October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm

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International Security 12:3 138 BUNDY: I don't see why we pick that track when he's offered us the other track, within the last twenty-four hours. You think the public one is serious? JFK: Yeah. I think you have to assume that this is their new and latest position and it's a public one. RUSK: What would you think of releasing the letter of yesterday? (Pause.) BUNDY: I think it has a good deal of virtue. JFK: Yes, but I think we have to be now thinking about what our position's going to be on this one, because this is the one that's before us, and before the world. (Short pause.) SORENSEN: As between the two I think it clear that practically everyone here would favor the private proposal. RUSK: We're not being offered the choice-we may not be offered the choice. JFK: But seriously, there are disadvantages also in the private one, which is a guarantee of Cuba. But in any case this is now his official we can release his other one, and it's different, but this is the one that the Soviet government obviously is going on. NITZE: Isn't it possible that they're going on a dual track, one a public track and the other a private track; the private track is related to (words unclear), and the public track is one that's in order to confuse the public scene [and bring?] additional pressures. JFK: Possible- - THOMPSON: I think it's one that the Soviets take seriously. RUSK: I think, yes, I think that the-uh-NATO-Warsaw Pact arms problem is a separate problem and ought to be discussed between NATO and Warsaw Pact. They've got hundreds of missiles looking down the throat of every NATO country. And I think this is-we have to get it into that context. The Cuba thing is a Western Hemisphere problem, an intrusion in the Western Hemisphere. NITZE: I think we ought to stand as much as we can on the separate stages. VOICE: Absolutely....
October 27, 1962 ExComm Transcripts | 39 NITZE: Fight the Turkish one with the best arguments we can. I'd handle this thing so that we continue on the real track which is to try to get the missiles out of Cuba pursuant to the private negotiation. BUNDY: The other way, it seems to me-if we accept the notion of a trade at this stage, our position will come apart very fast. It's a very difficult position. It isn't as if we'd got the missiles out, Mr. President. It'd be different. Or if we had any understanding with the Turks that they ought to come out, it would be different. Neither of these is the case. JFK: I'd just like to know how much we've done about it and how much did we talk about it- - BUNDY: We decided not to, Mr. President. We decided not to play it directly with the Turks. RUSK: ... our own representatives- - BALL: If we talked to the Turks, they would take it up in NATO. This thing would be all over Western Europe, and our position would have been undermined. BUNDY: That's right. BALL: Because immediately the Soviet Union would know that this thing was being discussed. The Turks feel very strongly about this. They-uh- we persuaded them that this was an essential requirement, and they- they feel that it's a matter of prestige and a matter of real- - BUNDY: In their own terms it would already be clear that we were trying to sell our allies for our interests. That would be the view in all of NATO. It's irrational, and it's crazy, but it's a terribly powerful fact. THOMPSON: Particularly in the case that this is a message to the U.N., to U Thant. It seems to me we ought to get word to [U.N. Ambassador Adlai] Stevenson that if this is put up there he should immediately say we will not discuss-discuss the Turkish bases. BUNDY: The problem is Cuba. The Turks are not a threat to the peace.... JFK: I think it would be very desirable to tell (word unclear) that until we get time to think about it, this thing-the fact of the matter is that we received a letter last night from Khrushchev with an entirely different proposal. Therefore we first ought to get clarification from the Soviet Union of what they're talking, at least give us-as I say you're going to find a lot of people think this a rather reasonable condition.
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BUNDY: Yes, sir. October 27, 1962 E
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October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm

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