The humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions on Burundi

More documents

Recommendations

Info

By this time, however, <strong>sanctions</strong> were already causing higher food prices, while tight import restrictions were beginning to affect UN and NGO operations. Those engaged in providing <strong>humanitarian</strong> assistance to the Burundi civilian population had already begun to express their concern regarding the strict nature <strong>of</strong> the embargo. RSCC members were convinced, however, that <strong>sanctions</strong> would require only one or two months to fulfill their objectives. Indeed, they believed that “tough” <strong>sanctions</strong> would bring the regime to the negotiating table faster, with less overall civilian hardship, than other available options. Kenya’s foreign minister declared to reporters on August 7, “If everybody cooperates, it will not take a month.” His Government recognized “that the innocent Citizens <strong>of</strong> Burundi may suffer as a result <strong>of</strong> the imposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>economic</strong> <strong>sanctions</strong>”, but that these were “unavoidable sacrifices” to prevent further deterioration <strong>of</strong> the situation in Burundi. 11 Chapter 2 reviews the impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>sanctions</strong> on Burundi’s economy and society. Chapter 3 assesses their impact on the work <strong>of</strong> <strong>humanitarian</strong> organizations. NOTES 1 According to the UN, ethnic fighting which followed President Ndadaye’s assassination in October 1993 resulted in the death <strong>of</strong> an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 persons and the movement <strong>of</strong> nearly one million. Amnesty International estimated that an additional 50,000 civilian deaths occurred from 1994 until June 1996. In November 1996, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Paolo Sérgio Pinheiro estimated that 10,000 persons had been killed since the July 25 military coup. 2 UNHCR estimates that as <strong>of</strong> January 1997, approximately 300,000 Burundians reside as refugees in the neighboring countries <strong>of</strong> Tanzania, Rwanda and Zaire. 3 Minority Rights Group, “Burundi: Breaking the Cycle <strong>of</strong> Violence” (March 1995). 4 A United Nations International Commission <strong>of</strong> Inquiry into the October 1993 coup attempt, assassination and massacres was presented to the UN 10
secretary-general just two days before the July 25, 1996 military coup. 5 Although Zaire became the Democratic Republic <strong>of</strong> Congo in April 1997, the text refers to the nation as it existed during the period under review. 6 Former Tanzanian President Nyerere formally discussed his intention to call for <strong>sanctions</strong> against Burundi with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on July 24, 1996 as the coup was unfolding. 7 It is important to note that the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burundi advocated <strong>sanctions</strong> in a written press statement dated July 18, 1996. “Should the Burundi authorities refuse to respect the commitments undertaken there (at the Arusha Summit on June 25), the international community must not shrink from its responsibilities. It should then consider applying <strong>sanctions</strong> against Burundi. It could also envisage collective <strong>sanctions</strong>, aimed at reducing international assistance or suspending certain United Nations programmes.” 8 "Les <strong>sanctions</strong> n’ont jamais été soutenues par la communauté internationale. Aucun texte du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies n’a été adopté a cet effect.” Written correspondence to the authors from the government <strong>of</strong> Burundi dated March 26, 1997, transmitted through Mr. Nakaha Stanislas, Burundi’s ambassador to Kenya. 9 UN Security Council Resolution 1072 (August 30, 1996). 10 A comment by UN <strong>of</strong>ficial Lakhdar Brahimi in the preface situates the regional <strong>sanctions</strong> against Burundi in relation to other similar measures elsewhere. 11 Buchizya Mseteka, “Kenya clamps blockade on Burundi,” Reuters, August 5, 1996 (dateline Nairobi). 11
Page 1 and 2: Occasional Paper #29 THE HUMANITARI
Page 3: CONTENTS Preface ..................
Page 6 and 7: ing about political change through
Page 8 and 9: political changes, on the other. As
Page 10 and 11: NOTES 1 Thomas G. Weiss, David Cort
Page 12 and 13: continues to export, through smuggl
Page 14 and 15: Recommendations • The</st
Page 16 and 17: a system can be successful only if
Page 18 and 19: NOTES 1 Statement of</stron
Page 20 and 21: imposed, Burundi was a country alre
Page 22 and 23: xxii
Page 24 and 25: UNHCR UNICEF UPRONA WFP WHO United
Page 26 and 27: xxvi
Page 28 and 29: Most exports transit through neighb
Page 30 and 31: whether distinctions between the tw
Page 32 and 33: The Military Coup
Page 34 and 35: indicating that negotiations should
Page 39 and 40: CHAPTER 2 THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS
Page 41 and 42: Burundi also has found ways to smug
Page 43 and 44: eappeared, along with salt from Tan
Page 45 and 46: egan to slow. With the onset <stron
Page 47 and 48: 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 3
Page 50 and 51: sons, mostly farmers, resulted in e
Page 52 and 53: Rate of inflation
Page 54 and 55: However, CPI increases in the July-
Page 56 and 57: seeds, as well as the normal distri
Page 58 and 59: income. Coffee pro
Page 60 and 61: The embargo has pr
Page 62 and 63: Essential Drugs All human medicines
Page 64 and 65: target of vaccinat
Page 66 and 67: from chronic malnutrition. In the c
Page 68 and 69: Table 2.5: Populations and Observed
Page 70 and 71: and Food Supply Assessment Mission
Page 72 and 73: Table 3.1: Chronology of</s
Page 74 and 75: guidelines for exemptions. 2 <stron
Page 76 and 77: authorities and UN/NGO agencies gre
Page 78 and 79: fertilizers and to the potential lo
Page 80 and 81: items to be imported by the UN, sub
Page 82 and 83: Nairobi and Bujumbura, as well as t
Page 84 and 85: cratic problems associated with the
Page 86 and 87:
Tanzania, so that only small quanti
Page 88 and 89:
conflict-prone areas into regroupem
Page 90 and 91:
10 World Food Programme, An Analysi
Page 93 and 94:
CHAPTER 4 THE POLITICAL IMPACTS OF
Page 95 and 96:
the country was in danger and urgen
Page 97 and 98:
genocide deeply affected regional p
Page 99 and 100:
if negotiations between opposing fa
Page 101 and 102:
egion as a whole appears to have co
Page 103 and 104:
to which political parties could ex
Page 105 and 106:
On November 16, Buyoya once again m
Page 107 and 108:
the Arusha IV Regional Summit on Ap
Page 109 and 110:
“[T]he embargo set on Burundi mus
Page 111 and 112:
International reported that “arme
Page 113 and 114:
14 UN Information Service, “Speci
Page 115:
46 Matthew Bigg, “Burundi defiant
Page 118 and 119:
sustain the momentum of</st
Page 120 and 121:
usiness-like enforcement of
Page 122 and 123:
for prohibiting such items. UN sanc
Page 124 and 125:
enforcement rather than allowed to
Page 126 and 127:
talks and the Arusha Summit. At the
Page 128 and 129:
Mid-August August 16 August 16 Augu
Page 130 and 131:
flights for emergency evacuation so
Page 132 and 133:
December 6 Franco-African Summit, O
Page 134 and 135:
“appeals to the countries <strong
Page 136 and 137:
Rudi Veestraeten Second Secretary,
Page 138 and 139:
Alexandra Humme Arjun Katoch Freder
Page 140 and 141:
114
Page 142 and 143:
116
Page 144:
elations. It seeks to be a multifac
show all

The humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions on Burundi

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?