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POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS - UW Law School

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WILLIAMS - FINAL 11/29/2007 4:07 PM<br />

2007:827 Postnuptial Agreements 877<br />

acceptable. 247 To the extent that this alimony scheme illegitimately<br />

assigns ownership rights over a spouse’s future income stream, the<br />

results of postnuptial bargaining will reflect that illegitimacy. Yet, even<br />

if postnuptial agreements are reflecting an underlying illegitimate<br />

property right, regulating postnuptial agreements is an extremely<br />

underinclusive way of addressing the problem. Courts and<br />

commentators should instead continue debating the proper alimony<br />

regime.<br />

B. The Communitarian Critique and a Brief Response<br />

The previous Section considered the benefits of postnuptial<br />

agreements for the spouses within a particular marriage and bracketed<br />

the question of possible externalities. But several communitarian and<br />

feminist communitarian theorists argue that enforcing postnuptial<br />

agreements sends an expressive signal that is corrosive to our shared<br />

notion of what constitutes a good relationship. They have argued that<br />

when a state supports a contractual view of marriage in general, it<br />

sends a signal that contracts are an, or perhaps the only, appropriate<br />

way to approach marriage. 248 Others might argue that, although<br />

prenuptial agreements are widely available, the state should not<br />

exacerbate the problem by allowing postnuptial agreements as well.<br />

Formal negotiations could be limited to the premarital stage, plausibly<br />

maintaining the marriage itself as a sphere governed by the ethic of care<br />

rather than personal self-interest.<br />

It is difficult, however, to maintain a firm distinction between the<br />

pre- and postnuptial contexts when the core challenge is grounded in a<br />

general aversion to contractual thinking. If law has a powerful,<br />

expressive force, then any differences in the law must be explained for<br />

247. In addition to postdivorce earnings, a husband’s value on the remarriage<br />

market contributes to his outside option. Unlike property entitlements, the state is not<br />

directly responsible for the biological differences between the length of men’s and<br />

women’s reproductive lives. See Wax, supra note 9, at 548. Under some theories of<br />

equality, however, the state may nonetheless be obligated to mitigate the costs that stem<br />

from this difference. This is beyond the scope of this Article. It is sufficient here to<br />

note that these arguments would require a large shift in the current and historical norms<br />

of state obligation.<br />

248. GLENDON, supra note 222, at 113 (suggesting that our cultural and legal<br />

vocabulary is dominated by individual rights and that this prevents Americans from<br />

accurately describing and dealing with social issues); Scott, supra note 82, at 717<br />

(“[T]he law’s description of marriage and family distorts the aspirations and<br />

experiences of many people.”). Some have argued that the use of a political and<br />

economic theory is a self-fulfilling prophecy. See REGAN, supra note 132, at 82<br />

(“Theory is also an attempt to understand ourselves, and such understandings enter in<br />

subtle ways into our sense of who we are and why we act.”).

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