Legal Committee - World Model United Nations

e legally binding. While a political declaration does not
typically provide a very clear guide for state action as a
code, it can act as an influential document. This declaration
is focused on reducing threat of war or military class in the
South China Sea and has important significance in creating
an environment for cooperation, peace, and stability
and promoting trust, confidence building, and mutual
understanding between ASEAN and China. However, as with
most agreements, the enforcement of its principles remains
in the hands of its parties. Vietnam made an encouraging
statement on this point: “The Parties concerned reaffirm
that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China
Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region
and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the
eventual attainment of this objective.” 149
Under the agreement, the countries agreed to “resolve their
territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means,
without resorting to the threat or use of force, through
friendly consultations and negotiations.” 150 However, as
recent events demonstrate, Vietnam and China have not
been successful in abiding by the principles of the agreement
and ASEAN continues to discuss new ideas for resolving the
dispute.
Current Situation
Tensions have risen between Hanoi and Beijing, following
recent Vietnamese naval exercises in the resource-rich
sea. This Chinese-Vietnamese conflict has been escalating
since 1974 when China seized the Paracels from Vietnam
and killed several Vietnamese troops. In 1988 the two sides
collided again in the Spratlys, where Vietnam again suffered a
great loss, losing about 70 sailors. 151 The Philippines has also
had some minor encounters with Chinese, Vietnamese, and
Malaysian forces. China’s recently increasing aggressiveness
has contributed to the most recent rise in tension. Beijing
officials have issued some serious statements, one warning
their rivals to cease any mineral exploration in the area.
Additional accusations, such as a statement by the Philippines
that China is building up its military presence in the Spratlys
and claims of the Chinese navy intentionally disrupting two
Vietnamese exploration operations, have intensified anti-
Chinese feelings. Large anti-China protests on the streets of
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are evidence of this. Vietnam’s
recent attempt to hold live-fire exercises off its coast was seen
as a threatening action to Beijing. 152
Recent attempts at resolution have not been successful. China
has historically preferred more covert, bilateral agreements
negotiated with the individual leaders of other countries.
Other countries have disagreed with this method of solving
the problem, pushing for international mediation in full
public view and with complete transparency. The involvement
of the United Stated in July 2010, when US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton called for a binding code of conduct, was in
opposition of China’s interests. 153 Agreements such as the
United Nation’s 1982 convention seemed to provide a solid
framework for resolution, yet it contributed to the rise of
more claims and more disputes. Even bilateral agreements
by the Philippines and Vietnam with China have not made a
significant improvement in relations.
Recent times have been especially filled with tension,
featuring accusations by Vietnamese officials saying that
Chinese vessels cut cables to oil exploration ships in May and
June (Chinese officials have denied some of these accusations
and have warned Vietnam and other nations that only joint
oil exploration is acceptable), and several disputes between
Chinese and Philippines vessels. In March, two Chinese
maritime surveillance ships ordered a Philippines survey
ship to evacuate Reed Bank, inciting the Philippines to send
in military aircraft. 154
The conflict has evolved into even more of a global issue,
extending so far as to becoming a policy interest for the
United States. Statements by Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton that the United States had a “national interest” in
the South China Sea became a perceived threat to China’s
sovereignty. “Regarding the role of the United States in this,
the United States is not a claimant state to the dispute,” stated
the vice foreign minister, Cui Tiankai. “So it is better for the
United States to leave the dispute to be sorted out between
the claimant states.” Mr. Cui added, “I believe the individual
countries are actually playing with fire, and I hope the fire will
not be drawn to the United States.” 155 The United States has
not taken a side in the territorial disputes but has encouraged
peaceful resolution.
The United States and China differ greatly in their
perceptions of the South China Sea dispute. In July 2010,
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a statement at
the 10 th ASEAN Regional Forum that the South China Sea
Dispute is a “leading diplomatic priority” and “pivotal to
regional security.” 156 The greater presence of the United States
in the region has led to a series of quarrels over the dispute.
In March 2010, Chinese officials told two visiting senior
Obama administration officials that China would not tolerate
any interference in the South China Sea, which is now part
of its “core interest” of sovereignty. 157 Beijing interpreted
Clinton’s statement to be a signal that the United States was
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