Shifting Alliances in the Accreditation of Higher Education: On the ...

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION The study of accreditation and institutional eligibility is only to a small degree an educational issue; it is more a political issue, a study of how the power to distribute benefits is generated, channeled, and regulated. David A. Trivett, Accreditation and Institutional Eligibility On December 5, 2006, the U.S. Department of Education, via the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI), accused the American Academy for Liberal Education (AALE), a privately run accrediting agency, of failing to meet its responsibilities to the American public and then essentially shut it down. 1 The underlying reasons for this action are open to debate, but the questions that were raised by the actions taken by the federal government are indicative of a much larger issue that is occurring throughout the world: the attempt to reconcile private authority with public accountability. Governments have found it useful in numerous cases to adopt the standards, rules, licensing requirements, and other outputs of privately run, self-regulatory bodies for their own purposes. These self-regulatory bodies are created by members of a given industry or profession and the governance of such bodies is usually reflective of the power 1 Elizabeth Redden, ―The Heat is Turned Up,‖ Inside Higher Ed. (December 6, 2006), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/12/06/aale 1
dynamics within that self-regulating sector. A well-known example of a self-regulatory body would be the American Bar Association, which regulates the legal profession and which is made up of representatives from that same profession. Adopting standards established by pre-existing, self-regulatory bodies is often significantly less resource-intensive than starting from scratch. The growing reliance on privately established standards and rules can also be attributed to the contemporary perception that governments are highly inefficient as compared to the private sector. From this perspective, it appears far more logical to simply incorporate the rules that have been already been established by the experts within industries rather than set government bureaucrats with limited industry-knowledge loose to regulate that which they may not fully comprehend. This study examines the long term consequences of the delegation of government authority to self-regulatory organizations. In Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe‘s article, Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest, the authors distinguish between the consequences of delegating government authority to a public agent, such as a government agency, and the delegation of that authority to a private agent: ―…[T]he key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals problem emerges that is qualitatively different from the one usually considered in the literature. An agent‘s action will be determined by the relative tightness of competing principal-agent relationships. This tightness is a function of the relative importance of each principal 2
Page 1 and 2: Shifting Alliances in the Accredita
Page 3 and 4: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Although I did the
Page 5 and 6: TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract…
Page 7: The agents in this case-study are r
Page 11 and 12: never fully defined within the arti
Page 13 and 14: considered, and the implications of
Page 15 and 16: Section Two, “A Service to the Br
Page 17 and 18: November 14, 2007. In addition to h
Page 19 and 20: The long-term consequences of the d
Page 21 and 22: differences for self-regulation the
Page 23 and 24: Government Regulation: Addressing M
Page 25 and 26: Traditionally, at least, the functi
Page 27 and 28: A variation of public and private i
Page 29 and 30: All of the aforementioned theories
Page 31 and 32: government tying the requirements o
Page 33 and 34: government might have imposed upon
Page 35 and 36: egulating regimes should be expecte
Page 37 and 38: truly regulate themselves, as oppos
Page 39 and 40: suggests that the burden of proof s
Page 41 and 42: professionals while also creating b
Page 43 and 44: of research and were attracting pro
Page 45 and 46: y the higher education community to
Page 47 and 48: These distinctions between self-reg
Page 49 and 50: Although the accreditation associat
Page 51 and 52: neatly and the accreditors were, fo
Page 53 and 54: Operational viability refers to the
Page 55 and 56: The following chapter will transfor
Page 57 and 58: What are the long term consequences
Page 59 and 60:
problem. Such a hypothesis would ha
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certifies predetermined qualificati
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Actor Designation in Political Anal
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"(B) that consists of not less than
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each category has its own constitue
Page 69 and 70:
Shared characteristics do not neces
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there have been fewer major policy
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The following chapter will explain
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goal is not simply to test pre-exis
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NY: NOVA Science Publishers, Inc. I
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principals problem will be determin
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etween the regionals and the federa
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Introduction CHAPTER FIVE: THE ACCR
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I. The Development of the Accredita
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- and the principles of commerce -
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This ruling greatly reduced the pow
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colleges didn‘t have any admissio
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In 1905, frustrated by the federal
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Office of Education to compile a cl
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the reputations of those schools th
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Louis G. Geiger, in his written his
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II. “A Service to the Broader Com
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apparent that the states had used a
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the Veterans Administration, which
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meant that no proprietary school co
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affected by adverse accreditation d
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institutions. By this move of admin
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agendas of the institutions that re
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Come into the ‗70s, you have the
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were all kinds of charges that they
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III. Baruch College v Middle States
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Several member institutions of Midd
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allocation for research.‖ 200 Per
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stated that, as requested by Middle
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Presbyterian belief must be men.‖
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of saying ―no‖ to an accreditin
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Analysis The actions taken by the M
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the letter, Dr. James F. Guyot, wro
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federal government and that, theref
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Ideology One possibility that shoul
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Middle States, it probably means eq
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Logan: That's the best guess I've g
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As noted previously, the principal-
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The Department of Education does no
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The legislation attempted to force
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is an extremely disturbing abdicati
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faced by the regional accreditation
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education: access, affordability, a
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Their attempt at using the accredit
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The Chronicle of Higher Education a
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advocacy depends on clear, open com
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never attempted to discuss the matt
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However, if the regionals were cons
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The respondent‘s answer clearly i
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with our backs to the public, to st
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Interviews with Leaders of Regional
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Commissions: The Commission on Accr
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accalaureate degree and above in Ca
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A conscious decision was also made
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accommodating accreditation to fit
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espondents cited the increasingly i
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The third broad category of signifi
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institutional effectiveness standar
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B) For each of those shifts, what w
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federal, state, and local governmen
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Finally, two of the responses rejec
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elow: The complete texts of the res
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shift our stance from facing the in
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identified in the hypotheses. Rathe
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didn‘t work out very well. And so
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And they [the Department of Educati
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The relative tightness of competing
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accreditation system were not ident
Page 205 and 206:
The Baruch case suggested several a
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accreditation… I‘m very passion
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the regionals; certainly the insist
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Degree of Co-Dependency between Age
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION The follo
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several reasons, among them the per
Page 217 and 218:
Bibliography 210
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Brumbaugh, A. J. ―The Significanc
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―Frank Newman Memorium.‖ The Sp
Page 223 and 224:
Haufler, Virginia. Public Role for
Page 225 and 226:
Mattli, Walter and Tim Büthe. ―A
Page 227 and 228:
Rupe, Manuel R.. ―Higher Educatio
Page 229 and 230:
Weiss, Samuel. ―Education Chief C
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