October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm

International Security 12:3 | 62
I'm certain, but the only thing is I don't want him-that's why we've
got to end-end with saying, whatever we're going to do, that we've
got to get a cessation of work.
BUNDY: That's right, but I think that Bobby's notion of a concrete acceptance
on our part of how we read last night's telegram is very important- -
JFK: In other words you want to-you have to get them to say we accept
your proposal.
The Shoot-down of the U-2
Late in the afternoon of October 27, we move into what some recall being
the most dramatic hours of the Cuban missile crisis. The discussions take on
an unmistakable urgency, as Taylor reports that low-flying American recon-
naissance aircraft have encountered anti-aircraft fire, probably from Cuban-
controlled batteries. There is general agreement with Taylor's assessment
that 24-hour surveillance is absolutely necessary at this stage. But in the face
of anti-aircraft fire from the Cubans, McNamara argues, "we have to put a
cover on"-that is, provide protection for the reconnaissance aircraft. He
then presents the President with his options: limited fire at the offending
anti-aircraft batteries the next day (Sunday), or go in the following day
(Monday) and destroy all the batteries. The President thinks the latter course
will be necessary, although he postpones the decision a day to determine
whether a general pattern is developing or whether the fire just encountered
was an aberration.
The ExComm next receives news that Major Anderson's U-2 has been shot
down over Cuba. This has been generally believed to be the single most
significant event of the missile crisis, so frightening and sobering to the
American leadership that they sought and found a way to resolve the crisis
peacefully less than 24 hours later.17 The U-2 shoot-down posed difficult
questions: the SAMs in Cuba were believed to be under control of the Soviets,
unlike the anti-aircraft batteries which were controlled by Cubans. Did this
mean that the tougher, second letter from Khrushchev was only part of a
plan to rush the Americans to the brink, or over it, and that such a plan
17. For a fuller discussion of the importance of the U-2 shootdown, see David A. Welch and
James G. Blight, "The Eleventh Hour: An Introduction to the ExComm Transcripts," International
Security, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Winter 1987/88) pp. 19-22.