Shifting Alliances in the Accreditation of Higher Education: On the ...

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discourage pollution since the cost of the pollution—environmental damage and health risks—is not usually borne by those producing the pollution. 12 The alleged efficiency of market solutions depends on certain assumptions being made; in particular, there must be ―low transaction costs, perfect information, and the absence of collective action problems.‖ 13 Further, the efficiency that results from market solutions does not necessarily satisfy distributional concerns. That is, overall efficiency may be achieved without government regulation in certain cases, but this often overlooks distributive consequences that may further diminish efficiency, not to mention basic values such as fairness. Government regulation may also be used to deal with collective action problems, as when workers are unable to organize to insist on safety rights. 14 Collective action problems are not unique to labor, however; firms may face collective action problems resulting from the need to remain competitive by maintaining low costs. For example, firms may find themselves unable to pursue costly, but environmentally responsible, policies unless they can be certain that their competitors are doing the same. In such a case, there must be some uniform set of standards that is being imposed upon all firms within the industry, as well as a reliable system of monitoring and enforcing those standards. 15 12 Lindblom, The Market System, 147-153. 13 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ―International ‗Standards‘ and International Governance,‖ Journal of European Public Policy, 8:3 (2001): 348. taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/8CFAP21MMLYP5R3U.pdf 14 Ibid., 349-350. 15 Ibid., 353. 17
Traditionally, at least, the function of regulator has been fulfilled by the public sector and the target of regulation has most often been the private sector. Early theories of regulation, therefore, focused almost exclusively on government as the designer and implementer of regulation. The vast majority of these early theories were public interest theories, which were built around the assumption that government regulation ―is supplied in response to the demand of the public for the correction of inefficient or inequitable market practices.‖ 16 Public interest theory assumes that economic markets are imperfect and that regulation is simply government‘s response to the public demand that these imperfections be put right. Richard Posner, for one, disputes this notion, arguing that if this were really the reason for government regulation, one would expect to see government regulation occurring almost exclusively within industries that suffer from such market imperfections as monopolies or diseconomies. Such a correlation is not found, however, and from this Posner concludes that government regulation is not, in fact, a response to market imperfections. Posner reformulates public interest theory to suggest that perhaps ―regulatory agencies are created for bona fide public purposes,‖ but that they are ―then mismanaged, with the result that those purposes are not always achieved.‖ 17 He then goes on to dismiss even this watered-down version of public interest theory on the basis that much of the evidence actually suggests that ―the socially undesirable results of regulation are 16 Richard A. Posner, ―Theories of Economic Regulation,‖ The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5, no. 2 (Autumn, 1974): 335. 17 Ibid., 337. 18
Page 1 and 2: Shifting Alliances in the Accredita
Page 3 and 4: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Although I did the
Page 5 and 6: TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract…
Page 7 and 8: The agents in this case-study are r
Page 9 and 10: dynamics within that self-regulatin
Page 11 and 12: never fully defined within the arti
Page 13 and 14: considered, and the implications of
Page 15 and 16: Section Two, “A Service to the Br
Page 17 and 18: November 14, 2007. In addition to h
Page 19 and 20: The long-term consequences of the d
Page 21 and 22: differences for self-regulation the
Page 23: Government Regulation: Addressing M
Page 27 and 28: A variation of public and private i
Page 29 and 30: All of the aforementioned theories
Page 31 and 32: government tying the requirements o
Page 33 and 34: government might have imposed upon
Page 35 and 36: egulating regimes should be expecte
Page 37 and 38: truly regulate themselves, as oppos
Page 39 and 40: suggests that the burden of proof s
Page 41 and 42: professionals while also creating b
Page 43 and 44: of research and were attracting pro
Page 45 and 46: y the higher education community to
Page 47 and 48: These distinctions between self-reg
Page 49 and 50: Although the accreditation associat
Page 51 and 52: neatly and the accreditors were, fo
Page 53 and 54: Operational viability refers to the
Page 55 and 56: The following chapter will transfor
Page 57 and 58: What are the long term consequences
Page 59 and 60: problem. Such a hypothesis would ha
Page 61 and 62: certifies predetermined qualificati
Page 63 and 64: Actor Designation in Political Anal
Page 65 and 66: "(B) that consists of not less than
Page 67 and 68: each category has its own constitue
Page 69 and 70: Shared characteristics do not neces
Page 71 and 72: there have been fewer major policy
Page 73 and 74: The following chapter will explain
Page 75 and 76:
goal is not simply to test pre-exis
Page 77 and 78:
NY: NOVA Science Publishers, Inc. I
Page 79 and 80:
principals problem will be determin
Page 81 and 82:
etween the regionals and the federa
Page 83 and 84:
Introduction CHAPTER FIVE: THE ACCR
Page 85 and 86:
I. The Development of the Accredita
Page 87 and 88:
- and the principles of commerce -
Page 89 and 90:
This ruling greatly reduced the pow
Page 91 and 92:
colleges didn‘t have any admissio
Page 93 and 94:
In 1905, frustrated by the federal
Page 95 and 96:
Office of Education to compile a cl
Page 97 and 98:
the reputations of those schools th
Page 99 and 100:
Louis G. Geiger, in his written his
Page 101 and 102:
II. “A Service to the Broader Com
Page 103 and 104:
apparent that the states had used a
Page 105 and 106:
the Veterans Administration, which
Page 107 and 108:
meant that no proprietary school co
Page 109 and 110:
affected by adverse accreditation d
Page 111 and 112:
institutions. By this move of admin
Page 113 and 114:
agendas of the institutions that re
Page 115 and 116:
Come into the ‗70s, you have the
Page 117 and 118:
were all kinds of charges that they
Page 119 and 120:
III. Baruch College v Middle States
Page 121 and 122:
Several member institutions of Midd
Page 123 and 124:
allocation for research.‖ 200 Per
Page 125 and 126:
stated that, as requested by Middle
Page 127 and 128:
Presbyterian belief must be men.‖
Page 129 and 130:
of saying ―no‖ to an accreditin
Page 131 and 132:
Analysis The actions taken by the M
Page 133 and 134:
the letter, Dr. James F. Guyot, wro
Page 135 and 136:
federal government and that, theref
Page 137 and 138:
Ideology One possibility that shoul
Page 139 and 140:
Middle States, it probably means eq
Page 141 and 142:
Logan: That's the best guess I've g
Page 143 and 144:
As noted previously, the principal-
Page 145 and 146:
The Department of Education does no
Page 147 and 148:
The legislation attempted to force
Page 149 and 150:
is an extremely disturbing abdicati
Page 151 and 152:
faced by the regional accreditation
Page 153 and 154:
education: access, affordability, a
Page 155 and 156:
Their attempt at using the accredit
Page 157 and 158:
The Chronicle of Higher Education a
Page 159 and 160:
advocacy depends on clear, open com
Page 161 and 162:
never attempted to discuss the matt
Page 163 and 164:
However, if the regionals were cons
Page 165 and 166:
The respondent‘s answer clearly i
Page 167 and 168:
with our backs to the public, to st
Page 169 and 170:
Interviews with Leaders of Regional
Page 171 and 172:
Commissions: The Commission on Accr
Page 173 and 174:
accalaureate degree and above in Ca
Page 175 and 176:
A conscious decision was also made
Page 177 and 178:
accommodating accreditation to fit
Page 179 and 180:
espondents cited the increasingly i
Page 181 and 182:
The third broad category of signifi
Page 183 and 184:
institutional effectiveness standar
Page 185 and 186:
B) For each of those shifts, what w
Page 187 and 188:
federal, state, and local governmen
Page 189 and 190:
Finally, two of the responses rejec
Page 191 and 192:
elow: The complete texts of the res
Page 193 and 194:
shift our stance from facing the in
Page 195 and 196:
identified in the hypotheses. Rathe
Page 197 and 198:
didn‘t work out very well. And so
Page 199 and 200:
And they [the Department of Educati
Page 201 and 202:
The relative tightness of competing
Page 203 and 204:
accreditation system were not ident
Page 205 and 206:
The Baruch case suggested several a
Page 207 and 208:
accreditation… I‘m very passion
Page 209 and 210:
the regionals; certainly the insist
Page 211 and 212:
Degree of Co-Dependency between Age
Page 213 and 214:
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION The follo
Page 215 and 216:
several reasons, among them the per
Page 217 and 218:
Bibliography 210
Page 219 and 220:
Brumbaugh, A. J. ―The Significanc
Page 221 and 222:
―Frank Newman Memorium.‖ The Sp
Page 223 and 224:
Haufler, Virginia. Public Role for
Page 225 and 226:
Mattli, Walter and Tim Büthe. ―A
Page 227 and 228:
Rupe, Manuel R.. ―Higher Educatio
Page 229 and 230:
Weiss, Samuel. ―Education Chief C
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