October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm

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Editor's Note International Security 12:3 | 32 Each section of transcript excerpt is preceded by James G. Blight's summary of background and developments of the crisis, indicated by larger type. Bracketed paragraphs within each transcript section summarize parts of the full transcript not reprinted here. Italics within the transcript indicate emphasis noted by transcriber McGeorge Bundy. Minor changes in punctuation and capitalization made by the editor are not indicated. The following conventions are used in the transcript: ) indicates transcriber's description of sounds or uninterpretable material. [ indicates information or punctuation supplied by the editor. ?] indicates tentative interpretations by the editor. .... .. indicates that a few words or transcriber's description of sounds (such as "voices unclear") have been omitted by the editor. a line of ellipses in the left margin indicates that more than one line or more than one speaker has been omitted by the editor. [deleted] indicates deletion of classified material by the sanitizers of the transcript. VOICE: in the left margin indicates a speaker whose identity was not clear to the transcriber. indicates that the speaker trails off or has been interrupted. The Annotated October 27 Transcripts The Two Letters From Khrushchev Soviet Premier Khrushchev's first, private letter to President Kennedy on October 26 vaguely proposed a favorable deal: the Soviets would withdraw their missiles from Cuba in return for an American pledge not to invade the
October 27, 1962 ExComm Transcripts | 33 island.' The transcript begins with the ExComm in consternation and initial confusion after having received Khrushchev's second, public, and more de- manding letter. The letter demanded that American Jupiter missiles be re- moved from Turkey in exchange for removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. The members of the ExComm wonder which they should regard as the real Soviet offer. It is clear that all would prefer to reach an accord that does not include the appearance of trading the Jupiter missiles. There ensues a wide-ranging discussion in which the President, believing that a trade of missiles will appear fair and reasonable to many observers, is confronted with arguments that such a trade might be very difficult and potentially very damaging to intra-NATO relations. Reasons are sought for believing in the efficacy of responding to the terms of the first letter while ignoring the second. The development of this response (nicknamed the "Trollope Ploy") can be traced in this transcript. The Trollope Ploy is en- dorsed by most ExComm members immediately, but the President initially resists. He believes it overlooks the wide public appeal of the missile trade proposed in the second letter from Khrushchev. The ExComm discusses why two letters were received so quickly, one public and one private, with contradictory contents and conflicting messages. Llewellyn Thompson suggests that after Khrushchev sent the first letter, the Soviets may have become aware of a statement of Austrian Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky, mentioning the possibility of a missile trade. Thompson suggests that either the Soviets interpreted the statement as a signal of American willingness to trade missiles, or the Soviets themselves put Kreisky up to it, then responded affirmatively to a "signal" they sent themselves. McGeorge Bundy suggests that the private Khrushchev proposal of the day before has been overruled by his harder-line colleagues in the Kremlin. Thompson suggests they may have been completely unaware of Khru- shchev's earlier letter at the time it was sent.2 After 25 years, however, the 1. Encouraging signs had also emerged from an unofficial channel opened up by the Soviets the day before. Alexander S. Fomin, ostensibly a Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washing- ton, but generally believed to be a high ranking officer of the KGB, had met with John Scali, State Department correspondent for ABC News, early in the afternoon at a Washington restau- rant. Fomin had asked Scali whether he thought the U.S. would agree to a deal for ending the crisis that involved, in essence, a Soviet pledge to withdraw the missiles from Cuba and never to replace them, for an American pledge not to invade Cuba. Scali took this proposal to Dean Rusk, who sent him back to tell Fomin that the U.S. government would be interested in such a proposal, but also to tell him that time was getting short. See Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 217-19. 2. Marc Trachtenberg has recently advanced the hypothesis that shortly after the first Khru- shchev letter was sent, the Soviets became aware of secret American diplomatic activity at the
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BUNDY: Yes, sir. October 27, 1962 E
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October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm

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