Manufacturing the Muslim Menace - Political Research Associates

Conclusion
Since 9/11, Muslim
Americans have helped
thwart eleven al
Qaeda-related plots,
nearly one-third of all
such known planned
attacks that threatened
the United States.
48
Manufacturing the Muslim Menace
In the aftermath of 9/11, Arab and Muslim organizations
mobilized to demonstrate their commitment
to the United States while defending their
rights and distancing themselves from the terrorists.
In response to hate crimes, widespread discrimination,
and repressive government initiatives, these
groups asserted themselves, built new alliances
beyond their communities, and
made a variety of political, social,
and legal demands for inclusion
and respect.
Through fieldwork and interviews
with community leaders,
sociologists Anny Bakalian and
Mehdi Bozorgmehr showed how,
in the process of reassessing their
collective presence in the United
States, a distinct “American
Muslim” identity gained new currency
as “an identity that seeks to
assert its independence from forces abroad, one that
combines the essential elements of Islam and the values
of American constitutional democracy.” 290 This
broader-based renewal has also been accompanied by
Islam’s reassertion in public life: an increase in
Islamic oriented organizations, banks, social welfare
services, and educational institutions. 291
While a variety of Islamic religious tendencies
and movements may challenge many non-Muslim
Americans’ religious beliefs, they do not pose a threat
to the U.S. Constitution or Americans’ safety.
Nevertheless, scapegoats are formulated to turn intelligence
analysts and law enforcement professionals
against Muslims who express constitutionally-protected
religious beliefs, such as the right to wear
Muslim garb. 292
The Islamophobic messages conveyed to a varying
degree by trainers associated with the three
groups profiled in this report risk fostering resistance
to Muslims integration into the fabric of American
society. Trainers often treat public expressions of
POLITICAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
devout, fundamentalist, or “pure” Islam as evidence
of belief in a theology that supports terrorism. 293 The
ideological link between al Qaeda and fundamentalist
Islam is used to justify suspicion of devout
expressions of Islam that have nothing to do with
crime or terrorism. 294 An Islamic reawakening in
personal life does not signify support for violence,
intolerance, or anti-democratic views. Yet, Islamophobic
counterterrorist experts appear to identify
religious conversion as one step in the path to
becoming a violent terrorist. 295
Since 9/11, Muslim Americans have helped
thwart eleven al Qaeda-related plots, nearly one-third
of all such known planned attacks that threatened the
United States. 296 The tip that led to the FBI’s sting of
a Washington, D.C. subway bombing plot came from
a Pakistani-born man in the Muslim community. 297
If law enforcement has reason to believe that
there are potential terrorist threats within the Arab
and Muslim communities in the United States, it
should seek ways to work with the millions of law
abiding members of those communities to help identify
the true criminal threats, rather than treating the
entire communities as suspect. 298 If adopted by law
enforcement, the ideological, Islamophobic approach
advocated by the training groups profiled in this
Report leads to a number of unconstitutional and
otherwise negative outcomes:
Biased Intelligence Analysis: The equation
of Islam and terrorism may taint intelligence
analysis by grossly exaggerating the
threat factor and targeting innocent activity.
As reported by the Washington Post, local
police departments and Fusion Centers are
hiring their own trainers to develop terrorism
expertise, including some “selfdescribed
experts whose extremist views
are considered inaccurate and harmful by
the FBI and others in the intelligence community.”
299 In 2009, the DHS Office of