1 Harvard University Political Theory Colloquium For 11 March 2010 ...

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scrutiny in the ‘denial of akrasia’ passage: Socrates introduces the views of the
many only insofar as he can enlist Protagoras in a joint refutation of them, and so
bring Protagoras himself to admit further implications of the priority of
knowledge (such as, eventually, the connection between courage and knowledge,
closing the second frame).
What completes the inner frame is clearly marked in the text, but is both surprising in
itself and surprisingly seldom noted in the literature. This is Socrates’ conclusion of the
putative joint refutation of the many by inferring that since ‘being overcome by pleasure’
is actually ignorance, it is therefore curable by teaching: hence, he concludes, the many
would do well to pay for themselves and their children to be instructed by the sophists.
He goes so far as to propose that he and Protagoras say to the many: ‘By worrying about
your money and not giving it to them [the sophists], you all do badly in both private and
public life’ (Prt. 357e, trans. Lombardo & Bell). This last sentence – and the warm
approbation it elicits from Hippias and Prodicus as well as Protagoras – should be a red
flag for those interpreters, such as George Rudebusch, who embrace the measure doctrine
as a full account of Socratic knowledge, and so embrace a fully hedonistic Socrates. 11
(Another more minor red flag may be the enjoinder to Protagoras to join in ‘persuading’
and ‘teaching’ people at 353a: Protagoras and his fellow sophists are comfortable with
the language of ‘teaching’, but it fits uneasily with Socrates). Socrates here presents
himself and Protagoras as jointly persuading the many to give their money to the sophists
and so to do better by learning the art of measurement and so not being overcome by
pleasure. In effect, he concludes the measure doctrine by framing the art of measurement
as the newest line in the sophistic bag of tricks. 12
My analysis of the text takes this red flag seriously. By looking at each frame in
turn, and then at the core discussion and refutation of the views of the many, I shall argue
that by submerging what I will call the executive dimension or intrinsic executive role of
knowledge, the measure doctrine gives only a partial and misleading account of what
Socrates means by knowledge, so deteriorating into sophistry and aporia. However,
there are clues in the text which signal what is going wrong and provide the lineaments of
an alternative view, on which the crucial issue is the success or failure of knowledge in