The humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions on Burundi

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political changes, on the other. As they indicate, Burundi’s internal crisis and civil war already had far-reaching and devastating human consequences even before the imposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>sanctions</strong>. Although the researchers succeed in identifying elements <strong>of</strong> the observed <strong>humanitarian</strong> conditions that were the result <strong>of</strong> <strong>sanctions</strong>, they are careful to avoid sweeping generalizations that fail to take complex <strong>economic</strong> and political interactions fully into account. <strong>The</strong>y also identify a second and related difficulty: that <strong>of</strong> drawing conclusions concerning the <strong>humanitarian</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>sanctions</strong> in the absence <strong>of</strong> adequate and reliable data, both for a given baseline period and to describe changes over time. Our own research on other <strong>sanctions</strong> episodes confirms that whereas it is difficult to disaggregate the <strong>impacts</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>sanctions</strong> from other factors when adequate data is available, it is impossible to do so when such data is lacking. <strong>The</strong> researchers therefore recommend a series <strong>of</strong> improvements in data collection and methodology, a suggestion also featured in our own report to the United Nations. A third extenuating circumstance also merits comment here. Our consultants conducted their interviews and reached their judgments based on the situation observed in February 1997. <strong>The</strong>y concluded that the <strong>humanitarian</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> <strong>sanctions</strong> outweighed the political benefits. In the ensuing months, however, there have been changes on both the <strong>humanitarian</strong> and political fronts. In April 1997, the Regional Sanctions Coordinating Committee relaxed the <strong>sanctions</strong> to permit entry <strong>of</strong> a wide range <strong>of</strong> <strong>humanitarian</strong> essentials. In subsequent months, the Buyoya regime confirmed its involvement in peace talks, which have yet to bear fruit. <strong>The</strong> text <strong>of</strong> the report notes both developments in passing. A UN review <strong>of</strong> the <strong>sanctions</strong> against Burundi was published in December 1997, based on a mission by two DHA <strong>of</strong>ficials to the region in October. It concluded that while <strong>sanctions</strong> had not been formally lifted, they no longer caused serious <strong>humanitarian</strong> distress among civilian populations or serious logistical impediments to aid operations. Many <strong>humanitarian</strong> essentials were exempted by the RSCC, although governments varied in the extent to which, viii
if at all, they controlled shipments that crossed their borders into Burundi. As supplies became increasingly available within the country’s local markets, whether through illicit or licensed commercial entry, many aid groups, particularly NGOs, simply procured them there, thus avoiding residual <strong>sanctions</strong> clearance procedures. Clearly, the evolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>sanctions</strong>-related issues will merit ongoing monitoring. 3 In publishing this report, we wish to express gratitude for the resources that have made possible various aspects <strong>of</strong> our <strong>sanctions</strong> research. Funds have been provided by five UN organizations— DHA, the Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations Development Program, United Nations Childrens’ Fund, the World Food Programme—and by the United States Institute <strong>of</strong> Peace and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Funds were also tapped from the resources <strong>of</strong> the three collaborating institutions, described in greater detail on page 117. This and other publications <strong>of</strong> the Watson Institute are available directly from the Institute’s web site at http:// www.brown.edu/Departments/Watson_Institute/H_W We welcome comments from readers. Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies Providence, R.I. George A. Lopez <strong>The</strong> Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies University <strong>of</strong> Notre Dame Notre Dame, Ind. David Cortright Fourth Freedom Forum Goshen, Ind. December 1997 ix
Page 1 and 2: Occasional Paper #29 THE HUMANITARI
Page 3: CONTENTS Preface ..................
Page 6 and 7: ing about political change through
Page 10 and 11: NOTES 1 Thomas G. Weiss, David Cort
Page 12 and 13: continues to export, through smuggl
Page 14 and 15: Recommendations • The</st
Page 16 and 17: a system can be successful only if
Page 18 and 19: NOTES 1 Statement of</stron
Page 20 and 21: imposed, Burundi was a country alre
Page 22 and 23: xxii
Page 24 and 25: UNHCR UNICEF UPRONA WFP WHO United
Page 26 and 27: xxvi
Page 28 and 29: Most exports transit through neighb
Page 30 and 31: whether distinctions between the tw
Page 32 and 33: The Military Coup
Page 34 and 35: indicating that negotiations should
Page 36 and 37: By this time, however, sanc
Page 39 and 40: CHAPTER 2 THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS
Page 41 and 42: Burundi also has found ways to smug
Page 43 and 44: eappeared, along with salt from Tan
Page 45 and 46: egan to slow. With the onset <stron
Page 47 and 48: 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 3
Page 50 and 51: sons, mostly farmers, resulted in e
Page 52 and 53: Rate of inflation
Page 54 and 55: However, CPI increases in the July-
Page 56 and 57: seeds, as well as the normal distri
Page 58 and 59:
income. Coffee pro
Page 60 and 61:
The embargo has pr
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Essential Drugs All human medicines
Page 64 and 65:
target of vaccinat
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from chronic malnutrition. In the c
Page 68 and 69:
Table 2.5: Populations and Observed
Page 70 and 71:
and Food Supply Assessment Mission
Page 72 and 73:
Table 3.1: Chronology of</s
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guidelines for exemptions. 2 <stron
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authorities and UN/NGO agencies gre
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fertilizers and to the potential lo
Page 80 and 81:
items to be imported by the UN, sub
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Nairobi and Bujumbura, as well as t
Page 84 and 85:
cratic problems associated with the
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Tanzania, so that only small quanti
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conflict-prone areas into regroupem
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10 World Food Programme, An Analysi
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CHAPTER 4 THE POLITICAL IMPACTS OF
Page 95 and 96:
the country was in danger and urgen
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genocide deeply affected regional p
Page 99 and 100:
if negotiations between opposing fa
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egion as a whole appears to have co
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to which political parties could ex
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On November 16, Buyoya once again m
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the Arusha IV Regional Summit on Ap
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“[T]he embargo set on Burundi mus
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International reported that “arme
Page 113 and 114:
14 UN Information Service, “Speci
Page 115:
46 Matthew Bigg, “Burundi defiant
Page 118 and 119:
sustain the momentum of</st
Page 120 and 121:
usiness-like enforcement of
Page 122 and 123:
for prohibiting such items. UN sanc
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enforcement rather than allowed to
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talks and the Arusha Summit. At the
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Mid-August August 16 August 16 Augu
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flights for emergency evacuation so
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December 6 Franco-African Summit, O
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“appeals to the countries <strong
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Rudi Veestraeten Second Secretary,
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Alexandra Humme Arjun Katoch Freder
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114
Page 142 and 143:
116
Page 144:
elations. It seeks to be a multifac
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