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Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems - Network Research Lab

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These limits are the best possible and the equivocations in question can be<br />

either for key or message.<br />

The total redundancy DN for N letters <strong>of</strong> message is defined by<br />

DN = log G − H(M)<br />

where G is the total number <strong>of</strong> messages <strong>of</strong> length N and H(M) is the uncertainty<br />

in choosing one <strong>of</strong> these. In a secrecy system where the total number <strong>of</strong><br />

possible cryptograms is equal to the number <strong>of</strong> possible messages <strong>of</strong> length<br />

N, H(E)≤ log G. Consequently,<br />

Hence<br />

HE(K) = H(K) + H(M) − H(E)<br />

≥ H(K) − [ log G − H(M)].<br />

H(K) − HE(K) ≤ DN.<br />

This shows that, in a closed system, for example, the decrease in equivocation<br />

<strong>of</strong> key after N letters have been intercepted is not greater than the redundancy<br />

<strong>of</strong> N letters <strong>of</strong> the language. In such systems, which comprise the majority <strong>of</strong><br />

ciphers, it is only the existence <strong>of</strong> redundancy in the original messages that<br />

makes a solution possible.<br />

Now suppose we have a pure system. Let the different residue classes <strong>of</strong><br />

messages be C1, C2, C3, · · · , Cr, and the corresponding set <strong>of</strong> residue classes<br />

<strong>of</strong> cryptograms be C ′ 1, C ′ 2, C ′ 3, · · · , C ′ r. The probability <strong>of</strong> each E in C ′ 1 is the<br />

same:<br />

P (E) =<br />

P (Ci)<br />

ϕi<br />

E a member <strong>of</strong> Ci<br />

where ϕi is the number <strong>of</strong> different messages in Ci. Thus we have<br />

H(E) = − P (Ci) P (Ci)<br />

ϕi log<br />

i<br />

ϕi ϕi<br />

= − P (Ci)<br />

P (Ci) log<br />

Substituting in our equation for HE(K) we obtain:<br />

Theorem 11. For a pure cipher<br />

i<br />

HE(K) = H(K) + H(M) + P (Ci)<br />

P (Ci) log .<br />

This result can be used to compute HE(K) in certain cases <strong>of</strong> interest.<br />

689<br />

i<br />

ϕi<br />

ϕi

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