<strong>THE</strong> AUTHORS JAMES MCGILL BUCHANAN has been University Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong>s and Director <strong>of</strong> the Center for Study <strong>of</strong> Public Choice at the Virginia Polytechnic <strong>Institute</strong>, Blacksburg, Virginia, since 1969. Previously he was Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong>s at Florida State University, 1951-56, University <strong>of</strong> Virginia (and Director <strong>of</strong> the Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy), 1956-68, and University <strong>of</strong> California at Los Angeles, 1968-69. He is the author <strong>of</strong> numerous works on aspects <strong>of</strong>the economics <strong>of</strong> politics and public choice, including The Calculus <strong>of</strong> Consent (with Gordon Tullock) (1962), Public Finance in Democratic Process (1967), Demand and Supply <strong>of</strong> Public Goods (1968), Public Principles <strong>of</strong> Public Debt (1958), The Limits <strong>of</strong> Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (1975), and (with Richard E. Wagner) Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy <strong>of</strong> Lord Keynes (1977). Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Buchanan is a member <strong>of</strong>the IEA's Advisory Council. The IEA has published his The Inconsistencies <strong>of</strong> the National Health Service (Occasional Paper 7, 1965)- RICHARD E. WAGNER is Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong>s at Virginia Polytechnic <strong>Institute</strong> and State University. He has taught micro- and macro-economic theory, public finance, and urban economics. He is the author or co-author <strong>of</strong> several books, including The Fiscal Organization <strong>of</strong> American Federalism (1971), The Public Economy (1973), Perspectives on Tax Reform (1974), Inheritance and the State (1977), and (with Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Buchanan) Democracy in Deficit. He has contributed articles to the journals <strong>of</strong> economics and public policy, and to a recent collection <strong>of</strong> essays on Parents, Teachers and Children: Prospects for Choice in American Education (1977). JOHN BURTON is Principal Lecturer in <strong>Economic</strong>s at Kingston Polytechnic. He was previously an economic consultant to the National Board for Prices and Incomes, the Office <strong>of</strong> Manpower <strong>Economic</strong>s, and the OECD. He is the author <strong>of</strong> Wage Inflation (1972), and <strong>of</strong> articles in the journals. He contributed a paper, 'Are Trade Unions a Public Good/'Bad' ?: The <strong>Economic</strong>s <strong>of</strong> the Closed Shop', to IEA Readings No. 17, Trade Unions: Public Goods or Public 'Bads'? (1978). [10]
PART I Democracy and Keynesian Constitutions: Political Biases and <strong>Economic</strong> Consequences JAMES M. BUCHANAN and RICHARD E. WAGNER
- Page 1 and 2: The Consequences of Mr Keynes J. M.
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taxes or duties, or for an increase
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growth and deficit finance. Indeed,
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TABLE III THE 'HUMP EFFECT': PESC P
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comprises spending on private goods
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ward excluded from total government
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'could not be costed accurately eno
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there is no 'problem' of explanatio
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In the long run—when, pace Mr Key
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A. FATALISM VERSUS REFORM This Pape
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concern about the conduct of budget
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Orderly transition to full implemen
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First, there is simply no evidence
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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION i. Compare
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Some IEA Papers on Aspects of the N
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Five Outstanding IEA Books The Theo
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The Economics of Charity A. A. ALCH
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[continued from back cover _ 5. The
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Summary of The Consequences of Mr K