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Haiti Case Study - The Department of Global Health and Social ...

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the USNS COMFORT was based largely on resource considerations. Thus, once earthquakerelated<br />

injuries levelled <strong>of</strong>f <strong>and</strong> the non-earthquake related injured <strong>and</strong> ill began seeking<br />

care from COMFORT 137 , the ship began a tacit program <strong>of</strong> “weaning,” whereby fewer <strong>and</strong> fewer<br />

patients were accepted, even though COMFORT had additional capacity. COMFORT left on 09<br />

March 2010 138 , 49 days after she treated her first patients.<br />

DISCUSSION<br />

30. Existing health facilities—already struggling to meet the needs <strong>of</strong> the population—were<br />

devastated by the earthquake, especially at the secondary <strong>and</strong> tertiary care levels.<br />

Hospitals, where they survived, were rapidly overwhelmed by patients. Military security <strong>and</strong><br />

military medical treatment facilities were used to temporarily strengthen the health system<br />

<strong>and</strong> clearly provided net benefit to the <strong>Haiti</strong>an population <strong>and</strong> in the immediate aftermath <strong>of</strong><br />

the disaster.<br />

31. <strong>The</strong>re were however some challenges faced by those providing security at existing<br />

medical treatment facilities <strong>and</strong> those working at military hospitals. It is worth noting that<br />

both military health facility providers considered in this narrative, although operating very<br />

different facilities <strong>and</strong> from different nations under different m<strong>and</strong>ates, faced similar<br />

challenges. Many <strong>of</strong> these challenges were also faced by NGOs operating treatment<br />

facilities. <strong>The</strong> following sections sum up the challenges faced.<br />

Military security provision at indigenous health facilities<br />

32. Initially, security did not appear to be a major concern on the ground: <strong>Haiti</strong> was not<br />

involved in armed conflict at the time <strong>of</strong> the earthquake. <strong>The</strong> immediate-post-shock stage<br />

affected everybody universally, an idea corroborated, for instance, by statistical data with<br />

respect to gunshot wound interventions in MSF facilities; there were about the half as many<br />

in the first month following the earthquake than in the following months. 139 As a<br />

consequence, there was no evidence <strong>of</strong> civil unrest outbreak <strong>and</strong> no particular report <strong>of</strong><br />

violence against health facilities. 140 Due to the lack <strong>of</strong> coordination <strong>and</strong> the absence <strong>of</strong> police<br />

forces during the first days, a military presence was helpful to secure the healthcare facilities<br />

<strong>and</strong> allow service providers the opportunity to triage casualties, until transition to local police<br />

or private security could be arranged.<br />

Building situation awareness <strong>and</strong> coordinating<br />

33. <strong>The</strong> early responders from the international community had to set up their facilities<br />

without coordination or st<strong>and</strong>ardization. At the outset, newly-arrived responding healthcare<br />

providers simply did not know what <strong>Haiti</strong>an (or pre-existing non-<strong>Haiti</strong>an) healthcare facility<br />

capabilities existed—they did not have comprehensive knowledge <strong>of</strong> what prior capabilities<br />

had existed to begin with <strong>and</strong> they did not know the current status <strong>of</strong> those capabilities. An<br />

assessment <strong>of</strong> the status <strong>of</strong> existing capabilities is required for any provider seeking to<br />

integrate with existing efforts. US military providers seemed to have among the best<br />

situation awareness in this respect following extensive pre-deployment surveys. Some<br />

private sector care providers sent personnel with h<strong>and</strong>held (e.g. Blackberry, Palm Pilot, etc.)<br />

communication devices to get data <strong>and</strong> develop a database <strong>of</strong> needs <strong>and</strong> capabilities. It<br />

seems that little information sharing took place in the early days <strong>and</strong> at least one observer<br />

felt this ad hoc effort to create a common operating picture ultimately took too long to set up.<br />

“By the time it could be up <strong>and</strong> running, need was over”, one US Government representative<br />

said.<br />

34. One surprising but undeniable feature <strong>of</strong> the effort to coordinate <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ardize efforts<br />

<strong>and</strong> build situation awareness was the role <strong>of</strong> personal knowledge <strong>and</strong> informal contacts<br />

among key players. Military contributions benefitted significantly from the ad hoc capability<br />

provided by informal contacts. It seems likely there will be a lack <strong>of</strong> coordination <strong>and</strong><br />

st<strong>and</strong>ardization to cope with at the start <strong>of</strong> any crisis response <strong>and</strong> informal contact networks<br />

are a pragmatic solution to overcome this challenge <strong>and</strong> should be encouraged.<br />

B-6

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