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Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems - Network Research Lab

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is that the decipherer knows the particular key being used, while the cryptanalyst<br />

knows only the a priori probabilities <strong>of</strong> the various keys in the set.<br />

The process <strong>of</strong> deciphering is that <strong>of</strong> applying the inverse <strong>of</strong> the particular<br />

transformation used in enciphering to the cryptogram. The process <strong>of</strong> cryptanalysis<br />

is that <strong>of</strong> attempting to determine the message (or the particular key)<br />

given only the cryptogram and the a priori probabilities <strong>of</strong> various keys and<br />

messages.<br />

There are a number <strong>of</strong> difficult epistemological questions connected with<br />

the theory <strong>of</strong> secrecy, or in fact with any theory which involves questions<br />

<strong>of</strong> probability (particularly a priori probabilities, Bayes’ theorem, etc.) when<br />

applied to a physical situation. Treated abstractly, probability theory can be<br />

put on a rigorous logical basis with the modern measure theory approach 45 .<br />

As applied to a physical situation, however, especially when “subjective”<br />

probabilities and unrepeatable experiments are concerned, there are many<br />

questions <strong>of</strong> logical validity. For example, in the approach to secrecy made<br />

here, a priori probabilities <strong>of</strong> various keys and messages are assumed known<br />

by the enemy cryptographer—how can one determine operationally if his estimates<br />

are correct, on the basis <strong>of</strong> his knowledge <strong>of</strong> the situation?<br />

One can construct artificial cryptographic situations <strong>of</strong> the “urn and die”<br />

type in which the a priori probabilities have a definite unambiguous meaning<br />

and the idealization used here is certainly appropriate. In other situations that<br />

one can imagine, for example an intercepted communication between Martian<br />

invaders, the a priori probabilities would probably be so uncertain as to<br />

be devoid <strong>of</strong> significance. Most practical cryptographic situations lie somewhere<br />

between these limits. A cryptanalyst might be willing to classify the<br />

possible messages into the categories “reasonable”, “possible but unlikely”<br />

and “unreasonable”, but feel that finer subdivision was meaningless.<br />

Fortunately, in practical situations, only extreme errors in a priori probabilities<br />

<strong>of</strong> keys and messages cause significant errors in the important parameters.<br />

This is because <strong>of</strong> the exponential behavior <strong>of</strong> the number <strong>of</strong> messages<br />

and cryptograms, and the logarithmic measures employed.<br />

3 REPRESENTATION OF SYSTEMS<br />

A secrecy system as defined above can be represented in various ways. One<br />

which is convenient for illustrative purposes is a line diagram, as in Figs. 2<br />

and 4. The possible messages are represented by points at the left and the<br />

possible cryptograms by points at the right. If a certain key, say key 1, transforms<br />

message M2 into cryptogram E4 then M2 and E4 are connected by a<br />

4 See J. L. Doob, “Probability as Measure”, Annals <strong>of</strong> Math. Stat., v. 12, 1941, pp. 206–214.<br />

5 A. Kolmogor<strong>of</strong>f, “Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung”, Ergebnisse der Mathematic, v.<br />

2, No. 3 (Berlin 1933).<br />

664

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