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THE CONSEQUENCES OF MR KEYNES.pdf - Institute of Economic ...

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costs <strong>of</strong> government expenditure because it is planned and committed<br />

under this system in real terms, irrespective <strong>of</strong> the money<br />

costs that emerge. The PESC projections <strong>of</strong> government<br />

expenditure are all made in the prices ruling at the time <strong>of</strong> the<br />

survey, with an allowance made for a relative price effect<br />

resulting from anticipated movements <strong>of</strong> public compared with<br />

private wages and other costs. The unforeseen, although predictable,<br />

consequence <strong>of</strong> this system <strong>of</strong> planning public expenditure<br />

in terms <strong>of</strong> 'funny money' (as Samuel Brittan has<br />

described it) is that government departments have absolutely<br />

no incentive to economise on their cash outgoings when it outruns<br />

their nominal budget allocation. As they have been given<br />

real resource commitments under PESC, irrespective <strong>of</strong> the<br />

money costs, departments 'have been able to bill the Treasury<br />

for increases in pay [etc.], simply like that'. 1<br />

Fifth, the five-year horizon <strong>of</strong>the PESC system <strong>of</strong>'controlling'<br />

government expenditure creates the possibility that difficult<br />

decisions on government expenditure reductions (due, say, to a<br />

crisis <strong>of</strong> overseas confidence) will be deferred to the distant<br />

future. Faced with a call for 'cuts', Ministers and administrators<br />

in the spending departments are prepared to trade with the<br />

Treasury for the maintenance <strong>of</strong> their current/immediate future<br />

expenditure while conceding large cuts on their planned programmes<br />

in more distant years. The assumption—evidenced in<br />

the 'hump effect'—is that they can later be re-negotiated via the<br />

application <strong>of</strong> pressure in Cabinet. 'Slashing' cuts in government<br />

expenditure are then announced by the Chancellor to<br />

impress overseas opinion. In reality, this represents a postponement<br />

<strong>of</strong> expenditure cuts to the distant future. Moreover, they<br />

are likely to be reversed as that future draws nearer: cuts are<br />

always manana. The cuts <strong>of</strong> £1,100 million for 1976-77 (at 1975<br />

Survey Prices) announced in the Budget <strong>of</strong> April 1975 were, for<br />

instance, more than reversed in the March 1976 PESC White<br />

Paper.<br />

Sixth, and finally, the PESC measures rest implicitly on the<br />

basic assumption that all government expenditure is on public<br />

goods, which must necessarily be financed by government, and<br />

which are, therefore, appropriately controlled and controllable<br />

by government machinery. An examination <strong>of</strong> British government<br />

expenditure quickly reveals, however, that the bulk <strong>of</strong> it<br />

1 W. Godley, 'The Measurement and Control <strong>of</strong> Public Expenditure', <strong>Economic</strong><br />

Policy Review, No. 2, March 1976.<br />

[66]

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