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An Organizational Approach to the Design of Patent Law

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6 VERTINSKY FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012 2:20 PM<br />

228 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13:1<br />

and North are considered <strong>to</strong> be <strong>the</strong> founders <strong>of</strong> NIE, and <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

work informs our understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> core concepts <strong>of</strong> NIE.<br />

The focus <strong>of</strong> NIE, <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>the</strong>re is a single focus for a<br />

loosely grouped set <strong>of</strong> analytical approaches, is on coordination<br />

<strong>of</strong> economic activities through formal and informal rules, and<br />

on <strong>the</strong> alternative governance structures within an institutional<br />

environment that are a product <strong>of</strong> political, his<strong>to</strong>rical, economic<br />

and social forces. 64 Property rights and patent rights are<br />

formal institutions designed <strong>to</strong> describe <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong>, and<br />

allocate control rights over, <strong>the</strong> disposition and use <strong>of</strong> resources.<br />

Formal rules interact with informal rules, such as<br />

norms and cus<strong>to</strong>ms regarding fairness and business attitudes,<br />

<strong>to</strong> create <strong>the</strong> “institutional environment,” or set <strong>of</strong> background<br />

constraints, that guide transactions. 65 North draws an analogy<br />

between <strong>the</strong> institutional environment and <strong>the</strong> rules <strong>of</strong> a game,<br />

with institutions defining and limiting <strong>the</strong> set <strong>of</strong> choices available<br />

<strong>to</strong> individuals. 66 Individuals or individual entities enter in<strong>to</strong><br />

agreements <strong>to</strong> govern <strong>the</strong>ir specific relationships in light <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> background rules. 67 These arrangements are <strong>of</strong>ten referred<br />

<strong>to</strong> as governance structures, and include <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> contracts<br />

and different types <strong>of</strong> public and private bureaucracy as alternative<br />

ways <strong>to</strong> organize economic activities. 68 Governance involves<br />

<strong>the</strong> interaction <strong>of</strong> public and private orderings; public<br />

ordering can be viewed as <strong>the</strong> “rules <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> game,” while private<br />

ordering can be viewed as <strong>the</strong> “play <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> game.” 69 Organizations<br />

can be unders<strong>to</strong>od as groups <strong>of</strong> people and <strong>the</strong> arrangements<br />

those people create <strong>to</strong> coordinate <strong>the</strong>ir collective actions,<br />

and include firms, government entities, universities, families,<br />

64. NIE provides multiple methodologies for studying economic behavior,<br />

including a combination <strong>of</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matical modeling, case studies, econometric<br />

modeling, and experiments <strong>to</strong> test alternative <strong>the</strong>ories. See Joskow, supra note<br />

59, at xxxix-xli (exploring <strong>the</strong> methodologies <strong>of</strong> NIE). NIE encompasses diverse<br />

work on transaction costs, agency costs, property rights, incomplete contracts,<br />

social costs, collective action, and hierarchy and organization. See, e.g., Brian<br />

Dollery, New Institutional Economics and <strong>the</strong> <strong>An</strong>alysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Sec<strong>to</strong>r, 18<br />

REV. POL’Y RES. 185 passim (2001).<br />

65. See North, supra note 60.<br />

66. Id. at Part III.<br />

67. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE<br />

4–5 (1996).<br />

68. See, e.g., id. at 5.<br />

69. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Lens <strong>of</strong> Contract: Private Ordering, 92<br />

AM. ECON. REV. 438, 438 (2002).

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