Cleavage Structures.pdf

Cleovoge Structures, Porty Systems, ond
Voter Alignmenfs; An lntroduction
Seymour Mortin Lipset ond Stein Rokkon
INMAL FORMI'LATIONS
DIMENSIONS OF CLEAVAGE
AND ALLIANCE
.1. - '.
THE TRANSFORMATTON OF CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES
INTO PARTY SYSTEMS
A MODEL FOR THE GENERATION OP THE EUROPEAN
PARTY SYSTEM
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPAMTIVE
SOCIOLOGY
INITIAL FORMULATIONS
POLITICAL
Questions lor Comparartve Analysis
The analyses brought together in this collection bear on a series of central
questions in the comparative sociologr of politics.
The fint set of guestions concernsdregepsis ol the system ol conta,sts and
clea'ttages within the national commuui-ry: *Which conffcts came first and
'fuhich"later? Which

CLEAVAGE $TRUCTURES, PARTY SYSTEMS, AND VOTER ALIGNMXNTS
deqlclons or the introduction of sornc variety of Proportional Representation?
/n *ira and final tet of qucationrbeari on the- behavior of- the mass ol
ra)ft party systems: How quickly were
the parties able to recruit support among the new m4sses of enfranchized
citizens, and what were the coie characteristics of the groups of voters mobilized
by each party? Which conditions helped and which conditions hindered
the mdbilizatj,6rdstt-ntfag1 p"rty wiGin ffi- @
tiiiienry? How quickly did -he cbapges in economic, social, and cultural
conditions brought about through eionomic growth or stagnation translate
themselves into ihanges in m@es of ihe parties? How
did political success affect the rates of mobilization and the inflow of new
supp[rt ruit new clienteles and
chiirge their folloivingi as they established their viability as useful channels of
influence in the decision-making processes?
Jlesb are some of the questions we hope to throw light on in this volume.
We have assembled
the economic, the social, and the
confront us with tasks of developmental comparison' to understand the current
alignments of voters behind each of the parties, we have to maP variations
in intlte the iauences g-e4uegqes*of of alternatives altqgatrver set for the active active and the passive citizens citizens- within
each iyite-Tince*itt" Em?ig"nc" of competitive politics. Parties do not
simolv simply orl:;nt prLjnt themselves de nbvo n-ovo to the citizen at each election; theY they each
have a history and so have the constellations of altematives they preselt to
the electorate. In single-nation studies we need,. go-1*q[y1ays take this -hjsto:y*.
into account in analyzing critt€iif-dli$ments: we assume that the parties are
equally visible "givens" to all the citizens within the nation. But as soon as
wL move in@ have to add anaristorical dimension.
We simply [annoi-mak. sense-of variations in current Aignments wiif,-ddf
detailed-dita on difterences in the sequences of party formation and in the
character of the alternatives presented to the electorates before and after the
extension oi the suffragc.t We have to carry out our comparative analyses in
several steps: we first have to consider the initial developments towald cop- -.
*ltlue-poiiUcr ana *r" insti xt must
i-tr;ntanli" t@s-iid oppositi on s which, produced the
nationallystem of mass organizations for electoral action, and then, and only
then, can-we make headway toward sone understanding of the forces producing
the cunent alignments of voters behind the historically given alternatives.ln
our Western democracies the voters are only rarely called uPon to
express their stands on single issues. They are typically faced with choices
adong historically given "packages" of programs, commitments, outlooks, and,
iO*"toOa-*ts."
ion of the
We shail fu$Ldlscus!- -2'
fithiq nitional political commun$i-l
The Political Party: Agent ol Conflict and Instrume)f;f Integration
..parry" has throughout the history of western- gd"*ttot :tTg,il,l di-
'i.i;; :""iil,,'.p-f.'J,itn;'ii;';'btdy politic'3'{'Partv" is etymologically
derived from "part" *d;i;;;il ilJ."ppJ"ita in nolitical'discourse in tbe late
Middle Ages has "f.,ruyr-i"iuio.A ttrir'refer"nce' to one set of elements in
comp,el!!q94-9r in controvlr's!'*ltf"t"itt"t tJ;;;;;
whole.{
*ittti" to*t unified "
'"'
L
tlll
I

cclr)posed of the active, mobirizing part of the nationar system: it does
'et €om'ere with other parties for"om""r unJ-iu_u--o-;ui,i
rnobiliae' ii'.iiii'r""r, the uopuhce ,.
-igainsr
comiti-io!-ugain5t gen5pilatorial
rorces
counter_
wtrhin rlie iationar cimmunity o, ugiioriinT;r;J.#ilfi".$ui, r.oo,
- {gi'gn enemies. Totaritarian erecti'ons ,riay not make much sense from a
Y:._,":l perspe,ctive,.but they_ neverth"f"rr-i".1.1ap9rtant leg,itimLin& fuS_q*_
.-trons: they are "rituals of confirmation" i:r a c
iit{g.t"rlta#"'iu"ll*" lregitimate oooo.*n,,oll'il""H.:fiilJo:'fl"1t'frIt "" -
'/n rYnatever ue struc.t]T:9lq:
t"ti,y{-p3.fti"-r }ave served u, ..r"itiul ug"ni
/ :'_:' or rno lilizariatr--and as su ch -h €LEAVAOE ^T ."flUC'Tt'NES' PARTY SYSTEMS, AND VOTER ALIGNT{ENTS Cleavage Structures, Parry Syslems, ana Vorcr Attgnnent:
I
I
\J
;r;ii€lF,'i+i{,,."ffi llrffiu ni,i.r p
the post-coloniar era- I"-r!-r-. insighttul' anarysis ; ff'Iffi^ii"r'Ji' *,"
ir*ffi ,ff i%r,fi3*,'F#.ii,*",n-::,iJ""'*tt*i"i ;X",:":g:
Federalists and the Democr'atic-R"puuii."ori'iirey were the tuit genuinery
"^Tlrl il :rggg llol1, -',t' r.y represin te d tr," ni, i' .u"..rri,T ffi ffi p u u
Ame'cans out ot thcir-locar community qnd their state and to give them rores
in the national poliry.l,Analys., of p*i$i-i" iir"'o"* nations of the twentieth
qe-nlury a.rrive at similar cbnclusions. futh Schachter has shown how- the
anditsruresor.il;;;l;ff-;;?fr a{ii?ffi to distinguish iffeTl"jH;".,,H"|lj:?
.between- i1r; sylt-em- "no "u*"oi'omcetotaers. itre';;;;r"ry
tends to jlentif_y the polity ytlr t!," policies of particular t"^a.rr, o"a
power-holders A"
habituiry lxploit ttre 'estaurstrea'nutioo"t- rrt"l;d io .ary
support_for themselves. In such societies any attack on the political leadcrs or
913: dominant parry tends to turn into ai "tt*r, "" iii. ;;ii;i;;i ;;# i,:
llf^ Y,ylliri-
over particurar poricies or particurar incumb6ncies imrirediatery
rarse runoameotal issues of system survival. In a competitive partv svstem
opponents of the current governing team may weil be "^.t.u..J ,ii*io-ri"oi"g
thcstate,or.betraying the iraditions"of the naiion, but the .ontinuro .*iri"o."
ot ure potrucal system i:,i:_t t:t lgonTff. A.competitive party sysrem protects
the nation against the discontents'of iis citizens: grrevances and attacks are
from the overau system and directed iorui'o tn, .ur;";l;"t;lo*"._
f:irTj:.{
-sociologists such as E. A. Rosse and Georg Simmello have analvzed the
llH-: fgof jnstitution4*?ed-confl icts wttrtl"itt""r tytr.*r.'iii .r"u
usnment ot regular has
helped to stabilize th:stru4@tes. The eflcctive
equalization of the status of difierent dcnominations hasT-elped to take
much of thelbrunt off the earlier con0icts over religious issues. I[e extcnsien_
of the suffrfge and the enforcement of the freedom"of political e$re6iooadhelped
to 6trengthen the legitimacy of the nation-state. The opeuing up of
chanoels for the expression of manifest or latent conflicts between the estab.
lished and the underprivileged classes may have brought many systems out of
equilibrium in the earlier phase but tended to Etrengthen the body politic over
time.
.f!is conflicgiglegra[on dialectic is of central concem in curreDt research
on thd-comparative sociology of political parties. In this volume the emphasis
will be on conflicts and their lranslation into party $ystemJ. This does not
mean that we shall neglect the-integrative functions of parties. We have simply
chosen to start out fr6m the fienf d mffiIe,it-srratnsloa-eleavages aud wiil
deal with trends toward compromise and reconciliation against the background
of the initial conflicts. Our concern in this introductory discussion as
well as in the chapters on particular systems is with parties as alliance,s. irt
eedb;";;;pii[iiq",Ai;,;;;i;i;,4';'t'yitme-i,elsai@@
gqnflisJs-oveL poticies-a!4 vatue commitylents- y!tU!_ tfg,lglV!_!99y_p9!g!c-
For the-qcle!9gitt,-pgdlclexert-a the.qc!e!9gi!t,p3rtic! eieqfao"Ule dgCbfe_fasciueti, far-ci"uin-._They ._They help-to help to c_ryslal_lize crystallize
-
and m a ke-lSiifrt'tii *nniffi g i"t*"-tt, Gel
"t*t
strains aria coritr astt in
the existing social structure, aod they force subjects and citizens to aUy
themselves across structural cleavage lines and to set up priorities among
their commitments to established or prospective roles in the system. Parties
have an expressive function; they develop a rhetoric for the translation of
Contrasts in the sOcial and the -cultural Structure into detnauds ".d .ressrtres
for action or inaction. But they also_hav_e W!n^S!1"1_and rrygllIllgtive
functions: they force the spokeimen for the-mtny;o;tiasting interests ana.-ouflookS
to strike bargains, to stagger demands, and to aggregate Pressures.
Snall parties may content themselves with expressive functions, but no.party
can trope to eain decisivg influence on the affairs of a community without
roor"-Silingn@leavages to establish common fronts
with potential enemies and opponents- This was true at the early stage ol
ernbryonic party formations around cliques and clubs of notables and legis'
lators, but the need for such broad alliances became even more Pronounce(
with the extension of the rights of participation to new strata of the citizenry
No one has given us a more concise literary analysis of this Process o
aggregation during the early phase of mass mobilization than H. G. Wells i
The New MachiavelE:rr
. . . multitudinousness had always been the Liberal charactcristic. Lib-
' eralism never has been nor even can be anythiag but a diversified crowd.
Essentially it is the party of criticism, the "Anti" party. It is a system of
hostililies and objections that somehow achieves at times an elusive
commoo soul. lt is a gathering together of all the smaller interests which
find themselves at a disadvantage against the big established classes, the
leasehold tenant as agaiost the laodowner, the retail tradesman as agarnst
the merchant and money-lender, the Non-conformist as agair:st the
Churchman, the smaller employer as against the demoralising bospitable
publican, the man wilhout introductions and broad connections against
tbe man who has tbese tbings. , . . It has no more essential reason for lov-

6 ctravAcE srRucruREs, pARTy sysreMs, AND, vorER ALIGNMENTS
ing rlrc Q_c_l!!S!!.1-{t state than the Conservatives; the smaller dealer is
doomed to absorption in that just C mGh as tFeErge one; but it resorts
to the state agaibst its antagonists as in the middle ages common men
pittcd thansslves against the barons by siding wirh the king. The Liberal
Party is tho party ngalnst "class privilege" because it reprelents no class
advantages, but it is also the party that is on the whole most set against
Crllective control because it represents no established responsibility. It
is conslructive only as far as its antagonism to the great oivner is more
powerful than its jcalousy of the state. It organizes only because organ!
zation_is forced upon it by _the organization of its adversaries. It tipses
in and out of alliance with Labour as it sways between hostilitf to
wealth and hostility to public expcnditure. . . .
the main lines of cleavage are over morals and the nature of human destiny
than if they concern such mundane and negotiable matters as the prices of
commodities, the rights of debtors and creditors, wages and profits, and the
ownership of y. However, this does not take us very far; what we want
to know is u
will more salient than the
other, what k they have these
constellations of forces have had for consensus-building within the nationstate.
We do not prctend to find clear-cut ans\ryers, but we have tried to move
the analysis one step further. We shall start out with a review of a variety of
logicaltf possible s6urces of strains and oppositions in social structures and
shall then proceed to an inventory of the empirically extant examples ol polilical
expressions of each set of conflicls. We have not tried to present a com-
prehensive scheme of analysis in this context but would like to point to one
possible line of approa"h. ---
Dimensions ol Cleavagt A Possible Model /
The much-debated fourfold schemtr iiCvised by
,"t"",(.1-_}ror the
Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignrnents
classification of the functions of a social system ofiers a convenient Point
of
departure for an inventory of potential cleavage bases.
The four-function sche-me was originally developed in working Papers in
the Theory of Actionr2 and was derived -from a- g-ors:dassification*o,t-&ql*'
Aask illqmlrna *olBuq!!A!!oll*in*thc-roles-taken-hy actors in social systems:
Categorization of
situational objects
I. Universalism
v.l.
Particularism
II. Performance
vs.
QualitY
This abstract schema caqe to serve as a basiq*Pgggjgg-in a series of
successive attemDtsl3 to map-tbe-flgws-and thg-media of interc!41ge among
IEE iitotr uod th'e Jollcctiviiies within social syslemi oi w-'rtfiin total ieiitbrial
societies. The_gar-adigm.posite-d_four "fugctional subsystems" of every socie$r
and -six lines of interchange between each patr:
"%) )
/ lnstrumental i
z,
9Fo
o
f
o
5-A
f, AOrptiw #ReeuneMobiliation+
E Subsystem
:The EconomY
t\
l\
h\
'e E
5
* a/s,/
I"/
-D
Attitudes to obiects Cotresponding functions
for lhe system
III. Specificity ldaPtation
vt
Diffuseness Integration
IV. Afiectivity Goal attainment
vs.
Neutrality f,atencY: fjl:L""""
and tcnsion
release
Consummatory
\G,
dol
Atlainment
:The Polity
AE
=5
lntegntive
SubsYstem
:ThePublic,
"Commuhitica."
A!scialion!
i6 Pattem
5 Maintenance
€ :Householdq
Schools
-Loyalv.Solidarity,Commitnenl+
Figure l-fhe Porsonion Pnrodigrn of Societol lnferchonges.
I

Tllfes 0f llic$e s'ts of interchanges are of crucial concern to
rocioiogirt;
the political
Hc wanto to knowr how the, solidary
-cotecrivitics)
thc latent communalities
of interests and pro.sp'ects, and the ..1"it J-urrociatrbns and movemeuts
rnwith-
a trven territoriar society Iimit the arternatives and influence ttre oicirions ot
governmental leaders and their executive agencies-ther, ,.. .ti
interchange pro.rrr., ot
between the I ancl G subsvstef,s.li-
He wants to know how ready o,'horu reluctant individual subiects and
households in the society are to'be mobilizpd t", Lf ,ir" IH""r*, sociations
.r_
and movements and how they make up ""ti", their ininds in cus". ot
competition and conflict berween diffcrent mobiliziirg ;t;";i;;h;r"li" uu
questions about interchanges between the Z and I suisy"stems.
He is concerned finally to find out about regularities'in the bebavior of individu-al
subjects and households in their directlnterchanges (I t" C, C i f
;b;;;;;,
l
; i;s; ;"g"_
f*-,1"":=:lfl1l_"e"n"i"s of government, be it rauons' as taxDavers and,conscripted manpower, or ". as voters in instltutional_
ized elections^and consultations.^ '--r- --:
.However, our task in this vorume is narrower. we do not intend to dear
Y\,:ll the interchanges between f and G, Uitween I and L, or tetweenl ana
:l' we,aIe only concerned with the r-G interchanges insofar as thev press
T"*1.9.ue- de_velopment of syslerns ol competing-parties. We are i"_
terested in the r-z interchanges insofar as thdy treip'to ","ti
".tutti.t
iiit,rr'iii"*,
of membership, id.entificatioi, and readinessior hobitizatirn b"t*een siven
parties {f given categories of subjects and householi.. A"t;;-*J no,
rnterested tn au the z-c interchanges, bu.t onry in the ones that find expression
in electioTj utd in arrangemeritl ior tormil representation.
ln i:f.l of the \arsonian paradigr| our tasks are in foct fourfold:
I. we hrst have to examine the-fuyynal structure of the I quadrant in a
range of territorial societies: what cle;Gg-dsTaffiTdnifested therirselves in the
national community in the.early phases o"f consolidation, unJ *tui-"i.u*g",
R::g:^l^ii" -,h:,_r:bj.qu.:l! phis6s of ,cenrrarization *i g-*tur
eucsuons ot thls type will be dealr with in the next section. ""ono*t"
2.- next- 9lr job is to compare se4uencoJf t_C)aterchaaes_to trace
regularities in the processes of parly firmatiii. iTow did the inhiriteJ ctav-
$:r-_qg f"t1$cal,expression,
and Low did the territorial o.gu-oir"-tio" oi tl"
nahoo-state, the division of
.powers
between govcrnors andrepresentatives,
and thc broadening.of the riehts of participati"on and consultatibn affect the
oeveropment ot alliances. and oppositions iunong political tendencies and
movements and eventually produie a distincdvJ piarty system? euestions
alorg these lines will occuly us in the two succeediig ,6.ti6"r.- - -----
. 3'- 9uI third job is to iiudy the consequences of-these developments for
+" t-! -ilercttanges- which identities, which solidarities, which c^ommunali-
ties o{ experience and fate could be reinforced and made ur" oitu tt.
and..which ones had to be softened or ignored?
^.,ltlgiqg,parties
lVf,J." i"
the social structure did the parties.find it easiest to mobilEe stable support,
*1"-r-._
3od. d9 ,1,"y meet thi most impenetrabre barriers oi *r-pi"i*-"i{ ,"-
JectlonT we shall touch on these questions in the final section l6ut must refer
for details to the chapters on particular national party systems.
4. And our final task is to bring all these diverse data to bear on the
analysis- of the L-G interchanges in the operation ol elections and the recruitmenl
of reprcsenidli'es]]EItJw-f'tr do electoral distributions reflect structural
cleavages in the given societyi how is electoral behavior aftected by the narrowing
of alternatives brought about by the party system; and how far are the
efforts of indoctrination and mobilization hampered through the development
of a politically neutral electoral machinery, the formalizing and the standardization
of procedures, and the introduction of.secret voting?rg
Underlying this interpretation of the Parsonian scheme is a simple three-
_
phase model of the process of nation-building:
In the first phase the thrusts of penetration and standardization from the
national center increase territorial-resistances and raise'issues of cultural
identity. Robert E. Lee's "am I a Virginian or an American?" is a typical expression
of the G-L strains generated through the processes of nationbuilding.
In the second phase these local oppositions to centralization produce a
variety ol alliances across the communities of the nation: the commonalities
of family fates in the L quadrangle generate associations and organizations
in the 1 quadrangle. In some cases these alliances will pit one part of the
national territory agaiost another. This is typically the case in countries
where a number of counterestablishment loyalties converge: ethnicity, re-
Iigio:r, and class in Ireland under thi raj, l'anguage and 6lass in Beigium,
Finland, Spain, and Canada. In other cases tbe alliances will tend to spread
throughout the nation and pit opponents against each other in all localities.
In the third phase the elliances in the I quadrangle will enter the G
quadrangle and gain some measure of control, not only over the use of
cettral national resources (O-z{ interchanges) but also over the channeling
of the flows of legitimation from L to G. This may find expression in franchise
reforms, in changes in the procedures of registration and polling, in new
rules of electoral aggregation, and in extensions of the domains of legislative
intervention.
This model can be developed in several directions. We have chosen to
focus initial attention on the possible differentiations within the .l quadrangle-the
locus for the formation of parties and party constellations in
mass democracies.
DIMENSIONS OF CLEAVAGE
AND ALLIANCE
for the explanation
level-by-level procedure of analysis bears essentially on the emergence of
single manifestations and offers no direct clues to the @
parison of s)stems of s:gal agygtents1ud political parties within historically

J CTTAVEGE STRUCTUNES, PARTY SYSTEMS, AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS
rven socletieg. we cannot hope to fil this lacuna in the theoretical literature
:*+#,',",'*s^ff i,",ffi +1,""i';;ujltt*i*ff :il;rff 'lf,
.utrcat :[
expressto's can be ordered within the two_dimensiodi;p.;;
:ated by the two diagonals of ;;;_
the double A.t otorny,.
n
s
1:
U
lnteresl- t
Seccitic i
Oppositions
I
fdernrl.Consumftrlory
Opporiti6r Within
Nsh'od E laulsh€d Etllr
8r
pt ^t ll
{l
L I .0;
Zt \b
ot
- rt E
C16s.ticel
rdeorogiat 5
-";";?ffl'....----*;'
Afit/ - oPnositiorc n -- -'- --
5
bi .s
E
€l
LI
ll
.ll . r*ro ', 5 !tur

,tu,J r! lll t' ,'l I;l r||| ,l' ,lt ;t r,l t it :;'J't t :t
1? CLTJP-\'AqF ITRUCTUNES, I'ARTY SYSTEMS, AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS
purcl) territorial oppositions rarcly survive /ive extensions of the su suffrage.
jvluelr -relr will tlcpend, dcpend, of of iixlrse, cotlrse, on the timing of of the the crucial crucial stePs stePs in in the the buildbuilcliflgirg of the nation: territoriai unifis61isn, the estab]ishment of legitimate gov-
eriment and the monopolization of the agencies of violence, the takeoft
toward industialization and economic growth, the development of popular
education, and the entry of the lower classes into organized politics. !u.ly-,democratizarioo
ryiu nar. $e_sessardy ce[eJ-qlg 9!gg-cu1 -dr{si9113n$_"9q9l3i_-.
n b;-an aCaEntiia-
lines. The initial result of a yid-gqing of-fbejuflie]
tion of the contrasts betrveen the the urban centers and
between the orthodox-fundam€ntalist of the peaiantry' end*tlte- smalltown
citizens and the secularism fostered in the larger cities and the metropolis..In
the Uniied_ State$, the g!"9_Y3ggs-y:|.9*lfE"c,aug_cuuy-I1l-3lrg 1eldojg,
The'struggles between the Jefferi

14 cLEAvAcE srRucruREs, pARTy sysrEMs, AND vorER ALTcNMENTs
the trink of disrrrption but left an intractable heritage of territorial-cultural
eonf,lct; tbe Catafin-Baeque-Castilian oppositions in"Spain, the conflict betwoen
Flemings and lValloons in Belgium, and the English-French cleavages
in Canada. _The conditiqgs_for_.the_s.ofienmg*oriadgr, ng*gt*Sgch-cle_ey3ge
lines in tully mo6ilr-zeAl6fities have Ueen po6rg stri&E$e miiifrpie ffireligious
cleavages of Switzerland and the language bonfl.icts in Finland and
Norway have proved much more manageable than the recently aggravated
conflict between Nederland,s-speakers and francophones in Belgium and between
Cuebec and the English-speaking provinces of Canada.
To account for such variations we clearly cannot proceed cleavage by
cleavage but must analyzegtWcllations of conflict lines within each polity.
To account for the vfiations h such constellatious we have found it
illuminating to distinguish-]ii u/ crl'tical lines ol cleavage:
Economy a t lntegntlon
t
L6lily,Hd$hdd
Figure 3-Suggesfed locotions ol Four Critical
Clecvoges in lfte o-g-i-l Porcdigm.
tween the the (3) :
the conflict on the one side and tenants,
I ab o r e r s, an d w o r k e r s -6ii4e 6-thei-f4 ):

Plarcw*t.qf,fush s"d-c14 hal for close to a century been divide{U!9-.Q[-ee.national-liberal-secular,
-jgt!9$u\Eaq+S:=thi frriquentfiretened to as thentssmcd*
thg. "g6flefal" sector; the orrhodox proiestani column; aud t}te
Rornan ettholio columrr,!s
Tho orthodox Protostsnt eolumn developed through a series of violent
conflicts over doctrinal irsusr withlq the es^tablished "National church. The
Nederland,s Hervormdc Xe,,* earnc eaw pressure in the decades after
Ae Eglch Bgygbtjon--and tho l.iapoleonic uifr"avai-With the spread of
gggglS5is;q lggutadsm and ratio2alism, I{ggCI:lL the tho fuodirmentelists-were fuodamentelists-were rdameDtelists were increasinslv iincreasingly
ouih"d pushed itrto into
a minority position, both
within the the Church Church and and in in the field bf education.
originally, fhe orthodox protests against these developmeots restricted themselves
to intellectual evangelical movements within the Establishment and to
an isolationist walkout of pietistic lower-class elements in the separation
(Alscheiding) of 1843. But from the 1860's onward, the movement ichieved
massive momentum under the organizational inspiration of Abraham Kuyper.
This fundamentalist clergyqal organized an hnti-school-Law Leagriri in
1872 and in 1879 succeeded in bringing together a variety of orihodox
groups in a party explicitly directed againsl the ideas of the French Revolution,
the Anti-Revolutionary party. This vigorous mass movement soon
split up, however, over issuei ol doctrine ind of cultural identification.
Kuyper led his followers out of the Mother church in 1gg6 and defended the
rights of the Kerkvolk, the committed calvinist christians, to establish their
own cultural_community, free of any ties to the state and the nation, The very
extremism of this anti-cstablishment posture produced several countermovements
within the Hervormde Kerk. Impo*an[ groups of orthodox Calvinists
did not want to leave the Mother Ciurch but wanted to reform it from
within; they wanted a broad Volkskerk rather than an isolated Kerkvolk.Tha
conflict between these two conceptions of the Christian community led to the
breakup of the Anti-Revolutionary party in 1894 and the graduai formarion
of second Calvinist _a party, the Clvistian Historical (Jnion, formally cousolidated
in 1908. These two parties became the core organizations of tle two
wings of the orthodox Protestant front in Dutch society: the Anti-Revolutionaries
deriving tleir essential strength trom Gereformeerden, whether iu
separate dissenter churches or io Hervormde congregations controlled by
cprgymgl of the same persuasion; the Christian Historicals deriving practically
all their support from other orthodox segments within the M6ttrer
Church.
The Roman Catholic minority had at first found it to their advantage to
work with the Liberal majority, but from tle sixties onward took steps to
form distinct aqd social organizations. This was a
-political
slow pr6cess,
however; the first federation of Catholic voters' associations was not-formed
until 1904 and a formally organized natioual party was not established until
tho lwenties.20
,Both the ?rotestant and the Catholic movements eventually developed
l{gc retworks of associations-and-institutions for their members and were
abfg-to establish remarkably stable biFs ofTnpp

18 cLEAvAcE srRucruREs, pARTy sysrEMs, AND vorER ALIGNMENT'
:iuf i:':":'#:l?1,::[Sg##:*,r:,.ro.toverzuirins.Ananarysis
fff t$:11tffi ijruj*".iotr,Jrdaffi ,.,ffi Hffi mJou,ft *,1
r"t.i.ii,'iii,i:ii,i,H'ui'll,'.ilar,#:1T_eT.;:il;f
many examples of t.li,f highry iUlt:Ul*
ideorogizeJ
burghers' p"rr! oppo.sitions
cbnflicts beiween to officia,s
*ort?., and
etemenrs of economic_
have always
b".qgi;;l'', "r,f,"i",iproyr;,
"oot"io.d
^ilJiit.r,i* ;;;-"fr; rt.#"r*oog
elements of curtural oppo!itior.'lJra?"i"i."1 ins,lation. -wo.iling-"tu*
parties in opposition rid ;til; p";;ilffi -tended to be more virzuitd.,
fi :::,r##,H, ji,!l-:iry*T'Hi3J*""Tg;,1T#$Hi"ds:*
to become ofizuild., 6om6sticatea,
*f,f,i, r;;"';;;'
,-t" to influence from all segments
"riil""l,r.1f"r"
$mjlar variations wi''occur-at.a wide range of points on the territotiar
-axis-of orEFfrEDia--T' ou. irritiu aii"rri* ,i'it " I pore we gave examnriioF
cutturat and re ti e iois,::rf;;;; -ii" "i#i"rrion of the centrar national
elite'-but such oipositions are not arways purery tertitoriar. The movements
may be completerv dominant in theii prJv;ri"i"i .t.ongt otds but may also find
#"8#.'i:;;Hr1;:*-ti.d;'"fi
;ifi ['t",#;;;;;h-#L"-
- 'Ihe opposition of the ord Left in Norway-was essentially of this character.
It was from rhe outset
"_*ou"rn"oi Jii"in"g42rotest against the dom-
i n a nce of the ccn trar i t" ; f riffi "r " ffi # i into ans
a mass
t-u
movement
r3ra:air;ry-Eio aden ed
the suffrage 9r-*li"Jfri;fi#T;" dominlant
was extended urbin strata. As
abte to entrench ";;-;"-t#;#il;;" efforts
itself
proceeded
in th" it was arso
;*trJ';d[i1t'"uun gain contror in sorne of
them'ss rhis vcrv broarrening
"tlr* *."i*",irt"o" vulnerable to fiaementariol fi" ora L"tt in"*xi"gry
g^* itself up as an Apiaria".y?rty $;".m"oil,toward rhe a pote and set
f S in F'il,il pole
onJtf,..
and after
wing
ironp moved
rrilory.o.t toward the j
itself
.tr"if,r
as tir,iithe tbe Christfan
mother partv estabrished
y",iptri p-A; ii"in !ig. sl. TLe Scandinavian
ffi:$:',:"H"'::i:*l r"rmation- J JenJ,ur'lu"r, -o,"."iir,-"'*!"ili'iini",
'',b.*u;;"ilffi
q,riigiffi1lT.iil';f '::lHTf,**rt"",."Hlil
posed nationar education a. ,u"h *o of rr""r'i"i functional built
organizations
up extensive networks
around ttreir roitoJerr; tirry'nro" -u..n
concefnc i to defend the 6*atry
.traditions - or or-irroaoi evangelism againsf the on-
*ilf;ix,$
*i'-to"^#"iil"i"gi,r.ii".
ii'?ft ,:::J?'i'*
-."iii;"
""L."u,iu"
qtr,"i,i";"",i;;;;;",,ff :f;j,,lhi"J':,Lilg**#,:l*;;li*"**#"lit;
Church they resemblu tt
"
norionf;;i#'ttreat Britain and the And_
Revolutionaries in the Netherlands,-;;'rh"
";;;ts of their eftorts very different. rn the
have been
"lfr-l_"-l!; {il ;;it-d,T activists courd work wjrtun
13""kin"i lr:fr",:T1e1or course, also wittin Labour) *Jt"""j ji^pJrfur"
ffl,tllx#ti*i*tltur*9";"rut**"r*;l;--*f I
The National Revolution"foiil-;;#,i;ing ci.cres of the tenirorial
Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Ahgnmenrs
population to chose sides in conflicts over vahtes and cultural identities. The
Industrial Revolution also triggered a variety of cultural countermovements,
but in the longer run tended to cut across the value communities within the
nation and to force the enfranchised citizenry to choose sides in terms of their
economic interests, their shares in the increased wealth generated through
the spread of the new technologies and the widening markets.
In our a-g-+-/ paradigm we have distinguished two types of such interest
cleavages: cleavages between rural and urban interests (3) and cleavages between
worker and employer interests (4).
TheSgerlac_ulargr,gpth of -world trade and industrial production generated
-inc5,qfifuItriins,b-eurililttlJfrimary piiiinCui-in the countrysidJ and the
merchants and the entrepreneurs in the towns and the cities. On the continent,
the conflicting interests of the rural and the urban areas had been recognized
since the Middle Ages in the separate rcpresentation of the estates: the
nobility and, in exceltional c"s"r,'th" freehttd peasants spoke for the land,
and the burghers spoke for the cities. The Industrial Revolution deepened
these conflicts and in country after country produced distinct rural-urban
alignments in the national legislatures. Often the old divisions between
estates were simply carried over into the unified parliaments and found expression
in oppositions between Consewative-Agiarian and Liberal-Radical
parties. The conflicts between rural and urban interests had been much less
marked in Great Britain than on the continent. The House of Commons rvas
not an assembly of the burgher estate but a body of legislators representing
the constituent localities of the realm, the couuties and the boroughs.3o Yet
even there the Industrial Revolution produced deep and bitter cleavages between
the landed interests and the urban; in England, if not in Wales and
Scotland, the opposition between Conservatives and Libcrals fed largely on
these strains until the 1880's.36
There was a hard core of economic conflict in these oppositions, but:uhal
.made them so deep and bitter was the struggle for,fhe-saintenance of acquiiettl-sratusandfirec@oTaEEGvffiEt.(frEngblgJhelqgg{efiQ.mled
the country, and thi rising class of inAustrill-erftifirenefirs, m-any of*l
them religiously at odds with the established church, for decades aligned
themselves in opposition both to defend their economic interests and to assert
their claims to status. It would be a misunderstanding, says the historian
George Kitson Clark,"t to think'of agriculture "as an industry organized like
any other industry-primarily for the puqposes of efficient production. ^lt was
. . . rather organiZed to ensute the survival intact ol a caste. The proprietorS
of the great,estates were not just very rich men whose capital happened to be
invested in land, they wcre rather the life tenants of very considErable positions
which it was their duty to leave intact to their successors. In a way it
was the estate that mattered and not the holder of the estate. . . ." !hc^-qqtt_
-4ie++€t\ueen-Cqrervatives and Liberals reflected an opposition between two
y,alue orientations n-
nections versus the claims for status throu$h achievement and entcrprise,
. These are typical strains in all transitional-societies; they tend to be most
intensive in the early phases of industrialization and to soften as the rising
elite establishes itself in the community. In England, this process of reconciliation
proceeded quite rapidly. In a society open to extensive mobility and

A similar
ur'AvAcE srR'cruREs' penrv-svsEuv effi vFr'n-lridr.rr"ryrvrS- - -
llrti'3.T#St:"':3ffifXo industrial wealth could ggdu-atry be translated into
a'd more mersers ,.^u,l,.1l1olllinat aierarchy. and m ori mersers,"Lt'pr of" the I"riafi r"*i:lr:L]i,i.."
i
terests' ""-i'"iffi ;tr:!{f,ir..l# and this consoridalion
HTt?T,1n;,yu:
"r tr," ".iiJ""rTriil ,oo' changed the character
of the conservadve-Liherar dfl*r. ;;;;.r'"i..r"1"J r,r!--r,Ji*" ifri""eh
his detailed ecorogical ,rrai"r,.th"
countryside oo.**.*
and ,te business
tre suburbs
owners
hi"t "t into the
*o them into ttt".'r."ot,,n"i.
close relation. *o;i..;;;; trl-ugn,
:,* lt{i_*q;t'r: jlh". r".ur; ;;; ;;;;tffi ot
li:?:Til-"\1il"::T,.T;:#""y'i"*.if ?iJf ioyincreasing"ru,,-ptr*?"_
g'"siii13
n ifi c an trv, rhe bu r k or r r,
", iiu-"i"r' #;;r#d'kT "Hffixr,i,:J :l5HH
fJ,,i:;i'l"H"T'.-T"i*iT-;i*i1*i":,li$:s.inthcwaytheBritish
parg did durine rhe
";ioJ ;p;;'ff;o" of the chasm #"f b"etw"ri il. *Jil uurgnJ.s-aod #r",H#J*';l
*"-*"rland tempts to bridge
a variety
it thtougfapp..Irl";;;i of desperite at-
and miritary varues.io
.;,;,i h
i." ::,1':J ll "^ ""ii,:.f "';p.;-;;"";;ent the * i,r-',!,i creavage
uuttr*'poiitiffi #,:i":,liili:i,r":i,["j j:1, jo,i,,ff
on the concentratioirs orrveatitr ililttl".: ,*,il1ilr."T3::,i;
ownership structure
Jontrol in the
i". cities tl" and.on the
Itaty, and Spai:r. 'ui^il-""ffi;.'t; tn" ro* rural_urp; iouiiiiJ,-nion.",
;]g;;4.-;'
the i#i),'i;""J'd#.ffi;ri,o","
developnient of oarty oppositions.'o,t.r?.uu"g.s,
the srate and the particularly between
"frur.i_r';Jil;;;';*;r, and tenanrs, had greater
rmpact on the alignm"op gf .tfre etectomi.i"Ay "or,rr"st, in the five frordic
countres the ciries had trad.itionary ;;;;;;;#nationar poritical life, and tbe
struggle for democracv and parliailr;;;"ry;.was^ triggered off through a
broad process of mobitizarior';A; ffif.uiilrry.,, Ttiii was essentialy an
expression of protest against tr" *"rr"rrJit"it"om.i.,, ""a p"ni.i"", t"
:l'^1^"9: "" ttri'e. fs 1+, t" ;; ;;il,"'dir",',n"r" were arso^elemenrs or
:::il:ffi ifl ':il,'?f, i"*T"_*,:il:'#:#?Ttli:[",Ti;#ffi f,ff
urban economiei' These cconomic "t""uugr-b..ame more and moie pro-
nounced as the primaty-p*d:ii"g
"i-*ltiiti! entered m-oney aod mark6t into
econbi'ry. the national
Th";"r"h;;; ot rnterest organizations ii" to..ution of
ood
a broad front
Agrarian parties- "oop".utii.r;;1!g deveropment
Even after of distinctive
tr,"'.ir"
domrnance' oi-ttlroitiog-"luss
these Asrarian
parries to
parties
nationar
aio-rot
mon fronts with
nni^it possible'to
thetouseri,ative estabrish cou_
d"i;"r;;r?thc cuttural contrasts business
between
community.
tn. .ouot
The
the strict vlfri"ili;
market contrors ;;;;J';;lr?''^ 1"- l'u"s were.strll strong, and
::trff iHwi,h,heu5i'ry';;LliiT,dtiltffi i"::f $l;*t'i*
".ffi #:id: cleavages at #lTlfl the levcr "lTf#,i,j;i-ff
"**-
of ivorrd ..ono*y.TrrJ?n*.."
a long time seen the
Communists .t.ysglt have ;;-A;;;6i for
in these terms:
nations
as of
a nghttT
Asia and Africa
the Gilfi':;l?"st the city interests. As Lin
EferfrgeVfUil''rerlto-er,e._--_ _ ___ _ _ _ _ !
Piao put it in a recent policy statement: "The countryside, anaine i*"6- - - - - - -
side alone, can offer thi revolutionary bases from which the Revolution can
go forward to final victory, . . . Iq a sense, the contemporary world revolution
also-presents the picture of the encirclement of the cities by the rural areas.""
'The conflict between landed and urban iuterests was centered in the conmodrit-marketjfi
G.sonts w"tiiea to Gtt tleii-ruaies-af ttreTest pofruli
ffi-s-dnftofiy whit they necded from the indu'striat and urban p-duc.rs
i4lowcost.Su;d;o;ni;Gitrilnotin-variablyptovepmty6rmlng.Tfi eyconld-bd
dealt with within broa[parqy-fronts,or could be channeled through intsrest
organizations into rifrowir irenas of functional represetrtation"and bargaining.
Distinctly agrarian parties have only emerged where strong cultural
oppositions have deepened and embittered the strictly economic conflicts.
Conflicts n the lqbor lnar&et_ prs94 much_ aqoft,_ _gnitgugll {ivpive.
Working-class partiis emerged in &ery country of-Euiope in the wekt-of
the early rvaves of industrialization. The rising masses of wage earners,
whether in large-scale farming, itr forestry, or in industry, resented their conditions
of work and the insecurity of their contracts, and many of them felt
socially and culturally alienated from the owners aud the employers. The
result was the formation of a variety of labor unioos and the development of
nationwide Socialist parties. The success of such movements depended on a
variety of factors: the strength of the patemalist traditions of asciiptive recogoition
of the worker status, t}re size of the work unit and the local ties of the
workers, the level of prosperity and the stability of employment in the given
industry, and the chances of improvements and promotion through loyal
devotion or through education and achievement.
A crucial factor in the developlgg4ltsfutlglaqlworking-class movements
wa{the ofE:ruiess-of-th-$ven Codiety: Was the *ork& st;tus a lifetime predicament
or were there openings for advancement? How easy was it to g€t ar
education qualifyiog for a change in status? What prospects were there for
striking out on one's own, for estabtshing iudependent work units? The conrrasts
between American aad European developments must clearly be analyzed
in these terms; the American workers were not only given the vote
much earlier than their couuades in Europe; but they also found their way
into the national system so much more easily because of ttre greater stress on
equality and achievement, because of the many openings to better education,
aud, last but not least, because the established workers could advance to
better positions as n€w waves of immigrants took over the lower-status
jobs.t'! A similar process is currently under way in the advanced countries
of Western Europe. The immigrant proletariats from the Mcditerranean
countries and ftom the West Indies allow the children of the established
national working class to move into the middle class, and these nel waves of
mobility tend to drain off traditional sources of resentment.
In nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe the status barriers were
markedly higher. The traditions from the estate-divided society kept the
workers in their place, and the narrowness of the educational channels of
mobility also made it difficult for sons and daughters to rise above their
fathers. There were, however, important variations among the countries ot
Europe io the attirudes of the established and the rising elites to the claims
of the workers, and these difierences clearly affected the development of the
',,- (p;

22 cLEAvAcE srRucruREs' pARTy sysrEMs, AND vorER ALIGNI'ENT' Cleavage Structures, Pafiy Sysrcms, utu,L r \rtLt !^..6,.,..,...
tlnio6g 11L4 the Soeialist parties. In Britain and the scandinavian countries
tits ititjl+deFef the elites tended to be ooen a
-?om-trrec tiiu* w"i #';e ;;"i;i"; ; ;f, """.ff'Fiff#g' ft:.t ;ll, iiLi:
or no direct reDression.-Trresc are toa"y-li.'.ountries with the larpest and
the most domeiticated r.il"i:prrii.rll#;.;
I'::::_l;,r,'*j :;;" tn" ."rL*u!"s - --' -"arlffi
rempts werc made to ."p..*'ih" unffi
""d'iii n.it "r
##fffil:ffi;r:ti**,::,
ilH:H'iH",l'J"" j":J:l*"y:':,Tl*::-:l_il;l'ffi "?,'.""iilki"-
uucnces rrom tne encompassing social environq..ntr. _$j.?l* rl_gd_pglg:
-djgn'1nese parf;.w9re i".t+i-*4" ir'"-i^i"r" as their opponents in tbe
:.#"j: j?:p:,ll':._i{-'y@'l.lir"55"li;':;",o_
pean working crass was broirght t" . lrrlhe
Revolution'
aftermath
the communist"-ou"-"oi.JJ "ri-u" of the Russian
il just
stratum
speak
of the
for an alienated
territoriar community but
conspiracy to be seen
against
as
"urn.
an external
the nation. Th"i, J*.il;;ents brought
European a countries
numbcr of
to the p-oint of civil war i'n
The
the twentie!
greater anJ
the ,f,i',ii.,i*.
numbers dr i"- sucr,
"itir"n. ""dh; oir"cl.i;;;:f;r'"pi:rili:"t
to each other the greatcr ti," a"i!". .t total disruptio" tr," u"ay
"i
-;3i1#"ffi *1,"'1ff:"*"*u"Il'^ll.B:p:iit*ggug{lreductionor
such.pitched olpoqitinns a.d
ment from
lof
the i toward the
tening of IlCafoSj €€fcis-i6nffi,e:
n
contributed A variety
to ihis
of factors
Oevel,opmenl thE
werKrngs&lss and the Oour*"ojg.,
the entrenchmenaoT.Ec ffiEfng-cr;;-iiii"i n locar and nationar'porrrn_
mentar structures and their consique.nt ,rdoo,oti.uii-#;
system' The deverooments in Auitria on". "rirri"iii!'Jrlu"u'riri,ra
"
f*ti""r".rrt;;;;ili"..rrpr".
T" ..",..:T: opposition be;; s;;rl;rl, .'o5"corr,olics
war in 1934,
had
but
endld
after
in civil
the experienc" oi Nution.r-socialist
and occupation,
domination,
the
war,
two partits ,"ttl;J;;;io shar"
bilities
government
under responsi-
a Proporz iystem, a settlement still bascd
between the
on mutual
two distrust
camos dut
coexistence'{' "t'r.rti-oiJ'i'tot".."ogoi"ed the necessity
comparisons for
gf the positiont'rot.n by the
munrst parries
two leadins in western. tom-
Europej the Italian
to the impjrtanre *i',r,"-e,r"i.r,,'rir3
of entrenchmeuts r"
i","a
-th; national system of goiern-
:til.3:^l."n"lt p*y has been o'u"nl"r, iiuolved
corrmunrtres
in the runninp
and dr locar
bas rcmained much more isolalJ- ;hil;;"
"'"i"rrr
system, while the Itarian party.has responded much morc ay*.i"u'i exigencics of communitv tlrtrc
decision_maki"c.; E;i'i arroroi t r,,
onstrated l]o;ffirly
the importani'e ;"or-
or rirnir". r""'to"o in"olo,np".^on
porarization
of revers of crass
in tlie Nordic .ouotiG. u"-;;;il;* that
of
while-the
rvorking-class percentage
voters siding with- tn. rlrt rl".munlsts and
crats) is
social Demo_
louFlrly
the same in Finland irr'Nor*oy and sweden,
"t the pcrcentage
of middle-crass leftists used ro be muchlowJr i" ri"r""Jt#iri'rr,"
W__
lallllaalarlllllaaaalaaaaaaaaaaaa-aaaa---_-
trvo other countries. This difterence apPears to be related to a contrast in thc
chances of upward mobility from the working class: very low in Finland,
markcdly higher in the other countries.a? The continued isolation of the Finnish
working-class parties may reflect a lower level of participation in responsible
decision-making in the local communities and in thc nation. This
his not yet been investigated in detail, but studies of working class mobility
and political changes carried out in Norway{8 suggest that the principal channels
of advancement were in the public sector and that the decisive rvave of
"bourgeoisification" came in the wake of the accession of the Labor party to
a position of dominance in the system. In Finland the protractcd period of
underground Communism until 1944 and the deep split in the working-class
movement during the next decades tended to keep the two parties from
decisive influence on the public sector and maintained the old barriers against
mobility; in the othcr Scandinavian countries the victories of the Social
Dcmocrat Labor partics had opened up new channels of mobility and helped
to break down the isolation of the working class.
Cleavages in Fully Mobilized Polities
7 The four critical cleavages described in terms of our paradigm were all
{movements of protcst against the established national elite and {s cql-tqral
\tandards and were parts of a broad wave of emancipation and mobilization.
Qgite difleient^typx of piofest allgnments have'Gndeil to-occurin - -
. lully mglilQetl nation states. It these the focus of protest has no longer been
the traditional iiinTrdt etftme but the rising networks of new elites, such as
the leaders of the nerv large bureaucracies of industry and government, those
who control the various sectors of the communications industry, the heads of
mass organizations, the leaders in some countries of oncc weak or lorv-status
minority ethnic or religious groups, and the like. Protest against these nerv
elites and the institutions which foster them has often taken "anti-systiff -
form, thoirgtr-fte-ideology-has variedJnrm-corintry to EounTqn Fasii5m in----
Italy, National Socialism in Germany, Poujadism in France, "radical rightism"
in thc United States. In our paradigm sueb- Drotest movements rvould cut
across the territorial axis very'near jn: f 0".$ + .*na, is no longeib"- (i -''
tween consiituent-territorAl irnits oF the- niiition, but between differeit conceptions
of the constitution and the organization of the national polity. These
have all been nationali.rt movements: they not only accept, they venerate thc
historically given nation and its culture, but they_lgjqe! the sptem of dejisionmaking
and cgntrol *v9toP94 through tlre process of demociEtic moEilEa--=tionEndbargaining.
pheir aim is not just to gain recognition for a particular
set of interests withi$q pluralist system of give and take-but_tlr:epJasclhir
system by more authoritarian procedures of allocation.
In one way or another they q-ll ex.press_-dggp_ll&lt coqyic-tlo4g about the
ldestiny and the mission of the nation, some quite inchoate, others highly
systerhatized; and they all endeavor to develop netrvorks of organizations to
keep their supporters loyal to the cause. They aim at Vuryiling but want
only one column in the nation.
In our therefore, fg-t lsclyma,
a fully verzttild nationalist movement

-ee'--r-'-tOltlt!
21 cLEAvAGE srRucruREs, pARTy sYsrEMs, AND vorlR ALIGNMENTS
would have to be placed at thQ g-i intersection outsidc what we might catl.the
"cornpetitivepolitics"diamond:
Functiooa[
Corporatism:
Nationwido
lnleresl
Bargaining
Commu@l
Federalism
1,,
d
Nationalist
-:.- : Totalitariaism:
--- - - - --l-
- - - - - - -Z\-- - - - --l
l'"'*x'
i/
! ^,/ \..
\i
r
I ot'*sition to "systrn" \
,1
i\ /i
I
t\ **\tocen'fatcutt!?a
j
j
L _ _ _ _ _ __V_ _ _____ _ j rr"ountist
I
Totalitarbnism
Figure 4-J,tggested locolions of Four "Exfremes"
in the o-g-i-l Schemo.
In its early varieties such nationalist movements essentially reflected the
reactions of the lower-class strata of the dominarlt culture against the rising
tides ot mobilization within subject populations.,trn HapsburgAustria the rise -
of thelintransigerit Pan-Germans wis -decisivef riicelerated-through the alliance
between-the'university Burschercchalten and Schdnerer's nationalist
workers' associations; these essentially recruited support among Germanspeaking
craftsmen and workers threatened by the invasion of Czechs into
the new centers of industry.{o fne.renophoha_oJ-thp,AU-q!-rlan-workiog-clas+
Brove{ contagious. There are clear hjstorical hnks between the early workingclass
nationalism of the eiglrties and nineties and the National Socialist movement
after the dcfeat in 19l8."o Hitler inherited his hatred of the Slavs and
the Jews from the Austrian rvorking-class nationalists. In our terminology, the
Nlgoq"al Secialisl movement was an alliance at thp-g pnl of the_terlilolal- .gglqfgF"$
the counterpart within the damusxtateLanal culture to an ? ljp:
pi-sitioi-*ii6in some sub'l"crp9pCbli9n-eLlhe periphery.
---A-vatiety-of-aftempts have been r4ade-qo determine the conditions for the
emergence of such conflicts at the t
pole,of the political system. Contrasts
in the continuity and regularity of nafion-building have certainly counted.
Austria. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the United States lrave all gono
tlgough extremely painful crises of nation-building and have still to contend
with legacics of conflicts over national integration. Ralf Dahrendorf has re-
:cntly interpreted the rise of Natlo_nal Socialism as the final breakthrough
.oward political ruqdernization in-_German;6-It broke dcirvn the local pockets
rf insulati.-n and established "die traditionilreie Gleichheit der Ausgangsstelung
aller Menschen," an achievement-oriented society unfettered by diffuse
:
.
!-
u.eotfaflSrarSlSltr
Cleavage StructuresrPart) Slslens' anclVoter Alignrnents
statusbarriers."}/Thestatisticalhistoriesofanumberof..anti-system''moveurents
of.tbrs tyPe sugges;;tiirttf *"0" thcir greatest clectoral-gains through
appeals to th9 "Seinp d;,';1d"'^il"t"0..'ykt citizen" threatened by the
risc of strong .oo ,o*p'ffi'orpoi.tioor within a pluralist body politic' The
"small man" came out ;;;;;li;gtbtitt" g',tut inancial interests' the coroorations,
and the entrenched'buieaucracies bui also Cgql*t q".poYT d
in,i iilii'Jr,Jr, ,ti"-tr.o" ioilo', uoa th9 9::P*il5ffi.:lt*;5ry"{_--
6;;-;fiio"i or ts3a, te32' and
-19.33 1
.
decisive thiudt of mass ;;#;;; tle llutionar socialits cameiom owners-'
of,-uuall and medium.i##iHt:ld .idt-t*' shopkeepers' and other
independeuts in the towei"iJn;I"f ,Uifiiiaie cf"si- ui6fO'th-em Protestants'
all of them in morc tll"il?"'""ppotiil"t t" the siant cartels aod the flnancial
networks, to the'"irt*, "' tl" foitia"ainC
"o'dto PTTi :t^i+"ti"
orsanizarions around,ii'"iihr"ii.ri"Si-if"r -"fisnmEns have been
-documJnted
for Italy, N"J;;, iiL"l",'r"a rue united'States. There are obvious
contextual variations, ;,ii tf;fr;et;t; iugg.rt i-portant.invariances in the
qonditions for the growh oi such "aiti-syiiem" movements's3
/ We have come to the end of a cursory review of th"' Sp&{ c-leavases
I eenerated in Western polities during the'e-arfy"ffi4t"q;A=**Ogf"-
\-*O tt" Iater--glq;eq of suff:ag9..-extenso fdl6mtio"a-growth' We
\ave proceeded uy wali'oilx"niprin"uao" yu"t tn"i rigorous developmental
comparison. Ou, pu#o'" f'"' i'ot been to g"" * eibaustive accllnt-g!differences
*a ,i.it^[l"e"t ffitil Ut*"1'p o"t tt qPrT tLg:tentialities
of a-scheiiie-of "fi;;in;;-;i"it"i4n.lry". centg!-c9.19ep.ts i! current.'
$;!d6:;i;;:;ffi lf i;*mf:5,lffi ffi ::",T;tln"?:lTT;
!4!g'j-
Hfi ffi l?l.; ffi '1,-"1;"ft g ffi @
-"ffif##r* shortcomings of the empirical applications, we feel confident
that the Parsonian A-G-I-f-schema gtn"t'iti a set of aoalyical tools of
"uo
great value io c"vetopinentl of political systems' We have no
"ffitit"nJ
doub! deparreo iSiL**p";;t;;;;-,he
"" slandard iiterpretations of the
aarsonian -oo.r "niplr;afir-i."" "i.rence to it in transforming it into a
i rwo_dimensionrr ,yriJ"oi-5o"iao^t"i. To us this is of minor importance'
tilil"#;'*Plt;G;;il!i""r t"rt91"-1t^a sprinsboard for atr attemPt to
brins som€ order into the comparative analysiis'
"f" til-l-tlllfal developmenis.
we might no doubt hai'e come uP "*itn u very sin{alpgl#l*without
recoul'se .'irtJ p*t"J"l -1gel' but fris*ee3@{ffi
"s1e
'Hil+ili##gni*;iffi F,ffim
:;it#16pilil; ilh iEp;r_.r,e fields as the family, the professions, re-
lision, and politics ;*-1"'dk-Pt"tise definite pavoffs in the-future'
-Our
use of the Parsonian categories novel in twd respects' First of all we
is
rr"#,r#ineffio;;;;odirderinto-ttrecomparali*q*alalvsllof con'
flicts, cleavag", oniTpfiotlif,Jnt: thi"k *e hav6 shown that thev do not
Y"
ilCf maptl3r". rOatrtg4$r4 Lt gtg^"ntt of v iable soci al systems and
eeu5*rr*urqes*af'dissgulUbrigqind (
\. __. --,
in"";;-&ui";.t"";';;;;anoinafi tpll,l*p'##l*-H#kt-
25
lrlu'

26 cLEAvAGE srRucruREs, pAnry sysrEMS, AND vorER ALIGNMENTS
tllr l:ategorlos for purposcs of disrrncfly developmenral analysis. IVe have
el,9yL!;-yj!t!eg9_qi!crn be trinsforfredlnto
a mof,e1 of-atcF--4r-step shif6 -o-Ldaublci!ls!9!9!!!9!_ggn in cleavage-dimfiiions,Tiom I to i, from i to a,
and from i or_ilgiward n.
-'-We-are aware ttrat rom" of these innovations may prove to be purely
terminological. We hope to show in our further development of these lines of
-
analysis that they open up possibilities of direct gains in the intellectual con-
tJol of the vast masses of information about party developments across the
6ountries of the world.
THE TRANSFORMATION O['
C-LEAVAGE STRUCTURES INTO
PAfu*.|-
Condilions lor the Channeling ol Opposition
hus far, we have focused on the emergence of one cleavape at a time and
only incidentalty incidentally concerned ourselue ourselves wfihfh'e growth of clpnvoge sy.ctery.<
and their translations into constellations of political parties. In terms of our
schema we have limited ourselves to the analysis of the internal d.ifierentiations
of. tlre 1 quadrant and only by implication touched on interchanges between
,I and G, I and. L, and L and G. But cleavages do not tleq,slate *leq
selves into mto partv Darw oppositions opDosluons as a matter oicourse: ol course: ifie;A;re tnere are considerations
consroerauons
of..organizaiiloiifdn-trcForal strategy; there is m: gr$1rrg_{!ryg$1"f .
alliances asainst losses throush sDlit-ofts: and tlere is lf,e-ffiiEisi?e-ianowinFf
th;@the time sequences of organizational
efforts. I{ere we enter into an area of crucial concern in current theorizing
and research, an area of great fascination crying out for detailed cooperative
research. Very much nceds to be done in @
,:national party system and even more in exploring the possibilities of fitting
such findings into a wider f'amework of developmentt theory. We cannot
hope to deal exhaustively with such possibilities-of coinpaiis6n in this volume
and shall limit ourselves to a discussion of a few characteristic developments
and suggest a rough typolory.
How does a-A9g9cu1lg13[39nfli9i€;et translated into an opposition between
parties? To approach an understanding of the lariations in such processes
of translation we have to sift out a great deal of inlormation about the coztlitions
lor the expression ol protest and the rcpresentation ol intereiti-freaehs-new.
(firrt,2fd must know about the traditions ol decision-makinginthe polity:
the-]tdvalence of conciliar venus autocraiic procedure{ of central government,
the rules established for thc handling of grievanges and protests, the
measures taken to control or to protect political associations, the freeifom of
co4rnn+ication, and the organization of demonstrations.5o
TSecond, )re must know about the channels lor the expression and mo-
-!Y'llf-AgW;
EEisible were tFe
was there a sYste
Cleavage Structures,Patty Jysrcms' u'rt! '
v'-' -- u
strations, through strikes, sabotage' oP:o or could it be chan-
9' -violence'
neled through regular ih'o'igh Prettutti
"tJ"iil"ni '?i on ttgitimot"ty tttuu-
Pffiffi:"$::'fflr*"tion about tlte e1pornnities' ttte pavoffs' anct the
W*#.#ffi**+iffi**,E*W
ffi';;;;;is to gain "pttttntutioo on their own?
ldourth) and fi n otty, *t' "#i"s"t]il.;titjg o s s ib i li t i e s' t h e i m p I i c a t i o n s'
iffi limitationsof ;,p;''0,#t-tnep::';Xt.t$S,t"?":SJ"9#=-
( The Four Thresholds
These series of questions suggest a seqttence ol thresholds in the path of
anv movement Presslng forward Dew sets ot demands within a political
'sv-B'ttd -. . ^ -- in fact exen on
SiH.ihxI"JJ:[J'il;i;;;
:'?irrr"lb" -. --
tbreshold ol legirimationi Are all Pr9tffi
rial, or is there some icC"ogtiition of the r[[
*a-i,J arroiarions within the svstem?
most of the suPPorters
choice of ntaa
Par
wl
-ssin icprbscntation on its own?
(- Eo,rittJ the thresholi Jl' power.: Are thcre built-in checks and
^oiortty
countgrf6rces against "it"""titJ'*^lttlty *tt .in the svstem or rvill a victoq!
at the polls give a party or an alliance Power
to bring about major structural
Itt.ng"i in tlie national.svstem?
This gives u, o t'ool""o"#-variable tJrylqy of conditions for the development
of partY systems'
€"r"li'
Level ol each thresholtl Resulting party systent
Leeiti- Incorpo- Represen- Majority
a"'iion ratidn tation Power ^ . ---^.:^ ^- ^rionrchic repimer
;i;;' H '"'#" r;-' il;;T;*;lnTfin'"0:',*,"S3;
Protests and grievances -ertner
channeled thro*ugh the field ad-
\' ministration or through estate
rePresentation'
MediumH H H 3*:Xi'tf..'1T"""i'i:ll{,'H;
clubs of notables' ExamPles:
Britain before 1832' Sweden
durinq thc quarrels betrveen
"HatJ' and "CaPs.'"u

Jtaa
28
r-. ! r.:--!! r. a a taaaaaaaaatalraalf araa
CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES, PARTY SYSTEMS, AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, qnd Voter Alignments
Low
Level ol each thresholcl
Incorpo- Represen- Majority
matron *qt ration tadou pciwei
M M H ^H
orM
L
-M
L
M
M
L
L
H
H
H
H
H
M
Resulting party systen't
Internal party systems generatlng
ruclrmenta.ry outside support
through registration asi&ia-
_tioa hut s3feguaid-s-TfrTid-

l
32 .LEA'AGE sTRUcrLrRES, pARTy sysTEMS, AND vorER ALI.NMENT' Cleavage Structures, Par$ Systems, and Voter Alignments
. tended to encourage resional rnr{ nrrlr,,_^r
oarries hava -.^.,1.r :g::_11 ?id cultural parries
protest parriesl
have provEd .E u.[ourf ;ffi;;tiffiLii
avarieryormbvemenlr_"1,9i;i;,ryrd:i#=ffi
',,iiil.,t*:_lll:.:lt';;i;;,*Erd.ir,."nlmigii'ii
1in the united states slilh^l,i"?ffi cannot be taken-ai'a ;*ruftfig
no.mar outcfr,e -or rarties4 while the American
tl-or-loe!_demands from
iimpte
lajority
fllil*n*1ffi:::':::s'g'T,'ir."dt l;' ;;;;; ;"i,o characrer
I'#,:$T*:::i.p,bau".ain-Jo,*,LT^i"#tiffi fr ,"llu'l,".Hff ,fj
exp I a i ned ttirou sh i", rrloi,
"n -;i,h;""i#Jli#"iir;"lrTi,,H:..ffiilJ;
fl$;,jy: areius constitutionally
of the two established
areias or of a".lsion--m;i.i;g;il:
Executive.-
congress and the presidentiar ^rpo*6
This brines u, ,o_.1 crucial point in,our discussion
cleavage str[cture of the a:3!!!3!_"A_al
Tjjg[tr19g1g r^ri" antl th.e payoffs
"orr, ol mergers,
t'ii" r"pr"rentation tfrrJsnota and- the
Sf
two.party=sy,sleE@E
communications across ihe ile1au"g" iir"r_ouif-J.rid *ii,i"', *.rgr' o-
- elliqqcas are actual-ly ."*glq6t . ffi.ust be some minimum of trust
among theleaderi. #a-rneffi"ri ^^i" "ro*";"stifi ;;Ia&;;i expecting that
,n. **il: T,,l*.d^::11!f:,.;k;;J*i[ u" kept open whoever wins the
erection., The British .r""to"i- rv;;;; ";dy i: Hx.rT,x:?"L#:: rrl:
backgroirnd of the ron;-;;i;]dtJi''oudi,ionr-,ot-i"t't"#al ,epr.rentation;
the M.p. represents arl"his "ooriitu"nt , not iust those who voted him in.
But this ryrtlrm mut.s tr"uuy-ii;;;. on the-royalty of the constituents: in
two-parrv conte:rs- up .to..qb.p";;;"; _"1^tffi"fii#ul"to "bid. by the
*ffi'"Ji:t"3r::1i."$""ti'" d"v;;; not want; in'th,ee-cornered fights, as
Such demands are bound to produce strains ia ethnicaty, curturany, or
religiously divided communities''tr,"-qg"pg1tr_ggvages
the less the rikeri_
!::d of foyar acceptance of o".iriffiry representatin6;i thetEeF$rrrTr_
was no accident tliat the earriest rou.i^_t?yuro lroporqonal Representation
-came==in the ethnically- most t "t.iocn"ous of tfie Europg-an_ countries*
r. De nm a rk ( to accom m o'f,ate- sen€s 111g.!63 te-r rl i, "a.f li, t a s s, the Swi s s
cantom'from I 891 0"*"i0, -B"'td;ri il4ft 'g'9_dfi"lril' from 1 905, and
Fi nl and rroni 1 e 0 6. 0' Tne- g!e!i il:'?didi@ffi ffi * Kerl .Braunias,
disringuishes two phases fi trre:Grd of pRi:-ffe:r"i;#;rity protecrion,,
Hl".'r* *;'Y;:'L#:l"J "ili ;[l;ant iso"i ai'r pt'
"iJ i".. ;* u,='
)'. i',-
cal system. The introduction' ot-some
-minoriy
came to be seen
r"p..sentation
"re*"nf-or
::-": :rr..oqat-step
in
As the pressures mounted
ation-.
for txbnsions "ii;i6j-Lr9ql;;r!4j.as_q!i_
proportionality _oi ihe zuffi-age,
were also
demands
heard in for
tfr"-
o* jorrvlerecrio;*il"'";,ryffi rt#",1t{#-1f-#:1'f lr""-*''fi-ih:*fi I
W l''*"*r i?$r:t"rhti f .tU
nsng working crass wanted to ro'wer the threshoid ;f ,.pr";;ntation to gain
access to the reqisratures, and the most th;;;;;;';"",h"' old_estabrished
parties demandeE rn tr'p*["a'irri. poritio_ns agaisst -the new waves of
mobilized voters - und_e. .i"iu"..ut'- ,=uniug". In B-elgiuF, the introduction
of graduated manhood *n*g" i"- rsli^l"r*gil; ffi,fiH;lrreasingporarL
zation between Labor and citholics-ano thre?ie"rd-;i.-;";,,ou"o exrstence
- - - ta - - -. - - -, ta l l.r r-, ra\ ). t), t) t) ta ta ta t-
of the Liberals; the introduction of PR restored some equiiibrium to the
system.o3 The history of the struggles over electoral procedures in _Sweden
and. inNorway lells us a great deal about the cousequences of the lowerin$
of one threshold for the bargaining over tbe level of the next. In Sweden, the
Liberals and the Social Denocrats fought a long fight for universal and equal
suffrage and at first also advocated PR to ensure easier access to the legislature.
The remarkable sucdess of their mobilization eftorts made them change
their strategy, however.'From 1904 onward they advocated majority elections
in single-member'constituencies. This aroused fears among thefarmers.
and the urban Conservatives, and to protect their interests they made the
introduction of PR a condition for their acceptance of manhood suffrage. As
a result the two barriers fell together: it becane easier to enter the electorate
and easier to gain representation.G{ In Norway,there was a much longer lag
between the waves-oflmobilizatiqn-The-fanchise was much wider from
the outset,-6-cl 6g_!S!_ya1r- olaeasant mobilization brought d-o-wn the old
Iggmg-as,e-dg{L_1884. As a result the suffrage was extended well before
the final mobiEati-on olthe rural proletariat and the industrial workers under
the impact of rapid economic change. The victorious radical-agrarian "Left"
felt no need to lower the threshold of representation and in fact helped to
increase it through the introduction of a two-ballot system of the French
typ" io 1906. There is little doubt that this contributed heavily to the radicalization
and the alienation of the Norwegian Labor Party. By 1915 it had
gained 32 percent of all the votes cast but was given barely 15 percent
of the seats. The "Left" did not give in until 1921. The decisive motive was
clearly not just a sense of equalitarian justice but the fear of rapid decline
with furtber advances of the Labor Par$r across the majority threshold.
In all these cases high thresholds might have been kept up if the parties
of the property-owning classes had been able to make common cause against
the rising working-class movements. But the inheritance of hostility and dis-
trust was too strong.!@_P4g&n lL_ ib.eralsrould not face the possibility of a
-melger
with the Catholics, and the cleavages between the rural and the urban
interests went too deep in the Nordic countries to make it possible to build
up any joint antisocialist front. 3y_q9gt1asl_!he !ig!9{91e1 qf industrializatiqgjgd__thq
pqgglqsqive merger of rural and urban interests in Britain made
itiffifuia iii!;itfftana the d;mfrilioia cfi'dnp inThe iiyscm of representa.
tion. Labor was seriously underrepresented only during a brief initial period
and the Conservatives were able to establish broad enough alliances in tht
counties and the suburbs to keep their votes well above the critical point.
A MODEL FOR THE, GENERATION
OF THE EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEM
Four Decisive Dimensions ol Opposition
This review of the conditions for the translation of sociocultural cleavage
into political oppositions suggests three concl-usious.
First, the constitutive contrasts in the national system of partv constella
tions generally tended to manifest themselves befcre 6.nf iovlcring ol th
-
lr l: I t) aa
-r, .). .)\ _. _i _, _, _. _
33

t d t3'l' '.t^#ou|.'h?.ltqt $r*r?r#,#.,rn*|u"?"P^r#,o^F"r?
,/
-tfteltlol{.of representatiolt The decisive sequences of party formation took
plac-af the.-eairlystag€/t competitive politici, in sometases well before the
extension-€{-the franchise, in bther cises on the very eve of the rush to
mobilize the fnally enfranchised masses.
r Second, rhe high 1irreqLoldq_gt. 19p{_qyrr1qlion_duuteJhe +haqe_ei_masr*
politici?tion set seveie tests foi iheJiiin-g political orfanizations. The surviving
formations tended to be fumly entre;ihed in the inherited social structure
and could not easily be dislodged through changes in the rules of the
electoralgEne.
iThird, the decisive moves to lower the threshold of representation reflected
dilisions amon[ *re -estaUtiihea ie gimZ' ce i siiairi puities'
sures from the new mass movements. The introduition of PR iOOEd-i few
additional splinters but esseffially served to ensure the separate survival of
parties unable. to- come together in common defense againlt the rising contenders
for majority power.
- -${hat-hqppcned -at the. decisive party-forming phase, in each national
- society? WhiCh of the many contr-as:treaishd conniedGreGanslated into parry
oppositions, and how were these oppositions built into stable systems? ^
This is not the Place to enter inlo detailed comparisons of developmental
sequences nation by nation. our task is to suggest a framework -for the
explanation- of variations in cleavage bases and pirty constellations.
In the abstract schema set out in Fig. I we Oisiinguished four decisive
dimensions of opposition in Western politi-s:
u u
two of them were products of what we called the National Revolution
(1 and 2);
and two of them were generated through the Industrial Revolution (3
and 4) !
_ In their-Fagic-chalacteristics the party systems that emerged in the western
European politics duringEe-early,phasL of competitioi and mobilization
c an b e interpretcd a s p 6du cts ot'ffi u{Li afi nt e rt t i o n s*iitw e eiTie s e- wd
.funclamental-pqoqeqselb1 clrange. 'r^ '
Differences in the timing and--character of the National Revolution set the
stage for striking divergencies in the European party system. In the protestant
countries the conflicts between the claimi of fhe Sta-te and the Church had
been temporarily settled by royal fiats at the time of the Reformation, and
the processes of centralization and standardization triggered ofi after 1?89
did. not immediately bring about a conflict between ttre two. The temporal
and the spiritual establishments were at one in the defense of the central
nation-building culture but came increasingly under attack by the leaders and
ideologists of _counte-rmov_ements in the piovinces, in the- peripheries and
wi&in the underprivileged strata of peasints, craftsmen and wbrkers. The
other countries of Western Europe were all split to the core in the wake of
the secularizing French Revolution and without exception developed strong
parties for ths dcfense of the Church, either explicitly as in Geimany, the
I-orv Cor-rntries, Sraitzerland, Austria, Italy, and Spain or implicitly as in the
case ol the Right in France.65
DilTerertces in the timing and character of the Industrial Revolution also
made for contrssts among the national party systems in Europe.
-
'crtrogf, tto#"t?oil sfr"'t' ilrt1lu'.til}rrtlttl'' l D u
'
tlidlTi:$iflil'il1Tj\""'l*:x;
sector of tt e econorily-; i" -oit'"" the two t"-uin"A in' opposition to each
other and developedlirti", of their own..conni"t, it the^[abor market, by
point
Europe developed rolot':tf*'-*iss
or other before
Pat{C-ei*bome
worlil war I. Th.." ;;;"-*r"ry-r"in'.d into onc singl-e working-class party'
In Latin Europe the rower-crulrs ,oou"*"nts were iharply divided among
and Marxist factions on the one
revolurionary
"n*"#rq"uo"dfi*ogql!r hand and r"u,r,on,ri-1";elird;; m;trt"t. -fE.-Elltfqn Sevolution of
c ontr ast, p rqYg-q *"gPh- *. ti"dn1-Ut4 v i sive :- aff-countries -bf lYes ter n
ry#,
Social Democrat parties'
t"i^irtl-tpri"t"rr, "ial"ui'Gi*t -- ^"
(Jur Our tasK' task, however, luw.'vsr' is not just t9
'Lrrirr"i
accouniiot-1-".:T:19:i:"-::ti:g::J#:::
"iiiun"" ioinrution that&d_to._thq igygropmenr
b9t to" ft_"
?"ulyz: !j1t^r,-,^ o1 atoqnizntions in countrv after countrn-io ap-
*Hfr:ffi6'ryj;H
r;",i"r"r n"vorotior,'pioceeded at the point or the
inOuitriat "takeoff" did the two procisses of mobilizatibn' the cul-
""d-no*
tural and th" e"ono*if,'"tr""i-+;h .:t!:t' positively by producing common
ilffit; ;Auriu"y by maintaining divisions?
The decisive w"tttta-P:uty tl*ft:"lt:arly reflect
".t,rlril-"*on!
differences quhe- noriorof--niriirr", _of
"n" . canfl.ui^ti ,6mpromise across the
fiisl ttrZe of *u Iour'riio"'Ai" U*;iiitinguished in our-analytical schema:
Ht"-*-ffiffij",+;:lt*";:X;:";:.i;*",1ilt'#i:"":'Hx?::
iorker cleavage ,e"{;"fiJ ill*t.*;tt1-'y't"*t ctoser to each other in
;;;$-;";?,f*}rr'"cruciar-din"'""""i,"U1*tlTtJ"iTi,#:"#?t":t
it-i'ft" ."tfy qhases of competitive politicr
mobilization. T.hey ,"n""i"a'uusic contrasts in the conditions and sequences
'ii"iffi-i"irii"tetnttil"=tli'"*tf at the point ot take-
"f 'h" ""*"Jty
off toward sustalned ;"-'hjhtE to be sure' does not mean that the systems
varv exclusively on the '!gb{-aqd Atl* center' but are much more alike
#t#i.t,i,i-'ot1t" pofit6t spectrum. Ttr".e ire working-class movenents
throughout th:" wdtTS;--th"y-areT".rlPicyo.usfY.il:.ri: in.^cohesion' in
ideological orientatron, and in the extent of th"it integration into' or-aliena"
tion fr-om, ttre tristorichiy gi"r"-""ional.policy. our p=oint is simply that the
-Etoiftenerating th""'dilfft"nces on the leit arc iecondary' The decisive
ioniiasts among th" t;;;;-iil ;*"tt:o tAl"":f" t f the rvorking-
character of iGse mass partiet
class+a$i#ena]aid-I6-e
was heavily inno"n""5-ilyGEnstellations of ideologies, movements' an(
ffi;#;At ;h"y had td confront in th't arena'
-\
i ,q uoael in Three StePs
'-T;
'od;,o;A thFclitreienccs hnronS, the. wcstern Pafty system-q -ve hav
to starr out trom * il;1fi;;r"i{i"&uotion-of h9'ictive natiott-buitditt

g6 CLEAVAGB STRUCTUf,IS, pARfy SYSTBMS, AND VOTER AIIGNMENIS ae6r4te stu!:lufes, Part! slstemt, anil uo-tef AligT nents 31
m,v":,ll*t*:g*f:+*l***.ffi*f-"Eqi#fiffi l:*-idi-qqft ..;*lt"ll$$-.+:{,,i'*-5ffi.}ffi
*H"sj##1lf#j:i$rtffii+J.Ff,:i:H#i.H,: r'_ffi*_g;sl:S1"".';iT'T_i,%l-Y,"fi"!i""#:
nisories is riaugtrt *iii g'";; 'i"G. it i. "*y to g"i r*t ti G ;;Jrh
PJ-L do not occul'
of fascioatilg dcBil, ard it is equslly eary to 6uccumb to fasile gen$alities T'hese various elemests ard rcstnctioos combiae to Prcduc! atr eigh$old
and irespoD.sr'ble lbqadioDs. j Scholarly prudeEr prom]ts us to proceed twolog of basic potitical oPPosiiioas:
casc by case, but irtellectual idpatiedc€ lrges us to go beyotrd the alalysis
ot "odr"t" ;!h!"t* ;Jt y oot ilt"-"tioii"n".* doyrtio"tlration acioss nn r+5 conrdt.ENrs ,,s r€stoNsE . , t*:';,Tj-t tT,:],",
lhe know' cases' ,.l,"ioa k9":1k
To clarify the trogic of oul approach 1o the comparative alalysis ot party
systems, wi t""" E"u"rop.a i'i*t it At"r;dr; ;pi;ti - o'rion condiri'
"$."i'"rd
systems, wi t"uc E"u"rpJ i'i*t it ii*iir- ao^"i""a iipitl - oprio' coidiri'B ..- .." f::"" f:;ll:::"' i':"'
rLru-. *e havc po6ited dvetal gls of n"t" a series qi iules
"itgJr, ""t.tp I c c doEtndrr L l-oU !.fi.in coNs v' tl&
of aliame asd oppositiotr amoDE thc6c, and liavc tested the rcJultaut typolost toisrdr
r hcr^rlms ^^D^DirN
"#:'ffi&"'9":fff;tff'Jff"T;[ff"r9*ffi.T'"T;;n*" ,, c cdonincn' u p-'-'[ sd'di'6vrd coNsr "L'*'tfiil'si';
adong seven ssts of actor6. To uBderscore the abstract character of our [r^v^.I^Ns
€xerciie wc shall rcfer to each rct by a sborthsnd lyfbol:
... - rdbne . { "1- :illr .o^r.. ]iill^" ^'-
N-a cenhat core ot coope(aring "qatiol-bsildg# cootolliDg major ete- nt c ;r'-i I \ EF r'i'n [zEN UM
't1l%H'll"?i"ifJr"4tr;;t* yritbb tbe ""r.iorar terrirory and N . lirfi , t #i N.,i.rdnr. L,By' {1l;]i:l;il'*
grvetr a hrge me€sure ot coDtrrol ovcr educatrotr; ...-.
- -supranationally
R-the _cstablished ccdei;dcal body orgalized und€r , { H s*h l!.v*
tfiiitr *the
Roman C\ria alrd tbe PoF;
D-r dissidetrt, lo4contornist body of religious sctivisls opposed to C
u s u Fi-t
I ! r_s-.t
share of the totat primary production of tho natiotral tclrilory; vrr I ! r-s-.l', t"" * t"
{tlfll'"^'
U-a "u
cooperatiig body ^of urban commerciat and i-o

c L f^ v^-G E Fr n ric r u-n a sf oi*".r"#u #., AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS
u,.1.."""11,ii[ ,];,x:f""ir, I.,,^?,":1:::.::"- Revotution,after 178e_the con_
,p"Ol mobilizing
lJl: illf"": nation_state-l :,ij:", vast machin".i* ;i;;; fi:il#?l[: f;3fi;
tion berween tina.o iri",r"i"l""a"in!,zriir"rrtrnt Revotution_4he gpposi_
inclustrial r.oa".r',io-;" ciriec ,-,r +^..,_^ ns of the rising industrial leadership in commercidl^ and
"iti.,
uJio*rir.
I Tlil j:;'li'" ; * ril" nll:: T y:, :*:, !! " !_ ! ", o, u t i o n *the opp o si-
^^91,:-cight, types of .ailiance-opposition
combinar'oriar structure
pioducts are in
;hi;;-rtr.;etsive fact the simple
"f dichotomies:
FrRSr OTCHOTO My : f HE REFORA,{AITON
s toto,/lnrot, v_vtrr
Nojionol Cjrurch
Stote Allied to
sEcoND DlcHoro'y: r", .ouro.*#ff:ff.ti:,"^
r.ror;o,5r'cr,,_r, ,,_jlXI-"
v-vr
Dominont - 1)::,;;';'"" t;#:;,# tr,j,jjit;:,:;
THIRD DICHOfOtyiy: IHF ,NDUSIR,AI REVOIUIION
Lommilm€nt ^
Commilmenl
Commitmen, Commitmenl
Loncled
,o
lJrbon lo
Londed l,rb Londsd
loleresrs
lJrboo lqnded llrban
lnre.esrs ,nr.r."tu, tntururr"u,,,
Type: ; il ilr rv u
- Thu modcl spells out the consequenccs. of _the fateful division of Eurgpe
brougrrr abour rhrough Rerormaii"i "J ,n"_g",1ft.-n"to.*^r,oo. The out_
conres of the earrv riruggr.r.u.i*."f,tiite andc['nich- determined the structure
of national politics-in tt" "ru-oi JJ.ocrarization atrd mass mobilizarion
three hundred vtars'tater. in $fi*r and centrai E"r;" the counrer_
Reformation ha-d consorij;d il";;rilon of the cr,"..rr-i"o tied irs fare
to the.priv'egccr bodies or the )"ri\i;'ig,\g rrrl ;;i;';;r-'" porarization
' qf politics bitwecn . ""i"r.r*"ii"^t!L"t"r mouepp.ni iiro-a c-atholic_
rrad itionali it, on *. 11
) ol-,h;;;; d;;, ttement * of sr*i;ffi the sixfeenth ,"ui,i],,uuiu,
century rhe ser_
gu"" ;;"; diff_";;"t;;;;; the creavages
or the nineteenrh. The. estabrisfr; -.;;;", di;-;;;:;""d'iri opposition to
LH:t':,1;t:i'j.IL.T.ln" ;;t;;,Ro;; cathoric church dicr on rhe con_
found mosr o, ,r,",rtI,,-:1Y"Tl" opposed 1o the ;.;rgid';rtabrishnrent
f o rn, i s t s,, ; i f ,; ;;,: "1.5?i: ir:ilg ff T;t:i:'JHl *l * :;: tuulii
strara. Itr Sourhern and Central:#;;i rhe- bourgeois opposition to rhe
' unciett rdginte re'ded to u" inoin"r"ri"i?"",
Church: irrc culturar nostite-iJ'inJtifLn,"g,
,.;t,"g."r-i;^"r-'il"'ourioo
of rhe
";" il; had to {i'cl wharever place"it ""i ,n. church
w!ft. """rJ
*irri" the.
Europc the
new
opposition
poiitical order.
,o ,n" In North_
or;;;r;
::::rji::,;T,li;Jiir,,ou,r;r.rir,;;ffi
;;
J;f ,[,,#_T,ff
u,,
:::#,i#ffi H,::
'll T*:*;if ;ffi ;f,.1f,,:xT:";i,:::T'jfj,.i" u- uu,i",y br,."_
i"h.;ii.J;;i;,;';""T::;,:'Tff
oil".JJ.lff il,ffil;jx'ffi ,"iffi;Jl;
- - J -.J'a.ttt.l
Cleavage Structures, Party Systems,
Voter
political developments in the age of mass elections. It is of particular importance
in the analysis .of the religiously most divided of the European
polities: types III and IV in our 2x2x 2'schema. The religious frontiers of
Europe went straight through the territories of the Low Countries, the old
German Reich, and Switzerland; in each of these the clash between the nationbuilders
and the strong Roman Catholic minorities produced lasting divisions
of the bodies politic and -determined the structure of their party systems. The
Dutch system came closest to a dire'ct merger of the Southern-Central type
(VI-UII) and the Northwestern: on the one hand a.nation-building party
of increasingly secularized Liberals, on the other hand a Protestant "Left"
recruited from orthodox milieus of the same type as those behind the old
opposition parties in England and Scandinavia.
The difference between England and the Netherlands is indeed instructive.
Both countries had their strong peripheral concentrations of Catholics opposed
to central authority: the English in Ireland, the Dutch in the south. In
Ireland, the cumulation of ethnic, social, and religious conflicts could not
be resolved within the old system; the result was a history of intermittent
violence and finally territorial separation. In the Netherlands the secession
of the Belgians still left a sizable Catholic minority, but the inherited tradition
of corporate pluralism helped to ease them into the system. The Catholics
established their own broad column of associations and a strong political
party and gradually found acceptance within a markedly segmented but
still cohesive national polity.
A comparison of the Dutch and the Swiss cases would add further depth
to this analysis of the conditions for the differentiation of parties within national
systems. Both countries come close to our type IV: Protestant national
leadership, strong Catholic minoritics, predominance of the cities in the national
economy. In setting the assunrption of our model we predicted a split
in the peripheral opposition to the nation-builders: one orthodox Protestant
opposition (P-D-L) and one Roman Catholic (P-R-L). This clearly fits
ttre Dutch case but not so well the Swiss. How is this to be accounted for?
Contrasts of this type oper up fascinating possibilities of comparative historical
analysis; all we can do here is to suggest a simple hypothesis. Our
model not only simplifies complex historical developments through its strict
selection of conditioning variables, it also reduces empirical co: :tinuities to
crude dichotomies. The difterence between the Dutch and the Swiss cases
can possibly be accounted for through further differentiation in the canterperiphery
axis. The drive for national centralization was stronger in the
Netherlands and had been slowed down in Switzerland through the experiences
of the war between the Protestant cantons and the Catholic Sonderbund.
In the Netherlands the Liberal drive for centralization produced resistance
both among thc Protestants and the Catholics. In Switzerland the Radicals
had few difficulties on the Protestant side and needed support in their opposition
to the Catholics. The result was a party system of essentially the
same structure as in the typical Southern-Central cases.66
Further differentiations of the "N-P" axis in our model will also make it
easier to fit the extraordinary case of France into this system of coutrolled
dimension-by-dimension comparisons.
In our model we have placed France with Italy as an cla;npli: ui ali ;rl-.

40 cLEAvAcE srRucruREs, pARTy sysrEMs, AND vorER ALIGNMENTs
liance-opposition system of type VI: Catholic dominance through the Counter-
Reformation, secularization and religious conflict during the next phase of
nation-building in the nineteenth century, clear predominance of the cities
in national poiitics. But this is an analytical juitaposition of polities with
diametrically opposed histories of development and consolidation-France
one of the oldest and most centralized nation-states in Europe, Italy a territory
unified long after the French revolutions had paved the way for the
"participant nation," the integrated political structure committing the entire
territorial population to the same historical destiny. To us this is not a weakness
in our model, however. The party systems of the countries are curiously
similar, and any scheme of comparative analysis must somehow or other
bring this out. The point is that our distinction between "lation-builder"
alliances and "periphery" alliances must take on very difierent meanings
in the two contexts. In France the distinction between "center" and "periphery"
was far more than a matter of geography; it reflected long-standing
historical commitments for or against the Revolution. As spelt out in detail
in Siegfried's classic Tableau, the Droite had its strongholds in the districts
which had most stubbornly resisted the revolutionary drive for centralization
and equalization,o? but it was far more than a movement of peripheral
protest-it was a broad alliance of alienated elite groups, of frustrated nation-builders
who felt that their rightful powers had been usurped by men
without faith and without roots. In Italy there was no basi! Jor such a broad
alliance against the secular nation-builders, since ihe esta5liJhed local elites offered
little resistance to the lures bf iraiformismo, and the Church kept its
faithful followers out of national politics for nearly two generations.
These contrasts during the lnitial phqsJs,_qf pass -mobiliz?tion had farreaching
consequences for each party system..With the broidCning of the
electorates and the strengthening of the working-class parties, the Church
felt impelled to defend its position tbrough its own resources. In France, the
result was an attempt to divorce the defense of the Catholic schools from
the defense of the established rural hierarchy. This trend had first found
expression through the establishment of Christian trade unions and in 1944
finally led to the formation of the MI{P. The burden of historic commitments
was too strong, however; the young party was unable to establish itself as a
broad mass party defending the principles of Christian democracy. By contrast,
in Italy, history had left the Church with only insignificant rivals to
the right of the working class parties. The result was the formation of a
broad alliance of a variety of interests and movements, frequentiy at loggerheads
with each other, but united in their defense of the rights of the central
institution of the fragmented ancien rdgime, the Roman Catholic Church.
In both cases there was a clear-cut tendency toward religious polarization,
but difierences in the histories of nation-building made for diflerences in the
resultant systems of party alliances and oppositions.
We could go into further detail on every one of the eight types distinguished
in our model, but this would take us too far into single-country
histories. We are less concerned with the specifics of the degrees of fit in each
national case than with the overall structure of the model. There is clearly
nothing final about any such scheme; it simply sets a series of themes for
Cleavage Structures,Party Systems, andVoter Alignments
detailed comparisons and suggest'. Y/t of organizing the results within
a manageable concept;l.umi"*ort. The model"is a tobl and its utility can
be tested only ttuoufr"o"ti""out development: through the addi'ion of
further variables ,r il""",iJil". -"Ut.*.d' differences als well as through
refinements io tn" a"niil"o*o^;J;r;di"t of .the variables already included'
Two develop-"o,r lio- tne doaet iequire immediate detailed consideration:
(1)Whatvariablesha,vetobeaddedtoaccountfortheformationof
disiinctly territorial Parties?
(2) What criteria:hJld count in differentiatins between N-L and N-U
alliances, and what .onOitionuf variables can be entered into the model to
account for the emergence of expticitly agrartan parties?
Developments and Deviations: Parties for Territorial Defense
Nation-buildinginvariablygeneratesterritorialresistancesandcultural
strains. There will u" .onip.itition between potential centers of
-political
tonlrol; there may #.;;iiil;;i*"* trt" and the areas of growth
"aiital
in the provin."r; u" unavoidable tension. between the cuiturally
^"?"^"""a -u."u,
"nairi."rJ'*iir and the backward periphery..s Some of
;;;"T;;"|#iy
these territoiiat-cuttura] cottnitl' *"'" solved th1-ougfr siceision or boundary
changes, but others *ti" iot"ntified through unifica*tion movements' To take
;-#'3#;;"*uulpr", the dismemberment of the Hapsburg Empirc certaioly
settled a great ou,nt"' of hopelessly entangled conflicti' but it also led
to the politicuf uoin"iiiJ"t'r"itt "rfiurally a"nd economically,heterogeneous
:ilii:_%-il;- v;;ffi ,- unJ cr""t'.,ilovakia. Territorial-cultural conflicts
do not just nio potiiical expression in secessionist and irredentist
movements, ho*.u".1ffi"iil t"it the overall cleavage structure in the
national community J"i'iirp-i9 .o"airiot the developmeit not.only of each
nationwide party organizati6n but even more of the- entire system of party
oonositions and alignments' '
"tfi;-;;;;;;;";;;; the British and the scandinavian Parly systems
stauds out with great clarity in o-ur-.steP-by-step accounting schcmc' The
countrics of Nortn*Jst Effie had all-oited for'national religious solutions
at the time'of the n"r*o,"iion, but the^y nevertheless developed markedly
difierent purry ,yrr",i-J^a"uti;g th; larly ph'ases of democratization and mobilization-
'frri, .orrt.ur,- io -p"oriti"al development clearly did not reflect a
difierence in ttre saiien; Ji;;t i;"g1" li"" of 1|eavage-but^a difference in
lbe ioint operation oi two s"ti of "cleavages: the opposition between tlre
central nation_buildioi "ortur" and the truEitiont of fhs periphery, and the
opposition u"t*""o'iti"lri*ury and the secondary scctors of the economy'
rn Britain tt" ""oirui'..ii'*-iu"r upheld and reinforccd by a vast network
of landed tarruhesf in the Nordic c6untries by an.essenltally urban elite of
officials and patricians' in Britain the two cleavagg lile; cur ac'ross each other:
in Scandinav * tn"y"ilt"1r*"J*u.ft otfter' The"British structure encouraged
a gradual merger ]r'"ril',"" "ra-r,rrul iot"."sts, while the scandinavian madt
for division ""d ;;Giln.6s The British conservative Party was .191"..1,
establish a joint frf";";i i;"aeJ and industrial owner interests, whiic tht
,i l-Lt-LLLLLLLLI-ttLLLLrl.r I Lr l r ! l tll [l.l.-lJ-t t r
41

f f f l.t^t "f "I"f.,+^t *-trLtt t"f, ^f,"'T"ff" |' t t' Cnfiel}!*rFtlbt?'r'j!"uq' !6e'!
scandjnrvian ,,Ri8hr,, remai'cd essentiauy urban a,d proved unable ro iocreas-e r.he nostititv ow?+ T::'t-"-lTffl"T""Jjl"ffii'iitrllJl.tfitTl:
establ;sh aEy auraile attlance w;rh tle A9;rians a[d tho;eripheral 'IrfL"
separatist scnumeots could not rePress
simii€r processes of inreracrion can be obssved at work in fte devetop il5il tiiil* -i*i"*tt"t -g .Ytt'* l;do*ne$ ard teoast-Ianners
mea! of rhe coDt;nemat parry sysrem. conflicts belween obilizing etites aDd ;ii"l'il;;.dillttt forces into a right (thc LI*4) atrd a lelt (ue
peripheral cultures navi ii s6me cases been reinforced, in iome cases *ffrfli],:",0" rhrust of trational mobilizatiotr calre from the *".""gj:ll{
i:ff#1,?'-TflT"::l-'ffi,:*:B:,fi*i"r*"'J'J*'J"ffii:'S
cleavage reinforc€ment. The "Union of bppositions" of the iarly yein of "di;iffii;;i.*fi;-l;p.*'t",'"d.p,4;ffi*:$",i1',f"Hi:Li:;';1"#
resisted ihe new adminislrators.as au*
Dation-buildilg broke up over the schools issue, bur rhis was only ft€ frrst ,ii?#.J t*rtt**t the ruled thioueb varying mixtures ot com-
Pr€fec'ts
step in a Braduar deepening of creavatcs. The cotrtiluirt process€s of ecc. il;'s;;ffi;14.P'b'"g i."Pi*t ins'-truments of centra' zatron rn
nomic, sociat. and cuhurat hobilizariotr brought the co'nry ctro'er ro a iiit"iii"ir:ii*i-"; rtally as the cari'a,es in the r€gions of sPain contrcleo
"r
polaizarion berween French-speakint, secular and iqdustrial wallonia and irtJ'T"aia.; il"'"-
"i - 9!]t$ ekment of terilorial Protest In me
Nc.tetrands-spcakin', carhoric'and.alricurturar Frande$.?o rhjs porarizins
;f*dil:iJ:fi!1$-F_{,$I*'fi
..ililiii:ifiiff.it:'rT:r.I1x,il'iv"r'f.H.F:"Jffixd,t$;H 'ffi"T#,***l]{l*ilr;*'".:''tHtff;"*;:t-ffiiT,i'"il6-i
three are Protestant aDd two Catholic, atrd ot the Dineteetr Alnannic catrtons ",*f#f*,fn:if*ru*tn
thr.:at 11ll"^jY'Haffi;iJJi6" p"oA t"lrit ri*. Bu-r these rcs€nt-
or hallcantons rcn are Protestant and Diae catholic: "rhis creates toyalties natioD-builders ?s-lhe co-rql*i":1""",
.nfitics. The irrmtrsigent pohcy or
and afrnities which counterbalance the linguistic iarer-relatiotrships."ir n.rts wer€ not chrnnereu tuw
"""iTfr"t"i"" *J*"
"f ebc;roral'barCain-
Condirions for lJre emergerce and coniolidation of terdtoriai counrer- non erPed kePt tbe C.^thali"t o::.:.*,".-of
a mass parry for the dererse
curruccs have varied si8nin.i,,ry *rtr'io eo-p.. orsadzed resistarce asahsr
iiJco'.lninitio rr'*ugbout
rhe centralizing apparatus oI rhe nobilizing nation-srate appears ro have sr,i:l."ftrjil,iat q q:,*j.:1,.::i H?J;:.;;;*6;lb $i";"5;',::';ffiffi; **" in oo rhe eve of fie int'ot."n
rirciy i,i?"uirop io *i"e s"s or si-tuatioos:
"ro.t ^ ' $e ltaliar territory when PoPe
-th€
-heavy concentratioD o[ lhe counrer-culture within one crear-cut teritory; ii,""'ii?ii i"ji-titgt"g", tbese.cr;ss-locai cleavases produced a natiotrwrde
- tcw iies or communication, altiance, and bargainiog experience oward ,-f,",n J"pp""ii.* i'-C {o^**t :,Xto;;':;n*"0":";aj:!'#"J:'[H
thc Dational c€ot€r and more toward external centeis of iulrrirat or emnomic iarkea regionat variations m.ure sr
{reflrar cenrcrs or cur.ur
]I^-^, -.";.;^"" i. rte strstification ithe ltalian vote tells os.a Sreat deal
influence;
-m,n,mar economic depeDde'ce oD $e political metropohs. ;::iuffi;;;;-*-';'*l;.But in,contns! to thc developmeor in sPaitr' thc
Federal$t' aulonomist' ard s€Pa*tist movements and Parties a." most iii'"i"i i""irti lialy Iound oo dLect exprcssiotr rn lhe Pafly
"i*tt syste''
likely to occur through a cumulation of such conditioos. A comparison fiil'"'rll? ,igr i"rcrrttion' however; thc co'tsy was tom oy
"r
"ii" "r-t"t"ia
spain and lhly leus us a grear deal abour such processes of cleavage cumula- inecotrcilable coEflicls adong roeoinoi""tiv distinct caflps, but tbe cotrflrct
tioD. Both counrries have for centuries beetr heavitv dominared bv rhe lil"'"-Jil-tl"-*r-"triti"s ina ue i"giois. There were sdll unsettled aod
cathorrc church. Both were caugbt ili'. """i"r,"ji"1i,1t"i'iiffi:; ;J",,il uosenliq rerrirorial prcbrems, out rhese-were at the trcntiets The irre'lerust
powe! and ecclesiasrical privileges'in rhe wake of rhe Narional Revoludon, :l;;;;;;, Franci: and rlre Hapeburgs gerela:ed a tratsonalisFimPerral'st
frfl:::t51fiJ.",1T"*##J"fgffilry::_,:tji."it{:.ryfr.Tili 4:rrll;mfr"X"trii,!}*};*:i;1ff*r"Lt$.1#ll;
in the ch?ractcr of the party systems they d€veloped in the phase of jnitial centered cerhan Reich the clntr
nass mobir-,rion. spaDi"n ioriLi"" ** airmittated by territoJal oppositions; iii,i-*""i""a a variery of tenitorial tensions. Thc conflict bctween lhe
ttaty dcveloped a nirionat'party sysreE, tragmetrdd but w h i;edeDrist- i,11"-i,,i." -ullri
",,a tio s,*t Elbiatr cosservarives I:"t f* yL11"_-1:
separatist parlies oDly io such exfeme ca6es as the Soulh Tyrol and the Val i"rin- i..l"-i renected a! iEporrrnt cultural opposluon ruE paY.,q
d'Aosta ' 'J"tti"ii" igti-" -a again s& up panies of th;i; own and have'to thrs
_ ln.Spain, the opposition -ot the PJrennean periphcry ro the- cetuali?jng iav lound ir difiqrlt to ht llto a nlutirowiae systeE ot Parly oPP.otit'o::j:
Castilian rcgime 6rst found expres$iou in th€ dobilization of lhe Carlist
peasanrry m derense or rhe church aod their rocai riberries asains.he !i.r"*l:,:"":rH"#o*.*ti,ii#',,lj'l;f"iffff,Sil1H:
ijberats'and rhe Freemasons i! the.army aod sovemm_enr t{'".1'".i"r l}:Hli Jtffi;fi."J p"J*. i*i" r* without serious. coopetito$
i'!tii!'d*!iiii!:fiii!!Tl]3;$iiiii,sii!4i,,1 peasanlry tuded to regionalist and separatist parties to fight the parasitic . ffii"i,'x;ivin::$Yo"#,"::;*1"":'ffiii:il'J:-":i*
-T"::,:,:_:"^: lI.* r^"a"". but abo to Chicago io tr{oiPon, Itcl(on
icnr,at iaministration iaenueea *irrr 15e economicdry backsard ceDter or snd washio4on' as wa5 l-osdon' '* '-';i.il;;"'il edi*'r"r' =
trre nation- rn tr'" n""q; ;i*, .t*g iiri!i.* Glari* itot"o to
atrd cinciuati ia maouracunng'
"o"t

44 cLEAvAcE srRucruREs, pARTy sysrEMs, AND vorER ALI.NMENT'
Developments qnd Deviations: parties lor Agrarian Delense
we distinguished in our initiar paradigm (Fig. , berween twgi,typical,,
:*l:9,.: ar thi.rlnd or.,h;-i"';io"riii"urtu.a
opposrtron of axis:
ethnic-ringuistic on thd i iide tne
*inorities againri
nationar currure (l), tt"
; ,his_li;;ffiosition "ffiia# #;yf##:
;r ;ilil;;;try against
rT"ril:T[.:"f l]n""""uvtninnan:ct'i;;#;;;;r,"'ii"r#iiii,iur'io6,",t,
a,-**;;*-.# i*mH:'ff.,fm
cleavages o! type 3 in Fig. 3l--- "-" t'""
;;''";fti'il"iil-i'f;l'"org interests are most rikery ro nnd direct
+otitrs4_gllrrssias_ j
'u"@:'l;tii:1$.:".'""Jff "*,T,!m
But iu three of the rour_caser'tr," opplriti;;.1i-i##fflT',T" dominance
of the cities tended to be closery li"ffi;; with a rejection of the moral and
religious standards or tne nat#r-u.iiJ.irl ffi;;,ffi;';:il ariances in
ir"fl"aitilirl?i:"il ) ""d rd N";ilJ;a1 t tr_ne. iv i "rra n_i arriances in
vurl**"1"?,Hi"#,:.i:Ii;#r"4i.:t,+:i:ii,llIn*iilJ,r"tr
position movemenrs:,the Bergiaf i""*i"'b.,n"iiJririri"ig' u",t, in d6e
urban "establishmenr"
"l,o 1rnolg-,tlJ"r_"r, but, as it haipened, were
lH.fi i.i,,:ffiX*';,ru:tJ11ff ;{ilb';.'*J;itilt',,i.-,i"g"i;.
In only -one of these "four
"urm li-a-t,
countries ""uilJJ",ffii-ii-n",or,,uffi.iJ#;f"X",:kffi of "ri:
the North.. a peasaii party aiso established itserf in the pt'ote;-
tant cantons of switzerrano. ro tti otirei-countri.s
have been of
peasant tt" w"ri,t"r".uy
lisrs at t"*
" -"r"JJ4
ilf .'*,:ff :il"x*"ff f,"T!'dii"i;m.uffi why these differences? ffi *tweparties
This raisesl *-u.i"iaimi;il;":fi;, economics or nation-bul*g. about l" oui
rre
tG;Ltffi;i;:;",#rrry the options of the central
reduced
eti6 to u !"tween
interests
an
and
afliance
an alliance "nti., with the tanded,
with the lrrba n-nioncur-cr^;;;;it-iri)strtar.
of course, was never *11!"1 of This,
either,zor
changes in the " llt o{ continuing
overan equiribrium
adjustment to
in
does
each
not herp "ai-"; territory.-our
the oelLgtion.;r.;y-FEli:; dichotomy
out contrasts ffi;ii, amons IH": to
systems
bring
in the 'retative openness
dhection or
to alriances
the otrr?'
rn it the
the
one
decisive r,"g",
To
of
understand
partisan mobilization.
the conditions-foi
"irii""" "prions in the one direction the other it is essentiar to go i'to o'"r.il; or
at tle ,nE-iis"iirii"r;ii time of the *,j:::=:f )urat society
tf;G;e. What
thing else
counted
was the
more
concentrarion
than anv_
ol resouies ror the of mobitization, or
-conttot
rhe
and
pror"'r,
inthe counrryriil;il;
and siy the ol
hierarchies tt, irii, Jl production
of dependen;';;;"i;jh*;,"
more thau anv other r*t"i* ;;#,:dlms counred
-ur.';;";;5.';;.oncentration
and social pristige of dconomic
the easier it power
*;;r;;;Lor tne ;;.1-;;;r;d.rh" gr"ur",
Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, ana y oler .t1.116t.,,.c,.,e
the political payoffs of elliances with landowners. It was qo accident that
Conservative leaders such as Bismarck and Disraeli took a lead in the
extension of the suftrage; they counted on the loy4ty and obedience of the
dependent tenants and the agricultural workerg"lrTo measure the political
potentialities of the land-owning classes it w6uld be essential to assemble
comparative statistics on the proportions of the arable land and the agricultural
manpower under the control of the large estate owners in each
country. Unfortunately there are many lacunae in the historical statistics and
comparisons are fraught with many hazards. The data at hand suggest that
the countries we identified as typical "N-L cases" (types 15 III, V, and
VII in our eightfold model) all tended to be dominated by large estates, at
least in their central territories. This was the case in most of England and
Scotland, in Prussia east of the Elbe, in the Reconguista provinces of Spain,
and in lowland Austria.8o There were, to be sure, large estates in many of
the countries we have identified as "N-IJ cases" (types II, IV, VI, and
VIII), but such alliances as there were between urban and rural elites still
left large groups of self-owning peasants free to join counter-alliances ou
their own. In Belgium and the Netherlands the holdings tended to be small
and closely tied in with the urban economy. In France and Italy there were
always mdrked regional variations in the size of holdings and the systems of
land tenure, and the peasantry was deeply divided over cultural, religious,
and economic issues. There were large estates in- Jqtbqd, in southern Sweden,
and in southwestern Finland, _and the owners of these helped to consolidate
tle conservative establishments in the early phases of competitive politics,
but the broad masses of tle Nordic peasantry could not be brought into any
such elliances with the established urban elites. The traditions of independent
peasant representation were strong and there was widespread rejection
of the cultural influences from the encroaching cities. In Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden the decisive "Left" fronts against the old regime were coalitions
of urban radicals and increasingly estate-conscious peasants, but these coalitious
broke up as soon as the new parties entered government. In Denmark
the urban Radicals left the agrarian Venstre; in Norway and Sweden the old
"Left" was split in several directions on moralist-religious as well as on economic
lines. Distinctly agrarian parties also emerged in the two still "colonial"
countries of the North, Finland and lceland. In these predominantly
primary-producing countries the struggle for external independence dominated
political life in the decades after the introduction of universal suffrage, and
there was not the same need for broad opposition fronts against the establishments
within each nation.
Typically, agrarian parties appear to have emerged in countries or
\t--->'*- -
provinces - ( 1) where the cities and the industrial centers were still numerjcally weak
at the time of the decisive extensions of the suffrage;
(2) where the bulk of the agricultural populations were active in
family-size farming and either owned their farms themselves or were legally
protected lease-holders'largely independent of socially superior landowners;
- (3) where there were important cultural barriers between the countryside
' aud the cities and much resistance to the incorporation of farm production
in the capitalist economy of the cities; and

CLEAVACE STRUCTURES, pARTy SYSTEMS, AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS
(4) where the Catholic Church was without significant influence.
These criteria fit not only the _lbrd:q_cou!!4gq- but also the Pro
1919/This was essentially a splinter from the old Radical-Liberal Party and
rec/ited fectlllre(l mosl most or of rrs its support supiort in rn the tne countryside. countrysrde. In ln the the Catholic uatnollc cantons the
peasants remained loyal to their old party even after PR. Similarly in the
Austrian First Republic the Nationalist Lager wx split in a middle-class
Grossdeutsche Yolkspartei and a Landbund recruited among the anti-clerical
peasants in Carinthia and Styria. The Christian Social Party recruited the
bulk of its support among the Catholic peasantry but was able to keep the
rural-urban tensions within bounds through elaborate organizationaf differentiations
within the party.
: Variations in the Strength and Structure of the Working-
--Our three-step model stops short at a point before the decisive thrust
toward universal suffrase. suffrage. It pinooints pinpoints sources of variations in the svstems systems of
division within the "independent" strata of the European national electorates,
among the owners of property and the holders of Brofessional or educational
privileges qualifying them for the vote during tlfrr|gime censitaire.
But this is hardly more than half the story/fue extension of the suffrage
to the lower classes changed the character sf each national political system,
generated new cleavages, and brought about a restructuring of the old
alignments.
, Why did we not bring these important developments into our model of
,European party systems? Clearly not because the three first cleavage lines
\pere more important than the fourth in the explanation of. any one nalional
party Eystery. On the contrary, in sheer statistical terrns the fourth cleavage
lines will in at least half of the cases under consideration explain muih
more more of or the Ine varigrGe varlance in tn the tne distributions olstnDu of full-suftrage votes than any one
of the others-9{Ue focused on the
were the th,e ones ih-a-t--Eboeared thEf-alpeared tcr-ace6unt tcr-'ac for moif-6l-Tf,e vairarrce among
-syslgms! ttre interactidris of fte *center-periphery," -state-chGfr.id-Iffiindustrv
cleavases tended to producffi aooarentlv
of the cleavages brought about through the rise of the working-class movements.
We could of course have gone on to present a four-step model immediately
(in fact, we did in an earlier draft), but this proved very cumbersome and
produced a variety of uncomfortable redundancies. Clearly what had to be
explained was not the emergence of a distinctivg yorkingglggs moyp4ent at
some point or other before or after the extension of the suffrage but the
strength and solidariry of any such movement, its capacity tp mobilize the
underprivileged classes for action and its ability to maintain pnity in the face
of the many forces making for division and fragmentation. All the European
polities developed some sort of working-class movemenrat some point be-
Cleavage Sttuctures, Party Systems, and' Voler Alignments
tween the first extensions of the suftragg and the-y+ious. +QllHlemocratic"
anempts "t tt " r.pr".i# ij'"i.iittrt-ilgelE*-{6 predicf.the presZncc-ot-'
such movements was simple; to Prfrct- lffion"J would be'1ronq '1iO !'
which ones weak, whic-h-.|t. oon"O apd/which ones split down the middle' i
required much more il;;I"Jgffi national "onaitioot a|d developments and-.-._
;hffi-;;;;""1"-b";;;;el"of thehistoricatinteraction-process'-QutJbee*
'J"!i:*'i:"lllitJ'""Tffi"$,ffi
-
,#4;tr##r tibd'Enoa-or
-Hdi[:#ft liiti*;;ff 'E*"!'""'Tl%i:q:lel1"'*ffi '1"":,"$"'Ji
fiffi;;ffi ; ;;'il;J a"f "oa""t- labor. in indu.:'p--u:l:l',Y,*:1-:::
;;6;;il p"rriury rr'ro*"Lailators of the cleavase "distance" (differences
in the chances of interiJiion ""iott the cteav@Etlh@pysically de-
termined or normativ"f'tj-t"g.l"rcA), but -anY aitempt in this direction would
take us much too tu, iri ttrii an-too-long-introductory essay. At this point we
limit ourselves to an discusiion of the between-system variations
"1"fr;;t*y
which would have to t" through such an extension of our model.
*
".pr"i","d
,#*:"*il#il:5"$:ffiJx'"*::il;
itputt of univerrsal suftrage'
'*6:*; . , ^^zt^) c^..- r-^icir,- ,rimpnsinnc of cleavase
ii # -hdrylrf ;;alysis posited four decisive gi_merrsions 9l:9:+
in weste
generation of party systems pm-
-< :- -^+i^-^l f.iarmrr .^-".s.ondins tO tbg fifst
ft##fiftffi; i;;; i" nationatiistory corresponding to tbe first
ihree of these dimensions:
Cleavage Critical iuncture
Center-PeriPhery Reformation-
Counter-Reformation:
f6th-17th centuries
State-Church National Revolution:
1789 and after
Land-IndustrY
Industrial Revolution :
19th century
Issues
National vs' suPranatioual
relieion
Nafional language vs. Latin
Secular vs. religious cootrol
of mass education
Tariff levels for agricultural
products; control vs.
treedom for industrial
enterprise
Uqgqsfusg-'gbrynallY d;s1E!
It is tempting to add to this a fourth dimension and a fourth juncture:
Cleavage Critical Issues
iuncture
. owner-worker The Russian rntegration ht.:tt]:::l
Revolutiou: polity vs' commitment to
l9l7 and after international revolutionary
movement
There is an intriguing cyclical movement in this
:tht1:' gtft^:::l$g:
##;;;d;;;;;""#;;o oi oo" supranational Unqef Way/\flllll ure
-urvsuv"s
:I11^ T13: :i::1":*:
ment offtrong terntorial bureaucracies i'?qitimilltg.lle=TNelv:T
wirh
a conflict over national versus

nfril?-?:Jormallv integrated into the nation-state, the rurar
/ -#:T*l
The conditions to.
ll: _devetopment ot
{i,s1incL!ve working_"tu* purl.
J#::"f il5itl,*:t'::,:lly",;",'tlyv';;d:#;il11{iT;'uift eiences
48 .LEA'AGE srRucruREs' pARTy sysrEMs, AND vorER ALT.NMENT
il" *;lfffi;:t"t'illt
accentuated long-established tines ot Jivisioi within
velopments.rrrieenougr,"in"iSii-"iji#T;':f"'"$::1"T.'.sff ,",3##,_.:-+r:,Li:*.r_f
::rfs
o:o.:ojprgdugclear_cutpredictionsof thesede_
working-class movemenE gmerg.ed i" tu" ftogstant-dominated countries with
the smoothest histories of o"fioo_Urritdog; g1i1ein, Denmark, and Sweden
(types I and II rn ":::gtEq*ffi"f,o", the C;athotic_dominated coun_
trics witb difficult or -verr- reccnt tiirtoii", o,f nation-buirrring also produced
$:ii'jti:::+"H'rut;r,.ru"x'ffixH^ff t#:1:;I;Hii,I,,1I;
account for variation: io-th9 iot"*.ai"d!99e-!etneen the protestant North_
west and the Latin t"g qrJ* Itr;d *, Vrf and VIII). Both the Aus_
uian and the German *-oti6ig*fu* iiJ".rot deveroped their distinctive
countcr-cultures asainst the- do"minantl",i"ra efites. Th.e auit iuo sociarist
Lag",, heavilv coicentrated * it ;;;-vi"*u, was able to maintain its
unity in &e fice of the a"ii.rr-ll"r;;ilu., and the pan-German nationar_
ish after the dissorutiol ot o" uffiri't-pi.".r, By contrast, the German
working-class movement was deepry oviiea atpl ttre 6"r""ii. igr8. Sharpry
contrasted conceptions of the *i"" ;i th;poltical g;;;;d opposed to
each other and dere to prove t"t"r:io tn" nght against the wave of mass na_
tionalism of the early tLilies.;;- I"' s;;-ii;4a- u" -N!,ri".r.""os ( both
type IV in our scbenie), td i*;d -?iry c;;;;;ffi; produced
a few disturbances- bur the leftwaJsptit-on, t oo, ,rr";;'*rking crass
by parties were of iitu" rilnid.;;;:Hfilrked curtural and rerigious creav_
to r tne -ioci"ri'1 p.,tl.l^ ;#il;i'"ditions or
;ftrJ:ffi'"t _ uvrp
,.'r Of a' ^, .L^-:_-- ttre_inten_r-.rv "i:"5::944' uctl cuuy_lnro natlonal politics.
Iy to help their entry i"tb ouiiJ"ui;iil"..,
rcnCi'*',ffi *!"ff YI1. :ii:' Tgd:r )
a particularrv diffcurt r'i',"]i 6t
""ii.*t"iff;;ffii, i$;lTrl,,l?"""t *'*
ffit#"*1, ""* ili"ilffi; #T? ffi*31y1.:y-llis,case ffi;ffi
tr,1'*"n""J' ffi ;? ffi;ffi#
;1:T:"T.*:1:"q,,11","^"j:l"S-;;"Gfr..#TnffiTil'"'if; .::f :it&T:,S
ilf-ffi gfrHff Belgian-French 1;Iil,Hyi"n"'i"i"l.i;;;,;h'i#:i:il'i::;i"$:f contrasts :f
: 8{
The reconciliation of
social order. divirlarr ,Jl:"":t5l":.^1l.Hng class- to rhe political aod
li?"ir,?"f il._q1*:,*::r1..{:1",-.,T'H""'ff :,fr.l&11ll*i,;
11^ 1t Fremish-Walloon quesriron,
lglon
makes a vivid-coitrast witrr'itre
;#::,TJ:"::*f .^"-^y:rin;;;;;;il"J,lilHrl#.ii:XI" t;i:f
jff
$j:',.Hi "*."":,:3;" ':.r:"""-*.-i:l,i,l""s#,iiii#ieg:#lH'l
j":{,::^::1.:^::f _*J,-:-:,i"*ffi:;#:Hi;:.9:":::[
HS;ffi i:r,:,:::*.:*:i:rl:i;";ij't"Um{"fi Jf':'il,':,:lJl'H:
iii,:#J:L'l#i?,??1,."uu1ff :*-t,-"^i;i,;'.";1iliffi
itfjl3ll:it::::::.{G;;n"ai-;;il:tlihff "",SXlil"i:lr'".,ti;;
fi SJii;,,x",11"i,"J
I'X*IX' ;;;;b;#' ffi i;:il:.'ii:,:1ff1:f "#,,:X:
Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments 49
t/_C@e
"the cockpit of Europe," could not permit itself social aud political
couflict td the breaking point. Perhapi France could not either, but it
was harder for the bigger natiou to realize it.
The cpntrastbetween France* Italy,-andspain-on-th" one b4pd^. and Austria'ana
negium on in" othet suggeiis-a possiule generalization. G-woiking-*
ctes*sorzemeglljg,14ld to be much more divided in the countries where the
"nation-builders"
other during the crucial phases of educational development and mass mobilizatiou
(our "S" cases, types V and VI) than in the countries where the
Church had, at least initially, sided with the nation-builders against some
cornmon enemy outside (our "R" cases, an alliance against Protestant Prussia
and the dependent Hapsburg peoples in the case of Austria; against the Calvinist
Dutch in the case of Belgium). This fits the Irish case as well. The
Catholic Church was no less hostile to the English than the secular nationalists,
and the union of the two forces not only reduced the possibilities of a
polarization of Irish politics on class lines but made the likelihood of a Communist
splinter of any importance very small indeed.
It is tempting to apply a si
the greater the internal division during the struggle for nationhood,
greaterlth-e-"flrgqglg!_lbe*Bugsleg,-Rev,qhtion_aU:be-tliviqions*ryithinlhg_
-wor[fig class"-Wmntalreadt pointed to the profoundffiwithin the
Geinrln Reich was a^late-comFiffiong European
nations, and none of the_'lgrritolal icts within the
=and.telig
,,ladpg was anywhere near set ss parties
- egte{-gd the political arena. ArUeIlg the northern countries the two oldest na-
-tioni,DennrirkandSweden,w6iEist-Efec'tedtf
rhe-Com:munist:SoCiliiit
division. @om
colonial status were much more
directly affecte 14, a sovereign
state from 1905) for only a brief period in the early 1920's; Finland (independent
in 1917) aud Iceland (domestically independent in 1916 and a sovereign
state from 1944) for a much longer period. These difierences among
the northern countries,,hde been frequently commented on in the literature of
comparative politigsiThe radicalization of the Norwegian Labor Party has
beeJ interpreieatwittio seilrTfEleffidTE models, onE emphasizing the alliance
options of the party leaders, another the grass-roots reactions to sudden
industrialization in the peripheral counbryside, and a third the openness
of th-e party st!rctfire and itre iossibilities oi quick feedback from i-he mobilized
voterg4here is no doubt that the early-mo[!!!Eg!g_of the peasantry
and the quick victory over the old regime of the officials had left the emerging
Norwegian working-class party much more isolated, much less important
as a coalition partuer, than its Danish and Swedish counterparts.ss There is
also a great deal of evidence to support the old Bull hypothesis of the,radical- _
tzing gflects-of sud-den i'ldustrielizslisn, but recent research suggests that this
w)ffinly one element in'a b6atl-p-roeess of political change. The Labour
Party recruited many more of its voters in the established cities and in the
forestry and the fisheries districts, but the openness of the party structure
gllowed the radicals to establish themselves very quickly and to take over the
(najority winft the party during the crucial years just after the Russian
\

50cLEAvAGEsTRUcTUREs'PARTYsYsTEMs'ANDvoTERALIGNMENTs
S.wolution.88 This very openness to rank-and-file influences made the alliance I
with-TloicoR very shortJived; the Communists split off in 1924 and the old i
majority party "joined the nation" step by step until it took power in 1935.8? j
pdy-two-olthe-Scandinavi.an-countries-rgainea-s*onpeommunist*parties- . r
after World War Il-Finland and Icelandz/Superficially these countries have , i
two features in commonlTiolongerrslttfgler tor-cultriral-ancl political indgl* * :
pendence, and,late industrialization. {n fact the two countries went through :
iery iliffererit p-Lo-cesses-oE-p6lffiAild-ange from the intggl-ptrg!9.-sltl"4llo:ulijlgq[i-lizatioa-to
the final formation of the full-suffrage party system. One
obvious source of variation was the distance from Russia. The sudden upsurge
of the Socialist Party in Finland in 1906 (the party gained 37 percent
of the votes cast at the first election under universal suffrage) was part of a
eral wave of mobilization ltte-&assuegrsg-r@
nd doy4qThe middle; the working-class voters were
and its social hierarchy
@lture
and their solidarity iith'their clasi-an-f,if,srevomtionary defenders.ss Th-e
victory of the "Whites" and the subsequent suppression of the Communist
Party (19L9-Zl, 1923-25,1930-44) left deep scars; the upsurge of the
leftist SKDL after the Soviet victory in 1945 reflected deep-seated resentments
not only against the "lords" and the employers of labor but generally
against the upholders of the central national culture. The split in the Icelandic
labor movement was much less dramatic; in the oldest and smallest of the
European democracies there was little basis for mass conflicts, and the oppositions
between Communist sympathizers and Socialists appeared to reflect essentially
personal antagonisms among groups of activists.se
IMPLICATIONS f,'OR
COMPARATIVB POLITICAL
SOCIOLOGY
We have oushed our attemDt at a svstematization of the comoarative his-
' ':-- -
I
tory of-tpartisan oppositions in European polities up to some point in the
1920's, to the freezing of the.major party alternatives in the wake of the
extension of the suffrage and the mobilEddon-o-F mafoi-SEctions of the new
-
reservoirs of potential supporters. Why stoP there? Why not Pursue this exercise
in comparative cleavage analysis right up to the 1960's? The reason is
deceptively simple: the party systems ol the 1960's reflect, with lew but significant
exceptions, the cleavage structures ol the 1920's. This is a crucial
characteristic of Western competitive politics in the age of "high mass consumption":
the party alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party
organizations, are older than the majorities ol the national electorates. To
most of the citizens of the West the currently active parties have been part
of the political landscape since their childhood or at least since they were
first faced with the choice between alternative "packages" on election day.
This continuity is often taken as a matter of course; in fact it poses an
intriguing set of problems for comparative sociological research. An amazing
number of the parties which had established themselves by the end of World
Ci*og, Sor,'u'"'-, PitY SYsterns' and
Cleavage JtructureJ, L s"! vJeJ-"'-' -'
war I survived' not 9{r
the onslaueht:-":.Y::}:R3**X*'f;"
Sf ,lJ'il'J&1"$:'1Kil"^"f "#:-:ln::l:X'"';T'$11il"'i:S
:xl:f i"lli$'"J.,Hl:'E'"'r4$i"-i:T:li;:'*tilH:T;tlt
ii1"1',Hy;'J5Tffi'i!*"ilTliii;i.if*Hffi J3*T",fffi ,r
How were. these pantres aDrs Lu DurY'v "'r.iuti6nf,
How could they !ap.
social, and economlc
of t'r rrrvrr
social, and-economic "tit**
.conditions .conoltlons .,:ry:,,-T rhem oun, ovhr such long long.periods prrloas ,it ot
lr"it^i"tg" uoaies of. citizenll!.11:*],T*:T,ienreles
frbm seneratro-. to gen-
H,'lltJ ;lT ?'ii' ;ffi; tr'ii' iore crienteres generatio: to gen-
"'"*
eration? ' ' 'r---.^-A ^nc\r'ar tn anv of these questions' We know
-il*'"m;'ffiffi'trilil"";:'i.F[;i"'#"i'-;'r.'r]r'o"tiooi"g
tHR l+#il^d"-;;3"!. m:k,o.i".urti*r base and lhbii etr-
,J"-tr'":ti;",'Jt-"d
launch new parties d;#;;; it* a"tia"t of universal suffrage' I
iormed during the f,nal phase ot :"y1!:^:T':::;;;*;rt;;;". It is difficult
to see any .igoifi"uot'LTf.;;;;ih" *r""ln"t tn"parliesihich were able
to establishTur* orgu"ill",t;;;;;;;;,r"n"h th"mselves in the local govern-
"&i""
ment structu r, u ;;;i:jt
"I.f,i.'
Jqf"u' J maximat mobilization have
oroved ttre most vtable' The narrowing oi:=ine-t"ppor1matnef'T-rou gUt
ibout through ,1'" g;?; ii'*J* !"'ii"; it4ig titi' iiit^r thrust toward fullsufirase-dqmqcraayjeaty
!l!f"ty-f"* openinfls for new movements' Where
the cfiailenge-o1tn""ilJ'ffi*

52 cLEAvAcE srRucruREs, pARTy sysrEMs, AND vorER ALIGNMENTS
great deal of leeway for "post-democratic" party formations on the Protestant
right. konically, it was the defeat of the National Socialist regime and the loss
of the Protestad East which opened up an opportunity for some stabilization
of thc German party system. With the establishment of the regionally divided
CDU/CSU the Germans were for the first time able to approximate a broad
conservative party of the British type. It was not able to establish as solid a
membersbip organization but proved, at least until the debacle of 1966,
nmadngly effective in aggregating interests across a wide range of strata and
sectors of tbc federal commuuity.
Two otber countries of the West have experienced spectacular changes in
their party systems since the introduction of universal suffrage and deserve
sone conment in this context-Italy and Spain. The Italian case comes close
to the German: both weut through a peinfg[ process of belated unification;
bottr were deeply divided within their privileged strata between "nationbuilders"
(Prussians, Piedmontese) and Catholics; both had been slow to
recognize the rights of the working-class organizations. The essential difference
lay in the timing of the party developments. In the Reich a difterentiated
party sEucture had been allowed to develop during the initial mobilization
phase and had been given another fifteen years of functioning during the
Weimar Republic. In Italy, by contrast, the State-Church split was so profound
that a structurally responsive party system did not see the light before
1919-three years before the March on Rome. There had simply been no
time for the "freezing" of any party system before the post-democratic revolutiou,
and there was very little in the way of a traditional party system to
fall back on after the defeat of the Fascist regime in 1944. True, the Socialists
and the Popolari had had their brief spell of experience of electoral mobilization,
and this certainly counted when the PCI and the DC established themselves
in the wake of the war. But the other political forces had never been
organized for concerted electoral politics and left a great deal of leeway for
irregularities in the mobilization market. The Spanish case has a great deal
iu common with ttre French: early unification but deep resentments against .
central power in some of the provinces and early universalization of the suf- ,
frage but weak and divided party organizations. The Spanish system of sham
parliamentarianism and caciquismo had not produced electoral mass parties
of any importance by the time the double threat of secessionist mobilization
and working-class militancy triggered off nationalist counterrevolutions, fust
under Primo de Rivera in 1923, then with the Civil War in 1936. Ths entire
history of Spanish electoral mass politics is contained in the five years of the
Republic from 1931 to 1936; this is not much to go on and it is significant
that a lucid and realistic analyst like Juan Linz does not base his projections
about the possible structuring of a future Spanish party system on the experiences
of those five years but on a projection from Italian voting alignments.o2
These four spectacular cases of disruptions in the development of national
party systems do not in themselves invalidate our initial formulation. The
most important of the party alternatives got set for each natioual citizenry
Cleavage Structures, Party Systems' and Yoter Alignments
threecasesof France,Germanv'TqJip^9:::::l:::TT"3"*".1tJ:3lt[?
H':,":rffi',TJ?i!'oY-ifr il":i"",'i"t'ttrffi$::gfi:tr*3lj_q
;il-;; F e"nch case is ii manY waYs the
""i"0 "t internatty generated- disruption o
f-ouJ pUut" wouldclearly not have occurrec
1940), but there rr*."ilJ"i"u r"*u"r "t nior"ot oscillations between plebis'
citarian -d ,"pr"r""tuiiiJ'"t"J"rt of a"to"i""v and marked organizational
frasmentation both ",.th; i"u"r or interest aiiicuiation and at ihe ievel of
pur-ti"r. In spite of th;;]';;i;Pt;l* "o *urv't of French politics is
'i";;;h;dq"'*:*"";1,H.;I'"1*'i1*",X;;il:li'$::liil1i*'*::;
H"-XXffi #tl"ll",h;;i;;d"*uuti,""ffi il,ui'-.ui"o'ica'vgiven
lXiitJi;ril""iar"*'"pil"* for the system as a whole'
This "histori"ity" oi;fi;*i;;;1"J;; crucial rpPort'ance not only
in the study of dift"':;:'"" ";;"il;ltt6t oi'ou nations brit also within
",ations.
The p^rty at"'"o"iiutt't;"O;;!8"" utta dominance not onlv from one
overall sYstem to another but ft".T;; .e{ually. j;clf,t-io *ottt"i within the
same poiity. to g"io JJuift^o
o'f trt'" proc113;^of mobiliza-
"nl "oa"rttuoJi"8
tion and alignment #titt- *Il"tn-"^lu:t w! clearly'need information not
iust about turnout ;; tl'" 'aiui'i'oo of uft"t-Uut a6out the timing of the
iormation ol local ;;;'y";;;;;;;t"': This process of local entrenchment
tan be pinpointed io'oiu"'ui ways: through Jte""i""tional records' through
membership r"gist"'i, i"tot;utio'iabout
^t[ittt"'ga the lists oresented at
local electionr. n"p#"ii.:,i""it%.Ai,ir.^*iil^i.i*oti countries^of the West
oDeo up much more direct access to powei resoulces than repres'ntation at
tfie national r"*r. irrii""Jon""toti"r* lna io tot", the bickbone of the
'#ffi',ffi
[:f T1ffff'};j:,eyff:f;"*l'T"3"ffi :Sg*:t'+Tlf,t
[r;'Jt'T;*t**r"wi""ru"'*";:T:"H[T[ffi ;'i:fffi l:
of their organizatioi'i;#;tk..-tit;t may have iurvived on their trade
union strength, uoiffi aaaitionat ,_"rori.J" Jotentials inherent in local offrces
have meant much more them trr*rc-tfi"-p"t i"t deriving their essential
-to
strenqth from the networks of economic po*Lt'-ttota"rs or froim the organizationsif
*'itt"-t*ay the Church'
sntrenchment is still in its inlancy in
of these Processes
tl t:^"^1.:
mostcountri"s,andsiriouscomparativestudieshavesofarneverbeenattemDted.eE
rnis is'iiJ;;;-t5;t t."oo* lo empirical sociology'
_political
Theie is an unfortunate asymrietry in our knowled'ge and olr efforts at sys-
tematization: *" i;;; ;;il'il# o{ m-e ;;;;;d through which poliricar
alternatives ,,, "'Lll i#J'"ffi; #"t1;;;lut a gr6at deal
-*tityt
of information about the circumst*""t i" *tti"f, bne alternative or the other
in the access to data' It is
gets chosen.Thtt:"tlil;ily'-fir*".qii;t"n""t
a time-consur"-g'#'ilrii",ing 1oU to assemule data locality by locality on
,#^i;,;ti;;,d";;P;;'uia'0""'l:t;'u'"5;i'li:"?'.*":t"i'frffi ,f:
ilil4;;i,"tions'
ri is vastlY. easier.
arternativesonce!i;;:;9;iih:f::lFff :?*::":l'"1"t"*5':X[i*:"i
during the phases of mobilization just before or just after the final extension
of the suffrage and have remained roughly the same decades of sub- *f H*?i *ri itit: li;ti""; x**?:X#J',nH;T#:' # a',(
in the structrual

jlsli,{aE1 ; q+ 'ri':4' j;T / I 'rii:
AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS
surveyo$. What is needed now are systematic efiorts to bring together information
about the timing of local party entrenchments to pin down their
consequences for voter alignments.o4 With the development of ecological data
archiveseo in historical depth such analyses are bound to multiply. What is
needed now is an international effort to maximize the coordination of such
efforts.
With the development of such archives the time dimension is bound to
gain prominence in the comparative study of mass politics. The early school
of French electoral geographers were deeply conscious of the importance of
local entrenchments and their perpetuation through time. Statistical ecologists
such as Tingsten were less concerned with diachronic stability than with rates
of change, particularly through the mobiliZation of the latest entrants into the
national electorates, the workers and the women. The introduction of the
sample survey as a technique of data gathering and analysis shortened the
time perspective and brought about a concentration on synchronic variations;
the panel technique focused attention on short-term fluctuations, and even the
questions about past voting and family political traditions did not help to
make surveys an adequate tool of developmental research. The last few years
have seen an important reversal in this trend. There is not only a marked increase
in scholarly interest in historical time series data for elections and
other mass dataeo but also a greater concentration of work on organizational
developments and the freezing of political alternatives. These are essential
prerequisites for the growth of a truly comparative sociology of Western mass
politics. To understand the current alignments of voters in our difterent countries
it is not enough to analyze the contemporary issues and the contemporary
sociocultural structure; it is even more important to go back to the initial
formation of party alternatives and to analyze the interaction between the
historically established foci of identification and the subsequent changes in
the structural conditions of choice.
This joining of diachronic and synchronic analysis strategies is of particular
importance for an understanding of the mass politics of the organizationally
saturated "high mass consumption" societies of the sixties. Decades of structural
change and economic growth have made the old, established alternatives
increasingly irrelevant, but the high level of organizational mobilization of
most sectors of the community has left very little leeway for a decisive breakthrough
of new party alternatives. It is not an accident that situations of this
type generate a great deal of frustration, alienation, and protestation within
the organizationally least committed sections of the community, the young
and, quite particularlj, lhe students. The "revolt of the young" has found
many varieties of expression in the sixties: new types.of criminality and new
styles of living but also new types of politics. The rejection of the old alternatives,
of the politics of party representation, has perhaps found its most
spectacular expression in the civil rights struggle and the student protest movement
in the United States,e? but the disaffection of the young from the established
parties, particularly the parties in power, is a widespread phenomenon
even in Europe. The widespread disagreements with the national powersthat'bg
oyer foreign and military policy constitute only one among several
sdursdi ol sueh disillusionment; the distance between levels of aspiration and
levels of achievement in the welfare state has clearly also been of importance.
Clealage Structures, Party Systems' and Voler Alignntents
rhe probability that. such resenlm::t:l*I-
::,1*:l$t?,,,T?;:T:3::r:J:X1
:#"H',""T;{ "iffI";;;^;rili.. i' o-n th: whole low, but the processes of
G old ones wilr clearrv be affccted'
ffiil##^;d^;;;;"'i;,il;ilil
Much, of course, a.f"nJ. on local concentrations and the height of the
thresholds ot ,"p."r"dil;;. i"'A; low-threshold Scandinavian system the
wavesofdisaffectionhavealready.disruptedtheequilibriumoftheoldparties:
there have been itpotlutt *itint"' movements'on the Socialist Left' and
thesehavesapped,o*"^ofthestiategicstrengthoftheoldSocialDemocratic
parties. This happen"J nttt it Def,mark: ?he split-up of the Communist
iartv led to the devfi;;i ; a remarkably vigdrous^national-Titoist party
PolJt"?"iril L"d-"fi;;sh; ;b;;l ;'i'"'."1or..' for the social Democrats,
most spectacularly in the- autumn of 1966' Much the same sort of de-
;;fi;'h1, ,"t".^t'r;; Nor*"y since 1961. A splinter movement
within the gou"*rog f;;; Futty *af"nlv broke througfi and gained two
seats in 1961; for trt"lt'iiim" slnce the dar Labor wasblought into a mi-
;;tifi;r1i;;.-rhi;ffiil;;s;lil.s of a series of crises. By 1e6s the Left
splinter had grown to o p.r."nl of tfre votes cast and the Labor Party was
;ifi,^";;t po*.r."i"i"niiesurts for-.sweden show similar developments
there; the cp has ,*i;h;i; u-inution"l" line close to the Danish model and
has gained ground.
.
/ There is a crucral consideration in any comparative analysis of such
( changes in puiti"* h"J" b""nin Power' which ones have
Par.tl
-been in opposruon, "l""dj'Wltiih ;i';h" fiiti"r'*uny oUt"*"tt feaied the clevelopment of
Deimanent malonry parties. It was argued that thc P:Ii:t-,I" government
fiJ.iilil"-udu""i"gi. aud could -mobilize so many strategtc resources on
their side that the -opposition might i"ti p"*.tiess foi;ver *di"' It is
-be
heartening to ,r. n#fiil;kiy thd. observers had to c\ang3 their minds' In
the sixties tne mounin!-:;i"Joiuiiont oJ riling expectationi" cJearly tend to
place governi"g p*il;?t disadvaitage: they have to take the re-
"i.irityi"g
iponsibility to, pr"Ji"u*ents-thdy Jan no.long;t t:1T:lijhey be'rme the
tirgets of continuoui^.ri"r", a"ilands, grievaices, criticisms,- and no longer
"t
command ttre resources needed to meet iirem. The troubles of the governing
Labor partie, in S"uJinuuia ana in Great Britain can be understood only
in this lieh(. The welfare state, the spread of the "car and TV" culture' the
lla.iillJfi&.ipi;'il-'-"1-ir'"* devJlopments have placed the soverning authorities
undei incrlasing strains r"a vLry ainncult for.ihe old work-
"i^d"lf
t$.?,:;igiTf *{'""J*,**"tm"liff '"::'f#i.#1xF!}ii:+'i:
Labor rulers i" d;P",;t"t n"uuy. to h"uu" reached the end of their era'
Thev met the demands for an extension of the welfart-::1:lith innovative
Jfii'tffi;c; *," J"""lop*ent of the supplementary pensions scheme after
1956, but tt"y ootft.t for#er. Their ieCent troubles center on
"onfi'o#iiu" the "queuing society"'-,queues in front of the vocational schools and the universities,
queues f& idusing, gue]res- for health services. swedish workers
#i;+#ik*l'J";:;':."'*l'1"iil?i;lSiW-H#$f{;'41
,,'see ottters g", uloit-^i"*tio", bet6r housine' bettor services than they di"
.,r, ;;d",il;iE""r"p rie;, of t.ujtt"tion and a[Enation' It is signi0cant thni i:1
all the tt ree scaniiiu"irn .oootries the social DemgFradc losses have beon

56 cLEAvAcE srRucruREs, pARTy sysrEMs, AND voreR ALIGNMENTs
most marked in the cities and quite small in the rural periphery; the governing
puties ruu into the greatest difficulties in the arQas-where the'tevolution
of expectations" has run the furthest.
It is still too early to say what kinds of politics this will engender. There
wi& competing parties. Developments in Denmark suggest a trend toward
opeu uegotiations across all established party barriers. Norway is experiencing
a four-party coalition of the non-Socialist front; there are strains among
the four but it seems to work because:eaci-Dartv-finds it easy-to blame its
failure to Botform on electoral profriffi oh ttr6 nela tor unity within the gov- "
ernmenfn Sweden this alternative has not yet been tried, but there is much
talk ab6ut a "Norwegian solution." The events in the German Bundevepub-
&* during the summer and autumn of 1966_$py-sirxiilar+r€G€$ses-at-.ryork-in
quite i differeut pa!{isal !gltbg;. -an ifrcreasing disenchiantment with the
top political leadership and with the established system of decision-making,
whatever the party coloring of the current incumbents.
...Tosode.rstandrheso,*aovolopments-anA to "gauge the probabilities of the
possible projections into the future it will be essential to build up, monograph
by monogrcph, anaiysis by analys-rq, g comparative sociology of competitive
uiass politics. If this lengthy introduction to a volume of widely difiering national-analyses
has he$ed to suggest new themes and new perspectives for
such research and such systematization, it will have served its purpose.
N OTES
Cleovoge Slructures, Party Systems, and' Voter Alignnrcnts
unqsstab eingegliederte Vergesellschaftung-w.ird-wie z'B' die "parte Guelfa"' ' ' -'
so ist sie keitre Partei ;;;i-;;;;;;;- iii't-'t*'ni'd des politiichen verbandes" (our
italics), .tilirtsctnft ,"a"&iaiir'n"ti'

t t t , D f"ut t. t7'tT t a {a t'u I'ul uT llt-t.'Ttdl,",q|",t^,t I Tt sU
58 cLEAvAcE srRucruREs, pARTy sysrEMs, AND votEA aLToNMENTs Cleawge Stuctwes, Patty Ststems' an
ill,S*i'.ffi1*qfr?i*,,",rliii,?ili;W.;':..;;;;.;, *l*i,iHih*i*'i:'*lr,',t{'i,, ninfl#i:k}'*?;.j
re. For dera ed Aiicussion oi n. lint Be betw.ci reri8io6 cteavaees aDd loririor bot studi.s,3 (rert), PP. 1-r9,if bj.cn-3?t'.ii
i!;i- ii":*'iiirjrl iGto'i*ry
aad Prcserr" in n.. r* -a d. Nt^c.in, R.liiion ard Soci.l Confttr (New Yorl: in L vd dcr Ldd \.d r, -R.P.ttotnd v
osror

60 cLEAvAGE srRucruREs, pARTy sysrEMs, AND vorER ALIGNMENTS
in Zur Geschichte und Problematik der Demokratie: Feslgabe liir H. Herzleld (Bertin:
Duucker & Humblot, 1958), p. 178. For further details on German developments, see
the.recent study by, G_iinther Roth, The Social Dentocrats in Impirial Germaiy (Totowa:
Bedminster Press, 1963), Chaps. VII-X-
44. Ooe of the first political analysts to call attention to these developments was
Herbert Tingsten, then editor-in-chief of the leading Swedish newspaper Dagins Nyheter,
see his autobiography, Mitt Liv: Tidningen (Stockholm: Noistedis, 1963), pp. 224-31;
For further details see S. M. Lipset, 'The Changing Ctass Structure and Contemporary
European Politics." Daedalus,93 (1964), pp. 271-303.
45. On Austrian politics since 1945 see A, Vodopivec, IYer regiert in Osterreich?
(Vienna: Verlag fiir Geschichte und Politik, 1961),1nd the chapter by F. C. Engelmann
on Austria in R. A. Dabl (ed.), Political Oppositions in llestern Democracies,
op. cit.
46. See Walter Laqueur and I-eopold Labe& (eds.), Polycentrism: The New Factor
in Internatiornl Communism (New York: Praeger, 1962); L. Labedz (ed.), Revrsronisn
(New York: Praeger, 1962), and S, M, Lipsei, '"The Changing Class Structure . . ,",
op- cil.
47. Erik Allardt, 'Patterns of -_ Class Conflict and Working Class Consciousness in
Finnisb Politics" in E. Allardt and Y, Littunen (eds.), C/eavages, Ideologies and Party
Systemr, op. cit., pp. 97-131.
48. See chapter by S. Rokkan in this volume and the receDt study of Egil Fivelsdal
of unionization and politics amon^g w_hite-collar workers in Norway, Funksjonerenes
sytt pd faglige og politiske splrnndl (Olso: Universitetsforlaget, 1964)-
49. Sec Aadrew G. Whitesidc, Austian National Socialism belore 1918 (The Haguo:
Nijhoff, 1962), and his article on Austria in T. Rogger and E. Weber (eds.), -Tlre
Europcan Rr'grlt (London: Wcidenfeld, 1965), pp. 328-63.
50. For a detailcd analysis of the Austrian "invention" of mass anti-Semitism sbe
Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Gernnny and Austria (New York:
Wil€y, [t64).
51. R. Dahrendorf, Gesellschalt und Demokratie in Deutschland (Munich: Pipcr,
1965), esp. Chap.26.
52. On the electoral support for the NSDAP, see especially Sten S. Nilson, "Wahlsoziologische
Probleme des Nationalsozialismus" Zs. Ges.ltaalspiss, 110 (1954),
pp. 229*3ll; K. D. Bracher, Die Aufltisung der Weimarer Republik (3d ed.; Villingen:
Ring-Verlag, 1960), Chap. VI; and Alfred Milatz. "Das Ende der Parteien im Spiegel
der Wahlen 1930 bis 1933," irl E. Matthias and R. Morsey (eds.), Das Ende der
Parteien .1933 (Diisseldorf: Droste, 1960), pp. 741-93. A summary of evidence from
electoral analyses is given in S. M. Lipset, Polr'tical Man, op- cit. pp. 140-51. The best
analysis of the rural strength of the NSDAP is still Rudolf- Hebirllts From Democracy
to Nazism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Prcss, 1945). The fuller German manuscript
from 1932 has recently been published as Landbevdlkerung und Nationalsozialismus
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1963).
53. Such similarities in social bases and in attitudcs to national authority obviously
do not necessarily imply similarities in organizational tactics and in actual behavior
toward oPPonents. There is no implication that all such movemcnts would conform to thc
Fascist or the National Socialist ethos if victorious. For a discussion of the evidence for
Italy, France, and the United States see S. M. Lipset, Political Man, op. cil., Chap. V,
as well as "Radical Rightists of Three Decades-Coughlitrites, McCarthyites and
Birchers," in Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Rrgftl (New York: Doubleday, 1963), and
"Beyond the Backlash," Ettcounter, 23 (Nov., 1964r, pp. 11-24. For Norway, sce
Nilson, op. cit, For an interesting analysis of thc Social Ci-edit Movement in Canada in
similar terms see Donald Smiley. "Canada's Poujadists: a New Look at Social Crcdit,"
The Canadian Forum,42 (Sept., 1962), pp. t?l-23: the Socreds arc anti-metropolitan
and anti-institutional and they advocate pure plebiscitariaa politics against orgauizcd
group interests and established elites.
54, )4, In ln a recent recenl review revlew of oI Westero westero Eur-opean .b,ur-opean developments Hans Daalder Lraalder has nas argucd
this point with great force. It is impossible to underJtand the development, struciurc,
aod-op-eration of party systems without a study of the extent of elite cdmpetition belorc
tEmgrlA[&$si 4gqgratq revolutidns. IIe singfcs out Britein, the Low Countries,
I
Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Altgnments
pluralism and points ro the coDsequences of these preconditions for the development ot
inresrated. Dartv svstems. ;; fl-tsaj4.i, ';p".tio,'elites and Political Development(s).
t'"$ff;"Tir;i;;l; l.-L"i"ro*U"ra and M. Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and
iaiii*t Develoftnent, op.1it. For a fuller discussion of contrasts in the character
oiiii" ouloo-uuiroiog ptd""rt, *; a i Huntington, "Political Modernization: America
o.. Eutop"," IYorldVilitics, 18 (1966)'.pp.' 378-414'
55. This is Faul's term fo.r Ui inlti*'fnase in the trowth of parties, op' cit" pp'
62-9.
--Si. Sre esDecially Gunnar Olsson, Hattar och miissor: Studier over ParivAsendel i
siii ri 1 t s t 1I 7 6 2 iG otheoburg : Akademi-fiirlaget, I 96 3 )'
t';i: F;;; ,;;i;;i ilti;-titeriture see s. M. Lipset, "Introduction:.ostr_ogorski and the
errrvtifi ;;;;;;;h lf the Comparative .St_u

UU U U U'-U'U U-U UU UUU lt'! U U! U ! U'U!
62 cLEAvAcE srRucruREs, pARTy sysrEMs, AND vorER ALIGNIvIENTS
Jean Stengers, "Belgium," in Rogger and Webcr (eds.), T/re European Right, op. citi.,
pp. 128-67.
7I. Herbert Luethy, "Has Switzerland a Future? The Dilemma of a Small Nation,"
Encounler, 19 (Dec., 1962), p.25.
72. For sociologicat analyses of the system of cleavages in Spanish society after l8l5
see Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1943;
2d ed., 1950; paperback, 1960); Carlos A. Rama, Ia cise espagnole au XXe siicle
(Paris: Fischbacher, 1962); Juan Linz, op. cit., and "Spain: an Authoritarian Regime"
in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen (eds.), Cleavages, Ideologies and Parry Slstems, op. cit.,
pp. 290-341. See also the analysis of the elections of 1931, 1933, and 1936 in J.
Becarud, La DeuxiDme Rtpublique Espagnole (Paris: Centre d'Etude des Relations
Internationales, 1962), mimeo.
73. On the function of the cacique as the controller or rural support in the initial
phase of mass mobilization, see Brenan, op. cit., pp. 5-8; Raymond Carr, Spain, 1908-
J9J9 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966), pp. 366J9i and the classic analyses in Joaquin
Costa (ed.), Oligarquia y caciquismo como el lornn aclual de gobierno en Espafia
(Madrid: Hern6ndez, 1902).
74. See Mattei Dogan, "La stratificazione sociale dei suftragr," pp. 407-74, in A.
Spreafico and J. LaPalombara (eds.), Eleziotri e comportamerilo politico in ltalia (Milan:
Ed. di Comunita, 1963), and his chapter in the present volume.
75. See R. A. Webster, The Cross and the Fasces (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press,
r960).
76. On the origin of particularist movements in Germany see especially W. Conze
(ed.), Staat und Gesellschalt im deutschen Vormiirz 1815-1848 (Stuttgart: Klett,
1962).
'77. The vivid expression coined by lean-Frangois Gravier ir Paris et le ddserl
frangais (2d ed.; Paris: Flammarion, 1958).
78. Charles P. Kindleberger, Economic Growtlt in France and Britailt, 1851-1950
(Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1964), p. 255.
79. For details see S. Rokkan, "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting, and Political Participation,"
op. cir.
80. For a detailed evaluation of the comparative statistics of atricultural holdings
see F. Dovring, Land and Labour in Europe 1900-1950 (2d ed.; The Hague: Nijhoft,
1960), Chap.3 and appendices. The standard source on nineteenth-century statistics
of landholdings in Britain is J. Bateman, The Great Landowners of Great Brilain and
Ireland (London: 1883); see F. M. L. Thompson, English Landed Society, op. cit.,
Chap. V, On latifundia and mininilundia in Spain see G. Brenan, The Spanish
Labyrinth, op. cit., Chap. 6.
81. Recent advances in the techniques of electoral analysis make it possible to test
such statements about the weight of the difierent cleavage dimensions in conditioning
the alignments of voters. For data from sample .rrrv€)r the development of "tree
analysis" procedures opens up interesting possibilities of comparison. A "tree analysis"
of data for the Bundesrepublik for 1957, 1961, and 1965 gives interesting evidence of
the interaction of two major cleavage dimensioos in that setting:
Owner-worft er claovogcr
slolus of heod of housohold
Worker, unionized
Worker, nol unionizad
Worker, middla-closr o:pirolionr
Worker, unionized
Worker, noi unionized
Middle closs, of working+lcss
Church-dolo
commilncnl of
respondcnl
None 56
None 37
l8
Committed Cotholic ll
Committed Cqlholic 15
origins
Soloried, civil servonls, unionized
Middle clos Committed Cotholic
Percrnl voling SPD
in lolol olcclrolc
1957 1961 1965
61 61
41 43
28 28
21 33
l0 15
24 At
39 52
59
sourccr K. Liepalt, .'wtihlerbcwegungcn in der Bundesrepublik," Popcr, Arbcitrtogung 21' luly 1966,
lnrritut f0r ongowondle Soziolforschung, Bod Godesberg.
27
25
6
A,F"rErFn t,#dTr't;F,' E v|"|t't';s r u r I J' I
Foroeriodsbeforetheadventofthesample.surveysimilaranalyses.canb€Produced
-
,il],,d}ilft;f i;;i;j.;" si rar. vJrv rew statiiticallv sophisticated
"*ry'i'.
analvses have been..r'.f,o]ri fiiEurop""tt electoral'time series before the 1950's: an
illiiiir'iJ-r.--ct*, nre;";l--)no^ot'i"s tn the vorittg Be.ha.vior-of the Populatio.n
si,#1fr 1;rt'Vl";i;i:Jil;"tmx**'*'1.,1fi!;:l'113"::,qq1s:x'.J'T.::
the analvsis of the Frerlch iu*t-c"ntonr ty Mattei bog"n, "Lcs conteites- politiques
lT"rilrilijf r.p"r, Siiii"li". ln quontitative Ecolosicai Analysis, Evian, Sept. 1e66'
iii, t"Uf", ll ^and f3 coefficie"nts eit"]i;;-cJrrelation
for thi electoral strengths of
ths two left Parties in 1956:
sFro
Rurol
Fronco Wesl Cenler Norlh
Rurol
Ftonca Wesl Cenlsr North
Percent induslriol
workersr
Jirect correlqtion '28
-porliol
'26 '16 '55 '33 '19 '05 '03
correlotion .25
Percent ofiending mosl
correlolion -.60
-direcl correlqtion -.59
'12
-'62
-'59
'Og
-'48
-'17
'39
-'67
-'58
'Ot
-'21
-'21
'09
-'39
-'36
'03
-"10
-'09
'19
'30
'35
-pcrticl
lrluttiple correlotion -64 '62 '19 J3 '21 '40 '10 '35
Within rural France the traditions of anticlericalism clearlv tounl hsnvier than class in
the seneration of votes t". itt" i"ti. lt ihe Parisian subur6s and the other urban areas
iftil;;;ild.d ; il;;;ii.r, "i"rrir,"y wourd obviously have weighed much heavier
in the equation; se" Dogarrl. 'chapter in ttie -present volum6' To test tle implications of
il;Jl;,;;;ry.J, "r"""g'irr" il;;t;";;;iuy co* nog"n ousht to b6 carried out
""a
il;;;a;#;ust uefSre-anJ lurt the 6xtensions of tf,e suffiage in a number of
"'ti"r
difterent countries; r"" tfr"-.oJtlti"a-t""p, for 1849 and 1936 in Gebrges Dupeux' Ie
il:"i,ii"i-riit;;;; t;, erirtili ai ry36 (i'aris: colin, le5e), pp. 16e-70 and discussion
pp. 157-71.
82.Foraninsightfulanalysisoftheconditionsforthedevelopmentofthesethree
Laper see A. wandrusz?'a]^'.iirirr"i"t r -fotitir.u" struktur" in- H. Benedikt (tlg')
tfirn,riir';;r'i;prbti;"6lrrrriii'it:, iviln'iu, vert. rur Geschichte und Politik' le52)'
oo. 298-485, 618-21'
.^g3. see K. Bracher, Die Aufl1sung der weintarer Repub-lik.(3d ed; villingen: Ring'
1960), Chaps. III-IV.,ani-i.'fr't"ttf,ias and R'-Morley tUe'l Das Ende der Parteiet;
i-pil'ipii-riraorf: Droste, 1960), p!' l5A:9' 655-73e'
g4. Val R. Lorwin, ..W";iilg'd'";s fotitiis.anA Economic Dcvelopment in Westert
E;;p" ;:' i ;;. H ist. .Rev -, 6r I t ess 1,. pp'. 3 38--5 l'
85. This *u, " 'nu1oi piini iii ,tt"'irlisic article bv the elder Edvard Bull in "Dit
Entwickluns der arueitelie;;ild;;;; Jiei sLaiainavischen Lhndern," Arcl' I
"ii i"iiilni'a rl- i o iii ti i n *t 1 0 f I e i2 ), p p' 3 2e-6 r'
-fi:'Th;; ii., ueeo u'ou!'t'ioui in an i'irporta'J,lTiJ,"oJ*Y[I$:"$??r:":!#:,'"k
n.rti i"itiiir"ktur 1884-7940 (oslo: Institute fc
39-46, 73-98.
r*#A*n*l**:fr**l;9,'*;'';nfl:[i'{rl;''#*
Univ. Press, 1966), PP. 81-84'
"lti. ^s;;p;iiuiiy'ior,i' i.-Hodgroo, comtnunism in Finlottd (Princeton: Princetc
Univ. Press, 1966)'
8g.onlcelandicpartiesseeM*J!.olT.t*'..CommunisminIceland,''ForeignA
fairs. 36 (lg5g), pe. 'l;0r7, -aid' Donald, E. Nuechterlein, Iceland: Reluctant Al
tiih;.;r Cornell i-liiu. press, 1961 ), .Chap' r'.
90. A book ,o"n ur'S'J-i,J].'pfa"ttlu"ld's Polttica! Partles: a Behavioral AnalYt
tif,j"rg"i nana furcNaliy,'iX+i, suggests imPortant thsmes for new rescarcb' bttt i
utilitv for .o*p"."tru"'rirlfysi" lJ sev"e"rely lirnitea uy its. overconcentration on Fdrll{
the rirost atypicil of all existing Party organizations' tnc Amerlcnt1'

64 CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES, PARTy SYSTEMS, AND VOTER ALIGNMEI.ITS
91. To substantiate such generalization it will clearly be necessary to proceed to a
comparative census of "ephemeral" parties in Europe. Hans Daalder has made a useful
beginning through his inventory of small parties in the Nctherlands since 1918, the
country wilh the longest record of minimal-threshold PR; see "De kleine politiekc
partijen*-een voorlopige poging tot inventarisatie," Acta politica, I (1965-66), pp. 172-
96.
92. See Chapter 5 by Linz.
93. This is -a major theme in the Norwegian Program of electoral research; see
especially S. Rokkan and H. Valen, "The Mobilization of the Periphery," pp. 111-58
of S. Rokkan (ed.), Approaches to the Study ol Political Participation (Bergen: Chr.
Michelsen IDstitute, 1962), and T. Hjellum, Partiene i lokalpolitikken (Oslo: Gyldendal,
1967). The possibilities of comparativc research on the "politicization" of local govertrment
are discussed in S. Rokkan, "Electoral Mobilization, Party Competition and National
Integration" in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner, op. cit., pp. 2a1-65..
94. For -a general statemeot of the need for such controls for the character of the
local party alternatives see S. Rokkan, "The Comparative Study of Political ParticiPation"
in A. Ranney (ed.), Essays on the Behavioral Study ol Politics (Urbana: Univ.
of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 45-90.
95. On the development of this type of data fiIes for computer processing see S.
Rokkan (ed.), Data Archives for the Social Sciences (Paris: Mouton, 1966), and the
forthcoming report by Mattei Dogan and S. Rokkan on the Symposium on Quatrtitative
Ecological Analysis held at Evian, France, in September, 1966.
96. In the United States the ceotral figures in tbis movement were V. O. Key and Lce
Benson. It is interesting to note, however, that their work has in recent years been
vigorously followed up by such experts on survey analysis as Angus Campbell and his
colleagues Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes; see Elections and the
Polirical Order (New York: Wiley, 1966), Chaps. 1-3 and 9.
97. For a detailed effort to integrate the fndings of various studies of American
student activism see S. M. Lipset and Philip Altbach, "Student Politics and Higher Education
in the United States," Comparative Education Rev., 10 (1966), pp. 320-49. This
article appears also in revised and expanded form in S. M. Lipset (ed.), Sludents and
Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1967). Thc Lipset-Altbach artible, as iell as other
essays in this volume contain extensive bibliographic rcferences. Another comprehensivs
discussion of the relevant literature may bc found in Jeanne Block, Norma Haan, and M.
Brewster Smith, "Activism and Apathy in Contemporary Adolescents," in James F.
Adams (ed.), Contribulions to the Understanding ol Adolescence (Boston: Allyn aud
Bacon, in press). A special issue of the Journal ol Social Issres to be published latc in
1967 will contah a number of articles dealing with "Protest otr the American Campus."
One
The English-Speoking Democrqcir