November 2003. 

MOTU-ME is directly responsible 

to FMEO and then CSO(E) within 

the CSG. Our customers are the 

ships and SPOs. During the past 

six months the organization has 

attempted to increase its profile 

within the RAN by attending 

meetings, taking on work within 

maintenance work packages and 

offering technical advice on any 

URDEFs or correspondence 

relevant to our duty statements. 

The whole organization is also on 

standby for Sea Training Group at 

all times, and has been utilized 

for this purpose often during the 

past year. 

MAP OF GARDEN ISLAND 


LCDR BELINDA THOMSON RAN 

29


So what do we actually do and 

what can we do for you? 

Fleet Condition Assessment Unit 

comprises of three sections, one being 

Non-destructive testing, a position that 

has not been filled for the past 12 

months. The other sections are Vibration 

Analysis (VA) and the Oil Cell. The Oil 

Cell manages the Ships Oil Analysis 

Program (SOAP) which at present 

maintains a database of results, 

distributes all results from the oil testing 

labs to ships, as well as sending SOAP 

alert signals when warranted. The VA 

cell at present maintains a database to 

hold all past results and manages any 

software and hardware problems. 

Fleet Pneumatics is currently 

developing its responsibilities, phasing 

out the past tasks relating to the Fleet 

Boiler Inspector. The pneumatics cell 

maintains the pneumatics systems and 

controllers on FFGs, instructs a course 

on FFG Pneumatics systems (next one 

to be conducted late October 2003), 

but is mainly concentrating on 

expanding their responsibilities to all 

platforms. They have recently assisted 

HMAS Tobruk, Stuart, Melbourne, 

Canberra and Darwin with pneumatics 

systems, taking on tasks for their FAMPs 

as well. This section has also 

commenced testing gauges in situ and 

conducted tasks while sea riding, for 

the FFG Upgrade. 

Fleet Diesel Inspectors have been 

developing their programs during the 

past three years, but have recently 

expanded the platforms they assist to 

include all auxiliaries, FFGs and 

submarines (by the FDIs in WA). While 

inspection programs are underway, the 

FDIs are also available as subject 

matter experts on all diesels in the 

RAN, and they assist with URDEFs, 

troubleshooting and provide advice 

relating to diesels. They conduct 

deployment condition grooms and are 

currently developing an ABR on trouble 

shooting diesel defects, and information 

to be used in conjunction with the OEM 

technical manuals. 

PO LIM WITH KITTIWAKE OIL TEST KIT 

FLEET PNEUMATICS LAB – CPO JOHNSON AND LS BAYLIFF 

FDIS INSPECTING A BEARING – CPO PARROTT AND CPO KEENAN

FFG Propulsion Control System 

(PCS) Trainer plans and 

manages the training of FFG 

marine engineering sailors and 

officers in regards to the 

propulsion control system. 

Courses conducted at the Trainer 

include the CCS Operators 

course, CCS Maintenance Course, 

Engineering Systems 

Management Course and 

Engineering Control Systems 

Management Course. The school 

has the use of a 20H7A device 

simulator, which contains a 

computer software interface and 

ship fitted consoles. Staff are 

also available for conducting 

Engineering Mobile Team Training 

(EMTT), administering Marine 

Engineering LOE’s, conducting 

Ship’s Operational Refresher 

Training and Sea Training Group 

commitments. Staff also aid 

ships with PCS defect 

investigation by replicating 

symptoms in the device and 

utilising staff SME knowledge. 

Attached to the FFG Trainer is 

WOMT Shultz, RANR who 

manages the EOSS system 

updates and rewrites, as well as 

distributing, them throughout the 

FFG class via the Trainer. 

Instruction 

All areas within the MOTU-ME 

organization are involved with 

instruction and teaching in the 

classroom. A primary role of the 

FFG Trainer is instruction 

(including EMTT and refresher 

training), but the Fleet 

Pneumatics also has a classroom 

for the pneumatics courses. FCAU 

instruct the LSATT and CPOATT 

courses, but also provide 

guidance throughout the fleet 

regarding Vibration analysis and 

oil sampling. Instruction or 

guidance is available both at sea 

and in the office from any section 

of MOTU-ME and this can be 

requested by signal, email or 

phone. 

FFG PCS TRAINER – INSTRUCTOR (PO MARKS) IN SIMULATOR 

CCS MAINTENANCE COURSE 

VIBRATION ANALYSIS – PO THACKER 


31


There are however aims for the immediate 

future that are being developed 

During the next six months, 

MOTU-ME aim; 

a. To provide ships with a 

comprehensive condition 

assessment report in 

preparation for maintenance 

plans, including but not 

limited to oil and vibration 

analysis. 

b. To provide feedback to ships 

on their VA results and 

incorporate predictive results. 

c. To review the lists of machinery 

for VA and in conjunction with 

SPOs, reduce it to an 

acceptable and useful list. 

d. VA section to conduct visits 

throughout Australia to assist 

ships staff. 

e. To provide ships and SPOs 

with a trend analysis of oil 

results, on a piece of 

machinery across platforms, 

or a class issue. 

f. Have both oil and VA results 

received via electronic means. 

g. Continue to take on work in 

maintenance availabilities 

related to, but not limited to, 

pneumatics. 

h. Continue to develop Diesel 

inspection programs, 

concentrating on submarines 

for the west based FDIs, but 

FDIS IN WA (PO MILES AND PO CHAPLIN) – WORKING ON A HEDAMORA ENGINE 

also including other platforms. 

i. FFG Trainer to split the CCS 

Ops course and instruct pilot 

course. 

j. Maintain a standardized 

training regime throughout the 

FFG class. 

k. Transfer of thermography from 

FIST to MOTU-ME. 

l. Continue to learn and expand 

our responsibilities with 

feedback from ships, SPOs 

and other shore based 

support agencies. 

m. Investigate new technologies 

for use in the RAN.

Any requests for assistance or queries? 

We can be contacted via signal – AUSFLTCSG for MOTU-ME, via email or phone. 

OIC MOTU-ME Belinda.Thomson(at)defence.gov.au (02) 93592430 

FDI (FBE) Greg.Parrott(at) defence.gov.au (02) 93592634 

John.Keenan(at) defence.gov.au (02) 93592419 

FDI (FBW) Neil.Chaplin1(at) defence.gov.au (08) 95535190 

Ian.Miles(at) defence.gov.au (08) 95532371 

FVA Glen.Collins(at) defence.gov.au (02) 93592441 

Oil Cell Andrew.Lim(at) defence.gov.au (02) 93592428 

FPS Hugh.Johnson1(at) defence.gov.au (02) 93592622 

FFG PCS Trainer Brian.Woolmer(at)defence.gov.au (02) 93593110 

I/C FCAU 

WOMT(M) FFG 

186099 


Mobile Operational Technical Unit – Marine Engineering 

VA CELL 

CPOMT(E) ANZ 

186118 

CPOMT COLLINS 

POMT(E) FFG 

186124 

POMT THACKER 

POMT(M) ANZ 

186121 

VACANT 

OIL CELL 

CPOMT(M) AUX 

186104 

POMT LIM 

NDT CELL 

POMT(M) FFG 

186079 

FDI-FBE 

CPOMT(M) AUX 

186108 

CPOMT PARROT 

FDI-FBE 

CPOMT(M) FFG 

186113 

CPOMT KEENAN 

FDI-FBW 

POMT(M)/CPOMT(M) 

POMT MILES 

FDI-FBW 

CPOMT(M) /POMT(M) 

POMT CHAPLIN 

OIC MOTU-ME 

LCDR GL MEQ 

186040 

LCDR THOMSON 

I/C FPS 

CPOMT(M) FFG 

185728 

CPOMT JOHNSON 

I/C FPS 

CPOMT(M) FFG 

185728 

CPOMT JOHNSON 

POMT(M) AUX 

186094 

VACANT 

I/C FFG PCST 

WOMT(M) FFG 

186045 

WOMT WOOLMER 

CPOMT(E) FFG 

186050 

CPOMT RYLANCE 

SCPO 

USN EXCHANGE 

186055 

SCPO BRASSEAUX 

POMT(E) FFG 

186059 

LSMT BODE 

POMT(E) FFG 

186064 

LSMT JOST 

POMT(E) FFG 

186069 

POMT WILSON 

POMT(E) FFG 

186074 

POMT ELKIN 

POMT(M) FFG 

186084 

POMT MARKS 

33


BY LCDR SEAN LEYDON RAN 

Operation Sutton 

Apprehension of the Alleged Illegal 

Russian Fishing Vessel VOLGA 

Jack of all trades, this term has been used quite often with respect to odd 

jobs that technical departments (both WE and ME) have always carried 

out, but more so with the introduction of minimum (or more politically 

correct – optimum) manned ships such as the FFGs in the early 1980’s. 

Times have changed but the variety of ‘out of core’ responsibilities has 

kept up its momentum, Operations Sutton and Slipper Boarding and 

Steaming Parties are prime examples of this, and proof that an 

engineering position in the RAN isn’t exactly out of the text book. 

During the period of 29 Jan – 19 

Feb 02 HMAS CANBERRA was 

diverted from its upcoming 

commitment to Operation Slipper, 

to sail down to Heard Island and 

apprehend illegal Russian Fishing 

Vessels operating in the 

Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). 

The Boarding Parties for this 

operation were, for the first time 

in RAN history, made entirely from 

members of the Ships Company. 

Blue Boarding Party, which 

apprehended the Volga, 

comprised almost 50% from 

engineering branches and was 

led by Canberra’s DWEEO 

Lieutenant Commander Sean 

Leydon. The steaming party that 

remained aboard the “Volga” to 

transit the vessel back to 

Australia consisted of a majority 

of technical personnel, with 10 

out of a total of 15 sailors from 

either the WE or ME departments. 

Ready for Op Slipper? 

HMAS CANBERRA sailed early 

with no indication of what was 

happening. Email was suspended 

for security reasons and the 

Ship’s Company were only 

informed after sailing by their 

Commanding Officer, Captain 

Roger Boyce of what task laid 

ahead for CANBERRA’s crew. 

There were illegal fishing vessels 

The Boarding Parties for this 

operation were, for the first 

time in RAN history, made 

entirely from members of the 

Ship’s Company. 

in the Exclusive Economic Zone 

(EEZ) off Heard Island and the 

CANBERRA, with the help of 

HMAS WESTRALIA had been 

tasked to intercept and 

apprehend if required to do so. 

Preparation 

CANBERRA’s two boarding parties 

were at OLOC for Operation Slipper 

and ready for any task that was put 

to them. However the conditions off 

Heard Island were not comparable 

to that in the Persian Gulf. Larger 

sea states and temperatures 

around 1 – 2 degrees, called for 

Thermal (Mustang) suits, 

balaclava’s and special boots to be 

issued for the extreme conditions 

CANBERRA was heading into. 

Training routines of fast roping, 

small arms and baton (Red Man) 

training were carried out daily for 

both Boarding parties and also 

Steaming parties from both the 

CANBERRA and WESTRALIA. Daily 

meetings in the Wardroom with all 

stakeholders were also carried 

out to cover all aspects and 

potential problems of the 

operation. The Australian Fisheries 

personnel aboard CANBERRA 

fully briefed both boarding parties 

of their responsibilities and 

limitations when aboard any of 

the foreign fishing vessels. 

Detection and Interception 

On the morning of the 

07 February 2002, the foreign 

fishing vessel (FFV) Volga was 

detected by a RAAF P3 and 

reported to the CANBERRA, within 

30 minutes the boarding officer 

had briefed his team and Blue 

Boarding Party had gone to 

5 minutes notice. 

The first stick of seven personnel 

was aboard the ships S-70B and 

on the way to intercept the 

vessel, some 70 nautical miles 

from CANBERRA. Upon 

rendezvous with the FFV it was 

clear that it didn’t intend 

stopping as it made its way out 

of the EEZ at top speed. After the 

boarding officer identified the 

contact as a fishing vessel and 

queried the FFV (without receiving 

any response), the helo hovered

LCDR LEYDON WITH ENGINEERING MEMBERS OF VOLGA’S STEAMING & BOARDING PARTY 

in front of the vessel, opened its 

door and shotguns were pointed 

at the bridge. After this action the 

vessel decided to slow down. 

The first stick of blue boarding 

party were then inserted onto the 

FFV via fast rope in arduous 

conditions. After storming the 

bridge from both port and 

starboard sides, and receiving 

refusal from the master to turn the 

vessel around, the boarding officer 

ordered his bridge security to force 

a heading towards the CANBERRA 

by taking over the helm. 

After the Boarding Officer 

introduced himself to the master, 

the crew was ordered to muster 

on the forecastle. This 

commenced after some initial 

difficulty due to language 

differences, while the sweep 

parties proceeded to search 

through the Volga. CANBERRA’s 

helo stayed within close proximity 

of the Volga providing protection 

until the CANBERRA appeared 

over the horizon. 

With CANBERRA now only a few 

miles away from the Volga, and 

with ‘Low Threat’ 1 imminent, the 

boarding officer returned the helo 

to pickup the second stick of 5 

personnel. Along with the second 

stick there was also an Australian 

Fisheries Officer (to work with the 

boarding officer to decide if an 

apprehension would be required) 

and one of the ships PWO’s (who 

filled a navigation requirement in 

case CANBERRA was diverted 

before the steaming party was 

inserted). 

Apprehension 

After the crew was moved to the 

ships café Low Threat was passed 

to CANBERRA and the Fisheries 

Officer conducted a search of the 

vessel. After discussion between 

the fishery and Boarding Officer, 

and following large amounts of 

Patagonian Toothfish that had 

been found aboard, it was agreed 

that the vessel had indeed been 

utilised as a fishing vessel. A 

recommendation was then made 

by the boarding officer to the CO 

of CANBERRA for an 

apprehension to take place. 

After an approval from CANBERRA’s 

Commanding Officer, apprehension 

was then carried out to the Master 

of the Volga, with evidence 

gathered for future purposes. By 

now steaming party members had 


been winched aboard Volga after 

arrival via CANBERRA and 

WESTRALIA’s RHIBs. 

An assessment was carried out to 

determine whether the Volga was 

sea-worthy enough for a steaming 

party to safety transit the vessel 

to Fremantle. The assessment 

included such things as the 

general condition of the ship, life 

rafts, EPIRBs, navigation 

ABOVE: CANBERRA’S BOARDING OFFICERS LCDR LEYDON & LEUT LOWE WITH CAPTURED 

MV’S VOLGA AND LENA IN THE BACKGROUND 

35


equipment etc. The Boarding and 

Steaming Party officers completed 

their assessment and decided 

Volga was of a suitable standard 

for an RAN team to transit the 

vessel back to Fremantle. 

Return to Fremantle 

CANBERRA’s other boarding party 

(GOLD) had also successfully 

carried out a Non Compliant 

Boarding (NCB) 2 on another FFV, 

the Lena. Now both vessels were 

boarded and handed over to their 

respective steaming parties. 

CANBERRA circled Heard Island 

to check for any remaining 

vessels, leaving both MMV’s 

sitting in a holding area awaiting 

her return to transit them back to 

Fremantle. The long journey home 

began and the steaming parties 

did an excellent job in keeping a 

potential hostile crew in line, 

which knew fully well that the end 

result of the trip was arrest and 

possible deportation. 

Court Appeal 

It should be noted at the time of 

this article being written, Volga’s 

owners are disputing the 

apprehension of their vessel and 

are going to court in October. 

Volga’s owners are claiming that 

they were never in the EEZ, but 

only fishing around the border. 

The ADF and the Fisheries 

Department, with the help of 

CANBERRA’s crew, will put their 

case forward to show otherwise 

highlighting the value of accurate 

and comprehensive recording and 

evidence gathering when involved 

in such activities. 

Conclusion 

Over the period 29 Jan – 19 Feb 

HMA Ships CANBERRA and 

WESTRALIA sailed at short notice 

to the Southern Ocean for 

Operation Sutton. This was 

significant for a number of 

reasons: 

1. CANBERRA was due to 

commence a two year ERN 

(refit) as lead ship for the 

FFGUP only three months 

beforehand with no idea 

about the change in FAS that 

was about to happen post 

September 11, 2001, 

2. The RAN had never 

conducted boarding 

operations in the Southern 

Ocean beforehand using 

organic capability, 

3. Both boarding parties had 

been created from scratch 

only 2 months beforehand, 

with all training geared toward 

Persian Gulf operations, and 

4. The arduous and hostile 

environment of large scale 

poaching in the Southern 

Ocean, combined with the 

limited windows during which 

boardings could be conducted 

between inclement weather 

fronts. 

Operation Sutton was a 

resounding success for the RAN 

and the Australian Fisheries 

Department. It would appear that 

HMAS CANBERRA has set the 

standard for the RAN to carry out 

Southern Ocean operations while 

no longer requiring dependence 

on external agencies. 

1 Low Threat is passed once a vessels 

bridge and engine room are under 

Boarding Party control and the crew and 

weapons have been mustered, accounted 

for and the crew under surveillance in a 

confinable area. Once Low Threat has been 

passed the vessel is considered secure and 

safe for steaming parties to board. 

2 Non Compliant Boarding (NCB) – when a 

Boarding Party insert without consent from 

the vessel after they have been queried. 

A FISHERY OFFICER SPEAKS WITH LCDR LEYDON AND BRIDGE SECURITY WHILE VOLGAS FISHING MASTER LOOKS ON DEJECTEDLY 

A MEMBER OF BLUE BOARDING PARTY 

FASTROPES ONTO THE VOLGA 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR LCDR Sean Leydon 

joined in Jun 84 as an Apprentice at HMAS 

NIRIMBA and served on several FFG’s 

before completing an Engineering Degree 

at RMIT. He has been instructing FFG 

Combat Systems at CDSC since Sept 02 

after serving 18 months as DWEEO aboard 

HMAS CANBERRA. Previous postings 

include the GPS Project Office and Aide- 

De-Camp for the Assistant Defence 

Minister. 

LCDR Sean Leydon was awarded the 

Commendation for Distinguished Service 

for duties and leadership as a Boarding 

Officer during Operations Sutton and 

Slipper.

Applying Reliability- 

Centred Maintenance to 

Mechanical, Electrical, 

Electronic and Structural 

Systems 

Introduction 

In the March edition of Navy Engineering Bulletin, the benefits of 

applying Reliability-centred Maintenance to Naval assets were explored. 

It was shown that there is now a large body of experience in Defence to 

demonstrate that SAE JA 1011 compliant RCM (such as RCM2 and Def 

Stan 02 45) produces a maintenance programme which reduces the 

high cost of traditional naval maintenance without sacrificing system 

availability or reliability. Ongoing benefits in the Royal Navy for applying 

RCM to the majority of platforms and systems are expected to be in 

excess of £50M per annum. 

The article explained that true 

RCM involves answering seven 

structured questions about the 

asset or system under review: 

• What are the functions of the 

asset in its present operating 

context? 

• How can the asset fail to fulfil 

each function? 

• What would cause each 

functional failure? 

• What happens when each failure 

occurs? 

• In what way does each failure 

matter? 

• What can be done to predict or 

prevent each failure? 

• What should be done if no 

suitable proactive task can be 

found? 

Through the first four questions, 

RCM defines functional 

requirements, including 

performance standards, defines 

what we mean by ‘failure’ and 

completes a Failure Modes and 

Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the 

asset in question. The fifth 

question determines failure 

consequence and determines 

how each failure matters. The four 

RCM consequence types are 

‘Hidden, Safety, Environmental, 

Operational (loss of mission in 

the naval sense) and Non- 

Operational. The last two 

questions enable the appropriate 

failure management policy to be 

developed. 

These seven questions can only 

be answered by people who know 

the asset best – the maintainers 

and operators supplemented by 

specialist input where 

appropriate. 

Readers of Navy Engineering 

Bulletin have requested more 

information about the 

applicability of this process to the 

complete range of systems and 

subsystems which make up 

modern platforms and weapon 

systems. This article shows that 


the RCM process applies equally 

well to mechanical, electrical, 

electronic systems and naval 

structures and reviews the value 

of a comprehensive RCM 

database. 

RCM and Failure Management 

Before we can understand how 

RCM can be applied ‘across the 

board’, we must try to understand 

both the nature of failure and the 

decision-making logic involved in 

undertaking SAE compliant RCM. 

The six failure patterns 

The starting point is the six failure 

patterns described in the March 

issue, reproduced in Figure 1. 

These patterns, which are 

fundamental to understanding 

maintenance programme 

development, show the possible 

ranges of failure mode behaviour 

and are plots of conditional 

probability of failure (vertical axis) 

against time in service (horizontal 

axis). They arise from a large body 

of failure analysis conducted in 

BY DR ALUN ROBERTS, THE 

ASSET PARTNERSHIP 

37


A 

B 

C 

D 

E 

F 

FIGURE 1: THE SIX FAILURE PATTERNS 

the aircraft industry during the 

1960s and 1970s. 

The significance of the Patterns is 

as follows: 

• Patterns A, B and C display agerelated 

failure. For Patterns A and 

B the ‘conditional probability’ 

increases sharply after a specific 

point in time, (whereas with 

Pattern C, the increase is steady 

and there is no one age at which 

a rapid increase occurs). These 

three patterns generally apply to 

simple items or to complex items 

which have a dominant mode of 

failure. Typically, they involve 

failure mechanisms such as wear, 

corrosion, erosion, evaporation 

and fatigue, often associated, 

although not exclusively, with 

mechanical systems. For aircraft 

systems, only 11% of failure 

modes could be assigned to this 

group with any confidence. 

• Patterns D, E and F, on the other 

hand, are not age-related, as 

there is no age at which there is 

a rapid increase in the 

conditional probability of failure. 

With the exception of the low or 

high conditional probability of 

failure in the early periods of 

service for Patterns D and F, the 

three patterns display essentially 

random failure. Patterns D, E and 

F are associated with systems 

such as hydraulics, pneumatics 

and electronics. (A good example 

4% 

2% 

5% 

7% 

14% 

68% 

Pattern A: The “Bathtub Curve” 

High infant mortality, then a low level of random 

failure, then a wear out zone. 

Pattern B: The “Traditional View” 

A low level of random failure, then a wear out zone. 

Pattern C: 

A steady increase in the probability of failure. 

Pattern D: 

A sharp increase in the probability of failure settling 

down to random failure. 

Pattern E: Random Failure 

No relationship at all between how old it is and how 

likely it is to fail. 

Pattern F: The “Reversed J” curve 

High infant mortality, then random failure. 

of a Pattern E failure is a rolling 

element bearing. Bearings are 

complex items which tend not to 

have a dominant failure mode. 

For a family of bearings, failures 

will occur through normal wear 

and tear, incorrect installation, 

inadequate lubrication, faulty 

materials, overloading (etc), this 

diversity being responsible for the 

demonstration of random failure 

behaviour). 

• In the world of aviation, Failure 

Pattern F accounted for 

approximately two thirds of all 

failure modes. This was a direct 

result of the level of invasive 

scheduled overhaul being 

conducted which often left the 

system concerned in a failed 

state. The reasons for infant 

mortality are shown in Figure 2: 

Managing Age-related failure 

Failure Patterns A and B, and to a 

lesser extent C, can often be 

managed through some form of 

scheduled maintenance activity 

which will be driven by the age at 

which we are confident the 

conditional probability of failure 

increases. In RCM, these 

strategies are labelled scheduled 

restoration and scheduled 

discard. Here, we either restore or 

remanufacture a part or piece of 

equipment to name plate levels 

of performance, or throw the item 

away and replace it at some 

point before the conditional 

probability of failure increases. 

Such items are often described 

as having a ‘Life’. 

Unfortunately, most industrial 

organisations do not possess the 

large body of failure data 

necessary to demonstrate beyond 

doubt the presence of agerelated 

failure. Indeed, in current 

overhaul-oriented programmes 

such as those used in the RAN, 

most plant will not reach the 

point at which any rapid increase 

in the conditional probability of 

failure would arise – the 

equipment will usually have been 

changed out far earlier based on 

the current invasive maintenance 

regimes in place. When an RCM 

analysis is being conducted, 

there is therefore some doubt 

about whether a failure is truly 

age related or not. Where 

FIGURE 2: PREMATURE FAILURE (PATTERN F) 

sufficient doubt exists, RCM does 

not sanction scheduled 

restoration or discard as valid 

strategies and instead seeks an 

alternative approach. Also, 

scheduled restoration and 

discard are both extremely costly, 

and can seriously impact future 

reliability by increasing the 

incidence of Failure Pattern F 

failures. For these reasons, they 

are selected relatively 

infrequently. 

Managing Random Failure 

For obvious reasons, random 

failure (as demonstrated by 

Failure Patterns D, E and F and 

the early age failures in Patterns 

A, B and C) cannot be managed 

through scheduled restoration 

and discard. 

This reality has led to the growth 

of condition-based maintenance 

(CBM) strategies over the last ten 

to fifteen years in most areas of 

industry. CBM is based on the 

fact that most incipient failures 

provide us with early warning 

signs, known in RCM as Potential 

Failures. Once we know a failure 

is occurring, we are to undertake 

corrective action at a time of our 

choosing. 

In managing random failure, RCM 

employs the concept of the P-F 

curve shown in Figure 4. This 

describes the deterioration of 

physical systems and the 

conditions which apply to 

selection of an appropriate failure 

management policy known in 

RCM as an ‘On-condition’ task. 

Frequencies of On-condition tasks 

are driven by the gap between 

Premature failures caused by: 

• incorrect functional specification (what it must do) 

• poor design (what it must be in order to do it) 

• poor quality manufacture 

• incorrect installation 

• incorrect commissioning 

• incorrect operation 

• unnecessary maintenance 

• excessively invasive maintenance 

• bad workmanship

Conditional 

Probability of 

Failure 

FIGURE 3: SCHEDULED OVERHAUL 

FIGURE 4: THE P-F CURVE 

Small number of 

random failures 

There is a clear and (reliably) 

detectable potential 

failure condition 

resistance 

to failure 

Evident to 

operators? 

N 

On-condition 

task? 

Scheduled 

restoration? 

Scheduled 

discard? 

Failure-finding 

task? 

Redesign may 

be compulsory 

FIGURE 5: RCM DECISION LOGIC 

Conduct a scheduled 

overhaul just before 

reaching this point 

time 

Y 

"Life" 

Time in Service 

P 

P - F Interval 

Affect safety 

or the 

environment? 

Y 

On-condition 

task? 

Scheduled 

restoration? 

Scheduled 

discard? 

Combination 

of task? 

Redesign is 

be compulsory 

compulsory 

The P - F Interval: 

• It must be long 

enough to be of 

use 

• It must be 

consistent 

• It must be 

practical 

to do the task 

at the required 

interval 

F 

N 

Affect 

operations? 

N 

Y 

On-condition 

task? 

Scheduled 

restoration? 

Scheduled 

discard? 

No scheduled 

maintenance 

Redesign may 

be desirable 


On-condition 

task? 

Scheduled 

restoration? 

Scheduled 

discard? 

No scheduled 

maintenance 

Redesign may 

be desirable 

39 

the Potential Failure (P on the 

curve) and the functional failure 

point (F). For mechanical 

systems, a good example of an 

On-condition task would be 

vibration analysis on a rolling 

element bearing. On-condition 

tasks need to be undertaken at 

frequencies less than the P-F 

interval in order to give adequate 

time to react before the 

functional reaching point F. 

Where failure is random 

(scheduled restoration and 

discard is not an option) and Oncondition 

maintenance is not 

feasible or economic, the 

maintenance policy designer is 

faced with some hard decisions: 

• Allowing the failure to occur 

(known as No Scheduled 

Maintenance in RCM); or 

• Redesigning the system or the 

way it is operated or maintained 

so the failure consequences are 

reduced. Aircraft maintenance 

policy designers learned at an 

early stage that when random 

failures occur and there is no 

warning, then some form of 

protective device is usually 

required, such as installation of 

back up systems. With aircraft, 

additional systems increase 

complexity and add to overall 

weight, reducing economy. 

The RCM Decision Logic 

All of the above sounds complex. 

Fortunately, the architects of RCM 

have laid out a decision-making 

framework for us, known as the 

Decision Diagram in the case of 

RCM2 and Def Stan 02 45. The 

RCM2 logic is shown in summary 

form in Figure 5. 

Starting from the top left, the 

logic firstly sorts Evident from 

Hidden failures, and then 

identifies whether Evident failures 

have Safety, Environmental, 

Operational or Non-operational 

consequences. (A good example 

of a Hidden failure is a domestic 

smoke detector which lies 

dormant until required to sound 

an alarm in the event of smoke 

levels in the room being above a 

particular level).


FIGURE 7: RCM APPLIES EQUALLY WELL TO 

ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS 

Percentage 

25.0 

20.0 

15.0 

10.0 

5.0 

0.0 

On Condition 

Scheduled Restoration 

Scheduled Discard 

Failure Finding 

Combination Task 

Redesign 

FIGURE 6: PERCENTAGE OF MAINTENANCE TASK TYPES FOR MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS 

Each column in the Diagram then 

provides guidance for selecting 

an appropriate On-condition, 

Scheduled Restoration or Discard 

task for managing the failure 

mode in question. If these 

proactive tasks are not feasible, 

the bottom of the Diagram 

identifies a series of Default 

actions which are selected where 

proactive maintenance is not 

possible. These include No 

Scheduled Maintenance, 

Redesign and Failure Finding. 

The incidence of each 

maintenance task type varies 

significantly whether we are 

FIGURE 8: COMPRESSIVE AND TENSILE STRESSES INDUCE FATIGUE IN WARSHIP STRUCTURES 

examining mechanical or 

electrical/electronic systems. 

Figure 6 shows the percentage of 

each type of maintenance for a 

sample of 1300 failure modes in 

5 mechanical and 5 


RCM and Mechanical, Electrical 

and Electronic Systems 

What conclusions can we draw 

from Figure 6? 

We know that all systems, 

whether mechanical or electrical, 

come to us with a built-in level of 

capability (or resistance to 

external stress). We also know 

that this built-in capability will 

inevitably deteriorate over time in 

accordance with the second law 

of thermodynamics to the point 

at which it will no longer permit 

the user to achieve the required 

outputs. At this point, it has 

failed. 

For mechanical systems, 

deterioration takes several forms 

including wear, erosion, 

corrosion, fatigue and 

evaporation. In some 

circumstances, failures caused 

by these mechanisms may be 

age-related (Failure Patterns A, B 

and C) and so scheduled 

restoration or discard may be 

Mechanical 

Electrical/Electronic 

appropriate. Whether the failure 

is truly age related or not, 

however, the RCM decision logic 

(Figure 5) always requires us to 

evaluate ‘On-condition’ tasks 

first, before considering 

scheduled restoration or discard. 

This encourages maximisation of 

service life and reductions in the 

level of intrusive maintenance 

undertaken. Mechanical systems, 

therefore, produce a relatively 

high proportion of proactive 

maintenance activities – Oncondition, 

scheduled restoration 

and scheduled discard which are 

found on the first three 

maintenance task selection rows 

of the Decision Diagram. Figure 6 

shows that On-condition 

maintenance applies to around 

22% of failure modes in the 

sample and traditional scheduled 

restoration and discard 

(overhaul) only about 9%. Failure 

Finding and redesign account for 

a further 19%. 

On the other hand, electrical and 

electronic systems display 

predominantly random failure, 

although there are some agerelated 

failures associated with 

such items as batteries, 

capacitors, switches and other 

built-in mechanical devices. Not 

only do electrical and electronic

FIGURE 9: THE DIRECTED SURVEY APPLIES RCM TO STRUCTURALLY SIGNIFICANT ITEMS ONLY 

systems tend to fail randomly, but 

they generally provide us with no 

warning of impending failure, so 

that the interval between P and F 

in Figure 3 is minimal and oncondition 

maintenance is 

therefore not feasible. For the 

electrical/electronic systems in 

Figure 6, only 6% of failure 

modes respond to on-condition 

maintenance, with scheduled 

restoration and discard applying 

only to a further 3% of failure 

modes. Failure Finding on 

redesign account for a further 7% 

of failure modes and are 

therefore still important features 

of managing the failure of 


Overall, there is a tendency for 

electrical/electronic systems to 

push us towards the Default 

actions at the bottom of the RCM 

Decision Diagram. 

FIGURE 10: THE STRUCTURES FMEA 

Figure 6 also shows us that 

there are still nearly 50% of all 

failure modes in the mechanical 

systems for which no form of 

proactive maintenance is 

possible, the corresponding 

figure for the 

electrical/electronic systems 

being about 84%. 

RCM and Structures 

We now turn our attention to 

structures which are a form of 

mechanical system. RCM has 

been applied to aircraft structures 

for a number of years, although 

its application to Naval structures 

is relatively recent. Structures 

suffer from three categories of 

failure modes: 

Fatigue Damage (FD): Here, 

applied cyclic stresses resistance 

to failure. All ships are prone to 

fatigue failure as they are 


subjected to tensile and 

compressive forces in heavy seas. 

Environmental Deterioration 

(ED): Corrosive and other 

processes lessen the resistance 

to failure by reducing cross 

section, or by producing 

metallurgical changes at the 

molecular level. 

Accidental Damage (AD): 

Random stress applications 

reduce resistance to failure by 

deformations which change load 

paths and/or accelerate other 

failure modes. Accidental damage 

often occurs through docking and 

removal of systems for 

maintenance. 

Complex structural assemblies 

have a range of functions 

including longitudinal strength, 

local strength and containment. 

Structural failure can affect all of 

41 

these functions simultaneously. 

For instance, a corroded 

structural component may reduce 

longitudinal and local strength as 

well as causing a containment 

breach (flooding/leakage). For 

this reason there is usually no 

need to define the functions of 

structural elements so the 

structures FMEA can be based on 

physical components rather than 

functions, simplifying the analysis 

process. 

The number of physical 

components in a large warship is 

enormous making the 

completion of a structural survey 

of the whole vessel immensely 

complex and time consuming. 

Instead, recent experience in the 

Defence community with the 

application of RCM to structures 

has led to the development of a 

‘Directed Survey’ on Structurally 

Significant Items (SSIs). In the 

model shown in Fig 9, RCM and 

the Directed Survey would apply 

to the shaded areas only which 

include those components prone 

to FD (red), ED (Green) and AD 

(blue). 

For each SSI, the appropriate 

failure modes and effects are 

considered within the overall 

RCM database for the vessel. 

FD, ED (corrosion and erosion) 

and AD (random failure) are 

covered in the 6 Failure Patterns 

(Figure 1), allowing us to use 

the RCM decision logic to 

develop the appropriate survey 

elements and periodicities. 

Examples of the RCM software 

outputs for structures are shown 

in Figures 10 (SSI FMEA) and


About the author: Alun Roberts is a 

Director of The Asset Partnership, based in 

Sydney. His company is closely allied to the 

RCM implementation programmes being 

conducted by the Royal Navy and the US 

Navy. The Asset Partnership has supported 

the RNZN, ANZAC and ASASMO in RCM 

reviews of several systems and is also 

working closely with the Army in 

determining the supportability requirements 

of the new BUSHMASTER Infantry Mobility 

Vehicle using RCM2. In addition to working 

in world of Defence, The Asset Partnership 

works closely with a range of assetintensive 

businesses including mining, 

utilities, petrochemicals and manufacturing. 

FIGURE 11: THE STRUCTURES RCM DECISION WORKSHEET 

11 (Structures Decision 

Worksheet). 

RCM has been successfully 

applied to structures on a 

number of Warship classes in the 

Royal Navy including Hunt Class 

MCMV and Type 23 Frigate. 

The Consolidated RCM 

Database 

We have seen how the RCM 

process applies equally well to 

mechanical, electrical, electronic 

systems and to the vessel 

structure itself. It delivers a 

management policy for all likely 

failure modes - some of which we 

will already have suffered, others 

of which will not yet have 

happened – and maximises 

system reliability and availability. 

RCM also facilitates very 

significant reductions in 

maintenance expenditure. 

It is less well understood that a 

comprehensive consolidated RCM 

database is of immense value for 

a range of other purposes, 

including: 

• Review and optimisation of 

Useage and Upkeep Cycles (UUC) 

for a variety of Mission profiles: 

With little further effort, the 

impact of extending useage or 

changing the upkeep cycle can 

be readily determined. This is 

because RCM separates truly 

age-related failures from non agerelated 

(random) failures and 

allows us to evaluate the risks of 

extending upkeep intervals. The 

holy grail of UUC optimisation is 

indeed notoriously difficult to 

achieve by any other route; 

• Improved forecasting of manning 

levels required for completion of 

UUC work packages: The RCM 

database details proactive, 

default and corrective actions 

including the full range of ILS 

requirements (work content, 

skills, spares, tools, manuals, 

drawings etc), allowing work 

packages to be determined with 

ease; 

• Provision of a consistent frame of 

reference for reporting defects 

both for individual ships and 

across Class, particularly if RCM 

failure codes are embedded in 

the ship/shore maintenance 

management system; 

• Satisfying the needs of 

regulation, classification and 

internal audit by demonstrating 

asset management due diligence. 

Applying and implementing RCM 

will require a high level of 

commitment from the Navy and 

its contractors, disciplined 

application of the RCM 

technology and some time to 

achieve. The rewards, however, will 

be enormous. 

Is the Royal Australian Navy ready 

for the challenge?

The 2003 Navy Engineering Re-union was held at 

HMAS KUTTABUL Senior Sailors Mess on Friday 

evening, 4 July. 

Approximately 80 attended, (slightly down on 

previous years but this can perhaps be attributed 

to the busy times the Navy is currently 

experiencing), with plenty of old (and sometimes 

shamelessly embellished) warrie’s being spun and 

many an old friendship renewed. 

The organisers of the Navy Engineering Reunion 

would like to take this opportunity to express their 

gratitude to their generous sponsors, without 

whose support the evening would not have been 

possible: 

The Limited edition framed print of a painting of 

HMS NOTTINGHAM at Norfolk island was donated 

by Matrix HR International, formerly known as 

Reliable People Worldwide. 

This company has previously provided fire sentries, 

confined space cleaners, and trades assistants to 

FIMA Sydney. 

(The R.N. Long Look exchange WO was exempted 

from buying a ticket for this prize) 

3 framed maritime prints were donated by 

Maritime Press. These prints generated a lot of 

interest and a full inventory of the companies 

products can be viewed at 

www.maritimepress.com.au 

2 signed copies of the book In The Navy were 

donated by the author David Rickard. 

ADI also donated several corporate gifts which 

were well received. 

The artwork (HMAS ANZAC) used on the reunion 

flyer was created by Daryl White. 

Of particular note were the willing and enthusiastic 

volunteers from the Skills Development Centre 

and from FIMA Sydney; the night would not have 

been possible without their help. 


Navy Engineering Reunion 2003 

43 

BY CPOMT GRAHAM TURNLEY


Naval Engineering Reunion 

2 0 0 3 

Canberra 

All serving, retired and civilian members of all Naval 

Engineering branches are cordially invited to attend the 

Naval Engineering Reunion 2003 

which will be held on 

FRIDAY 14 November 2003 

Venue: Tuggeranong Valley Rugby Union & Amateur Sports Club, 

Ricardo Street, Wanniassa, ACT, 2903 

From: 1730 (5.30pm) to 0300 (3.00am) 

Cost: $25.00 per head (not changed since 1990), includes drinks, 

buffet & entertainment 

Bookings can be made by contacting one of the committee members listed below. 

The preferred method of payment is by cash or cheque. Cheques should be made 

payable to "Naval Engineering Reunion" and forwarded to: 

K. Assenheim 

1 Haskett Place 

Kambah ACT 2902 

(Payment is requested by no later than Friday 07 November 2003) 

Contacts: 

Kevin Assenheim Phone: (02) 6239 1133 

Email: krassenheim@sma.com.au 

Peter Webb Phone: (02) 6209 5503 

Email: Peter.Webb@VikingsClubs.com.au 

Ian Thompson Phone: (02) 6266 1845 

Email: ian.thompson1@defence.gov.au 

Ron Sheargold Phone: (02) 6292 3583 

Email: dimples.vvmc@bigpond.com 

DON'T MISS OUT – BOOK NOW

The New C3 – Cost, 

Capability, and 

Commonality 

A Naval Fantasy 

Imagine looking around a new RAN ship, of a class that you have never 

been on before, and feeling familiar with the systems and equipment 

and their general layout. You’ve operated and maintained equipment of 

the same family before, the layout of major systems within the ship is 

similar to your last ship and most of the outfit and fittings provided 

reliable service in that ship also. 

If you are having difficulty with 

this scenario it is probably 

related to the wide variety of 

countries from which we have 

sourced the designs for our ships 

in the past. The number of 

classes of ships currently 

operated by the RAN only just 

exceeds the number of countries 

of origin and while there is 

commonality evident within a 

class there is little in common 

between classes. This is because 

the technology, design philosophy 

and practices, and the associated 

standards used by different 

countries vary considerably. When 

faced with a similar problem, ship 

designers from different countries 

often pursue different but still 

effective solutions. While this 

variety might put some spice in 

our lives, it does little to assist us 

deliver reliable capability. 

• HMAS SUCCESS – French 

• FFG, LPA – USA 

• ANZAC, Hydrographic Ships – 

German 

• TOBRUK, FCPB and WESTRALIA – 

UK 

• MHC – Italian 

• Collins – Swedish 

• LCH – Australian 

In contrast if you have ever had a 

look around a current USN 

surface combatant you will have 

noticed the high level of 

commonality with classes such as 

our FFGs and DDGs, in 

equipment types, system and 

ship layout. 

From the perspective of an 

operator and maintainer, high 

levels of commonality between 

classes are definitely beneficial. 

But would a policy of increased 

commonality between platforms 

bring significant benefits to the 

RAN’s bottom lines of capability 

and cost? The recent DMO Future 

Ship Commonality Study 

responded to that question, and 

this article is based on that 

report and subsequent 

developments. 


What is Commonality? 

Commonality between ship 

classes can be achieved at 

various stages in the engineering 

life cycle of an asset often 

leading to increased commonality 

at later stages. 

The number of classes of 

ships currently operated by 

the RAN only just exceeds the 

number of countries of origin 

and while there is 

commonality evident within a 

class there is little in 

common between classes. 

Common design philosophy refers 

to the way in which systems and 

sub systems work together and 

how they achieve their outputs. 

For example the use of separate 

or combined firemain and salt 

water cooling systems within a 

ship. This has significant benefits 

in terms of operator familiarity 

and training requirements. 

Common design standards refers 

BY SIMON SYKES AND MARK 

WARREN - AASSPO 

45


FIGURE 1 - LEVELS OF COMMONALITY 

to the use of a similar set of 

consistent standards across the 

fleet and with the advent of 

computer aided design, the 

ability to re-use the detailed 

design for components based on 

these standards has never been 

more straight forward. 

Common product specifications, 

operating procedures and support 

arrangements are all relatively 

easy to achieve if the high level 

commonality is achieved. 

How Commonality Influences 

the Cost–Capability Equation 

In general commonality enables a 

wide variety of economies of 

scale. Provided the common 

approach continues to be 

utilised, non-recurring expenses 

are able to be spread over more 

projects and the subsequent 

projects experience lower nonrecurring 

expenses. Examples of 

non-recurring expenses include: 

• system specification & design; 

• production processes; 

• stockholdings of contingency 

spares; 

• development of logistic support 

data; 

• development of system and 

equipment support experience; 

and 

• system and equipment specific 

training; 

Commonality could also lead to 

increased operational availability 

through such effects as the 

increased availability of critical 

spares from ships in company 

and familiarity of personnel with 

equipment such that they are 

less likely to damage it during 

operation and maintenance. 

On the down side commonality 

can reduce capability and 

increase costs by: 

• restricting access to innovative 

technology, 

• increasing the likelihood of block 

obsolescence, and 

• locking the RAN into a single 

supplier who subsequently uses 

that arrangement to its 

commercial advantage. 

Why is there currently so little 

commonality between current 

RAN classes? 

There appears to be three main 

reasons for the lack of 

commonality between RAN ship 

classes: 

• acquisition arrangements; 

• rate of change of technology, 

and 

• rate of change of requirements. 

Acquisition Arrangements 

Currently the acquisition of RAN 

ships is conducted by separate 

and almost independent projects 

each looking to get the best value 

for money on the day for 

Australia’s rather unique 

capability requirements. In 

isolation the decision to acquire 

any particular class of ships may 

appear sensible but together we 

have ended up with a truly multicultural 

navy. It does reflect our 

Australian society but does it 

assist us in spending the Defence 

budget efficiently? 

Assuming earlier ship 

acquisition projects did 

examine through life costs and 

the possibility of leveraging 

efficiencies from commonality 

with existing classes, one could 

conclude that the open 

competitive tendering practices 

that are encouraged generally 

result in greater cost 

efficiencies than commonality. 

Technology Change 

In no other arena is the 

development of technology more 

important than for military 

superiority. In fact it is sometimes 

only through radical change in 

technology that a military 

advantage can be gained over an 

opponent.

Changing technology hinders the 

achievement of effective 

commonality. In general, 

commonality appears to be more 

easily achieved between classes 

progressively utilising the same 

basic technology than between 

classes where a significant 

change in technology has 

occurred. 

Given the rate of change of 

technology in some areas, such 

as communications, and the rate 

at which we acquire new RAN 

ships, commonality in these 

areas is hard to achieve. 

Nevertheless, for areas where 

technology change is slow, such 

as internal combustion engines, 

effective commonality between 

classes should be relatively easy 

to achieve. 

Large Changes in Requirements 

Large scale changes in 

requirements encourage 

significant changes from the 

current system and equipment 

solution, often associated with 

technology change. With the 

recent changes in international 

circumstances we are observing a 

review of our defence 

requirements that may result in 

significant changes to the 

systems and equipment we 

operate. Achieving effective 

commonality in these 

circumstances is problematic. 

How Could Increased 

Commonality Be Achieved? 

The circumstances most likely to 

result in significant commonality 

between future naval platforms 

involve teaming with a single ship 

design and build team over 

multiple projects, especially 

where the ship designer already 

incorporates significant 

commonality between classes. 

This approach would require the 

DMO to seriously change its 

acquisition management 

arrangements. 

Long term arrangements with 

some technology sectors and 

suppliers for various capability 

would also increase the level of 

effective commonality between 

classes. This initiative could be 

pursued independent of or in 

conjunction with the use of a 

common ship design and build 

team. The development of the 

ANZAC propulsion plant was an 

example of this type of approach. 

The formation of the DMO has 

lead to a focus on the total cost 

of ownership of a platform, with 

life cycle costs having a 

significant influence on the 

acquisition decision. Recognising 

the financial benefits of 

commonality within this 

modelling would encourage 

increases in commonality where 

appropriate. 

The current Defence Capability 

Plan (DCP) identifies the 

intended acquisition of 8 major 

surface platforms (2xAOR, 

3xLPD/H, 3xAWD) in the next 10- 

15 years with the selection of the 

designs mostly completed in the 

period 2004-2007. This program 

presents a significant opportunity 

to realise effective commonality 

between elements of the surface 

fleet. 

Taking the Good without the 

Bad 

As stated previously, ensuring that 

commonality strategies actually 

increase capability and decrease 

costs is a major challenge. The 

research for the Future Ship’s 

Commonality report found the 

only way to make commonality 

work effectively is to be rigorous 

and detailed in system design 

analysis. 

For example, the German Navy 

required that the MCR of the 

F-123 be common with that of 

the F-122. That sounded like a 

good idea, as the F-123 could 

use the F-122 training system, 

logistic support data, and 

inventory. However in the 

intervening 13 years between 

the design of these ships (1979 

– 1992) much had happened in 

engine management control, 

computer technology, and the 

education system. Consequently 

it was more expensive to acquire 

the MCR systems and equipment 


as the F-122 system was long 

out of production, and more 

expense to train because the 

1990s recruits had to be given a 

computer history lesson before 

they could understand the 

1970s era computers. Of course 

the 

F-123 also missed out on all the 

efficiency advances in the 

interim. In the end some sort of 

sense prevailed and the MCR on 

the F-123 was ripped out and 

replaced by a modern system. 

To successfully leverage the 

advantages of commonality it is 

necessary to understand where 

resources are currently being 

consumed and why, where the 

inefficiencies are, and what the 

lessons of history are. Along 

these lines the DMO has just 

completed a study on the effect 

of the lack of commonality 

between the Australian Frigate 

and the ANZAC Frigate on the 

ANZAC production costs 1. It is 

estimated that 5-10% was 

added to the acquisition costs 

of the ANZAC (averaged across 

the entire program) because of 

lack of commonality in design 

philosophy with the Australian 

Frigate. If the ANZAC Frigate was 

less than 10% cheaper than an 

equivalent offering that was 

common to an FFG, then from 

an acquisition perspective, the 

FFG based option may represent 

money well spent. 

What hasn’t been sufficiently 

studied is the effect of lack of 

commonality on through life 

support. Given that crew size, fuel 

usage, and hull maintenance are 

among the biggest contributors to 

through life cost, it is not hard to 

see that commonality could 

easily restrict access to 

substantial cost savings due to 

the limited common design 

solutions available for any 

particular problem. However this 

needs to be weighed against 

inefficiencies such as: 

• Class specific courses that could 

have been common but for the 

change in design philosophy 

47


About the author: Simon Sykes 

Joined RAN in 1985 

Graduated from UNSW with a BE(Mech) in 

1988 

Served on 1 DE (Torrens), 2 FFGs 

(Canberra and Sydney) and 1 AOR MEO 

HMAS SYDNEY 1997-98 (lots of fun) 

Resigned from RAN 1998 (for a peaceful 

life) 

1999-Current: various positions in 

DAO/DMO (ANZAC Ship project, FFG 

upgrade and AOR replacement project) 

Currently married with a mortgage and 

three cats and has never been to 

Portsmouth. 

• On the job training that could 

have been done ashore if 

economies of scale allowed 

• One off equipment that is poorly 

supported 

• The need for additional staff to 

deal with the uncommon class. 

• Increased inventory to support 

As stated above, the analysis 

needs to be rigorous if 

unexpected cost increases are to 

be avoided. For example, moving 

‘on the job’ training ashore will 

involve an increase in costs. If 

that isn’t offset by an increase in 

capability availability or a 

reduction in the SOC, then 

commonality has been negative. 

Conclusion 

Increased commonality is 

certainly achievable between 

future ship classes, with 

associated financial benefits also 

achievable. Teaming with a single 

ship design and build team over 

multiple acquisitions projects and 

the incorporation of life cycle cost 

models that recognise the 

benefits of commonality into the 

acquisition management 

processes appear to be the keys 

to achieving this objective. 

In order to justify pursuing 

significantly increased 

commonality between future 

classes, the cost benefit of the 

approach must be quantified. 

One of the major difficulties 

associated with quantifying the 

cost benefit of increased 

commonality is that to achieve 

the increases in commonality 

sought may require a move away 

from open competition in the 

acquisition process toward long 

term arrangements with 

technology sectors and suppliers 

over multiple acquisition projects. 

These changes in acquisition 

management present a whole 

new series of cost benefit issues. 

1 The Australian Frigate Project delivered 

FFGs MELBOURNE and NEWCASTLE. These 

were built at Williamtown dockyard, where 

the ANZAC Frigates are currently being 

built.

MOBI – A Look at the Past 

This is the second in our series of articles taking a humorous look at 

they way we used to train techo’s. Reprinted with the kind permission of 

the author, ex WOETP4SM ‘Sandy’ Freeleagus. 

WORKSHOPS 

Our workshops were old aircraft 

hangers fitted out with 

workbenches and shapers for 

fitting instruction and lathes of all 

sorts (centre lathes, relieving, 

turret and capstan lathes), 

grinding machines, andhorizontal 

and vertical milling 

machines in the turning 

workshop. 

The fitting workshop consisted of 

long metal benches back to back 

so you worked facing someone 

with a safety gauze between each 

bench. During our chiselling jobs, 

the frame around the gauze 

became a score board – hit your 

hand, fingers or thumb with the 2 

pound hammer and you put up a 

mark with chalk – do the same 

and draw blood – chalk up a 

mark with a blood spot on it. 

There were some quite impressive 

scores around indicating some 

quite unimpressive chiselling 

abilities. Naturally, all of this was 

done in winter so a smack on the 

thumb hurt just that little bit 

more. 

When we worked in the turning 

'factory' on the lathes, a favourite 

pastime was, each afternoon 

when we knocked off and 

cleaned up our lathes, we'd angle 

the coolant liquid nozzle up in the 

air. When the civilian instructor 

powered down the factory by 

throwing the main switch to OFF, 

everyone would turn their coolant 

pump motor ON. Next morning 

when the instructor came in and 

threw the main switch to ON, he’d 

be subjected to up to thirty 

fountains of coolant spurting 

away up into the air. This bloke, 

for some reason best beknown to 

himself, didn't bother to break 

the main switch immediately to 

turn off all the lathes, instead 

held rather run around madly to 

each individual lathe and turn 

them off one by one. By the 

time this exercise was 

completed, the deck used to be 

aflow with coolant. At least the 

floor wouldn't get rusty with all 

the lubrication it received day 

after day. 

If during the day we decided we'd 

like a break of 20 minutes or so, 


we'd all turn off the individual 

main switches of each lathe, turn 

on every conceivable accessory 

on the lathe, then on a 'ONE, 

TWO, THREE - NOW!!' all hit the 

main switches at once. This, we 

found, would blow the main 

power fuse for the factory which 

would take some 20 minutes to 

replace. They woke up to this little 

49


ploy when we blew our third 

consecutive fuse for an hour's 

break on a hot summer's 

afternoon. 

Our other work practices were 

spectacular as well. 

In Blacksmithing, we found that if 

you got your furnace going well 

and you threw cans of oil into the 

coke, you could effectively send 

an awesome mushroom fire-ball 

up the chimney and out into the 

atmosphere. 

Since Plumbing and 

Blacksmithing were in the same 

building and we didn't particularly 

like the plumbing instructor, and 

his office was on a mezzanine 

floor in the rafters of the building, 

we found that if we stoked up the 

furnaces first thing to get them 

going, used as little forced air as 

possible, a fair amount of oil and 

turn off the chimney flute, then 

thick oily smoke would roll out 

from under the chimney uptake 

and float up to the building's roof 

to be caught there. Some 

mornings, we worked it quite well, 

so well, in fact, you wouldn't even 

see his office – although you 

could hear him coughing – but 

he’d never give you the 

satisfaction of coming down out 

of it. 

Welding came in two forms – arc 

welding and oxy-welding. 

In arc welding, we'd slip into a 

mate's welding bay and either 

turn up or turn down his welding 

amperage controller. This either 

zapped his electrode on the job 

in one big glob, or the electrode 

would stick to the job and he 

couldn't pull it off. Another silly 

thing we did was yell for our 

instructor and when he stuck his 

head inside your welding cubicle, 

you and two or three mates would 

all strike an arc at once. Result 

one blind as a bat and swearing 

instructor groping around trying to 

find one of us to kill slowly. 

A particular favourite move was to 

ask some poor junior termer 

walking past to come and give 

you a hand. (They'd never refuse 

you - a senior termer). You'd tell 

them to look away as they stood 

on a big metal plate (to steady it 

of course) so they wouldn't hurt 

their eyes as you did your job. As 

soon as they looked away, you'd 

weld their steel toe caps and heel 

caps of their boots to the metal 

plate and then race off and leave 

them there. 

We found during our 

Coppersmithing, that if we held 

two oxyacetylene torches, burning 

on full acetylene, into a I inch 

water pipe securely clamped in a 

vice to a heavy metal workbench, 

and slowly increased the 

oxygen into the flame, then by the 

time you had the flame burning 

half and half (equally oxygen and 

acetylene), then the water pipe 

acted like a jet engine and the 

bench would try to take off. (This 

was nothing to the take-off that 

the plumbing instructor did when

he saw us doing it and the bench 

quivering and bouncing around 

on the concrete floor and a great 

long flame whistling out of the 

tail end of the water pipe). 

Any misdemeanours caught 

during the factory hours resulted 

in 'extra factory' duties - generally 

a Saturday afternoon for two 

hours. One instructor put us on 

this extra factory, then got us to 

do a private job for him while we 

were serving out our time – then 

wondered why we buggered 

it up'.! 

But our workshop training was 

excellent and our end of term test 

jobs and passing out test job 

were quite remarkable both in 

their complexity and complete 

uselessness as practicable 

equipment. However, the jobs we 

had to do in NIRIMBA with the 

choice of materials and endless 

availability of countless tools bore 

no resemblance to any job we 

had to perform on board a ship 

out in the Fleet. 

Our technical training was carried 

out 'over there' (over the airstrip 

at Building 259). As Ordnance 

Artificers, we had only a single 

hydraulic bofor Mk V14 a twin 

Bofor Mk-V, a Simple Tachometric 

Director and a Twin 4 inch HA/LA 

mounting. (The acquisition of a 

4.5 inch turret was still a hopeful 

dream away in those days. As it 

was, we completed the 4.5 inch 

turret complete - mechanically, 

electrically and hydraulically - 

three times altogether - the first 

two times without even seeing a 

4.5 inch Mk 6* turret and only 

knowing what class of ship 

carried them). We were also 

instrumental in stripping a couple 

of the old quadruple 40mm 

Bofors mountings from the old 

'AUSTRALIA' for scrap. Apart from 

the historical value in these 

mountings, the equipment was 

superb and very well maintained 

with everything still in perfect 

working order. At that seemingly 

early stage of our careers, we 

could appreciate the relatively 

simple and basically functional 

equipment the Americans 

produced compared to the 

correspondingly bulky and 

intricate gear obtained from 

the Brits. 

One rather contrived incident 

back-fired on us. We were 

struggling through our Gunnery 

Theory that consisted mostly of 

electrical theory and to say we 

were somewhat confused with 

this 'white man's magic' was, if 

nothing else, a gross 

understatement of fact and a 

flattering assessment of our 

electrical knowledge. 

We had been told all about eddy 

currents and magnetic fields of 

force around electrical conductors 

and different insulations, and 

knew only enough to put a little 

plan into effect. 

In our Ordnance building, we had 

a number of motor-generators to 

drive our various mountings, so in 

some down-time, we went to one 

of the motor-generators, and on 

the coupling on the shaft 

between the motor and the 

generator, we secured a very fine 

piece of wire whose length was 

slightly shorter than the distance 

from the coupling to the deck. 

The result was, when the machine 

was flashed up and you put your 

hand near the coupling, it'd get 

hit by the now invisible wire which 

felt like an electrical shock. 

Nonchanantly we flashed up the 

motor-generator and, putting on 


our most confused and worried 

expressions, we approached our 

naval instructor, who hearing of 

our symptoms with the machine, 

put on a 'you stupid drongos' 

look and confidently ambled over 

to the machine. As if only to 

humour us, he stretched out his 

hand - and ZAPP!! He whipped 

his hand back, then very 

tentatively, tried again 

ZAPP!! Got him again. 

After about five minutes of deep 

thought during which his full sum 

of electrical why-fors in this area 

were exhausted and proven that 

this just could not possibly 

happen, he stretched out his 

hand again - ZAPP!! 

That was enough for him - call in 

bigger reinforcements. 

Up came a solemn, unbelieving 

civy instructor, who giving us all 

(including our PO instructor) a 

'you incompetent fools' stare, did 

the honours 

and – ZAPP!! 

Two more ZAPPS!! followed until 

civy instructor was completely 

baffled also. Before too much 

time had elapsed, we apprentices 

were quite worried, because, not 

only was our PO instructor and 

civy ordnance instructor involved 

with this unique phenomenon, 

but so too were the Ordnance 

Officer, the Electrical PO 

instructor, the Electrical Officer 

51


and the Electrical Civy Instructor 

along with the Instructor 

Commander. 

Unfortunately for us, the civy 

engineering instructor, Reg, who 

shared our building, noticed us 

rolling around laughing at the 

back of the rapidly expanding 

group (before the brass began to 

arrive), slapping each other on 

the back and holding our sides to 

keep in the peals of laughter. 

Putting two and two together and 

getting four (and we numbered 

four), and knowing us OA's from 

previous little efforts, Reg 

casually asked if anyone had 

thought of turning off the 

machine? To those that 'knew' us, 

the penny began to drop - and 

we stopped laughing and began 

to plan an escape route. 

The machine wound down, was 

inspected and many pairs of 

glaring eyes swung around to find 

us 'innocents' quietly engrossed 

in the breech mechanism and 

recoils systems of the 4 inch 

guns. Accusation time has arrived 

and before a hastily convened 

inquisition of baleful stares and 

accusing twisted half grins of our 

immediate superiors (and anyone 

else who had a score to settle), 

we were given the third, fourth, 

fifth and sixth degrees, but 

thankfully, they couldn't prove we 

had 'set them up'. However, we 

received an extra work load 'just 

in case', which we thought was 

most unfair, but decided, under 

the circumstances, not to push 

our luck too far. 

The irony of all this was, soon 

after we were informed that we 

were to be fully crossed trained in 

high power electrics to become 

Systems Artificer Power - SAP's - 

'Quite appropriate', said Reg and 

agreed upon by all our 

instructors. 

But then, if we couldn't take a 

joke, we shouldn't have joined. 

But it wasn't all fun and games. 

Studies were demanding and 

pass marks inordinately high. Our 

final Ordnance examinations were 

as follows: a paper on Bofors 

(single, twin and associated 

directing gear); a paper on 

Gunnery Theory (including 

mechanical fire control 

mechanisms) and three papers 

on the 4.5 inch turret - one each 

on the electrical, mechanical and 

hydraulic aspects of the turret. 

The problem was, there was no 

time limit and our final exams 

lasted on an average, four hours 

per paper – some longer, blowing 

out to five hours (forget about a 

meal break too). 

This was followed by an oral 

exam if it was considered 

necessary (if the instructors 

thought you covered up-a 

question with a profusion of 

words but didn't actually say 

anything). We were marked on 

what we put down in an answer 

and had marks taken off for 

anything we didn't put down in 

our answer. We hated the multiple 

choice answers as all choices of 

answer were very similar and you 

had a mark deducted for every 

wrong answer. The rule was - if 

you don't know - don't guess. It 

was quite possible to emerge 

from a multiple choice 

questionnaire with a minus score 

that had to be made up in other 

more conventional questions. 

When one left ‘NIRIMBA', one was 

confident that he knew what he 

was talking about theory wise 

and could, if need be, prove his 

point.

To MTE, or not to MTE 

As Marine Technical Electrical (MTE) instructors at HMAS CERBERUS we 

are often called upon to provide “Streaming Lectures” to the MT sailors 

passing through the Faculty. These lectures are basically delivered before 

they are given the opportunity to stream “M” (mechanical) or “E” 

(electrical), and are intended to be our recruiting sales pitch to entice 

impressionable MT’s into making a career choice. In addition to these 

structured presentations it is commonplace for trainees to “hit us up” for 

advice in the passageways as they ponder, what could very well be, for 

an ever-decreasing number, a lifetime decision. This in itself creates a 

moral dilemma for us, as we knowingly connive to tempt them into 

signing into a branch that will ultimately disadvantage them financially 

and retard their career progression. 

The problems we are having with 

attracting sailors to the MTE 

branch are many and varied. 

Certainly one of the major 

disincentives appears to be the 

fact that MTE sailors must 

complete a much longer ITT 

course and thereby suffer the 

financial consequences of being 

16 weeks behind their MTM 

counterparts. They must then 

attain all of the MTM 

qualifications, more often than 

not without the under pinning 

knowledge provided to MTM 

sailors by EAC’s or ASTC’s, in 

order to be competitive for career 

progression and promotion. This 

is in addition to their own stream 

requirements. 

Many of the Trainees will readily 

admit they take the easy way out 

and stream MTM straight away to 

avoid the extra course time, in a 

bid to escape Cerberus that 

much earlier. 

There is a definite perception of 

inequality in the duties and 

responsibilities of the MTM as 

opposed to those of the MTE. 

Despite what the “theories” on 

cross-training and multi-skilling 

may reflect, the responsibility for 

all but the lowest level electrical 

tasks still traditionally fall to the 

MTE, regardless of whose work 

centre they belong to. The age old 

” it’s an electrical problem, get a 

Greenie” mentality is still very 

much alive and well. Admittedly 

not in all cases, but certainly 

anecdotal evidence would 

suggest that in the majority in 

most cases this is still 

happening. In effect an MTE must 

endeavour to become a subject 

matter expert in his chosen 

electrical field, in addition to 

fulfilling the watch-keeping, MWC, 

and ERWC demands placed upon 

him if he wishes to progress his 

career. 

MTM sailors only conduct about 

60 odd hours of electrical 

training during their Initial 

Technical training, consequently 

they are excluded from all Shore 

Power Evolutions and the vast 

majority of Electrical tasks based 

on their lack of under pinning 

knowledge. 

The fact that the Anzac Stream 

have re-assigned equal numbers 

of MTM and MTE sailors to the reconfigured 

work centres highlights 

this inequality in expectations 

and must justify a case for "a 

separate promotional stream for 

the MTE". One that focuses the 

promotional pre requisites on the 

electrical as opposed to the 

mechanical aspects of our 

employment. The overwhelming 

evidence from the coalface must 


lean pretty heavily to the 

affirmative. Realistically, if you are 

a work centre I/C and you 

develop a mechanically oriented 

fault on the RO plant, who are 

you going to send to attend to it? 

The sailor best qualified to deal 

with the problem of course, 

electrical sailors for electrical 

problems and mechanical sailors 

for the mechanical aspects. 

Hardly the shining example of 

multi skilling TTP92 was designed 

to provide. 

As ETP’s (Electrical Technical 

Power branch) we had an clear 

identity, a deep sense of pride in 

who we were and what we did, 

this reflected in our levels of 

expertise and service. Despite 

common perception this was 

important as it nurtured that 

pride, a sense of belonging and 

encouraged the passage of 

knowledge between the more 

experienced members and their 

younger peers or subordinates. 

Yes, there were inevitable lines of 

demarcation between the various 

Technical Branches, although I 

doubt they were ever truly 

enforced or a real problem for 

anyone, rather a guide to where 

respective areas of responsibility 

began and ended. 

The lack of civilian recognition of 

the MTE qualification must also 

53 

BY POMTE JIM RANKINE, HMAS 

CERBERUS


be addressed. At present, 

because our competencies are 

issued under the MERS ITAB, as 

opposed to the Electrical ITAB the 

best the MTE sailor can hope for 

is recognition to a Second Year 

Apprentice level. Not exactly the 

greatest enticement given the 

level of training MTE sailors 

undergo. Moves to rectify this and 

attain recognition under the 

Electrical ITAB have seemingly 

been filed in the “Too hard“ 

basket. 

As MTE’s however, we are adrift 

and have no real sense of identity 

or direction. We are expected to 

attain MWC’s and ERWC’s, yet will 

almost always be employed as 

electricians. I am in no way 

disputing the advantages gained 

by possession of system 

knowledge. But do they really 

need to be promotional pre 

requisites to allow us to perform 

our primary roles as electrical 

sailors? Surely a better solution 

would be to encourage MTE’s to 

complete these qualifications 

without retarding their 

development and progression 

within their chosen field. The fact 

we are often seen as the poor 

cousin within the Marine 

Engineering empire and expected 

to provide watch keeping and 

evolution manpower in addition to 

our own excessive workloads 

within electrically oriented ships, 

certainly adds to our growing 

levels of dissatisfaction and 

disillusionment. 

This was partially high-lighted in 

the findings of the mis-guided 

MTE survey conducted a few 

years ago. The major problems 

with the survey were, 

a. it was conducted by a civilian 

consultancy firm who really 

didn’t understand the 

requirements, 

b. they asked a narrow section 

of the MTE world (FFG MTE’s), 

and 

c. they simply asked the wrong 

questions, . 

It seemed more focused on a 

rate and sea service badge and 

the fact that individuals didn’t 

have a great working relationship 

with their immediate supervisor, 

rather than the ”big ticket” issues. 

The end result is an acute 

shortage of electrical expertise as 

MTE’s separate from the service. 

After all, is it a fair and 

reasonable expectation for MTE 

sailors to effectively have to be 

proficient in two entirely differing 

areas of expertise to be 

competitive for promotion, whilst 

the people we are competing with 

only really require one? And 

where will the MTE sailor be 

predominantly employed 

throughout his naval career? 

Speaking from experience, my 

work profile as an electrician has 

fundamentally remained constant 

whilst the goal posts for 

promotion and progression has 

altered immeasurably. 

The abolition of the POMT Engine 

Room Watchkeeping Certificate 

Under Training billets within the 

ANZAC Class Frigates has only 

compounded the problem. Whilst 

eliminating the requirement for 

an additional Petty Officer to be 

borne, it effectively closes the 

only avenue for the POMTE to 

under-study the ERWC qualified 

sailor, without the additional 

responsibilities and ancilliary 

duties incurred as a (day 

working) work centre I/C, and the 

long hours they already attract. 

One of the methods adopted to 

overcome the shortage of MTE 

sailors in the various ranks was to 

give Electrical ASTC’s to MT 

sailors, and then promote them 

as MTE’s. Whilst this satisfied the 

number requirement, the 

implications in terms of 

workplace electrical safety were 

of concern as the ASTC was a 

three month course, the majority 

of which was conducted at 

civilian institutions, centred 

around the MEN distribution 

system, with a 3 week Naval 

Specific component here in 

Cerberus. So “on paper” these 

personnel were afforded the 

same qualifications as former ETP 

sailors who had undertaken the 

intensive electrical training 

associated with the ETP category, 

with nowhere near the degree of 

the experience or deep subject 

knowledge. 

The concept that the entire MT 

world be trained to the MTE 

standard has thankfully been put 

on hold with the new ITT 

curriculum. Great theory, but 

realistically the additional costs 

involved in terms of training time, 

resources and manpower 

availability would make it 

impossible to justify. 

The fact is, that the calibre of a 

large percentage of the trainees 

we receive as a result of the 

recruiting process would not 

possess the electrical aptitude to 

pass the current requirements of 

the MTE curriculum. It’s the 

square peg into round hole 

conundrum, only we aren’t 

allowed to hit them with hammers 

(or wheelies) anymore. To some of 

them, fitting of a plug top really is 

Rocket Science. 

Until at least some of these 

injustices are addressed the 

unacceptably high separation 

rates and low recruiting levels for 

MTE sailors will continue. Despite 

the rumour that a fully AMOC’ed 

MTE (qualified with an Auxiliary 

Machinery Operator’s Certificate – 

AMOC Ed.) is the Engineer’s most 

employable sailor we continue to 

penalise and ostracise them. 

Despite the change to the 

watchkeeping requirements 

recently implemented within the 

ANZAC Class, the system still 

requires POMTE sailors to obtain 

a MSM qualification, MTCC and 

complete the CPOATT to be 

eligible for promotion to CPO 

regardless of their future 

employment prospects 

Jim Rankine 

Senior Instructor – High Power 

Engineering Faculty 

HMAS CERBERUS

ERUS 

(Engineering Ready-Use Stuff!) 

News, Views and Issues concerning 

Marine Technicians 

Welcome to the second edition of ERUS. This time, I aim to provide you 

with an update on the changes to MT Operator qualifications and 

watchkeeping practices that I outlined in the last edition of the Navy 

Engineering Bulletin. Following that, I’ll give you details of the 

Occupational Analysis of the Category which will be conducted in 2004. 

What about these watchkeeping 

changes? 

In the last ERUS, I gave an 

overview of some of the farreaching 

changes proposed for 

the MT Category in the areas of 

MT Operator Qualifications and 

watchkeeping practices. To 

simplify reference to these 

changes, they have been given a 

Project name: PROJECT MEPAQ, 

an acronym for Marine 

Engineering Practices and 

Qualifications. 

There has been a delay in the 

official roll-out of these changes 

to the Fleet as a whole while 

minor amendments have been 

made to address concerns raised 

by AUSFLTCSG (Fleet Staff), and 

some of the Force Element 

Groups. Significant progress has 

been made, however, toward 

implementation of the new 

operator qualifications in the FFG 

and ANZAC Classes. CSOE (CAPT 

David Sippel) has endorsed the 

changes for full implementation 

in the ANZAC Class. HMAS 

PARRAMATTA will enter service 

under the new Engineering 

watchkeeping regime, using the 

new qualifications and 

implementing the reduced 

Engineering Watch manning 

states that accompany them. 

PARRAMATTA’s initial Light-Off- 

Examination and Work-Up will 

provide AUSFLTCSG staff with an 

ideal opportunity to critically 

assess the new arrangements, as 

well as validate the revised 

ANZAC MT Scheme of 

Complement. 

In the case of FFG’s, a 

comprehensive study has been 

conducted by an external agency 

engaged by the acting FFG 

Capability Element Manager, 

(CMDR David Coyle) to analyse 

the proposed changes, identify 

any risks or hazards arising from 

their implementation and provide 

risk management strategies to 

mitigate these. The company 

chosen to undertake this study 

was RELeGEN, an IT Development 

and Consultative agency which 

has been involved in or has 

managed a number of Navy 

Engineering projects. 

Part of RELeGEN’s charter was 

also to analyse the changes from 

a retention viewpoint, and provide 

opinion as to the anticipated 

effect on MT retention the 

changes will bring. I’m pleased to 

announce that the comprehensive 

report and extensive list of 

recommendations provided by 

RELeGEN as the project 

deliverable, has ratified the 

implementation of the new 

watchkeeping qualifications; 

revised rounds and data 

collection routines; and reduced 

Engineering Watch manning, in 

the FFG Class. As a result, CSOE 

has authorised the FFGCEM to 

proceed with trials of the new 


arrangements. A condensed list of 

the recommendations arising 

from RELeGEN’s report is 

contained at the article 

Optimising Engineering Watch 

Keeping Duties in FFGs – A 

Systems Approach, at page 57 of 

this edition of the Bulletin. Not all 

these recommendations will be 

implemented, however those that 

directly relate to the initiatives 

above will be trailed and 

validated, under Fleet Staff 

supervision, over the next 

12 months. 

With regard to implementation 

and trials in all other classes, at 

the time of writing this article, an 

AF Memo is being drafted which 

will initiate Project MEPAQ 

throughout the Fleet, and call for 

implementation plans from the 

various FEGS to be provided to 

the Maritime Command. 

Hopefully, by the time you read 

this the AF Memo will be on the 

streets and you’ll all be familiar 

with it. Subsequently, AUSFLTCSG 

Engineering Staff will assume the 

role of Front-line management of 

trials of the initiatives associated 

with Project MEPAQ on a class by 

class basis. The Submarine FEG 

already has a well developed 

implementation plan which 

converts the Project MEPAQ 

initiatives to align with their 

qualifications and routines; 

similarly CPO Paul Kenny at the 

Patrol Boat FEG has developed 

an innovative strategy for 

BY WOMT MARK RICHARDSON 

MT CATEGORY SPONSOR 

55


introducing the new qualifications 

throughout the FREMANTLE Class. 

MT OCCUPATIONAL ANALYSIS 

Another major issue on the 

horizon for the category is the 

conduct of a formal Occupational 

Analysis (OA) of Marine 

Technicians. The Directorate of 

Strategic Personnel Policy and 

Research (DSPPR) will undertake 

this research on behalf of the MT 

Category Sponsor during 2004. It 

is expected to take the whole of 

next year to complete. 

What is the purpose of the 

Occupational Analysis? 

The purpose of an Occupational 

Analysis is to identify current 

tasks performed by all MT 

personnel by rank, class of ship 

and organisation. It is also used 

to identify and evaluate the 

current structure in terms of 

career progression and overlap of 

tasks performed between ranks. 

The OA will provide additional 

training emphasis and task 

learning difficulty data to assist in 

the validation of training and 

competency logbooks, and 

establish priorities for training 

development. 

The OA will also collect relevant 

background information about 

retention factors, morale status, 

workload levels, remuneration 

and career management. 

What does an OA involve? 

The occupational analysis for the 

MT Category will involve gathering 

Subject Matter Experts (SME) 

from all major populations of 

Marine Technicians; (i.e. Fleet 

Base East and the Sydney area; 

Fleet Base West; the Darwin and 

Cairns areas and HMAS 

CERBERUS) to form SME panels, 

which will be interviewed in order 

to develop a ‘Task Inventory’. The 

task inventory will list all the work 

tasks that could possibly be 

carried out by a Marine 

Technician. From this, a ‘Time 

Spent’ questionnaire is compiled 

aimed at quantifying just that: the 

amount of time spent on each 

task by individual marine 

technicians. All marine 

technicians will complete the 

‘Time Spent’ questionnaire; 

additionally ‘Training Emphasis’ 

and ‘Task Learning Difficulty’ 

questionnaires will be circulated 

to selected experienced 

personnel within the category. 

Oh No! Not another survey!!! 

Before you all groan too loudly 

about having to fill out yet 

another survey, I’d ask you to 

consider a few pertinent points: 

a. A formal Occupational 

Analysis has not been 

carried out on the Marine 

Technical Category since it’s 

inception - if you consider 

that the current MT sailor 

arose from the integration of 

the old Sailstruc MTP, MTH 

and ETP categories resulting 

from the recommendations 

of TTP 92. 

b. In the case of the MT 

Category, the OA is aimed at 

defining areas of training 

shortfall and areas of 

training ‘overkill’ or wasted 

training. It will also assist in 

identifying ineffective jobs 

and jobs that don’t provide 

the opportunity to develop 

core skills. 

c. The Occupational Analysis 

will comprise the foundation 

for the impending Pay group 

placement review of the MT 

Category. 

Furthermore OA’s are 

extraordinarily expensive to 

conduct in terms of time, money 

and resources, – the MT survey 

alone will require a full-time 

commitment by two OA analysts 

from DSPPR, (CPOCIS Ivan Oreb 

and Ms Kirsty Yates) for over 12 

months, combined with extensive 

involvement from Category 

Sponsor staff to co-ordinate the 

SME panels and survey returns. 

Add to this the commitment of 

Subject Matter Experts in each 

location for panels lasting up to 

three days, and the costs 

associated with producing, 

distributing, completing, 

collecting, and analysing the 

survey forms, and it becomes 

clear that this is not an 

undertaking to be taken lightly. It 

is also clear that any subsequent 

OA will be a long time coming, 

especially when you consider that 

DSPPR are responsible for 

occupational analysis of all 

Defence trades, numbering over 

300 individual categories in total. 

( For example, DSPPR have 

recently completed the OA of the 

tri-service communications 

categories, the results of which, 

for Navy, will be used to formulate 

policy on a wide range of issues 

affecting the employment, training 

and remuneration of our CIS 

sailors). Once our turn is finished, 

we will drop to the bottom of a 

very long list. 

Subject Matter Experts 

A word about the Subject Matter 

Experts. Commands will be 

approached to supply highperforming 

PO and CPO MT 

sailors to form the SME panels in 

each locality. We will be looking 

for exemplary sailors who can be 

considered role models for the 

branch, and are able to provide 

accurate information on tasks 

performed by junior and senior 

marine technicians. A panel will 

comprise approximately 8 sailors 

in each locality and will need to 

reflect the wide diversity of Ship 

classes and employment 

environments encountered by 

marine technicians. It is vital that 

the personnel nominated for the 

panels are spared for three full 

working days to concentrate 

solely on the compilation of the 

Task Inventory; interruptions or 

absences while the panels are 

convened will significantly impair 

the quality of the data collected. 

What’s in it for me? 

The Occupational Analysis 

presents you, the individual 

marine technician, with an 

invaluable opportunity to 

comment on your employment, 

your training and to suggest ways 

that things can be improved. We 

will be actively pursuing the 

optimum result of a 100% return 

rate of survey forms; we will be 

pestering you and your superiors 

for your completed survey forms. 

Remember as you fill them out 

that the future of your category 

will very much depend on the 

results gained from the surveys 

and the future policies they 

generate. 

SUMMARY 

In light of what I’ve covered 

above, it would be a huge 

understatement to say there’s a 

big year ahead for the Category. 

The challenges presented by the 

introduction of new operator 

qualifications and watchkeeping 

practices will test the category 

and will require extensive resolve 

and commitment on all our parts 

if it is to be successful. Similarly, 

total resolve and commitment to 

the OA will be crucial in ensuring 

the data it produces is accurate, 

and leads to the development of 

policy that will truly benefit the 

Category and represents the 

direction you want your branch to 

follow. 

We at DNPR(E&L) welcome 

comment and feedback on the 

above topics or on any other 

issue you think is important to 

the MT Category. Until next time, 

keep progressing your operator 

qualifications and stay safe. 

Cheers Richo

Optimising Engineering 

Watch Keeping Duties in 

FFGs – A Systems 

Approach 

Introduction 

RELeGEN Pty Ltd, an innovative Australian owned Defence Systems 

Development business was recently contracted to provide independent 

engineering analysis to ensure the generic engineering watch keeping 

structure proposed by DNPR(E&L) could be safely implemented on the 

RAN’s FFG Class ships. The RELeGEN team consisted of the author as 

Team Leader, Ken Clayton (ex-WEEO) and Brad Whitford (ex-WOMTM). 

The team brought together considerable experience in FFG Class ships, 

systems engineering, risk analysis and departmental restructuring 

respectively. 

The Study’s final report included 

38 recommendations. Of these, 

only the core recommendations 

are discussed in this article. The 

purpose of this article is to show 

that significant improvements can 

be made to engineering work 

practices without loss of 

capability by the application of 

systems based analytical tools 

and the judicious use of modern 

technology. 

Background 

An engineering cruising watch on 

an FFG at sea currently 

comprises four personnel. Two 

personnel are located within the 

Central Control Station (CCS) – 

the Engineering Officer of the 

Watch (EOOW) and the Electric 

Plant Control Console Operator 

(EPCCO). A further two are 

employed as roving monitors and 

operators for the propulsion and 

auxiliary plant. 

The Engineering Duty Watch in 

harbour consists of four 

personnel: 

a. Engineering Officer of the 

Day (EOOD), 

b. Duty Engineering Leading 

Hand (DELH), and 

c. two watch keepers that also 

perform specialist roles 

should an emergency 

incident occur. 

A general feeling within the FFG 

Engineering Community 

considered that, noting the 

advancements in personnel skills 

and technology, the time had 

come to re-examine the current 

watch keeping manning structure 

and practices. 

DNPR(E&L) had already proposed 

a common watch keeping 

structure that has been 

successfully implemented within 

the ANZAC Class ships using the 

skills of WO Brad Whitford. This 

proposal included a suite of 

competencies that would assist 

with providing a common level of 

assessment and skill across the 

various ship classes. In summary 

DNPR(E&L) proposed a cruising 


watch keeping structure that 

would allow for: 

a. the Machinery Systems 

Manager (MSM) to oversee 

the watch but not 

necessarily be in the 

controlling space; 

b. the Machinery Systems 

Controller (MSC) to man the 

controlling space and be 

capable of carrying out all 

normal plant operation as 

well as being capable of 

bringing the plant to a 

stable state should a 

malfunction occur. 

Subsequent plant 

restoration would be carried 

out by the MSM; and 

c. the Machinery Systems 

Technician (MST) be 

employed to monitor the 

propulsion and auxiliary 

systems externally to the 

controlling space. 

The Task 

The scope of the review was 

primarily aimed at examining the 

57 

BY STUART REEVES (EX WOMTE) 

RELEGEN PTY LTD


MT watch keeping requirements 

needed to: 

a. safely sail an FFG in cruising 

watches, and 

b. maintain ship safety and 

preparedness whilst the ship 

is alongside. 

The review needed to consider all 

likely situations that a watch 

keeper would face whilst carrying 

out their normal duties. These 

included plant failure, damage 

control incidents and operation of 

the engineering plant whilst in 

redundant modes. The effect of 

such on the rest of the ship’s 

capability was also examined. 

Finally, other peripheral issues 

were considered including what 

effect the proposed changes in 

watch keeping practices may 

have on current training. 

The scope allowed for both 

hardware and routine based 

solutions. 

Finally, one of the drivers for this 

study was a need to increase 

retention of personnel and so a 

broad license was given to 

consider any areas associated 

with the topic that may improve 

the workplace leading to a 

reduction in personnel wastage. 

The Analysis and Optimisation 

Process 

The approach for this Study was 

carried out mindful of what we 

viewed as the root requirement. 

That is, to keep a Defence Asset 

(the Ship) at a stated level of 

preparedness in order to either 

complete a mission or to be 

available on a stated level of 

standby to carry out a mission if 

required. Keeping this in mind, 

the Study attempted to link each 

watch keeping task needing to be 

performed back to this root 

requirement. 

Within the FFG Class context, the 

broad functions listed below were 

considered as making up the 

perceived need for personnel to 

keep continuous watches at sea. 

Attached to each of the functions 

listed below would be a list of 

tasks carried out by an 

engineering cruising watch 

keeper. These functions were: 

a. plant operation to provide 

control for navigational, 

operational or safety 

reasons, 

b. manual recording of 

machinery and other 

operating data, 

c. performing low-level, high 

frequency maintenance 

tasks, 

d. safety examinations (via 

visual inspection) of 

engineering and, during 

transit, other spaces 

throughout the ship, 

e. to provide a ready and alert 

team that can: 

i. respond quickly to 

engineering plant failures 

or critical problems, 

ii. respond quickly to 

emergencies such as fire, 

toxic hazards or floods, 

and 

iii. operate the plant in 

redundant modes should 

a normal operating mode 

fail, 

f. to provide timely and flexible 

services such as being part 

of the helicopter or boat 

refuelling team, and 

g. to provide expert and 

immediate advice on 

engineering matters to 

Command or other 

functional areas of the ship 

as required. 

Alongside watch keeping routines 

were broken down into the 

following functions: 

a. maintaining preparedness, 

b. emergency and hazard 

monitoring, 

c. specialist and general 

response to above incidents 

(within given constraints), 

and 

d. ship security. 

The task listings were developed 

using a three tiered breakdown 

structure underneath the 

functions listed above. This 

approach ensured all tasks likely 

to be carried out as part of the 

current practices were captured 

for analysis. 

Using a risk-based approach, 

each task was considered with a 

view to removing the task from 

the duties of the watch keeper. If 

removal was not an option, other 

alternatives were explored. The 

risk analysis was carried out 

using an adaptation of the 

RELeGEN’s BASELINE CIRAS 

(Critical Item Risk Assessment 

System). In short, the four 

decision collection points were: 

a. omit without further action if 

HRA =/> 18, 

b. omit with alterations/ 

contingencies placed on 

other tasks, 

c. modify task to reduce 

frequency, complexity or 

duration, and 

d. retain in current form. 

From this exercise, 421 raw tasks 

were identified. Examples of 

these tasks at the lowest level 

would be ‘Start Gas Turbine in 

Manual Mode’ or ‘Respond to 

loss of lube oil pressure on Ship 

Service Diesel Generator at local 

operating position’. For various 

reasons there was a considerable 

difference in some operator work 

practices and procedures across 

the Class. In order to ensure all 

tasks would be included for later 

analysis, task lists were 

developed from first principles 

using information contained in

equipment technical manuals, 

system drawings, Standard 

Operating Procedures, various 

policy and directive documents 

and Standing Orders. 

The only items considered as 

rigid constraints on our analysis 

were the ship’s hardware, the 

capability to be delivered and 

generic personnel training (such 

as Initial and Advanced Technical 

Training). The remainder of 

associated topics were 

considered as potential for 

variation. 

The raw tasks were analysed 

using CIRAS to produce the first 

refinement of the task lists. 

Reasons for task removal or 

modification included duplication 

of records and parameter 

monitoring, alternate (or more 

practical) operating means and 

more functionally efficient work 

practices. 

The next step was to breakdown, 

within the functions, tasks that 

were tied to an operating station. 

This step determined that, due to 

hardware constraints, personnel 

would be required on standby 

both inside and external to CCS 

to provide an initial response to 

casualty and emergency 

situations. The analysis showed 

that all initial plant actions could 

be controlled from within CCS 

with other personnel able to 

attend the plant or scene at short 

notice. This confirmed the need 

for an as yet undefined number 

of watch keepers to be present 

whilst equipment was 

operational. 

At this stage it was decided to 

determine the workflows based 

on a need to either stay within 

CCS or have the ability to move 

about the ship. To summarise the 

process, the following steps were 

taken: 

a. allocate tasks based on the 

need to be present in CCS 

or elsewhere; 

b. divide tasks based into onoccurrence 

(only requiring a 

time allocation if the 

situation occurs. For 

example, responding to a 

fire or plant casualty) or a 

cyclic time requirement 

(checking the oil level on an 

air compressor); 

c. subdivide tasks based on 

operator skill levels as 

proposed by DNPR(E&L); 

and 

d. further divide tasks on timebased 

labour division into 

manageable work packages 

based on personnel physical 

constraints. 

Our initial findings were that the 

typical workload that would be 

experienced during a watch could 

be easily handled by one watch 

keeper at the MSC level in CCS 

and one MST roving external to 

CCS monitoring and operating the 

propulsion and auxiliary systems. 

The Study also found that whilst 

the MCS would need to maintain 

a four-hour watch routine, the 

MST and MSM were no longer 

tied to this routine. The MST 

would be free to work in a routine 

similar to an alongside duty 

watch where they complete 

rounds as required and can 

complete other working activities 

providing they are available 

immediately should an incident 

occur. The MSM was entirely ‘on 

call’. Therefore, a watch period 

extending beyond the current 

four-hour cycle for the MSM and 

MST was available as an option. 

Our proposed cruising watch 

composition was risk tested 

against what we saw as worst 

case and probable scenarios for 

the watch keeping team. These 

scenarios were: 

a. a fire in Auxiliary Machinery 

Room (AMR) 2 as this would 

have severe ramifications on 

the ships propulsion, power 

generation and auxiliary 

systems as well as requiring 


considerable damage 

control activity, and 

b. a propulsion system 

casualty during a period of 

increased navigational risk 

requiring an immediate 

reconfiguration of the plant 

as this would exceed the 

skills of the MSC and 

require assistance from the 

MSM. 

The scenarios were tested against 

a fully operational plant and also 

a plant carrying automatic control 

system defects. We found that the 

plant fully operational could be 

safely operated by the MSC and 

MST during a fire in AMR2. 

However, depending on the 

defect, there may be a 

requirement for a separate 

operator for the Electric Plant 

Control Console to reduce 

operator stress, human error and 

complete the required actions in 

a timely manner. As situations 

such as the AMR2 fire are 

random, there would be a 

requirement for a second watch 

keeper in CCS to operate the 

electric plant whenever the 

system was carrying control 

system defects. 

Discussions with senior 

navigation personnel indicated 

that there are likely to be varying 

levels of navigational risk of which 

some will require immediate 

response to a propulsion system 

casualty. Therefore, the propulsion 

system operator in CCS will need 

to vary between the MSC and 

MSM depending on this 

navigation risk. Although difficult 

to quantify, it is envisaged that 

the majority of steaming time will 

only require the MSC to be 

present in CCS. 

Watch Keepers Required 

Our analysis had reached a stage 

where the number and type of 

personnel required to watch keep 

at sea at cruising stations had 

been determined. It had shown 

that the original work force 

directly involved in sea watch 

59


keeping could be reduced by 

50% during defect free operation 

and low level navigational risk 

situations. These excess 

personnel were now available to 

carry out other activities. It had 

also determined that the sea 

watch keeping routines proposed 

by DNPR (E&L) could be safely 

implemented onboard the RAN’s 

FFG Class Ships. 

Getting a Hand From Modern 

Technology 

It was now down to refining the 

watch keeping activities to 

achieve the optimum resource 

loading. One of the activities 

shown to be a major time driver 

for the MST was the recording of 

equipment running data. The 

CIRAS analysis showed that 

inspecting many of the 

equipment running parameters 

were valid tasks. They were, 

however, being collected in a 

user-unfriendly manner that made 

it difficult for this valuable data to 

be used for condition monitoring 

or maintenance triggering 

purposes. Current technology 

such as the RELeGEN BASELINE 

Check system would allow for this 

data to be collected via bar-code 

enabled hand held PDA (often 

referred to as “Palm Pilot”) 

scanners integrated with AMPS. 

As well as increasing the MST’s 

workflow efficiency, it would also 

allow for greater integration with 

the maintenance planning 

process. Further, data is able to 

be loaded from the Check system 

into AMPS to trigger 

maintenance. 

The current direction for 

engineering rounds frequency is 

contained within ABR5225 and 

states a four-hour interval. Based 

on the inherent reliability of some 

of the equipment within the ship 

class, there may be scope for 

further optimising equipment 

rounds to a frequency that 

matches the individual 

equipment’s operating and 

reliability characteristics. This 

would allow a further reduction in 

the watch keeper’s workload. 

Field data for this type of analysis 

is currently limited and would 

require further collection before 

an optimisation analysis could be 

carried out. Again, BASELINE 

Check would also assist with this 

process by providing a long-term 

data repository and powerful data 

interrogation feature.

Training 

FFG MT console operator training 

is currently being carried out 

ashore at the FFG Propulsion 

Control System (PCS) Trainer. An 

excellent asset, however, its use is 

mainly for basic console 

operation and limited currency 

training. The remainder of training 

for propulsion and auxiliary 

system operation and monitoring 

and all assessment is carried out 

at sea. The usual approach (and I 

apologise for my gender specific 

term in advance) is a ‘Father-to- 

Son’ apprenticeship that is 

resource intensive in both 

personnel and equipment use. 

The repatriation and formalising 

of this training ashore would 

markedly reduce the considerable 

training overhead on the ships 

senior engineering personnel. It 

would also improve the 

consistency of training to ensure 

a common standard is achieved 

but not overshot. Completion of 

the majority of training ashore 

would then only require 

consolidation, final assessment 

and some currency training to be 

carried out at sea. 

Harbour Watch Keeping 

Harbour watch keeping involves 

mainly a presence in CCS to 

oversee plant and damage 

control monitoring systems. 

Rounds of engineering spaces 

and running machinery also 

continues to be carried out whilst 

the ship is alongside. CIRAS was 

again used to determine if these 

activities could be removed or 

modified to an optimum level 

whilst still maintaining the 

required level of plant oversight. 

Unfortunately the analysis 

showed that, whilst two other 

locations showed potential, the 

ships hardware was the limiting 

factor as none of the alternate 

positions provided the level of 

monitoring available in CCS. The 

next favourable location would 

have been the ship’s gangway as 

watch keepers were also present 

on a 24 hour basis. However, this 

position provided only very 

limited damage control and no 

machinery monitoring. 

Active Alarm Monitoring System 

As part of this Study, the Active 

Alarm Monitoring System (AAMS) 

was developed to concept stage. 

This would allow an extension of 

the plant and damage control 

monitoring systems at a remote 

location and repeated in a form 

easily understood by nonengineering 

personnel allowing 

action to be taken should an 

incident occur. This system would 

remove the need for watch 

keepers to be present in CCS 

whilst in harbour without 

increasing the risk to the ship or 

the duty watch personnel. As 

seen in the diagram, the system 

could be couple via flexible cable 

to other like configured ships and 

allow monitoring of multiple ships 

alarm monitoring systems by one 

gangway station. Monitoring from 

a shore facility is also possible 

with this system. A basic 

schematic of the system is shown 

below with items in blue showing 

existing hardware and red as new 

installation. 

Harbour Rounds 

Whilst the ship is alongside in 

harbour, a considerable amount 

of machinery continues to run. 

This potentially raises the risks 

within the machinery spaces to 

that above the ship’s background 

level. Examination of a number of 

these items shows that the 

systems could be shut down and 

secured removing many of the 

risks associated with their 

operation. A systematic approach 

to this process would reduce the 

risks within the engineering 

spaces to the ship’s background 

level and remove the need for 

specialist engineering personnel 

to conduct rounds through these 

spaces. Any person with sufficient 

ship knowledge could carry out 

rounds through the machinery 

spaces. 


The above situation opens up the 

possibility of having a whole ship 

rounds routine that would remove 

many of the concurrently 

conducted departmental and 

security rounds that are now 

carried out. The benefits of having 

a reduced rounds frequency 

would be enjoyed by the entire 

ships duty watch. 

Conclusion 

This Study has shown that with a 

systematic risk-based approach 

and judicious use of cost 

effective modern technology, 

significant efficiency gains can 

still be achieved in what is 

essentially an area seen as being 

limited by the existing hardware. 

The systems based approach 

(and technology based solutions) 

outlined in this article can be 

used on any platform to optimise 

watch keeping procedures. The 

refined practices open up a 

considerable number of options 

for engineering managers to 

redeploy their personnel into 

more worthy activities. 

Editor’s Note: 

RELeGEN has been involved in a 

number of other recent Navy 

Projects, including: 

a. The development of a 

barcode scanning audit tool 

that loads data from AMPS 

and the RAN’s new 

Configuration Management 

Tool– BASELINE Audit; 

b. Software to develop the 

RAN’s CMC code – 

BASELINE Connect; 

c. Software and hardware tools 

to collect watchkeeping data 

collected onboard – 

BASELINE Check; 

d. ISL data management 

software – BASELINE ILS; 

e. a critical item risk 

assessment system – 

BASELINE CIRAS. 

61


BY CPOMT GLEN POPE, 

HMAS STUART 

You would all be aware that 

current retention rates within the 

Technical Categories are poor, 

particularly for our ET brethren. 

You would also be painfully aware 

of the impact all those empty 

billets (resulting from said 

retention rate) have on the 

personnel that are left to 

shoulder the workload. And most 

of you would be aware that one 

of the main reasons our 

personnel leave the RAN is a lack 

of job satisfaction. What is not 

readily recognised is the exodus 

of corporate knowledge that 

accompanies the personnel that 

choose to leave. 

How do we solve this problem? 

The issue of job satisfaction is 

extremely complex; how exactly 

do you quantify job satisfaction? 

What I consider to be a satisfying 

day at work others may consider 

boring. A common complaint from 

most personnel relates to the 

need for them to perform noncore 

functions, such as café 

party, or watch on deck. Since the 

inception of the Navy there has 

been café party and watch on 

deck and I for one can not 

foresee a time in the near future 

when there will not be a 

requirement for them. The 

difference between now and the 

days of old is that our ships carry 

less personnel and subsequently 

there is a smaller pool of 

personnel to provide the 

resources required, therefore you 

will get “lashed” more often for 

non-core functions. 

So what is my point? My point is 

that it is going to be difficult to 

Retention Bonus or 

Reward Scheme? 

The following article is the result of absolutely zero research and was 

prompted by a random thought I had (which I naively voiced) at the 

recent TSAG meeting held in Sydney. My aim is to stimulate discussion 

on the subject of retention and how to achieve it, a topic I feel certain 

sections of the wider Naval community is ignoring. 

overcome the job satisfaction 

dilemma, and retention bonuses 

as we have seen in the past are 

not necessarily the answer. 

Retention bonuses have the 

unfortunate effect of annoying the 

hell out of all those who don’t get 

one, usually resulting in a drop in 

their performance or worst case, 

a dummy spitting discharge. 

Retention bonus or Reward 

Scheme? is the question I pose. 

What if we reward personnel who 

put up with the watch on deck 

and the café party, who persist 

with the long hours and the 

dismal sea/shore roster; 

personnel who persevere and 

progress themselves and who are 

prepared to stay for more than 

their initial engagement? I 

imagine right about now most of 

you are thinking, “what is the 

difference” (….and they let this 

joker loose on a ship?) between 

what I am suggesting and a 

Retention Bonus? 

The difference is simple. A 

Retention Bonus works like this; if 

we need personnel from Category 

A to stay in the Navy for x number 

of years, we get them to sign on 

the dotted line and at the end of 

the allocated period they are 

given a wad of cash that is then 

taxed as income. A Reward 

Scheme is as the name suggests; 

My point is that it is going to 

be difficult to overcome the 

job satisfaction dilemma, and 

retention bonuses as we have 

seen in the past are not 

necessarily the answer. 

a reward, not a fistful of dollars 

you have to share with the 

Australian Taxation Office. 

How will it work? I would suggest 

that the rewards should be 

something tangible and useful 

ranging from computers, 

contributions to a private 

superannuation scheme, or 

ultimately a car. I know all these 

things are available via salary 

sacrifice; the difference is the 

Navy would pay the relevant 

payments and the associated 

fringe benefits tax. As this is a 

system that is currently in place 

there would be minimal start-up 

costs, if any. 

Who would get the Reward, and 

when? Personnel re-engaging 

after their initial period would 

qualify for a “reward” that was at 

the lower end of the financial 

scale, and as they progress 

through to Senior Sailor level and 

10 years service the value of the 

reward would increase and so on. 

Eventually, a Warrant Officer with 

over 20 years service would 

qualify for a Porsche Boxster AND 

a new walking frame . . . no, just 

kidding, but you get the picture. 

As you can see, every one of us 

will qualify for some reward or 

other after our initial engagement. 

Personnel would have the option 

of rejecting the scheme and 

receive nothing until such time as 

it suited them. There would be no 

“cashing” out option and 

personnel would only receive the 

reward commensurate with their 

rank and “time in”. I have 

deliberately tied rank and time in 

service together, as some 

personnel experience more rapid 

movement in their promotion 

rosters than others. 

So is it feasible? I believe so. The 

beancounters will tell us that it is 

a pay rise by default and it will 

undoubtedly cost a fair sum of 

money. But how much money do 

we waste recruiting people and 

training them just to watch them 

walk out the door six years later? 

I believe that it will have a 

positive effect on retention – even 

if we only succeed in keeping 20 

personnel from leaving, that is 

money saved by not having to 

recruit and train another 20 

personnel (or in the case of 20 

Petty Officers, another 100 

personnel). Not to mention the 

loss of corporate knowledge, 

which is something no-one can 

put a price on.

Aircraft Battle Damage 

Repair and Contingency 

Maintenance in the 

Aviation World 

Picture this, you and nine other Aviation Technician (AT) maintainers 

are posted to an FFG S-70B-2 Seahawk Flight during a declared 

contingency. Far from home and any hope of Deeper Level 

Maintenance (DLM) support, you have, through necessity, become a 

fairly self-sufficient team. By day five of the operation, the aircraft is 

averaging eight flying hours a day and is considered an important 

force multiplier for the ship’s involvement in the operation. The aircraft 

is also heavily involved in up lifting stores and troops in support of 

allied operations. Your team is working hard to keep the aircraft 

available by undertaking scheduled maintenance tasks between each 

sortie, where possible. It’s just before lunch and the team, who have 

been working hard since before sunrise, are savouring the thought of a 

well-cooked steak. Suddenly, the Helicopter Control Officer (HCO) 

reports that the aircraft has declared a PAN and is returning to the 

ship immediately. The pilot has reported taking ground fire and the 

aircraft has fluctuating hydraulic pressure. 

The aircraft returns on deck 

without further incident and a 

cursory glance reveals evidence 

of gunshot damage to the STBD 

transition section, hydraulic fluid 

is evident down the side of the 

cab. The OOW phones the 

hangar, the ship’s CO wants an 

immediate report, and expects 

his aircraft back in the air before 

he finishes lunch. All hope of a 

well-cooked steak vanishes from 

their minds as the team start 

dragging the aircraft's Structural 

Repair Manual (SRM) out of the 

correctly secured-for-sea 

bookshelf and the Flight Senior 

Maintenance Sailor (FSMS) 

starts the Hostile Action Report 

(HAR). 

An unlikely scenario? Not really. 

A realistic timeframe? Now that 

depends. 

As the world stage continues to 

change shape, the above 

scenario is more likely to 

become a reality. Therefore, with 

a slight shift in focus the RAN 

Aviation Branch is endeavouring 

to better prepare its technical 

sailors for just such a situation. 

Accordingly, armed with newly 

acquired Aircraft Battle Damage 

Repair (ABDR) techniques, finely 

honed Sheet Metal Repair (SMR) 

skills, appropriate tooling and the 

right attitude, AT sailors are 

becoming increasingly prepared, 

and expected, to ‘do the job’ 

themselves. 


The recent Gulf Conflict saw a 

contingency declared for the first 

time since 1990 and as a result, 

RAN aircraft operating in the AO 

were able to adopt Contingency 

Maintenance (CMAINT) policies. 

CMAINT prioritises aircraft 

operational availability over the 

longer-term preservation of 

material condition, or economic 

considerations, and is intended 

to reduce maintenance 

downtimes without reducing 

safety - a ‘force-multiplier effect’. 

ABDR is normally a subset of 

CMAINT that utilises modified or 

unconventional rapid repair 

techniques to maximise aircraft 

availability without significantly 

compromising airworthiness. 

Historically, a greater number of 

BY LEUT NATASHA TINDAL, 

FLEET AVIATION ENGINEERING 

SUPPORT OFFICER 

63


aircraft are damaged during 

combat than lost completely. 

Through the application of rapid 

repair techniques, ABDR can 

return a damaged aircraft to 

service in the shortest possible 

time frame, whether the aircraft 

has been rendered unserviceable 

due to structural or system 

damage. ABDR employs locally 

designed, authorised and applied 

repairs utilising non-standard 

materials, tools and equipment in 

order to minimise aircraft 

downtime. 

ABDR is not an acceptable 

peacetime maintenance action, 

but can be used under certain 

circumstances to quickly repair a 

damaged aircraft so it can be 

flown out of further harms way. 

Implementing CMAINT and ABDR 

is a prerogative of the 

operational commander when 

contingencies are declared or 

warlike situations encountered. A 

potential downside for 

implementing CMAINT or ABDR 

is that the aircraft must be able 

to be returned to peacetime 

standards if required, once the 

contingency is over. Where 

CMAINT conditions have been 

implemented over a protracted 

period or the aircraft has 

undertaken a significant 

workload under such conditions, 

a considerable maintenance 

effort may be needed to properly 

complete any structural repairs 

and re-establish scheduled 

maintenance programs. 

So why has the RAN Aviation 

community suddenly started 

focusing on ABDR, and how 

does it impact our 

preparedness for combat? 

In early 2002 two separate 

aircraft structural repair 

instances highlighted a 

deficiency in the airframe repair 

capability of RAN ships’ Flights. 

Both instances were 

satisfactorily resolved by the 

Fleet Air Arm’s Mobile Aircraft 

Support Team (MAST), but 

arguably should have fallen 

within the capabilities of the 

ships’ Flights. Investigations 

revealed that both Flights lacked 

the required proficiency, 

confidence, and in some 

instances tooling and 

consumables to conduct the 

necessary repairs. This situation 

presented a significant capability 

risk. Central to this situation was 

an historical reliance to call on 

contractor assistance almost 

every time a complex airframe 

structural repair was required to 

be expediently completed at 

NAS Nowra. This practice had 

resulted in a subsequent 'deskilling' 

of the AT workforce. 

To rectify this situation, staff 

within the Fleet Aviation 

Engineering Unit (FAEU) set 

about assessing the existing level 

of tooling, material and AT 

sheetmetal repair skills in the 

embarked environment, and then 

compared the existing capability 

to what is required of an 

embarked ABDR/SMR baseline 

capability. The overall intention of 

the review was to ensure ships 

Flights were able to carry out, as 

a minimum, repairs detailed in 

the aircraft specific Structural 

Repair Manuals. Training and 

competency in the concept of 

ABDR, although not an initial 

focus, was also an objective. 

So where to begin? 

As with any situation, the ability 

to operate safely outside 

specified standard procedures 

requires a thorough 

understanding of, and ability to 

correctly carry out, those 

procedures. Therefore, in order to 

carry out CMAINT and ABDR 

procedures personnel must first 

have an in-depth understanding 

of electrical and structural repairs 

carried out with all the necessary 

resources and in accordance with 

approved standard procedures. 

FAEU Staff, in conjunction with 

ABDR is not an acceptable 

peacetime maintenance 

action, but can be used 

under certain circumstances 

to quickly repair a damaged 

aircraft so it can be flown 

out of further harms way. 

Training Authority - Aviation (TA- 

AVN) and the ABDR School at 

RAAF Williamtown, devised a 

method for evaluating a Flights’ 

structural repair capability, 

including their understanding of 

existing procedures. The 

evaluation employed the use of a 

'repair simulator' that replicated a 

section of an aircraft's structure, 

incorporating skin, frames, 

stringers, hydraulic lines and 

electrical looms. The simulators 

were employed during a ship’s 

Work-up and Unit Readiness 

Evaluation (URE) and were predamaged 

to reflect varying 

degrees of ‘battle damage’ 

expected to be sustained during 

a contingency scenario. The 

simulators were required to be 

repaired by the ship's Flight 

within a specified time frame, 

with technical personnel ‘thinking 

outside the box’ where necessary. 

The repair capability deficiencies 

identified by the exercises 

provided a clear indication of 

where efforts should be expended 

in order to improve a Flights’ 

repair capabilities. Typical 

examples of the simulators and 

damage are shown in figures 

1to4.

FIGURE 1: REPLICA S-70B-2 AIRFRAME SECTION (EXTERNAL VIEW) 

FIGURE 3: DAMAGED S-70B-2 (EXTERNAL VIEW) 

Trials with the SMR simulators on 

Flights at sea consistently 

demonstrated: 

(i) a professional and 

enthusiastic approach to the 

exercises; 

(ii) an eagerness on the part of 

both ATA and ATV sailors to 

use previously acquired but 

under utilised skills; 

(iii) a keenness to improve 

current capability and 

practices, and to become 

involved in the ‘bigger 

picture’; and 

(iv) a willingness to learn. 

Use of the simulators has 

continued beyond the initial 

evaluation process in order to 

determine the capabilities of 

Flights as they work-up. Flights 

have also developed an 

appreciation of their own 

strengths and weaknesses and 

confidence in their abilities. 

Subsequently, the Aviation FEG 

had a better understanding of 

each Flight's proficiency and 

warfighting capability and 

confidence that those Flights 

deployed to OP FALCONER could 

reliably carry out ABDR if 

required. 

As a result of the evaluation 

process and the identification of 

tooling shortcomings, FAEU is 

currently involved in designing 

special SMR toolboxes that are 

compact but robust and contain 

all necessary structural repair 

tooling and consumables, 

including some pre-fabricated or 

heat-treated sheetmetal pieces. 


FIGURE 2: REPLICA SK-50 AIRFRAME SECTION (INTERNAL VIEW) 

FIGURE 4: DAMAGED SK-50 TEST PIECE (EXTERNAL VIEW) 

The toolboxes should enable 

Flights to carry out repairs 

detailed in the appropriate 

aircraft's SRM and, if called on, 

undertake ABDR. 

TA-AVN is also developing a range 

of training packages to improve 

ABDR awareness, including 

Technician, Assessor and 

Instructor courses that should 

supplement skills already held 

and to enhance the RAN’s ABDR 

capability. The Fleet Aviation 

Engineering Instruction (FAEI) 3-1 

has also been promulgated to 

provide RAN policy guidance to 

Squadron’s to enable them to 

develop their own continuation 

training packages for SMR and 

ABDR processes peculiar to their 

specific aircraft. NASPO has also 

been directed to review the 

process for allocating airframe 

65


About the Author: LEUT Natasha Tindall, 

FAESO, Fleet Aviation Engineering Unit 

(FAEU), Maritime Headquarters, Wylde 

Street, Potts Point, Sydney NSW. An MHQ 

element of COMAUSNAVAIRGRP. 

natasha.tindall@defence.gov.au 

(02) 9359 4534. 

LEUT Tindall completed an Aeronautical 

Engineering Degree at the Australian 

Defence Force Academy in 1997. She 

subsequently trained at 816 Squadron in 

order to obtain her Aviation Engineering 

Officer’s Certificate of Competence 

(AEOCC). Since achieving this, she has 

worked as a Project Engineer for Project 

Sea (PS) 1405 (the Seahawk FLIR and 

ESM project) and been the Deputy AEO at 

817 Squadron. LEUT Tindall is currently the 

Fleet Aviation Engineering Support Officer 

(FAESO) at Maritime Headquarters. 

structural repair work to the 

contractor at NAS Nowra. 

The ADF Directorate General 

Technical Airworthiness (DGTA) 

has recently promulgated ABDR 

policy with the release of 

Australian Air Publication (AAP 

7002.011) that provides tri- 

Service guidance on how to train, 

test, implement and carry out 

ABDR. The RAN is well on track to 

meet all these requirements and 

to ensure an effective and 

efficient ABDR response if and 

when required. 

So where to from here? 

In parallel to the formal 

introduction of the simulated 

structural repair process into a 

Flight’s work-up and URE 

program, the first specialist SMR 

toolbox is planned to be trialed 

by the end of August 03. An initial 

order for seven toolboxes has 

been placed by NASPO and will 

be distributed between 816 and 

817 Squadrons for appropriate 

allocation to their Flights. 

Aircraft SRMs will be reviewed by 

NASPO Design Engineers to 

ensure they contain accurate, 

easy to read and user-friendly 

repair schemes that contain all 

relevant and approved structural 

repair processes. 

MAST will remain as a functioning 

capability under the control of the 

FAEO and will continue to provide 

support as required, but its role 

will focus on specialist DLM 

repairs that are patently beyond 

the capability of a ship’s Flight. 

OIC MAST (the Fleet Aviation 

Engineering Support Officer at 

MHQ) performs the role of the 

RAN ABDR Engineer to provide a 

readily deployable source of 

engineering advice and guidance 

to Flights during circumstances 

where complex structural or ABDR 

repairs need to be undertaken. 

Overall, ships’ Flights will be 

better equipped with appropriate 

tools, a wider range of 

consumables, and the necessary 

proficiency training to become far 

more self-sufficient. As a result, 

scenarios such as the one 

detailed at the introduction will 

be easily managed within the 

capability of the Flight's 

maintenance team, thus 

improving the RAN's ability to 

undertake sustained warfighting 

or contingency operations. 

Bibliography: 

AAP 7002.011, Aircraft Battle Damage 

Repair. 

‘Review of RAN Ships’ Flight Airframe 

Repair Capability’, report written by LCDR 

D. Hanley, dated 28 May 02.

The Navy Technical 

Regulatory System 

(TRS) – 

Development and 

Implementation Project – 

an Update 

(Formerly Project HELP) 

Introduction 

In the last Engineering Bulletin, I provided an update and described the 

plan for the immediate future (six months) of the Project. In this article, I 

will again provide a Project update, but also include some discussion on 

the Delegation of Engineering Authority component of the Navy Technical 

Regulatory System (NTRS). 

For those readers who have 

missed previous articles, Navy 

Technical Regulation is defined as 

“A principles based system for 

controlling the risks, during 

design, construction and 

maintenance, that impact on the 

technical integrity of ADF 

maritime materiel.” Technical 

integrity refers to an item’s fitness 

for service, safety and 

environmental compliance. 

Navy Technical Regulation is 

achieved by ensuring that work 

undertaken during design, 

construction and maintenance of 

ADF maritime materiel is: 

a. to approved standards, 

b. completed by competent 

and authorised individuals, 

who 

c. work for Authorised 

Engineering Organisations, 

and 

d. whose work is certified as 

correct. 

The Project was established to 

develop and deploy the NTRS 

during the period 2002 to 2004. 

Project Update and Immediate 

Future 

I am pleased to report that 

support for the Project remains 

strong and progress has been 

better than expected. As a 

consequence, the primary 

deliverable of this phase of the 

project — The Navy Technical 

Regulations Manual (ABR 6492) 

is now complete, has been 

signed by the Chief Naval 

Engineer (CDRE Tim Barter) and 

is in the hands of the Defence 

Publications Service for 

production and promulgation. The 

released version (V1.0) is also 

available on the Directorate of 

Technical Regulation – Navy’s 

(DTR-N) website (see contact 

details below). 

This progress would not have 

been achieved without the high 


level of support and constructive 

feedback the Project has received 

from its ‘customers’. Although 

many have contributed, particular, 

thanks must go to the following 

organisations; CME, LSA-N, NCSA, 

DSME, DSMS, AWD SPO, ANZ 

SPO, FFG SPO, AAS SPO and the 

ANZAC CEM. 

In parallel with the development 

of ABR 6492, the Project has 

conducted a number of 

successful appraisals of 

organisations with a view to CNE 

granting them Authorised 

Engineering Organisation (AEO) 

status. This is one of the 

requirements of the NTRS as 

listed in the introduction to this 

article. Seven organisations will 

be accredited by the end of 

September this year with a 

further 10 planned for the 

remainder of FY 2003-04. The 

achievement of AEO status 

indicates that the organisation 

has the right systems, people, 

BY CMDR BOB HORSNELL CSC 

67


processes and data 

management in place to 

effectively maintain the technical 

integrity of the ADF maritime 

materiel for which the 

organisation has responsibility. 

During the remainder of 2003 the 

Project Team and DTR-N will focus 

on the following: 

a. development of training, 

education and awareness 

packages for DMO and Navy 

personnel; 

b. improving the DTR-N website 

and its links to associated 

documentation and 

standards; 

c. development and 

implementation of strategies 

to inculcate the principles of 

Navy Technical Regulation into 

the culture of both the RAN 

and those DMO organisations 

responsible for the support of 

ADF maritime materiel; 

d. improve and automate, 

where possible, DTR-N’s 

process and practices; and 

e. progress the review and 

facilitate the upgrading of 

associated engineering 

documents and instructions 

including: 

(i) ABR 5230, 

(ii) ABR 5454, 

(iii) ABR 5225, 

(iv) DI(N) LOG 82-3, and 

(v) The TM 180 / 181 

process and 

management. 

Delegation of Engineering 

Authority 

Introduction 

The Navy Technical Regulatory 

System (NTRS), as you have read 

previously, is about controlling 

technical risk during design, 


ADF maritime materiel. One of the 

fundamental principles of the 

system is that only competent 

and authorised individuals are to 

undertake work on ADF maritime 

materiel. 

Although the principle is simple 

and few would disagree with it, 

application of the principle 

requires a shift in thinking from 

associating engineering authority 

with position to linking 

engineering authority to the 

individual. This paradigm shift 

may cause confusion among 

those setting up engineering 

organisations or considering an 

engineering organisation 

restructure. 

The aim of this article is to clarify 

the requirements of the NTRS as 

they apply to the delegation of 

engineering authority. Firstly I will 

define engineering authority, then 

detail the relationship between 

risk and engineering authority 

before outlining regulatory 

obligations of Authorised 

Engineering Organisations (AEO) 

and how engineering authority is 

applied in the Fleet. Finally, I will 

add a short paragraph explaining 

the links between engineering 

authority and IEAUST 

accreditation. 

Full details may be found in 

Volume 2 Section 5 of ABR 

6492. 

Definition 

Engineering Authority may be 

defined as “an individual with 

delegated authority, in 

accordance with ABR 6492, to 

make engineering decisions 

concerning ADF maritime materiel 

based on competency and the 

risk associated with decisions.” 

Engineering Authority and the 

Individual Vs Organisational 

Position 

You will note from the definition 

that delegation of engineering 

authority is related to individual 

competency and the risk 

associated with decision 

making. This is important, as it 

must be stressed that 

delegation of engineering 

authority is linked to the 

individual and not the position 

the individual fills within an 

organisation. Too often in the 

past an engineering 

organisational structure was 

established, individuals were 

recruited or posted to fill those 

positions, and then some level 

of engineering authority was 

assigned to the incumbent. For 

example, “As Combat System 

Engineer for XXXX, you are 

authorised to . . . ”. This method 

did not, as a general rule, take 

into account the actual 

competence of the incumbent. 

Under the NTRS, when 

establishing an engineering 

organisational structure, 

organisations are encouraged to 

firstly list the engineering tasks to 

be performed, then determine the 

category of technical risk 

associated with these tasks. A list 

of these risk categories can be 

found in ABR 6492 Volume 2 

Section 5 Chapter 2 Annex A, and 

range from 1 (catastrophic) to 5 

(Minor). 

Having established the risk 

categories associated with the 

engineering tasks to be 

undertaken by the organisation, 

reference can then be made to 

Annex B of the same chapter of 

ABR 6492 to determine the level 

of engineering authority required 

to make decisions for each risk

category. For example, a Level 2 

engineering authority is required 

to make decisions at Risk 

Category Level 2. 

Once the tasks, risk categories 

and engineering authority 

requirements have been 

determined, the organisation can 

then decide which engineering 

authorities will be maintained inhouse, 

and which engineering 

authorities will be ‘outsourced’. 

This decision will generally be 

based on the frequency of 

decision making at the higher (eg 

Level 2) end of the risk category 

scale. For example, if Level 2 

decisions of a combat system 

nature are taken infrequently, and 

the majority of decisions are at 

risk category level 3, it may be 

decided to outsource level 2 

decisions and retain one or more 

level 3 engineering authorities inhouse. 

The engineering 

organisational structure can then 

be formalised. 

It can be seen, from the 

paragraphs above, that the 

incumbent of any particular 

position within an engineering 

organisation may not have the 

engineering authority to take all 

of the decisions associated with 

that position. This must be clearly 

understood by the incumbent, 

who must exercise good 

engineering judgement when 

taking decisions, and seek higher 

engineering authority for 

decisions outside of his or her 

assigned authority. 

In all circumstances, engineers, 

technicians and tradespersons 

must exercise what is termed 

their ‘self-assessed level of 

competence’ when taking 

decisions. This means that if 

there is concern that the decision 

about to be taken may be beyond 

the assigned level of engineering 

authority, or the individual making 

the decision is uncomfortable in 

doing so, then peer review or the 

advice of a higher engineering 

authority should be sought. 

Technical Regulatory 

Requirements 

Organisations conducting design, 

construction and or maintenance 

on ADF maritime materiel must 

seek AEO status. To qualify for 

AEO status, organisations must 

have an Engineering Management 

System (EMS). A component of 

the EMS will be a documented 

process for the internal delegation 

of engineering authority, reviewing 

both the process and the 

delegations, and a method of 

recording delegations in what is to 

be termed an Engineering 

Authority Register. 

The Chief Naval Engineer (CNE) 

will be the only Level 1 

engineering authority within the 

ADO, and will be the only person 

with the authority to delegate 

engineering authority to Level 2 

engineers. Level 2 engineers may 

delegate Level 3 or below 

engineering authority to other 

engineers, technicians and 

tradespersons; however, Level 3 

engineering authorities (or 

below), may not sub-delegate 

engineering authority. Where there 

is to be no Level 2 engineering 

authority within an organisation, 

delegations for Level 3 and below 

are to be sought from a Level 2 

engineering authority outside of 

the organisation, or from CNE. 

AEOs are also responsible for 

ensuring that products and 

services provided by contractors 

and suppliers meet defence 

requirements. Therefore, they are 

to ensure that their contractors 

and suppliers have comparable 

levels of engineering authority 

associated with the technical risk 

related to the tasks to be 

performed. 

Engineering Authority in the 

Fleet 

The chain of engineering authority 

within Navy commences with 

CNE. From CNE, authority passes 

to CSO(E), as a mandatory Level 

2 engineer, and then into Fleet 


units and the FEGs. It is 

anticipated that Charge Engineers 

(WEEO/MEO) of platforms, and 

the Senior Engineers of each FEG 

will be at Level 3 as a minimum. 

Formal delegations of engineering 

authority below Level 3 in 

Platforms is not deemed 

necessary at this time with the 

exception of Senior Technical 

Officers in Minors. However, 

platform Charge Engineers are to 

ensure that work (maintenance) 

conducted on their platform is 

undertaken by competent 

individuals. This means ensuring 

that Competency Logs are 

complete, billet pre-requisites are 

fulfilled, and watch-keeping and 

Certificates of Competency 

(officer and sailor) are held where 

necessary. Charge Engineers are 

to flag shortcomings to the FEG 

and CSO(E). 

Professional development 

It is vital that both Navy and the 

DMO retain, maintain and 

develop engineering expertise. 

AEOs will be required to maintain 

a professional development 

program to demonstrate how the 

organisation will continue to 

provide competent individuals 

throughout the lifecycle of the 

ADF maritime materiel for which it 

has responsibility. Navy already 

has such a program. 

Readers will note that the 

minimum competency 

requirements for the higher levels 

of engineering authority as 

detailed in Annex B of Chapter 2 

to Section 5 of Volume 2 of ABR 

6492 are aligned to IEAust 

accreditation. Professional 

development programs are to be 

developed to encourage 

engineers to seek recognition at 

Chartered Professional Engineer 

or Chartered Professional 

Technologist and membership of 

IEAust. Naval officers and sailors 

interested in seeking recognition 

with IEAust should contact 

DNPR(E&L) for detail and 

application forms. 

In Conclusion 

69 

Technical regulation is about 

controlling risk. One way to 

contribute to the control of 

technical risks during design, 


ADF maritime materiel is ensure 

that those individuals conducting 

this work are both competent and 

authorised to do so. 

When developing an engineering 

organisational structure, it is 

important to assess the technical 

risk associated with the tasks and 

delegate engineering authority 

only to individuals competent to 

manage those risks, even if this 

means out-sourcing that 

competence. Delegation of 

engineering authority is to the 

individual, not their position in 

the organisation. 

AEOs must develop a process to 

manage internal engineering 

delegations and recording these 

delegations in the Engineering 

Authority Register. The chain of 

engineering delegations within 

Navy stems from CNE, through 

CSO(E) to platforms and the 

FEGs. 

Professional development 

programs are to be aligned with 

IEAust standards. RAN engineers 

are encouraged to seek IEAust 

recognition, and should contact 

DNPR(E&L) for detail. Application 

forms are available on 

DNPR(E&L)’s website, see details 

below. 

Contact details 

DEFWEB: see NAVSYSCOM site 

then select ‘Regulation’, then 

‘DTR-N’ 

E-mail: DTR-N@defence.gov.au 

Phone: CMDR Bob Horsnell 

02 6266 2652 

DNPR(E&L) 02 6266 4023 

DNPR(E&L) website: see 

NAVSYSCOM site then select 

‘Engineering and Logistics’.


MR. JEREMY LINDEYER 

SEA 1442 SYSTEMS 

ENGINEERING MANAGER 

FIGURE 1: THE SEA 1442 MTWAN 

Engineering of Maritime 

Capability, a Project SEA 

1442 perspective 

Introduction 

SEA 1442 Phase 3 is a critical project in Maritime Communications and 

Information Management Architecture Modernisation (MCIMAM), 

delivering both task-group Maritime Tactical Wide Area Networks 

(MTWAN) and automated message handling in the form of a Maritime 

Battlespace Communications and Information System (MBCIS), depicted 

in Figure 1. In contrast with the existing ‘stove-piped’ communication 

systems on board ships, the commercial IP network technology and 

adaptive networking within the MBCIS will efficiently utilize all available 

ship communication resources, irrespective of bearer type. This provides 

the infrastructure to support services ranging from command and control 

to ‘quality of life’ applications in the difficult maritime environment, 

allowing closer collaboration between Navy, other services, and allied 

force elements. The development of this infrastructure has been a major 

focus of AUSCANUKUS nations as outlined in ‘Allied Maritime Tactical 

Wide Area Networking’ -by Mr. Van Vu, Navy Engineering Bulletin, 

August 2002.

Developing Capability Definition 

Documents 

SEA 1442 Phase 3 is an 

endorsed project and the 

Integrated Project Team (IPT), 

including members from 

Capability Systems, are 

developing the initial version of 

the capability definition 

document suite for the Phase 3 

request for tender (RFT). The suite 

includes the Operational Concept 

Document (OCD), Function and 

Performance Specification (FPS) 

and Test Concept Document 

(TCD). To provide the 

Commonwealth with diversity in 

approach to the MBCIS solution, 

three independent prime system 

integrators were engaged early, 

yielding significant benefits for 

the Commonwealth as insight into 

the range of problems that could 

result from the development effort 

was gained. 

The SEA 1442 IPT team will 

consolidate the capability 

definition documents with 

stakeholders from DNC4ISREW, 

Force Element Groups (FEG), 

System Project Offices (SPO) and 

other RAN agencies into a 

capability baseline that will form 

the basis of a contract between 

Capability Systems and DMO. The 

DMO will use these documents 

for the contract baseline for 

tender activity. 

Systems Engineering Issues 

The DMO’s Capability Definition 

Documents Guide (CDDG) 

provides significant advice 

concerning the content of the 

OCD, FPS and TCD, the 

applicability of the various 

Defence Architecture Framework 

(DAF) views and an indication of 

the system engineering approach 

that must be followed to ensure 

stakeholder needs translate into 

effective capability. 

The IPT is maintaining the 

consistency of the various DAF 

views to completely describe the 

system by managing changes as 

they occur. Often, views are 

generated in Word or PowerPoint 

formats and require a great deal 

of effort to manually maintain 

consistency once changes are 

made. This ‘engineering by 

Microsoft Office’ approach is 

considered inadequate for the 

specification of complex systems 

such as the SEA 1442 Phase 3 

MBCIS. The complexity of the 

Phase 3 MBCIS stems not only 

from the technology involved but 

the potential number of other 

systems to which it interfaces. 

While the CDDG provides 

information about the content of 

the DAF views, it does not provide 

guidance about how the views 

should be kept holistic and 

complete. A robust and clearly 

articulated system engineering 

process in the context of a C4ISR 

(Command, Control, 

Communications, Computers, 

Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance) framework is 

required to guide systems 

engineering efforts within the 

project office and maintain the 

integrity of the system model 

being developed. 

For this reason, the project office 

decided to integrate a systems 

engineering standard into the 

foundation set out by the CDDG 

for the development of the 

capability definition documents. 

By mandating a more rigorous 

process that details what and 

how tasks such as requirements 

and functional analysis are 

implemented, those working on 

the project are better guided in 

producing a suite of mutually 

consistent documents with 

improved integration. 

The choice of which standard to 

integrate into the process was 

determined on basis of the 

standard’s quality, detail and 

popularity in Defence industry, as 

outlined below. 

SE Standards 

There are many standards 

applicable to the engineering of 

complex communications 

systems, written by several global 

authorities. One of the standards 

considered was the Electronics 

Industry Alliance 632 (EIA- 


632:1998), identified by the 

ASDEFCON(SM) template. It is an 

engineering policy standard 

requiring a complete and 

integrated technical effort from 

identification of need through to 

disposal. Oriented towards control 

and surveillance by the customer, 

its principle value is contained 

more in the guidance associated 

with the 33 abstract requirements 

than the description of 

recommended engineering 

processes. 

In contrast, the Institute of 

Electrical and Electronic 

Engineering 1220 standard (IEEE 

1220:1998) is similar to the EIA- 

632 but details systems 

engineering processes and its 

application throughout the 

system life cycle. It defines an 

engineering model involving 

numerous processes and 

associated planning that comply 

with the requirements of EIA-632 

and emphasize verification and 

validation. Each 

analysis/verification loop forms a 

phase of the overall process. This 

standard was selected because it 

contained detailed content, which 

suited the SEA 1442 Phase 2B 

project definition study and the 

relative immaturity of the 

processes within the project 

office. 

It is anticipated that as the 

project office’s capabilities 

mature, the less restrictive EIA- 

632 standard will be utilised for 

controlling engineering efforts in 

the SEA 1442 Phase 3 

acquisition. 

Process 

The systems engineering process 

(SEP) defined in IEEE 1220 

contain three phases: 

requirement analysis/verification, 

functional analysis/verification 

and design synthesis/verification. 

Each phase may be iterated 

many times during system 

specification to ensure validity 

and consistency of the resultant 

requirement, functional and 

logical baselines. A simplified 

overview of this process is shown 

in Figure 2. 

71 

Broadly speaking, two iterations 

of the entire IEEE 1220 SEP will 

be conducted during the 

development of the SEA1442 

capability documents, at two 

levels of detail. In the first 

iteration, the OCD and TCD are 

developed in parallel, using as 

inputs all the draft documents 

created by the collaborative effort 

with contractors mentioned 

earlier and further stakeholder 

engagement by the project office. 

This iteration codified the highlevel 

requirements of the 

warfighter, and sketches out the 

first few levels of the functional 

and logical hierarchy of the 

system. On completion of the 

OCD, the FPS is developed using 

a second major iteration of the 

IEEE 1220 SEP, translating the 

requirements of the OCD into 

technical specifications at far 

greater detail and filling out the 

lower levels of the hierarchies. 

These major iterations are shown 

in Figure 3. 

The CDDG guidance was 

extended by mapping it onto the 

SEP defined in IEEE 1220. The 

mapping involved relating all 

parts of the CDDG to IEEE 1220 

processes and the various 

sections of the capability 

definition documents to process 

outputs. 

The mapping created breakpoints 

in the development process of 

the definition documents where 

quality and consistency between 

the various sections of the OCD, 

FPS and TCD could be checked. 

As a consequence of explicitly 

embedding the iterative nature of 

the SEP into the CDDG, conflicts 

or variances discovered at each 

phase of development trigger 

another iteration of a phase in a 

controlled manner in accordance 

with the IEEE 1220 standard. This 

approach is in contrast with the 

CDDG, where updating the 

documents on receiving feedback 

is considered nearer the 

conclusion of the development 

process. 

The development of the 

integrated development process


FIGURE 2: SIMPLIFIED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS FROM IEEE 1220 

highlighted the importance of a 

cohesive and integrated approach 

to analyzing and specifying 

requirements. It identified the 

need to greatly reduce exposure 

to risk during architectural 

comparison, selection and 

development, particularly during 

the earlier concept definition 

stages in the exploration of 

mission need and benefit, and 

the development of mission 

concept and operations. 

The CORE integrated database, 

together with its specialized 

C4ISR schema has been 

mandated to capture systems, 

operations and design elements 

in a common data repository. The 

development process was 

extended to detail how data 

would be entered into the 

database using the special 

semantics of the C4ISR schema 

that relate operational and 

system architectural domains. 

As the system engineering effort 

progresses through the IEEE 

1220 defined phases of 

(operational) requirements 

analysis, functional analysis and 

synthesis, requirements and 

function/performance 

specifications are merged into the 

CORE repository’s model at everincreasing 

levels of detail, as 

shown in Figure 4. The CORE 

tool allows the requisite DAF 

views in the CDDG to be 

automatically generated and 

updated, removing the need to 

redraw them on modification, 

which improves project office 

efficiency. The use of the 

database gives the project office 

far greater control of the system 

model being developed, as the 

elements, relationships and 

attributes of the system within 

and between operational, system 

and functional domains are 

tracked automatically. 

With the system model complete, 

the OCD, FPS and TCD, complete 

with required DAF views may be 

generated from the CORE 

database using existing or 

modified scripts, ensuring tightly 

integrated definition 

documentation of the desired 

system and improving overall 

document integrity. 

Conclusion 

Building on the foundation of the 

Capability Documents 

Development Guide (CDDG), the 

SEA 1442 project office is 

actively reducing risk by explicitly 

integrating strong systems 

engineering processes of the 

IEEE1220 standard and powerful 

software tools into the 

development of mutually 

consistent and robust capability 

definition documents. These 

documents will form the basis of 

the project office’s Request for 

Tender. 

Further details including the 

SEA1442 OCD, FPS and TCD are 

located on the project website on 

the DefWeb. 

1 From ‘Systems Engineering 

Fundamentals’, Defense Acquisition 

University Press, January 2001, Figure 1-3. 

2 From ‘Systems Engineering and Core®: A 

Natual Approach to C4ISR’, Figure 3, Vitech 

Corporation, 2002. 

About the Author: Mr. Lindeyer joined DMO 

in January 2003 after five years as a 

software engineer. He has degrees in 

engineering and science and shall 

complete an MBA this year.

Desirable Products 

• Stakeholder 

Interviews 

• T&E Program 

• Draft OCD (sec. 4 & 5, 

annex A & D) 

• Draft FPS 

• Draft TCD 

• PD 

• Committee Endorsed 

Option 

• DSTO Study 

• RANCIS 

• MARIGOLD 

FIGURE 3: SEP USED IN OCD, FPS DEVELOPMENT 

FIGURE 4: C4ISR PRODUCTS AS A FUNCTION OF ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES. 

OCD, FPS Refinement 

OCD/TCD 

SEP 

FPS SEP 


Draft RFT 

• Initial OCD 

• Initial TCD 

• Final OCD 

• Final FPS 

• Final TCD 

73


Engineering or 

management? 

Nick Hammond spent 35 years as an engineer officer in the Royal 

Australian Navy, entering the RAN College in 1960 and retiring as a 

Rear Admiral in 1995. 

He has had a long involvement in 

Defence acquisition including the 

management of the Guided 

Missile Destroyer Modernisation 

and the Australian Frigate and 

ANZAC Ship Projects. In 1992 he 

became responsible for all Navy 

Projects as the Assistant Chief of 

Naval Staff – Materiel. 

He transferred to the Reserve in 

January 1995 to become the 

First Assistant Secretary, Defence 

Materiel, responsible for joint 

service acquisition projects and 

for Defence policy on information 

management. 

In January 1997 he took up his 

present job as Managing Director 

of Saab Systems (formerly 

CelsiusTech Australia), a supplier 

of major systems for the Defence 

market. He retired as Managing 

Director in 2003 but remains on 

the Saab Systems board and is a 

director of a number of other 

companies. 

The following letter appeared in 

the July 2003 issue of Engineers 

Australia, the Journal of the 

Institution of Engineers Australia. 

May I add a few thoughts to the 

“Real Engineer” vs “Engineering 

Manager” debate in your May 

2003 issue correspondence? 

The 1986 review of Engineering 

education came out strongly in 

favour of a solid base in the 

fundamentals. Given the 

academic background of the 

leadership and most of the 

members of the review team, it 

was not surprising that 

mathematics and hard sciences 

were well represented in the 

fundamentals. 

The input to the review from 

industry where most “Real 

Engineering” is done these days 

emphasised that people skills, 

communications and teamwork 

were more important than the 

ability to do fifth order 

differential-equations in one’s 

head. This awkward information 

was largely buried in the final 

report. As a result, the profession 

continues to attract more than its 

fair share of individuals whose 

enormous technical ability is 

rendered ineffective by their 

inability to communicate. 

There is a role and a career path 

for people who want to move into 

engineering management without 

fully developing their engineering 

skills. Many jobs in project 

management for example require 

an understanding of the 

engineering processes involved 

but not the ability to design those 

processes. Good people in this 

area are readily employable. 

“Real Engineers” are also in 

demand. Although many company 

chief engineers earn more than 

their engineering manager peers, 

this career path is probably less 

well renumerated on average. On 

the other hand it generally 

involves less day to day stress 

and better opportunities for a 

balanced lifestyle – something 

the younger generation thankfully 

seems to be more sensible about 

than its predecessors. 

A decision to become a real 

engineer does not burn bridges. 

As long as technical skills and 

people skills are both included in 

initial and continuing education, 

transition to engineering 

management in mid career is 

quite possible and good 

engineers with management skills 

are in high demand. Those who 

don’t aquire people skills early 

will have more difficulty but (as 

Ken Michael points out in the 

same issue) they won’t progress 

far in straight engineering either. 

For undergraduates and young 

engineers facing career decisions, 

the choice doesn’t have to be 

complicated. If “real engineering “ 

interests you and you have the 

academic ability, then take that 

path, but make sure that your 

engineering training is not at the 

expense of people skills, 

particularly effective 

communication and team work. 

You can still make a transition to 

engineering management in mid 

career. 

Nick Hammond, FIEAust 

Adelaide


MANAGEMENT 

EDUCATION 

Professional development is essential for career success. To keep you up-to-date with the latest knowledge and skills, 

APESMA Management Education offers a full range of management education and training solutions. Whatever your 

management education and training needs, APESMA has a solution to suit you. 

A quick skills update 

APESMA Short Courses are designed to produce immediate performance outcomes. Our expert presenters draw their content 

from workplace experience and case studies, which means you learn one day and apply your learning the next. You can use 

short courses to gain 1 Unit credit towards the Graduate Certificate of Management by completing 3 two-day courses* 

conditions apply 

Popular courses include: 

• Contract Management 

• Risk Management 

• Project Management 

• Leadership & Team Management 

• Writing Winning Technical Documents 

A selection of courses is also available online. 

See www.apesma-shortcourses.com or call 1300 85 33 77 for details. 

The essential management qualification 

If you aspire to a senior management position, then a Master of Business Administration (MBA) is rapidly becoming a prerequisite 

for success. 

The APESMA MBA 

• Offered in partnership with La Trobe University 

• Australia’s largest MBA: 2,000 active students and 10,000 graduates 

• Technology Management specialisation available 

• Flexible distance learning format 

See www.mba-distance-learning.com or call 1300 85 33 77 for details. 

Other qualifications available in partnership with La Trobe University include: Master of Technology in Project Management, 

Graduate Certificate and Graduate Diploma of Management. A Doctor of Business Administration is offered in partnership 

with Charles Sturt University. 

Training for frontline supervisors 

The Modular Frontline Management Program offers members in supervisory positions a nationally recognised qualification. It 

is a competency-based training program which aims to develop workplace skills across the following key areas: 

• Work priorities 

• Operational relations 

• Workplace relations 

• Teamwork 

• Information systems 

Three levels of qualification are available, and credit for workplace projects can be provided. 

See www. apesma.asn.au/education/frontline or call 1300 85 33 77 for details. 

75


Course Schedule 

Contract Management 

Members $650 Non Members $750 

This course is designed to provide participants with an 

understanding of the key concepts, skills and issues involved in 

contract management. 

Date: Location: Duration: 

September 9-10 Sydney 2 days 

October 7-8 Melbourne 2 days 

October 14-15 Perth 2 days 

Finance for Non-Financial People 


This course is recommended for participants with little or no 

financial or accounting experience who wish to develop their ability 

to understand and utilise financial information. 


September 8-9 Adelaide 2 days 

September 11-12 Darwin 2 days 

October 8-9 Sydney 2 days 

October 28-29 Perth 2 days 

November 24-25 Melbourne 2 days 

Leadership & Team Management 


This course will enable participants to understand how effective 

leadership can improve productivity, and what constitutes effective 

leadership and team management. 



Managing Consultants & Contractors 


This course is designed to help participants avoid the pitfalls and 

maximise the benefits from contracting work to others. 


September 16-17 Melbourne 2 days 

November 12-13 Canberra 2 days 

Strategic Marketing for Technical People 


This course has been designed for enterprises wanting to develop 

coherent, and appropriately structured, marketing plans and to 

understand the importance and value of developing marketing 

effective marketing strategies. 



Writing Winning Technical Documents 



November 27 Melbourne 1 Day 

Project Management 


This course aims to assist participants to understand how project 

management can be used to achieve business goals. 


September 2-3 Perth 2 days 


October 9-10 Hobart 2 days 


Risk Management 


This course gives participants an understanding of the principles, 

current processes and techniques of risk management. 


September 29-30 Darwin 2 days 

October 9-10 Brisbane 2 days 

November 12-13 Sydney 2 days 


Negotiation Skills & Dispute Resolution 


This course aims to demonstrate the importance of communication 

and problem solving skills in the negotiation process. 


September 24-25 Brisbane 2 days 

October 21-22 Adelaide 

November 25-26 Sydney 

Strategic Asset Management 


This course has been designed for enterprises wanting to develop 

coherent, and appropriately structured, asset management plans. 



October 15-16 Sydney 2 days 

Advanced Technical Writing Skills 



October 16 Canberra 1 day 

Effective Research for Busy Professionals 



September 4 Sydney 

Getting Results with Microsoft Project 



October 23 Sydney 1 day

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