Evaluation of General Budget Support: Synthesis Report - Belgium

Executive Summary
S12. A key aspect is whether PGBS has added to total aid or has replaced other forms of aid.
This is important when judging appropriate counterfactuals (what would have happened
otherwise?) and in identifying its effects at various points in the enhanced evaluation framework.
In Uganda, PGBS was associated with a large increase in total aid. In Malawi, PGBS was
essentially the replacement of previous balance of payments support which had also provided
non-earmarked budget resources. Other countries fell between these extremes.
S13. Judging by the financial amounts, the extent of donor participation and the duration of
PGBS experience, there are very different degrees of PGBS penetration among the study
countries. There is, therefore, rich variety in the sample, with opportunities to draw lessons from
both contrasts and similarities. At the same time, the short history of PGBS in all cases limits the
scope for robust findings at outcome and impact level. This is especially so for Malawi and
Nicaragua, where PGBS is particularly recent and/or unconsummated.
EVALUATION FINDINGS
Overview
S14. In all but two cases, the overall assessments by the country studies were clearly positive.
Malawi's first effort at PGBS got off to a false start, based on over-optimistic expectations
concerning macroeconomic discipline. However, there now are signs of regrouping based on
the lessons learned. In Nicaragua, significant funds have only recently begun to flow, making it
too soon to provide an ex-post assessment. Detailed synthesis findings are linked to the series
of main evaluation questions (EQs).
EQ1: The Relevance of PGBS
S15. This evaluation question focuses on the design of PGBS in each country and how well it
responds to the specific "entry conditions" found in that country. In all cases, the design was
found to be complex and evolving. Donors' decisions to commence PGBS were based on
country-specific conditions and not on a pre-conceived set of benchmarks. This applies both to
governance standards across countries and to public finance management capacities. There
were also variations in how systematically donors considered whether the study countries were
"ready" for PGBS, and whether the risks were made explicit. There were many technical
analyses of public finance management systems. Assessments of political risks, and their
reflection in the design, were less explicit, sometimes leading to later adaptations. For several
of the countries, the study found that the political risks of PGBS had been under-estimated, with
over-optimistic assumptions about the ability of international partners to influence matters that
are deeply rooted in the partner countries' political systems.
S16. A step-change in the nature of dialogue and conditionality is supposed to be a defining
characteristic of PGBS. The philosophy behind Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) is
that support for government-owned poverty reduction strategies should replace attempts to
impose external solutions through conditionality. In several countries, the PGBS relationship
does differ significantly from that which subsisted under structural adjustment programmes.
However, the change has tended to be gradual, to be present as an intention before it is
realised in practice, and to be more significant in the eyes of the donors than in those of partner
governments.
(S3)