Cleavage Structures.pdf

40 cLEAvAcE srRucruREs, pARTy sysrEMs, AND vorER ALIGNMENTs
liance-opposition system of type VI: Catholic dominance through the Counter-
Reformation, secularization and religious conflict during the next phase of
nation-building in the nineteenth century, clear predominance of the cities
in national poiitics. But this is an analytical juitaposition of polities with
diametrically opposed histories of development and consolidation-France
one of the oldest and most centralized nation-states in Europe, Italy a territory
unified long after the French revolutions had paved the way for the
"participant nation," the integrated political structure committing the entire
territorial population to the same historical destiny. To us this is not a weakness
in our model, however. The party systems of the countries are curiously
similar, and any scheme of comparative analysis must somehow or other
bring this out. The point is that our distinction between "lation-builder"
alliances and "periphery" alliances must take on very difierent meanings
in the two contexts. In France the distinction between "center" and "periphery"
was far more than a matter of geography; it reflected long-standing
historical commitments for or against the Revolution. As spelt out in detail
in Siegfried's classic Tableau, the Droite had its strongholds in the districts
which had most stubbornly resisted the revolutionary drive for centralization
and equalization,o? but it was far more than a movement of peripheral
protest-it was a broad alliance of alienated elite groups, of frustrated nation-builders
who felt that their rightful powers had been usurped by men
without faith and without roots. In Italy there was no basi! Jor such a broad
alliance against the secular nation-builders, since ihe esta5liJhed local elites offered
little resistance to the lures bf iraiformismo, and the Church kept its
faithful followers out of national politics for nearly two generations.
These contrasts during the lnitial phqsJs,_qf pass -mobiliz?tion had farreaching
consequences for each party system..With the broidCning of the
electorates and the strengthening of the working-class parties, the Church
felt impelled to defend its position tbrough its own resources. In France, the
result was an attempt to divorce the defense of the Catholic schools from
the defense of the established rural hierarchy. This trend had first found
expression through the establishment of Christian trade unions and in 1944
finally led to the formation of the MI{P. The burden of historic commitments
was too strong, however; the young party was unable to establish itself as a
broad mass party defending the principles of Christian democracy. By contrast,
in Italy, history had left the Church with only insignificant rivals to
the right of the working class parties. The result was the formation of a
broad alliance of a variety of interests and movements, frequentiy at loggerheads
with each other, but united in their defense of the rights of the central
institution of the fragmented ancien rdgime, the Roman Catholic Church.
In both cases there was a clear-cut tendency toward religious polarization,
but difierences in the histories of nation-building made for diflerences in the
resultant systems of party alliances and oppositions.
We could go into further detail on every one of the eight types distinguished
in our model, but this would take us too far into single-country
histories. We are less concerned with the specifics of the degrees of fit in each
national case than with the overall structure of the model. There is clearly
nothing final about any such scheme; it simply sets a series of themes for
Cleavage Structures,Party Systems, andVoter Alignments
detailed comparisons and suggest'. Y/t of organizing the results within
a manageable concept;l.umi"*ort. The model"is a tobl and its utility can
be tested only ttuoufr"o"ti""out development: through the addi'ion of
further variables ,r il""",iJil". -"Ut.*.d' differences als well as through
refinements io tn" a"niil"o*o^;J;r;di"t of .the variables already included'
Two develop-"o,r lio- tne doaet iequire immediate detailed consideration:
(1)Whatvariablesha,vetobeaddedtoaccountfortheformationof
disiinctly territorial Parties?
(2) What criteria:hJld count in differentiatins between N-L and N-U
alliances, and what .onOitionuf variables can be entered into the model to
account for the emergence of expticitly agrartan parties?
Developments and Deviations: Parties for Territorial Defense
Nation-buildinginvariablygeneratesterritorialresistancesandcultural
strains. There will u" .onip.itition between potential centers of
-political
tonlrol; there may #.;;iiil;;i*"* trt" and the areas of growth
"aiital
in the provin."r; u" unavoidable tension. between the cuiturally
^"?"^"""a -u."u,
"nairi."rJ'*iir and the backward periphery..s Some of
;;;"T;;"|#iy
these territoiiat-cuttura] cottnitl' *"'" solved th1-ougfr siceision or boundary
changes, but others *ti" iot"ntified through unifica*tion movements' To take
;-#'3#;;"*uulpr", the dismemberment of the Hapsburg Empirc certaioly
settled a great ou,nt"' of hopelessly entangled conflicti' but it also led
to the politicuf uoin"iiiJ"t'r"itt "rfiurally a"nd economically,heterogeneous
:ilii:_%-il;- v;;ffi ,- unJ cr""t'.,ilovakia. Territorial-cultural conflicts
do not just nio potiiical expression in secessionist and irredentist
movements, ho*.u".1ffi"iil t"it the overall cleavage structure in the
national community J"i'iirp-i9 .o"airiot the developmeit not.only of each
nationwide party organizati6n but even more of the- entire system of party
oonositions and alignments' '
"tfi;-;;;;;;;";;;; the British and the scandinavian Parly systems
stauds out with great clarity in o-ur-.steP-by-step accounting schcmc' The
countrics of Nortn*Jst Effie had all-oited for'national religious solutions
at the time'of the n"r*o,"iion, but the^y nevertheless developed markedly
difierent purry ,yrr",i-J^a"uti;g th; larly ph'ases of democratization and mobilization-
'frri, .orrt.ur,- io -p"oriti"al development clearly did not reflect a
difierence in ttre saiien; Ji;;t i;"g1" li"" of 1|eavage-but^a difference in
lbe ioint operation oi two s"ti of "cleavages: the opposition between tlre
central nation_buildioi "ortur" and the truEitiont of fhs periphery, and the
opposition u"t*""o'iti"lri*ury and the secondary scctors of the economy'
rn Britain tt" ""oirui'..ii'*-iu"r upheld and reinforccd by a vast network
of landed tarruhesf in the Nordic c6untries by an.essenltally urban elite of
officials and patricians' in Britain the two cleavagg lile; cur ac'ross each other:
in Scandinav * tn"y"ilt"1r*"J*u.ft otfter' The"British structure encouraged
a gradual merger ]r'"ril',"" "ra-r,rrul iot"."sts, while the scandinavian madt
for division ""d ;;Giln.6s The British conservative Party was .191"..1,
establish a joint frf";";i i;"aeJ and industrial owner interests, whiic tht
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