October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm

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International Security 12:3 | 56 RUSK: Mr. President, here's one other variation here that Mr. Foster14 has given some thought to, and that is that we say that the missiles in Cuba and the missiles in Turkey be turned over to the U.N. for destruction and that the-uh-nuclear defense of NATO, including Tur- key, is provided by other means. An actual disarmament step, send them off for destruction on both sides. THOMPSON: The Soviets don't want to let anybody get at them, and see what their technology is. VOICE: Take them out. JFK: I think that-uh-the real problem is what we do with the Turks first. VOICE: Yeah. JFK: If we follow Secretary McNamara, what we're going to do is say to the Turks-which they're bound to think is-uh-under Soviet pressure, we want to get your missiles out of there. MCNAMARA: Well what I'd say-what I'd say to the Turks: "Look here, we're going to have to invade Cuba. You're in mortal danger. We want to reduce your danger while at the same time maintaining your defense. We propose that you defuse those missiles tonight. We're putting Polaris submarines along your coast. We'll cover the same targets that your Jupiter missiles did, and we'll announce this to the world before we invade Cuba and thereby would reduce the pressure on the Soviet Union to attack you, Turkey, as a response to our invasion of Cuba." Now this is what I would say to the Turks. RFK: Now, then they say-uh-what if the Soviet Union attacks us any- way[?] Will you use the missiles on the nuclear submarines? MCNAMARA: Then I think, before we attack Cuba I think we've got to decide how we'll respond to Soviet military pressure on NATO, and I'm not pre- pared to answer the question. BUNDY: Well we haven't tried the block-the enlargement of the blockade. We haven't even thought about it for some hours, and it's been on my mind a good deal. POL15 we still have to- - 14. William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 15. "POL" refers to petroleum, oil and lubricants. Bundy is suggesting that the ExComm may want to add these items to the list of items restricted by the quarantine.
Approval of the Trollope Ploy October 27, 1962 ExComm Transcripts | 57 In the first major turning point of the discussion, the President is at length led by some ExComm members to wonder whether it is absolutely necessary to trade missiles publicly in order to resolve the crisis peacefully. At the conclusion of this sequence the President approves the Trollope Ploy. First, Bundy and Sorensen argue that the President ought to consider a private response to the first, acceptable Khrushchev letter. For the time being, this idea seems to lay fallow mainly because whether the response is private or public seems to the President secondary to his belief that the terms of the second offer, requiring the missile trade, are necessary to any resolution of the crisis. But this belief is powerfully challenged in a pivotal exchange with Thompson: JFK: ... we're going to have to take our weapons out of Turkey .... Thompson: I don't agree, Mr. President, I think there's still a chance that we can get this line going. JFK: He'll back down? Thompson: Well, because he's already got this other proposal which he put forward. . . . The important thing for Khrushchev, it seems to me, is to be able to say "I saved Cuba, I stopped an invasion. . ." Not that Thompson convinces the President easily. In fact, the President appears never to have quite believed that a deal could be struck with Khru- shchev on the basis of the non-invasion pledge alone. But Thompson's forthright contradiction of one of the President's fundamental assumptions prompts increased insistence by RFK, Bundy and Sorensen that Thompson might be right. Finally, the President agrees and so the Trollope Ploy is on its way to becoming policy. 16 VOICE: There's nothing strange (words unclear) different bargain- - THOMPSON: Mr. President, if we go on the basis of a trade which I gather is- somewhat in your mind, we end up, it seems to me with the Soviets still in Cuba with planes and technicians and so on even though the 16. It appears that the reluctance of the President to forego the trade and embrace the Trollope Ploy was also due to his keen awareness of the price of being wrong. The President Kennedy who emerges from this transcript has a sense that if his advisors are wrong, if the Soviets do require a missile trade, and if the U.S. fails its chance at such a trade and has to go to war, the trade will retrospectively increase in attractiveness and in proportion to the destructiveness of the resulting war.
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October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm

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