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An Organizational Approach to the Design of Patent Law

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6 VERTINSKY FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012 2:20 PM<br />

2012] AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH 221<br />

A. MAINSTREAM THEORIES OF PATENTS<br />

The dominant <strong>the</strong>ory underlying much <strong>of</strong> <strong>to</strong>day’s patent<br />

law and policy is <strong>the</strong> “reward <strong>the</strong>ory” <strong>of</strong> patenting. 33 At its most<br />

basic, this <strong>the</strong>ory explains that patents provide necessary incentives<br />

for invention by allowing inven<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>to</strong> appropriate <strong>the</strong><br />

returns from <strong>the</strong>ir efforts at <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> restricting use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> resulting<br />

inventions. 34 The “reward <strong>the</strong>ory” is supplemented by<br />

<strong>the</strong> “disclosure <strong>the</strong>ory” <strong>of</strong> patenting, which suggests that by<br />

providing property rights in discoveries <strong>to</strong> inven<strong>to</strong>rs, patents<br />

will allow inven<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>to</strong> disclose <strong>the</strong>ir information without fear<br />

that <strong>the</strong> benefits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> information will be appropriated. 35<br />

Recognizing <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> downstream investments in<br />

exploiting new inventions, a second main branch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ories<br />

has focused on <strong>the</strong> functions <strong>of</strong> patents in providing incentives<br />

for <strong>the</strong> development and commercialization <strong>of</strong> inventions. This<br />

branch includes Edmund W. Kitch’s well known “prospect <strong>the</strong>ory,”<br />

which examines <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> broad, strong patent property<br />

rights in ensuring efficient investment in and management <strong>of</strong><br />

downstream innovation. 36 O<strong>the</strong>r approaches focus more specifically<br />

on <strong>the</strong> need <strong>to</strong> induce <strong>the</strong> development and commercialization<br />

<strong>of</strong> early stage inventions where much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> investment<br />

and problems <strong>of</strong> appropriability occur after <strong>the</strong> initial discovery<br />

has taken place and are undertaken by different organizations.<br />

37<br />

These mainstream <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>of</strong> patents diverge in <strong>the</strong>ir concern<br />

for upstream investment versus downstream development<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> invention, and in <strong>the</strong> types <strong>of</strong> market failure that justify<br />

<strong>the</strong> need for patent rights. But <strong>the</strong>y share a similar starting<br />

33. Kieff, supra note 9, at 398–406.<br />

34. Without patents—or so <strong>the</strong> incentive <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> patents goes—ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />

<strong>the</strong> invention would be kept as a trade secret, limiting access <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> idea, or<br />

o<strong>the</strong>rs would be able <strong>to</strong> freely copy and use <strong>the</strong> inventions at lower cost, resulting<br />

in an under-supply <strong>of</strong> inventions and follow on innovation.<br />

35. According <strong>to</strong> Kieff, conventional views <strong>of</strong> patents are largely based on<br />

three dominant incentive <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>of</strong> IP: (1) some version <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “incentive <strong>to</strong><br />

invent” and “disclose” <strong>the</strong>ories treated <strong>to</strong>ge<strong>the</strong>r under <strong>the</strong> rubric <strong>of</strong> “reward,”<br />

(2) <strong>the</strong> “prospect” <strong>the</strong>ory; and (3) <strong>the</strong> commercialization <strong>the</strong>ory. Kieff, supra<br />

note 9, at 398–406; see also Rebecca Eisenberg, <strong>Patent</strong>s and <strong>the</strong> Progress <strong>of</strong><br />

Science, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–28 (1989) (discussing alternative <strong>the</strong>ories).<br />

36. For fur<strong>the</strong>r explanation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> prospect <strong>the</strong>ory, see Edmund Kitch, The<br />

Nature and Function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Patent</strong> System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). According<br />

<strong>to</strong> prospect <strong>the</strong>ory, strong patent rights protect <strong>the</strong> incentives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

invention owner <strong>to</strong> make investments that maximize <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> patent.<br />

37. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 23, at 1040.

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