Stealing Beauty: Pivot Point International v ... - UW Law School

2006:1067 Stealing Beauty 1089
idea, which flies in the face of the merger doctrine. This section briefly
describes the merger doctrine and how it has been applied in other cases.
It then asserts that a universal standard of beauty exists in our society.
Because this standard is so uniform, this section argues that any artistic
expression of the standard cannot adequately be differentiated from the
standard of beauty itself. Applying this idea to Pivot Point, this section
concludes that Pivot Point’s use of the particularized features of 1980s
runway models should not be copyrightable because its expression
cannot be adequately separated from the prevailing standard of beauty in
the 1980s.
As stated in the introduction to this Note, the merger doctrine relies
on the fundamental copyright principle that copyrights only protect the
expressions of ideas, not the ideas themselves. 137 The merger doctrine
states that when there is only one way to express an idea, the expression
of the idea “merges” with the idea itself. 138 If the idea and expression are
inseparable, the expression is not entitled to copyright protection because
to grant copyright protection would be tantamount to granting protection
to the idea. 139 If, however, the idea can be divorced from and exist
wholly outside the expression, the expression is deserving of copyright
protection. 140
Courts have found that, at least for animal mannequins, the merger
doctrine does not apply—that is, the artists’ expression of the underlying
idea is sufficiently different from the idea that it constitutes a unique
expression deserving copyright protection. 141 Similarly, courts have
137. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133, 135-36
(2d Cir. 2004); Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 507 (7th
Cir. 1994); Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int’l, 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1983);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
138. See, e.g., Sharon Appel, Copyright, Digitization of Images, and Art
Museums: Cyberspace and Other New Frontiers, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 149, 162 n.48.
139. See, e.g., Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Web Surfing 101: The Evolving Law of
Hyperlinking, 2 BARRY L. REV. 37, 53 (2001).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 323 (2d
Cir. 1996) (holding that fish mannequins are copyrightable); Rushton Co. v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 135 F. Supp. 317, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding that the facial features
of a chimpanzee toy are copyrightable); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810-11 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that the elements that are natural to jellyfish physiology could not be
protected). The Satava holding is consistent with the notion that copyrights only protect
the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves. See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit stated that “a combination of unprotectable elements is
eligible for copyright protection . . . if those elements are numerous enough and their
selection and arrangement original enough that their combination constitutes an original
work of authorship.” Satava, 323 F.3d at 811.