Cleavage Structures.pdf

More documents

Recommendations

Info

nfril?-?:Jormallv integrated into the nation-state, the rurar / -#:T*l The conditions to. ll: _devetopment ot {i,s1incL!ve working_"tu* purl. J#::"f il5itl,*:t'::,:lly",;",'tlyv';;d:#;il11{iT;'uift eiences 48 .LEA'AGE srRucruREs' pARTy sysrEMs, AND vorER ALT.NMENT il" *;lfffi;:t"t'illt accentuated long-established tines ot Jivisioi within velopments.rrrieenougr,"in"iSii-"iji#T;':f"'"$::1"T.'.sff ,",3##,_.:-+r:,Li:*.r_f ::rfs o:o.:ojprgdugclear_cutpredictionsof thesede_ working-class movemenE gmerg.ed i" tu" ftogstant-dominated countries with the smoothest histories of o"fioo_Urritdog; g1i1ein, Denmark, and Sweden (types I and II rn ":::gtEq*ffi"f,o", the C;athotic_dominated coun_ trics witb difficult or -verr- reccnt tiirtoii", o,f nation-buirrring also produced $:ii'jti:::+"H'rut;r,.ru"x'ffixH^ff t#:1:;I;Hii,I,,1I; account for variation: io-th9 iot"*.ai"d!99e-!etneen the protestant North_ west and the Latin t"g qrJ* Itr;d *, Vrf and VIII). Both the Aus_ uian and the German *-oti6ig*fu* iiJ".rot deveroped their distinctive countcr-cultures asainst the- do"minantl",i"ra efites. Th.e auit iuo sociarist Lag",, heavilv coicentrated * it ;;;-vi"*u, was able to maintain its unity in &e fice of the a"ii.rr-ll"r;;ilu., and the pan-German nationar_ ish after the dissorutiol ot o" uffiri't-pi.".r, By contrast, the German working-class movement was deepry oviiea atpl ttre 6"r""ii. igr8. Sharpry contrasted conceptions of the *i"" ;i th;poltical g;;;;d opposed to each other and dere to prove t"t"r:io tn" nght against the wave of mass na_ tionalism of the early tLilies.;;- I"' s;;-ii;4a- u" -N!,ri".r.""os ( both type IV in our scbenie), td i*;d -?iry c;;;;;ffi; produced a few disturbances- bur the leftwaJsptit-on, t oo, ,rr";;'*rking crass by parties were of iitu" rilnid.;;;:Hfilrked curtural and rerigious creav_ to r tne -ioci"ri'1 p.,tl.l^ ;#il;i'"ditions or ;ftrJ:ffi'"t _ uvrp ,.'r Of a' ^, .L^-:_-- ttre_inten_r-.rv "i:"5::944' uctl cuuy_lnro natlonal politics. Iy to help their entry i"tb ouiiJ"ui;iil".., rcnCi'*',ffi *!"ff YI1. :ii:' Tgd:r ) a particularrv diffcurt r'i',"]i 6t ""ii.*t"iff;;ffii, i$;lTrl,,l?"""t *'* ffit#"*1, ""* ili"ilffi; #T? ffi*31y1.:y-llis,case ffi;ffi tr,1'*"n""J' ffi ;? ffi;ffi# ;1:T:"T.*:1:"q,,11","^"j:l"S-;;"Gfr..#TnffiTil'"'if; .::f :it&T:,S ilf-ffi gfrHff Belgian-French 1;Iil,Hyi"n"'i"i"l.i;;;,;h'i#:i:il'i::;i"$:f contrasts :f : 8{ The reconciliation of social order. divirlarr ,Jl:"":t5l":.^1l.Hng class- to rhe political aod li?"ir,?"f il._q1*:,*::r1..{:1",-.,T'H""'ff :,fr.l&11ll*i,; 11^ 1t Fremish-Walloon quesriron, lglon makes a vivid-coitrast witrr'itre ;#::,TJ:"::*f .^"-^y:rin;;;;;;il"J,lilHrl#.ii:XI" t;i:f jff $j:',.Hi "*."":,:3;" ':.r:"""-*.-i:l,i,l""s#,iiii#ieg:#lH'l j":{,::^::1.:^::f _*J,-:-:,i"*ffi:;#:Hi;:.9:":::[ HS;ffi i:r,:,:::*.:*:i:rl:i;";ij't"Um{"fi Jf':'il,':,:lJl'H: iii,:#J:L'l#i?,??1,."uu1ff :*-t,-"^i;i,;'.";1iliffi itfjl3ll:it::::::.{G;;n"ai-;;il:tlihff "",SXlil"i:lr'".,ti;; fi SJii;,,x",11"i,"J I'X*IX' ;;;;b;#' ffi i;:il:.'ii:,:1ff1:f "#,,:X: Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments 49 t/_C@e "the cockpit of Europe," could not permit itself social aud political couflict td the breaking point. Perhapi France could not either, but it was harder for the bigger natiou to realize it. The cpntrastbetween France* Italy,-andspain-on-th" one b4pd^. and Austria'ana negium on in" othet suggeiis-a possiule generalization. G-woiking-* ctes*sorzemeglljg,14ld to be much more divided in the countries where the "nation-builders" other during the crucial phases of educational development and mass mobilizatiou (our "S" cases, types V and VI) than in the countries where the Church had, at least initially, sided with the nation-builders against some cornmon enemy outside (our "R" cases, an alliance against Protestant Prussia and the dependent Hapsburg peoples in the case of Austria; against the Calvinist Dutch in the case of Belgium). This fits the Irish case as well. The Catholic Church was no less hostile to the English than the secular nationalists, and the union of the two forces not only reduced the possibilities of a polarization of Irish politics on class lines but made the likelihood of a Communist splinter of any importance very small indeed. It is tempting to apply a si the greater the internal division during the struggle for nationhood, greaterlth-e-"flrgqglg!_lbe*Bugsleg,-Rev,qhtion_aU:be-tliviqions*ryithinlhg_ -wor[fig class"-Wmntalreadt pointed to the profoundffiwithin the Geinrln Reich was a^late-comFiffiong European nations, and none of the_'lgrritolal icts within the =and.telig ,,ladpg was anywhere near set ss parties - egte{-gd the political arena. ArUeIlg the northern countries the two oldest na- -tioni,DennrirkandSweden,w6iEist-Efec'tedtf rhe-Com:munist:SoCiliiit division. @om colonial status were much more directly affecte 14, a sovereign state from 1905) for only a brief period in the early 1920's; Finland (independent in 1917) aud Iceland (domestically independent in 1916 and a sovereign state from 1944) for a much longer period. These difierences among the northern countries,,hde been frequently commented on in the literature of comparative politigsiThe radicalization of the Norwegian Labor Party has beeJ interpreieatwittio seilrTfEleffidTE models, onE emphasizing the alliance options of the party leaders, another the grass-roots reactions to sudden industrialization in the peripheral counbryside, and a third the openness of th-e party st!rctfire and itre iossibilities oi quick feedback from i-he mobilized voterg4here is no doubt that the early-mo[!!!Eg!g_of the peasantry and the quick victory over the old regime of the officials had left the emerging Norwegian working-class party much more isolated, much less important as a coalition partuer, than its Danish and Swedish counterparts.ss There is also a great deal of evidence to support the old Bull hypothesis of the,radical- _ tzing gflects-of sud-den i'ldustrielizslisn, but recent research suggests that this w)ffinly one element in'a b6atl-p-roeess of political change. The Labour Party recruited many more of its voters in the established cities and in the forestry and the fisheries districts, but the openness of the party structure gllowed the radicals to establish themselves very quickly and to take over the (najority winft the party during the crucial years just after the Russian \
50cLEAvAGEsTRUcTUREs'PARTYsYsTEMs'ANDvoTERALIGNMENTs S.wolution.88 This very openness to rank-and-file influences made the alliance I with-TloicoR very shortJived; the Communists split off in 1924 and the old i majority party "joined the nation" step by step until it took power in 1935.8? j pdy-two-olthe-Scandinavi.an-countries-rgainea-s*onpeommunist*parties- . r after World War Il-Finland and Icelandz/Superficially these countries have , i two features in commonlTiolongerrslttfgler tor-cultriral-ancl political indgl* * : pendence, and,late industrialization. {n fact the two countries went through : iery iliffererit p-Lo-cesses-oE-p6lffiAild-ange from the intggl-ptrg!9.-sltl"4llo:ulijlgq[i-lizatioa-to the final formation of the full-suffrage party system. One obvious source of variation was the distance from Russia. The sudden upsurge of the Socialist Party in Finland in 1906 (the party gained 37 percent of the votes cast at the first election under universal suffrage) was part of a eral wave of mobilization ltte-&assuegrsg-r@ nd doy4qThe middle; the working-class voters were and its social hierarchy @lture and their solidarity iith'their clasi-an-f,if,srevomtionary defenders.ss Th-e victory of the "Whites" and the subsequent suppression of the Communist Party (19L9-Zl, 1923-25,1930-44) left deep scars; the upsurge of the leftist SKDL after the Soviet victory in 1945 reflected deep-seated resentments not only against the "lords" and the employers of labor but generally against the upholders of the central national culture. The split in the Icelandic labor movement was much less dramatic; in the oldest and smallest of the European democracies there was little basis for mass conflicts, and the oppositions between Communist sympathizers and Socialists appeared to reflect essentially personal antagonisms among groups of activists.se IMPLICATIONS f,'OR COMPARATIVB POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY We have oushed our attemDt at a svstematization of the comoarative his- ' ':-- - I tory of-tpartisan oppositions in European polities up to some point in the 1920's, to the freezing of the.major party alternatives in the wake of the extension of the suffrage and the mobilEddon-o-F mafoi-SEctions of the new - reservoirs of potential supporters. Why stoP there? Why not Pursue this exercise in comparative cleavage analysis right up to the 1960's? The reason is deceptively simple: the party systems ol the 1960's reflect, with lew but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures ol the 1920's. This is a crucial characteristic of Western competitive politics in the age of "high mass consumption": the party alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party organizations, are older than the majorities ol the national electorates. To most of the citizens of the West the currently active parties have been part of the political landscape since their childhood or at least since they were first faced with the choice between alternative "packages" on election day. This continuity is often taken as a matter of course; in fact it poses an intriguing set of problems for comparative sociological research. An amazing number of the parties which had established themselves by the end of World Ci*og, Sor,'u'"'-, PitY SYsterns' and Cleavage JtructureJ, L s"! vJeJ-"'-' -' war I survived' not 9{r the onslaueht:-":.Y::}:R3**X*'f;" Sf ,lJ'il'J&1"$:'1Kil"^"f "#:-:ln::l:X'"';T'$11il"'i:S :xl:f i"lli$'"J.,Hl:'E'"'r4$i"-i:T:li;:'*tilH:T;tlt ii1"1',Hy;'J5Tffi'i!*"ilTliii;i.if*Hffi J3*T",fffi ,r How were. these pantres aDrs Lu DurY'v "'r.iuti6nf, How could they !ap. social, and economlc of t'r rrrvrr social, and-economic "tit** .conditions .conoltlons .,:ry:,,-T rhem oun, ovhr such long long.periods prrloas ,it ot lr"it^i"tg" uoaies of. citizenll!.11:*],T*:T,ienreles frbm seneratro-. to gen- H,'lltJ ;lT ?'ii' ;ffi; tr'ii' iore crienteres generatio: to gen- "'"* eration? ' ' 'r---.^-A ^nc\r'ar tn anv of these questions' We know -il*'"m;'ffiffi'trilil"";:'i.F[;i"'#"i'-;'r.'r]r'o"tiooi"g tHR l+#il^d"-;;3"!. m:k,o.i".urti*r base and lhbii etr- ,J"-tr'":ti;",'Jt-"d launch new parties d;#;;; it* a"tia"t of universal suffrage' I iormed during the f,nal phase ot :"y1!:^:T':::;;;*;rt;;;". It is difficult to see any .igoifi"uot'LTf.;;;;ih" *r""ln"t tn"parliesihich were able to establishTur* orgu"ill",t;;;;;;;;,r"n"h th"mselves in the local govern- "&i"" ment structu r, u ;;;i:jt "I.f,i.' Jqf"u' J maximat mobilization have oroved ttre most vtable' The narrowing oi:=ine-t"ppor1matnef'T-rou gUt ibout through ,1'" g;?; ii'*J* !"'ii"; it4ig titi' iiit^r thrust toward fullsufirase-dqmqcraayjeaty !l!f"ty-f"* openinfls for new movements' Where the cfiailenge-o1tn""ilJ'ffi*
Page 1 and 2: Cleovoge Structures, Porty Systems,
Page 3 and 4: cclr)posed of the active, mobirizin
Page 5 and 6: Tllfes 0f llic$e s'ts of interchang
Page 7 and 8: ,tu,J r! lll t' ,'l I;l r||| ,l' ,l
Page 9 and 10: Plarcw*t.qf,fush s"d-c14 hal for cl
Page 11 and 12: A similar ur'AvAcE srR'cruREs' penr
Page 13 and 14: -ee'--r-'-tOltlt! 21 cLEAvAGE srRuc
Page 15 and 16: Jtaa 28 r-. ! r.:--!! r. a a taaaaa
Page 17 and 18: t d t3'l' '.t^#ou|.'h?.ltqt $r*r?r#
Page 19 and 20: c L f^ v^-G E Fr n ric r u-n a sf o
Page 21 and 22: f f f l.t^t "f "I"f.,+^t *-trLtt t"
Page 23: CLEAVACE STRUCTURES, pARTy SYSTEMS,
Page 27 and 28: jlsli,{aE1 ; q+ 'ri':4' j;T / I 'ri
Page 29 and 30: t t t , D f"ut t. t7'tT t a {a t'u
Page 31 and 32: UU U U U'-U'U U-U UU UUU lt'! U U!

Cleavage Structures.pdf

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?