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Skirmish 5: ignoring evidence
Various authors have complained about the vagueness of constructivist ideas. For instance, Prior McCarty
and Schwandt (2000, p. 42) describe knowledge construction as “a range of hazily imagined mental
activities”, while Anderson et al. (2000b) claim that constructivists “refuse to focus on details and
precise specifications”. Indeed, many constructivists seem to be satisfied with a highly abstract notion of
construction, although conceptual change theorists (Section 6.5) and cognitive constructivists who rely
on schema theory and mental models are exceptions. 9 The vagueness of instructional frameworks and
a lack of rigorous studies and testable hypotheses have been acknowledged as weaknesses also by some
scholars otherwise sympathetic to constructivism (Tobias and Duffy, 2009).
A related criticism is that constructivisms are said to be oblivious to much that is known through
research. Mayer (2004) and Kirschner et al. (2006) accuse constructivists of ignoring half a century of
empirical evidence from cognitive psychology regarding the human cognitive apparatus and its effects on
learning. Anderson et al. (2000b) pursue a similar line:
This [constructivist] criticism of practice (called “drill and kill,” as if this phrase constituted
empirical evaluation) is prominent in constructivist writings. Nothing flies more in the face of
the last 20 years of research than the assertion that practice is bad. All evidence, from the
laboratory and from extensive case studies of professionals, indicates that real competence
only comes with extensive practice.
Critics have called for radical constructivists and supporters of constructivist pedagogies to produce
testable predictions and empirical data that supports their claims. At least part of the challenge may
go unheeded, since some extreme forms of constructivism seem even to deny the possibility or relevance
of empirical data to educational decisions (Prior McCarty and Schwandt, 2000; Anderson et al., 2000b).
Skirmish 6: complex, authentic contexts
An issue of disagreement between (some) cognitive psychologists and (some) constructivists is the
constructivist claim that knowledge is context-dependent and effective learning requires rich contexts,
authentic settings, and ill-structured problems which learners make sense of largely on their own. Mayer
(2004), Anderson et al. (2000b) and Kirschner et al. (2006) cite numerous empirical studies whose results
indicate that knowledge can be transferred between contexts (under the right conditions), and that illstructured
problems, complex settings and other constructivist pedagogies tend to cognitively overload
learners and are commonly ineffective.
The psychologists that I have cited do not claim that authentic contexts are never useful or that no
knowledge is context-dependent or best learned in a complex context. Anderson et al., for instance, do
agree that some skills are best practiced in a complex setting, for motivational reasons or to learn special
skills that are unique to the complex situation. However, they object to the sweeping statements on this
topic that many constructivists make.
Mayer (2004) warns against “the constructivist fallacy” of equating behavioral activity (hands-on tasks)
with fruitful cognitive activity. According to Anderson et al. (2000b), situated learning and constructivism
are movements which claim to oppose behaviorism, but which, through their neglect of cognition, have
ironically ended up reiterating Burrhus F. Skinner’s utopian vision of behaviorist education from his novel
Walden Two, in which people learn best from being subjected to the control of the community in which
they participate.
Situated learning theory places a particularly heavy emphasis on how effective learning is dependent
on participation within a complex, authentic context. This makes situated learning a prime target for the
critical cognitive scientists. One of the assertions of Kirschner et al. (2006) is a succinct antithesis of
the situated theory of learning: “The practice of a profession is not the same as learning to practice the
profession.”
9 A colleague of mine once half-seriously commented that “constructivism can be used to justify any pedagogical
innovation” and – on a separate occasion – that “constructivism can’t be used to justify anything”. This apparent contradiction
is explained by the fact that constructivism, when taken in the broad sense, is so abstract when it comes to the processes of
learning that it says everything and nothing at the same time.
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