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Stealing Beauty: Pivot Point International v ... - UW Law School

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2006:1067 <strong>Stealing</strong> <strong>Beauty</strong> 1077<br />

that a particular expression of features on a doll’s face was not subject to<br />

copyright protection. 69 In its holding, the Goldberger court claimed that<br />

for a work to be copyrighted, it only has to have been “independently<br />

created” by the author and possess “some minimal degree of<br />

creativity.” 70 The court claimed that there are “innumerable ways of<br />

making upturned noses, bow lips, and widely spaced eyes,” all of which<br />

could be protected because each would be a particularized expression of<br />

the same idea, not a copy of the idea itself. 71 The Seventh Circuit<br />

applied the Goldberger case to <strong>Pivot</strong> <strong>Point</strong>, stating that Mara was merely<br />

the artist’s particularized expression of the “hungry look” of runway<br />

models, and was therefore copyrightable. 72<br />

II. THE CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTUAL SEPARABILITY<br />

Because of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in <strong>Pivot</strong> <strong>Point</strong>, it is<br />

significantly easier to determine whether an aesthetic element of a useful<br />

article is copyrightable or not. This section will describe the doctrine of<br />

conceptual separability in more depth and present several different<br />

proposed tests for conceptual separability, from both the Second Circuit<br />

and various legal thinkers. This section will then analyze the Seventh<br />

Circuit’s choice in combining the Brandir and Barnhart tests, and<br />

conclude that its synthesis of the tests adequately considers all of the<br />

rationales behind these competing tests while providing future courts<br />

with a workable test for determining whether conceptual separability<br />

exists.<br />

The doctrine of conceptual separability limits the copyrightability of<br />

useful items. 73 Generally, copyright protection is available to “original<br />

works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,”<br />

including “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.” 74 It is possible,<br />

however, for primarily useful articles to also have aesthetic elements that<br />

would otherwise place the entire item within this protected category. 75<br />

The doctrine of separability ensures that useful items 76 are only included<br />

69. Id. (discussing Goldberger, 365 F.3d 133).<br />

70. Id.<br />

71. Id.<br />

72. Id. at 931.<br />

73. See, e.g., id. at 931.<br />

74. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).<br />

75. See <strong>Pivot</strong> <strong>Point</strong>, 372 F.3d at 931.<br />

76. “Useful article” is defined as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian<br />

function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey<br />

information.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). For a judicial interpretation of this definition, see<br />

Langman Fabrics v. Graff Californiawear, 160 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that,

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