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THE CONSEQUENCES OF MR KEYNES.pdf - Institute of Economic ...

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sequences is essentially the same as that <strong>of</strong> the indirect consequences<br />

<strong>of</strong> the budget surplus.<br />

A democratic society, therefore, will tend to resort to an<br />

excessive use <strong>of</strong> deficit finance once acceptance <strong>of</strong> the Keynesian<br />

paradigm has led to a revision <strong>of</strong> the fiscal constitution.<br />

For this reason, the post-Keynesian record in fiscal policy is<br />

not difficult to understand. The removal <strong>of</strong>the balanced-budget<br />

principle <strong>of</strong> constitutional rule generated an asymmetry in the<br />

conduct <strong>of</strong> budgetary policy in our form <strong>of</strong> competitive democracy.<br />

Deficits are created, but to a larger extent than justified<br />

by the Keynesian principles; surpluses sometimes result, but<br />

they occur less frequently than required by Keynesian prescriptions.<br />

When plausible assumptions are made about the institutions<br />

<strong>of</strong> decision-making in political democracy, the effect is<br />

to increase the biases against the use <strong>of</strong> budgetary adjustments<br />

to prevent and control inflation, as well as to increase the bias<br />

toward budgetary adjustments aimed at stimulating spending.<br />

(iii) Keynesian economics in political democracy<br />

The grafting <strong>of</strong> Keynesian economics onto the fabric <strong>of</strong> a<br />

political democracy has wrought a significant revision in the<br />

underlying fiscal constitution. The result has been a tendency<br />

toward budget deficits and, consequently, once the workings <strong>of</strong><br />

democratic political institutions are taken into account, inflation.<br />

Democratic governments will generally respond more<br />

vigorously in correcting for unemployment than in correcting<br />

for inflation. Budgetary adjustments aimed at the prevention or<br />

control <strong>of</strong> inflation will rarely be observed as the result <strong>of</strong><br />

deliberate policy. Budget deficits will come to be the general<br />

rule, even when inflation is severe. In slack years, when deficits<br />

might seem warranted by strict application <strong>of</strong> the Keynesian<br />

precepts, the size <strong>of</strong> these deficits will become disproportionately<br />

large. Moreover, the perceived cost <strong>of</strong> government will generally<br />

be lower than the real cost because <strong>of</strong> the deficit financing.<br />

As a consequence, there will also be a relative increase in<br />

the size <strong>of</strong> the government sector in the economy. Budget<br />

deficits, inflation, and the growth <strong>of</strong> government—all are intensified<br />

by the Keynesian destruction <strong>of</strong> former constitutional<br />

principles <strong>of</strong> sound finance.<br />

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