1 Harvard University Political Theory Colloquium For 11 March 2010 ...

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  28  Garnsey, Peter (2007). Thinking about Property: From Antiquity to the Age of Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gergel, Tania (2000). ‘Rhetoric and Reason: Structures of Argument in Plato’s Crito’. Ancient Philosophy 20:2, 289-310. Gombay, André (1988). ‘Some Paradoxes of Counterprivacy’. Philosophy 63: 244, 191- 210. Grube, G.M.A., rev. C.D.C. Reeve (trans.) (1997). Republic. In John M. Cooper with D.S. Hutchinson (eds) Plato. Complete Works, 971-1223. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett. Klosko, George (1980). ‘On the Analysis of Protagoras 351B-360E’. Phoenix 34:4, 307- 22. Lane, Melissa (1998a). ‘Argument and Agreement in Plato’s Crito’. History of Political Thought 19:3, 313-30. ----- [as Lane, M.S.] (1998b). Method and Politics in Plato’s Statesman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ----- (2006). ‘The evolution of eironeia in classical Greek texts: why Socratic eironeia is not Socratic irony’. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 31, 49-83. ----- (2007). ‘Virtue as the Love of Knowledge in Plato’s Symposium and Republic’. In Dominic Scott (ed.) Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, 44-67. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lesses, Glenn (1992). ‘Commentary on Ferrari’. In John J. Cleary and Daniel C. Shartin (eds) Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Philosophy 1990 (vol.VI), 141-50. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Lombardo, Stanley, and Karen Bell (trans.) (1997). Protagoras. In John M. Cooper with D.S. Hutchinson (eds) Plato. Complete Works, 746-90. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett. [First published as Protagoras / Plato with introduction by Michael Frede (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992).] McGeer, Victoria (1996). ‘Is “Self-Knowledge” An Empirical Problem? Renegotiating the Space of Philosophical Explanation’. The Journal of Philosophy 93:10, 483-515. ----- (2007). ‘The Moral Development of First-Person Authority’. European Journal of Philosophy 16:1, 81-108. Mele, Alfred (1992 [1987]). Irrationality : An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  29  Moran, Richard (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001. North, Helen (1966). Sophrosyne : self-knowledge and self-restraint in Greek literature. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Penner, Terry (1997). ‘Socrates on the Strength of Knowledge: Protagoras 351B-357E’. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 79, 117-49. Pettit, Philip, and Michael Smith (1993). ‘Practical Unreason’. Mind, New Series, 102: 405, 53-79. Pettit, Philip (2003). ‘Akrasia, Collective and Individual’. In Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (eds.) Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, 68-95. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rudebusch, George (2000). Socrates, Pleasure, and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schwitzgebel, Eric (unpublished typescript: version dated 2008). ‘Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs, or the Gulf between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief’. Online at http://faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz. Sedley, David (1992). ‘Commentary on Mansfeld.’ Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 6, 146-57. Shoemaker, Sydney (1996). ‘Moore’s paradox and self-knowledge’. In Shoemaker, The first-person perspective: and other essays, 74-93. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Earlier version published in Philosophical Studies 77 (1995) 211-28.] Sissa, Giulia (1997). Le plaisir et le mal: philosophie de la drogue. Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob. Taylor, C.C.W. (trans. and ed.) (1976). Protagoras. Plato. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Vlastos, Gregory (1969). ‘Socrates on Acrasia [sic]’. Phoenix 23:1, 73-88. Walsh, James J. (1980 [1971]). ‘The Socratic Denial of Akrasia’. In Gregory Vlastos (ed.) The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays, 235-63. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. [This is ch.1 of Walsh, Aristotle’s Conception of Moral Weakness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).] Watson, Gary (1977). ‘Skepticism about Weakness of Will’. The Philosophical Review 86:3, 316-39.
Page 1 and 2:   1  Harvard University Politic
Page 3 and 4:   3  (Pettit 2004: 68). Plato
Page 5 and 6:   5  self-knowledge understood
Page 7 and 8:   7  achieved through self-inte
Page 9 and 10:   9  means of the art of measur
Page 11 and 12:   11  ruling. On this basis, we
Page 13 and 14:   13  exercises his virtue by -
Page 15 and 16:   15  ‘inner frame’ for the
Page 17 and 18:   17  failure to exert integrat
Page 19 and 20:   19  resolution to the aporia,
Page 21 and 22:   21  but to reject altogether
Page 23 and 24:   23  who is believed to be jus
Page 25 and 26:   25  that reason’s rule is i
Page 27:   27  agreement at 480e: ‘I t
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Page 33 and 34:   33          
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