Report on Multi-Unit Developments - Law Reform Commission

3.54 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission discussed the voting
rights in multi-unit developments and came to the provisional conclusion that
there should be one vote per unit and that votes should be accorded to unit
owners only. 60
3.55 As to the voting rights per unit, in principle each unit owner holds an
equal share in the ownership of the title to the development, unless they own,
for example, two units, in which case they should hold two votes. The
Commission acknowledges that in developments where there are units of
differing sizes and, accordingly, differing amounts of service charges paid, a
one-vote-per-unit approach may appear contentious. However, the
Commission believes that the one vote per unit formula is vital in the interests of
clarity for the running of the owners‘ management company and that this would
not be possible if weighted voting was permitted. Accordingly, the Commission
has concluded that its provisional view that there should be of one vote per unit
should be confirmed in this <strong>Report</strong>.
3.56 The Commission recommends that there should be one vote per unit
owner in owners‟ management companies and a prohibition on weighted voting.
3.57 As to who should have the right to vote in company meetings, the
Commission has received a number of submissions. In particular, it was argued
that the decisions of the owners‘ management company may have more day-today
impact on long-term tenants than, say, investor unit owners who may have
little interest in the operation of the owners‘ management company.
3.58 In the Commission‘s view, the necessity for unit owner-occupiers to
have a vote in the owners‘ management company is clear. Owner-occupiers
have an active financial investment in the owners‘ management company
through the ownership of their unit and their quality of life is also affected by the
actions of the company in terms of standards to which the development is run.
Similarly, in the case of owner-investors who do not live in the development, the
viability of the investment depends, at least in part, on the decisions of the
owners‘ management company. Submissions received by the Commission
argue that some owner-investors sometimes do not attend company meetings
and that, as a result, the interests of tenant-occupiers may be adversely
affected. On this basis, the submissions have argued that, in the case of absent
owner-investors, voting rights should instead be vested in the tenant.
3.59 While tenants may have an interest in the working of the owners‘
management company, the Commission reiterates the view expressed in the
Consultation Paper that this should not lead to the conclusion that they have an
60
Op cit, paragraphs 4.85-4.95.
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