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it – intuitive and self-evident. An example of a p-prim in naïve physics is the notion of ‘bouncing’: as a
smaller object comes into impingement with a large or otherwise immobile other object, the smaller object
will recoil (diSessa, 1993). ‘Bouncing’ is a common-sense equivalent of a physical law: it helps explain
other phenomena but does not itself, as a primitive, require explanation. 6
Knowledge-as-elements perspectives emphasize context-dependence. There is no overarching theorylike
structure that allows for generalization. As the learner forms a new idea, it becomes an element in
the learner’s conceptual ecology, associated with a particular context. It is possible for a learner to hold
several contradictory understandings of a phenomenon, each particular to a different context. Instead of
having a single consistent theory for the many physical phenomena governed by F = ma, for instance, one
may have entirely distinct p-prims for bouncing and throwing, and even for throwing objects of a certain
shape.
Marton (1993) provides a nice summary of diSessa’s view of learning:
This view of characterizing what it takes to learn physics contradicts other characterizations
in which the transition between naive and scientific physics has been seen in Kuhnian terms
as the replacement of one world view with another. [. . . ] The picture presented by diSessa is
more evolutionary than revolutionary: Scientific physics evolves from naive physics more by
organization than by reorganization, more by structuring than restructuring. (p. 228)
According to knowledge-as-elements perspectives, it is context-specificity that makes misconceptions
resilient to change; instruction intended to correct a misconception may simply add a parallel understanding
rather than replace the old. However, some proponents of knowledge-as-elements maintain (from an
explicitly constructivist position) that rather than being a problem, misconceptions are a useful or even
necessary basis for further learning (e.g., Smith et al., 1994). Although Smith et al. agree with knowledgeas-theory
perspectives that states of cognitive conflict are “certainly desirable and conducive to conceptual
change” (p. 22), they oppose the idea of confronting misconceptions and trying to replace them with
correct understandings. The challenge of learning from such a knowledge-as-elements perspective is not to
replace the learner’s naïve misconception-ridden understanding with another – there is no well-organized,
general structure to replace! – or even to replace individual misconceptions. Instead, the goal is to help the
learner to organize their knowledge elements, to find borders for the rules they have constructed so as not
to over- or under-generalize, to select the most productive ideas and refine them, and to observe similarities
across contexts. The elements of naïve knowledge – misconceptions included – are the raw materials for
such processes, which, if learning is successful, evolve into a theory-like scientific understanding.
Recent developments have seen knowledge-as-theory and knowledge-as-elements move somewhat
closer to each other, with researchers suggesting that both evolutionary and revolutionary changes are
important during learning and that both families of conceptual change theory can inspire improvements
in pedagogy (see, e.g., Özdemir and Clark, 2007; Hammer, 1996).
6.6 Situated learning theory sees learning as communal participation
This section introduces another theory that is a relative or form of constructivism, depending on
interpretation. The theory of situated learning conceives of learning as an intrinsically contextualized
process of social participation in a community (Lave and Wenger, 1991). Although it is not always
phrased in such terms, situated learning theory is based on a social constructivist epistemology in which
knowledge exists within a community rather than within individuals.
Ben-Ari (2004, pp. 86–87) primes us on the lexicon of situated learning, as defined by Lave and
Wenger:
The learner is considered to be a participant within a community of practice (CoP). Learning
occurs by a process of apprenticeship called legitimate peripheral participation (LPP): (a)
the learner participates in a community of practice, (b) the learner’s presence is legitimate
6 Although they were concerned with societal phenomena rather than physical ones, and their approach was less theoretical,
Run-D.M.C. (1984) might as well have been rapping about p-prims as they cautioned would-be inquirers: “Don’t ask me,
because I don’t know why, but it’s like that, and that’s the way it is.”
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