Cleavage Structures.pdf

44 cLEAvAcE srRucruREs, pARTy sysrEMs, AND vorER ALI.NMENT'
Developments qnd Deviations: parties lor Agrarian Delense
we distinguished in our initiar paradigm (Fig. , berween twgi,typical,,
:*l:9,.: ar thi.rlnd or.,h;-i"';io"riii"urtu.a
opposrtron of axis:
ethnic-ringuistic on thd i iide tne
*inorities againri
nationar currure (l), tt"
; ,his_li;;ffiosition "ffiia# #;yf##:
;r ;ilil;;;try against
rT"ril:T[.:"f l]n""""uvtninnan:ct'i;;#;;;;r,"'ii"r#iiii,iur'io6,",t,
a,-**;;*-.# i*mH:'ff.,fm
cleavages o! type 3 in Fig. 3l--- "-" t'""
;;''";fti'il"iil-i'f;l'"org interests are most rikery ro nnd direct
+otitrs4_gllrrssias_ j
'u"@:'l;tii:1$.:".'""Jff "*,T,!m
But iu three of the rour_caser'tr," opplriti;;.1i-i##fflT',T" dominance
of the cities tended to be closery li"ffi;; with a rejection of the moral and
religious standards or tne nat#r-u.iiJ.irl ffi;;,ffi;';:il ariances in
ir"fl"aitilirl?i:"il ) ""d rd N";ilJ;a1 t tr_ne. iv i "rra n_i arriances in
vurl**"1"?,Hi"#,:.i:Ii;#r"4i.:t,+:i:ii,llIn*iilJ,r"tr
position movemenrs:,the Bergiaf i""*i"'b.,n"iiJririri"ig' u",t, in d6e
urban "establishmenr"
"l,o 1rnolg-,tlJ"r_"r, but, as it haipened, were
lH.fi i.i,,:ffiX*';,ru:tJ11ff ;{ilb';.'*J;itilt',,i.-,i"g"i;.
In only -one of these "four
"urm li-a-t,
countries ""uilJJ",ffii-ii-n",or,,uffi.iJ#;f"X",:kffi of "ri:
the North.. a peasaii party aiso established itserf in the pt'ote;-
tant cantons of switzerrano. ro tti otirei-countri.s
have been of
peasant tt" w"ri,t"r".uy
lisrs at t"*
" -"r"JJ4
ilf .'*,:ff :il"x*"ff f,"T!'dii"i;m.uffi why these differences? ffi *tweparties
This raisesl *-u.i"iaimi;il;":fi;, economics or nation-bul*g. about l" oui
rre
tG;Ltffi;i;:;",#rrry the options of the central
reduced
eti6 to u !"tween
interests
an
and
afliance
an alliance "nti., with the tanded,
with the lrrba n-nioncur-cr^;;;;it-iri)strtar.
of course, was never *11!"1 of This,
either,zor
changes in the " llt o{ continuing
overan equiribrium
adjustment to
in
does
each
not herp "ai-"; territory.-our
the oelLgtion.;r.;y-FEli:; dichotomy
out contrasts ffi;ii, amons IH": to
systems
bring
in the 'retative openness
dhection or
to alriances
the otrr?'
rn it the
the
one
decisive r,"g",
To
of
understand
partisan mobilization.
the conditions-foi
"irii""" "prions in the one direction the other it is essentiar to go i'to o'"r.il; or
at tle ,nE-iis"iirii"r;ii time of the *,j:::=:f )urat society
tf;G;e. What
thing else
counted
was the
more
concentrarion
than anv_
ol resouies ror the of mobitization, or
-conttot
rhe
and
pror"'r,
inthe counrryriil;il;
and siy the ol
hierarchies tt, irii, Jl production
of dependen;';;;"i;jh*;,"
more thau anv other r*t"i* ;;#,:dlms counred
-ur.';;";;5.';;.oncentration
and social pristige of dconomic
the easier it power
*;;r;;;Lor tne ;;.1-;;;r;d.rh" gr"ur",
Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, ana y oler .t1.116t.,,.c,.,e
the political payoffs of elliances with landowners. It was qo accident that
Conservative leaders such as Bismarck and Disraeli took a lead in the
extension of the suftrage; they counted on the loy4ty and obedience of the
dependent tenants and the agricultural workerg"lrTo measure the political
potentialities of the land-owning classes it w6uld be essential to assemble
comparative statistics on the proportions of the arable land and the agricultural
manpower under the control of the large estate owners in each
country. Unfortunately there are many lacunae in the historical statistics and
comparisons are fraught with many hazards. The data at hand suggest that
the countries we identified as typical "N-L cases" (types 15 III, V, and
VII in our eightfold model) all tended to be dominated by large estates, at
least in their central territories. This was the case in most of England and
Scotland, in Prussia east of the Elbe, in the Reconguista provinces of Spain,
and in lowland Austria.8o There were, to be sure, large estates in many of
the countries we have identified as "N-IJ cases" (types II, IV, VI, and
VIII), but such alliances as there were between urban and rural elites still
left large groups of self-owning peasants free to join counter-alliances ou
their own. In Belgium and the Netherlands the holdings tended to be small
and closely tied in with the urban economy. In France and Italy there were
always mdrked regional variations in the size of holdings and the systems of
land tenure, and the peasantry was deeply divided over cultural, religious,
and economic issues. There were large estates in- Jqtbqd, in southern Sweden,
and in southwestern Finland, _and the owners of these helped to consolidate
tle conservative establishments in the early phases of competitive politics,
but the broad masses of tle Nordic peasantry could not be brought into any
such elliances with the established urban elites. The traditions of independent
peasant representation were strong and there was widespread rejection
of the cultural influences from the encroaching cities. In Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden the decisive "Left" fronts against the old regime were coalitions
of urban radicals and increasingly estate-conscious peasants, but these coalitious
broke up as soon as the new parties entered government. In Denmark
the urban Radicals left the agrarian Venstre; in Norway and Sweden the old
"Left" was split in several directions on moralist-religious as well as on economic
lines. Distinctly agrarian parties also emerged in the two still "colonial"
countries of the North, Finland and lceland. In these predominantly
primary-producing countries the struggle for external independence dominated
political life in the decades after the introduction of universal suffrage, and
there was not the same need for broad opposition fronts against the establishments
within each nation.
Typically, agrarian parties appear to have emerged in countries or
\t--->'*- -
provinces - ( 1) where the cities and the industrial centers were still numerjcally weak
at the time of the decisive extensions of the suffrage;
(2) where the bulk of the agricultural populations were active in
family-size farming and either owned their farms themselves or were legally
protected lease-holders'largely independent of socially superior landowners;
- (3) where there were important cultural barriers between the countryside
' aud the cities and much resistance to the incorporation of farm production
in the capitalist economy of the cities; and